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This thesis analyses the relationship between Indonesian nationalism and ASEAN 
regional integration, with specific reference to the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement 
(AFTA). Traditionally, the relationship between nationalism and regionalism has most 
often been characterised as contentious. This thesis, however, challenges the argument 
that nationalism and regionalism cannot co-exist, and argues instead that the two 
ideologies can stand in a symbiotic relationship to each other. The relationship between 
nationalism and regionalism can be conflicting or mutually exclusive, but can also 
sometimes be mutually reinforcing. Therefore, nationalists today are not necessarily 
hostile to free trade and closer economic ties with other states. 
In 1992, members of ASEAN agreed to closer economic integration through the 
formation of AFTA. In principle, this agreement was made to increase the international 
competitiveness of ASEAN industries and to make the Southeast Asian region an 
attractive investment location. This thesis analyses the contemporary attitude of 
Indonesians towards this trade agreement. During the signing of this trade agreement, 
little opposition was expressed by Indonesian domestic actors because within Indonesian 
politics at the time Indonesian foreign economic policy was the business of the President, 
the Nfinistry of Foreign Affairs, the military, and a handful of members of the academic 
I 
community. The wave of democratisation that emerged as a result of the economic crisis 
of 1997 allowed for the greater involvement of domestic actors in determining Indonesian 
foreign economic policy. Although the majority of the Indonesian political elite remain 
supportive of AFTA, some Indonesian pressure groups, particularly non-governmental. 
organisations (NGOs) and civil society organisations (CSOs), have expressed their 
scepticism. Despite this, scepticism about AFTA is not a result of increased nationalist 
sentiment in Indonesia, but is due instead to the lack of proper information disseminated 
to these pressure groups. 
ii 
Acknowledgments 
I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Dr. Christopher M. Dent and 
Simon D. Lee for their contributions in providing valuable and continuous 
encouragement, patience, guidance, assistance, and constructive criticisms during the 
making of this thesis. Moreover, I would also like to thank all my respondents in Jakarta 
and Surabaya who participated in the research interviews. It was an extraordinary 
experience to listen to them and to their opinions about and visions for the future of 
Indonesia, nationalism, and ASEAN regionalism. Any mistakes or omissions in the 
research and writing of this thesis are entirely mine. 
I would also like to acknowledge the contributions made by other individuals who 
were very supportive and helpful during my study in Hull and during the field research in 
Jakarta. Dr. Tim J. Huxley provided me with valuable insights and guidance during the 
early stage of my study. I should also express my gratitude to Rachel Alderson and 
Andrea McNicoll for their proofreading assistance throughout the making of this thesis. I 
am also indebted to my fellow students at the Centre for Southeast Asian Studies for their 
critical and constructive comments on my thesis. Thank you also to Sandi Wijaya and 
Lucky Lontoh for assisting me during my field research in Jakarta. The completion of 
this thesis also owes much to Mr. and Mrs. h-wan Chandra, Kartini Pouchous, and Budi 
Sulistianingrum, who provided me with personal support during the whole project. 
Finally, my gratitude also goes to all of my fiiends whose names cannot be included in 
iii 
this limited space, for their support and encouragement throughout my stay in Hull. It 
has been a privilege to make the acquaintance of all these individuals. 
iv 
Table of contents 
Page 
Abstract I 
Acknowledgments iii 
List of abbreviations viii 
List of illustrations iv 
Introduction I 
1.1. Regional integration arrangements and nationalism 1 
1.2. Objective of the research 3 
1.3. Contribution of the research 9 
1.4. Structure of the thesis 11 
1.5. Conclusion 15 
Understanding the relationship between regional integration and 
nationalism 17 
2.1. Introduction 17 
2.2. Recent trends of regionalism in the global economy 18 
2.3. Theoretical perspectives on regionalism 24 
2.3.1. Definitions and associative concepts of regional 
Integration 25 
2.3.2. Mainstream old (first wave) regionalism theories 31 
2.3.3. Economic perspectives upon free trade areas 44 
2.3.4. New regionalism theories (second wave) 50 
2.4. Different theoretical perspectives on nationalism 58 
2.4.1. The concept of nationalism 59 
2.4.2. Nationalism in international political economy 63 
2.5. The gap within the existing literature concerning the relationship 
between nationalism and regionalism 70 
2.6. Conclusion 73 
Ill. Nationalists and regional integration strategy 76 
3.1. Introduction 76 
3.2. Nationalism as a new domain in New Regionalism Theory analysis 77 
3.3. Nationalists' interests towards regional integration strategy 85 
V 
3.3.1. The achievement of sustained economic development 93 
3.3.2. The promotion of national unity 98 
3.3.3. The promotion of the state's autonomy in the international 
arena 105 
3.3.4. Collective action to contain the negative forces of 
globalisation and to achieve regional governance 107 
3.3.5. The elevation of the nation-state's bargaining power in the 
international arena 114 
IV. 
V. 
vi. 
3.4. The relationship between ASEAN regionalism and Indonesian 
nationalism 117 
3.5. Conclusion 123 
Research methodology 126 
4.1. Introduction 126 
4.2. Research evolution 127 
4.3. Data collection, categorisation of respondents, and research 
finding analysis 132 
4.4. Conclusion 142 
Indonesian nationalism and foreign economic policy 143 
5.1. Introduction 143 
5.2. The history of Indonesian nationalism and foreign economic 
policy 145 
5.2.1. Nationalism and foreign economic policy during the 
Old Order period 146 
5.2.2. Nationalism and foreign economic policy during the 
New Order period 156 
5.3. Contemporary Indonesian nationalism and foreign economic policy 172 
5.4. Conclusion 192 
Indonesia in the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) 194 
6.1. Introduction 194 
6.2. The history of AFTA 195 
6.3. Prospects and challenges for AFTA 205 
6.4. Prospects and challenges for Southeast Asian regionalism 
beyond AFTA 213 
6.5. Indonesian state and non-state actors' perception of the creation 
ofAFTA 225 
vi 
6.6. Conclusion 229 
VII. Contemporary Indonesian perceptions of AFTA: an empirical 
analysis 231 
7.1. Introduction 231 
7.2. The contemporary attitude of Indonesians towards AFTA 232 
7.3. ASEAN regionalism and Indonesia's economic development 236 
7.3.1. Maximalist 237 
7.3.2. Minimalist 247 
7.3.3. Convergence 251 
7.4. ASEAN regionalism and Indonesian nationalism 264 
7.4.1. Maximalist 265 
7.4.2. Minimalist 269 
7.4.3. Convergence 272 
7.5. ASEAN regionalism and Indonesia's bargaining position, 
autonomy, and ability to contain the negative forces of 
globalisation 283 
7.5.1. Maximalist 284 
7.5.2. Minimalist 287 
7.5.3. Convergence 289 
7.6. Other relevant issues: dissemination of information regarding 
ASEAN and AFTA 290 
7.6.1. Maximalist 291 
7.6.2. Nfinimalist 295 
7.6.3. Convergence 299 
7.7. Conclusion 301 
VIII. Conclusion 303 
8.1. Introduction 303 
8.2. NRT and the research findings: explaining the relationship 
between Indonesian nationalism and ASEAN regionalism 304 
8.3. Conclusion 315 
Appendices 318 
References 343 
vii 
List of Abbreviations 
ABAC ASEAN Business Advisory Council 
ABMI Asian Bond Market Initiative 
AC ASEAN Community 
ACCICG AFTA-CER CEP Implementation and Co-ordination Group 
ADB Asian Development Bank 
AEC ASEAN Economic Community 
AEM ASEAN Economic Ministerial Meeting 
AFMM ASEAN Finance Minister Meeting 
AFTA ASEAN Free Trade Agreement / Area 
Al Amnesty International 
AIA ASEAN Investment Area 
AIC ASEAN Industrial Complementation 
AICO ASEAN Industrial Co-operation 
AIELTF ASEAN - India Economic Linkages Task Force 
AIJV ASEAN Industrial Joint Venture 
AIP ASEAN Industrial Project 
ALADI Asociaci6n Latinoamericana de Integraci6n (Association of Latin 
American Integration) 
AMF Asian Monetary Fund 
AMM ASEAN Ministerial Meeting 
APA ASEAN People's Assembly 
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation 
APINDO Asosiasi Pengusaha Indonesia (Indonesian Business Association) 
APT ASEAN plus Three 
ARF ASEAN Regional Forum 
ASA Association of Southeast Asia 
ASA ASEAN Swap Arrangement 
ASC ASEAN Security Community 
ASCC ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community 
ASCU ASEAN Surveillance Co-ordinating Unit 
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
ASEAN-CCI ASEAN Chambers of Commerce and Industry 
ASEAN-ISIS ASEAN Institute of Strategic and International Studies 
ASEAN-PTA ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangement 
ASEM Asia - Europe Meeting 
ASP ASEAN Surveillance Process 
ASPAC Asia and Pacific Council 
ATF ASEAN Tourism Forum 
BAFTA Baltic Free Trade Area 
BAKIN Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara (State Intelligence Co- 
ordinating Agency) 
BAPPENAS Badan Perencanaan Penibangunan Nasional (National 
viii 
Development Planning Agency) 
BBC Brand to Brand Complementation 
BDNI Bank Dagang Negara Indonesia (National Trading Bank of 
Indonesia) 
BI Bank Indonesia (Central Bank of Indonesia) 
BIMP-EAGA Brunei Darassalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines East 
ASEAN Growth Area 
BOIT Board of Investment of Thailand 
BORSUMY Borneo - Sumatra Company 
BPPMA Badan Pertimbangan Penanaman Modal Asiang (Foreign Capital 
Investment Advisory Board) 
BSA Bilateral Swap Arrangement 
BULOG Badan Urusan Logistik (State Logistic Agency) 
CACM Central American Common Market 
CARICOM Caribbean Community and Common Market 
CEAO Communaut6 Economique de L'Afrique de L'Ouest (Economic 
Community of West Africa) 
CEEAC Communaut6 Econornique des Etats de L'Affique Centrale 
(Economic Community of Central African States) 
CEP Closer Economic Partnership 
CEPGL Commonaute Economique des Pays de Grands Lacs (Economic 
Community of the Great Lakes Countries) 
CEPP Comprehensive Economic Partnership Programme 
CEPT Common Effective Preferential Tariff 
CER Closer Economic Relations 
CET Common External Tariffs 
CGI Consultative Group on Indonesia 
CICP Cambodian Institute for Co-operation and Peace 
CIDES Centre for Information and Development Studies 
CMEA Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (also known as 
COMECON) 
COMESA Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa 
CSIS Centre for Strategic and International Studies 
CSOS Civil Society Organisations 
CUSFTA Canada - US Free Trade Agreement 
DEPPERINDAG Departemen Industri dan Perdagangan (Ministry of Industry and 
Trade) 
DOM Daerah Operasi Militer (Military Operation Area) 
DPOD Dewan Perimbangan Otonomi Daerah (Fiscal Balance Committee 
of Provincial Autonomy) 
DPR Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (People's Representative Assembly) 
EAEC East Asian Economic Caucus 
EAEG East Asian Economic Group 
EAFTA East Asian Free Trade Area 
EAI Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative 
EAIA East Asian Investment Area 
ix 
EAMF East Asian Monetary Fund 
EASG East Asian Study Group 
EAVG East Asian Vision Group 
EC European Community 
ECAFE Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East 
ECLA Economic Commission on Latin America 
ECOWAS Economic Community of West Affican States 
ECSC European Coal and Steel Community 
EFTA European Free Trade Association 
EU European Union 
FEP Foreign Economic Policy 
FNPBI Front Nasional Perjuangan Buruh Indonesia (Front National for the 
Indonesian Labour Struggle) 
FPTA Full Preferential Trading Arrangement 
FSPSI Federasi Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia (Federation of 
Indonesian Workers Union) 
FTA Free Trade Area 
FTAA Free Trade Area of the Americas 
GAM Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Aceh Freedom Movement) 
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
GDR German Democratic Republic 
GEL General Exception List 
GOLKAR Golongan Karya (Functional Group) 
GSP General System of Preferences 
GT Growth Triangle 
HPA Hanoi Plan of Action 
HST Hegemonic Stability Theory 
IBRA Indonesian Banking Restructuring Agency 
1CMI Ikatan Cendikiawan Muslim Indonesia (Association of Indonesian 
Muslim Intellectuals) 
IEI International Economic Integration 
IGGI Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia 
IIA Initial Investment Approval 
IIR Institute for International Relations (Vietnam) 
IKINI Ikatan Importir Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National 
Association of Importers) 
IL Inclusion List 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
IMT-GT Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand Growth Triangle 
INDEF Institute for Development of Economic and Finance 
INFID International Financial Development 
Intematio Internationale Credie en Handelsvereeniging (International Credit 
and Trading Association) 
los International Organisations 
10CU International Organisation of Consumers Union 
IPE International Political Economy 
x 
IR International Relations 
ISDS Institute for Strategic and Development Studies (Philippines) 
isl Import Substitution Industry 
Isis Institute for Strategic and International Studies (Singapore) 
Isis Institute for Security and International Studies (Thailand) 
ITWG Interim Technical Working Group 
JSE Jakarta Stock Exchange 
KADIN Kamar Dagang dan Industri Indonesia (Indonesian Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry) 
KLIK Kajian Layanan Informasi untuk Kedaulatan Rakyat (Civic and 
Information Studies) 
KOMNAS-HAM Komisi Nasional untuk Hak-Hak AsasiManusia (National 
Commission for Human Rights) 
KPPOD Komite Pemantauan Pelaksanaan Otonomi Daerah (Regional 
Autonomy Watch) 
KUKMI Kerukunan Usahawan Kecil dan Menengah Indonesia (Indonesian 
Society for Small and Medium Scale Entrepreneurs) 
LAFTA Latin American Free Agreement / Area 
LDCs Less Developed Countries 
LEAD Leadership for Environmental and Development 
LIPI Lembaga Ilmu. Pengetahuan Indonesia (Indonesian Institute for 
Sciences) 
Lol Letter of Intent 
Malphindo Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia 
MCEDSEA Ministerial Conference on Economic Development in Southeast 
Asia 
MERCOSUR Mercado Comým del Sur (Southern Cone Common Market 
Agreement) 
MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
MHA Ministry of Home Affairs 
MoC-SMEs Ministry of Co-operative, Small and Medium Enterprises 
MoF Ministry of Finance 
MoJ Ministry of Justice 
mop Margin of Preference 
Mou Memorandum of Understanding 
MPR Majelis Permusyahwaratan Rakyat (House of Representatives) 
NAFTA North American Free Trade Area / Agreement 
NAM Non-Aligned Movement 
NEFOS New Emerging Forces 
Nekolim Neo-colonialism, Colonialism, and Imperialism 
NEP New Economic Policy 
NGOs Non-Governmental Organisations 
NIEs Newly Industrialised Countries 
NRA New Regionalism Approach 
NRT New Regionalism Theory 
OCAs Optimum Currency Areas 
xi 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OLDEFOS Old Established Forces 
OPEC Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
OPSUS Operasi Khusus (Special Operation) 
PAN Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party) 
PANI Pesticide Action Network Indonesia 
PBB Partai Bulan Bintang (Crescent Moon and Star Party) 
PDI-P Partai Demokrasi Indonesia untuk Perjuangan (Indonesia 
Democratic Party for Struggle) 
PEC Pacific Economic Co-operation 
PEKSI Persatuan Eksportir Indonesia (Union of Indonesian Exporters) 
PERDA Peraturan Daerah (Provincial Regulations) 
PERTAMINA Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak dan Gas Bumi Negara 
(Indonesian Gas and Oil Company) 
PlFs Pacific Island Forums 
PK Partai Keadilan (Justice Party) 
PKB Partai KebanRkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party) 
PKI Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party) 
PPP Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party) 
PPTA Partial Preferential Trade Arrangement 
PSI Partai Sosialis Indonesia (Indonesian Socialist Party) 
PTA Preferential Trade Arrangement 
PTPM Panitia Teknis Penanaman Modal (Technical Committee on 
Investment) 
PUPUK Perkumpulan untuk Peningkatan Usaha Kecil (Association for the 
Advancement of Small Businesses) 
REI Regional Economic Integration 
RIA Regional Integration Arrangement 
RIIA Royal Institute of International Affairs 
RIS Regional Integration Strategy 
Rp. Rupiah (Indonesian currency) 
RTAs Regional Trade Agreements 
RTIA Regional Trade Investment Area 
RUSI Republic United States of Indonesia 
SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation 
SACU South African Custom Union 
SADC South African Development Co-ordination Conference 
SAFTA South Asian Free Trade Area 
SAPTA South Asian Preferential Trade Arrangement 
SEACEN Southeast Asian Central Banks 
SEATO Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation 
SEOM Senior Official Meeting 
SIIA Singapore Institute of International Affairs 
SIJORI Singapore, Johor, Riau (Growth Triangle) 
SL Sensitive List 
SMEs Small and Medium Sized Enterprises 
xii 
TAC Treaty of Amity and Co-operation 
TEL Temporary Exclusion List 
TNCs Transnational Corporations 
UDEAC Union Douani6re et Econornique de L'Afhque (Central African 
Custom and Economic Union) 
UN United Nations 
UNCTAD United Nations' Conference on Trade and Development 
UNDP United Nations' Development Programme 
UNISOSDEM Uni-Social Democrat 
UPC Urban Poor Consortium 
UUPD Undang-Undang Peraturan Daerah (Provincial Government Act) 
UUPKPD Undang-Undang Perimbangan Keuangan Pusat dan Daerah 
(Financial Balance between Central and Provincial Governments 
Act) 
WAC Western African Community 
VVEC West-East Corridor (Mekong Basin Growth Triangle) 
WTO World Trade Organisation 
YLKI Yayasan Lembaga Konsumen Indonesia (Indonesian Consumers 
Organisation) 
xiii 
List of Illustrations 
Figures Page 
Figure 2.1. RTAs in force by date of notification 18 
Figure 2.2. Types of regional groupings, as of February 2004-02-18 19 
Figure 3.1. The evolutionary process of regionalism 84 
Figure 3.2. Types, composition, and characteristics of nationalism 90 
Figure 3.3. Nationalists' motives in pursuing a regional integration 
strategy 93 
Figure 5.1. Indonesian level of inflation, 1966-71 160 
Figure 5.2. The concentric circles of Indonesian foreign policy 186 
Tables 
Table 4.1. Characteristics of respondents 134 
Table 5.1. Cost of living index in Jakarta, 1959 - 1966 162 
Table 5.2. Annual economic indicators 178 
Table 5.3. Indonesian economic indicators during Megawati's 
presidency 189 
Table 6.1. Average AFTA / CEPT tariff rates 202 
Table 6.2. CEPT product list for the year 2000, ASEAN 10 203 
Table 6.3. ASEAN-6 exports, 1999 - 2001 206 
Table 6.4. Foreign direct investment in ASEAN, 1990 - 1999 213 
x1v 
Chapter 1: 
Introduction 
I. I. Regional integration arrangements and nationalism: an initial comment 
Nationalism and regional integration arrangements (RIA) are two major 
phenomena that have emerged during the twentieth century and the early part of the 
twenty-first. These two trends, however, do not exist in isolation from other 
prevailing developments, such as the emergence of ethnonationalism' and 
globalisation. Whilst many nation-states have surrendered part of their sovereignty, 
they still continue to promote nationalistic ideals as a means of protecting the interests 
of their citizens. The demise of the Cold War in the late 1980s further unden-nined 
the existence of nation-states through the rise of ethnonationalist movements 
throughout the world, demonstrated most notably by the breaking up of the former 
Soviet Union and, to cite another example, the emergence of East Timor as the 
youngest nation to exist on earth. Ethnonationalist movements have also developed in 
other parts of the world, but have yet to achieve independence (i. e. in Quebec and the 
Chechen Republic). The concurrent emergence of these trends during the latter part 
of the twentieth century has thrown up some interesting contradictions within global 
structures. Global capitalism continues to expand in search of more profitable ways 
for the production and the distribution of goods and services, leading to a more 
intemationalised world economy. At the same time, nationalist economIc Policies are 
also prevalent in both developing and developed countries as a way of countering the 
1 In general, the term ethrionationalism refers to the promotion of self-determination of an ethno-nation 
(or ethnic-nation) within a nation-state. For Hechter and Levy (1979), ethrionationalist movements 
emerge as a result of regional claims to ethnic distinctiveness within a nation-state. Other alternative 
terms that are often used to describe ethrionationalism are ethno-regionalism, ethnic-nationalism and 
secessionist movements. A more detailed account of ethrionationalism will be provided in Chapter 2. 
I 
forces of globalisation and regionalisation. It is, therefore, possible to suggest that the 
world is becoming both a more integrated and a more fragmented place at the same 
time. 
The emergence of regionalism, globalisation, and ethnonationalism has, 
nevertheless, challenged the existence of the established nation-state system. 
However, contemporary studies of regionalism, commonly known as the New 
Regionalism Theory (NRT) challenge the conventional argument that the relationship 
between these different concepts is contentious. 2 Instead of focusing upon the 
competing nature of these divergent forces, theorists in this line of study emphasise 
the commonality and complementarity within the relationship between these different 
forces. It is argued that most states take a nationalistic stance as a response towards 
the changes that occur as a result of global capitalism (Horsman and Marshall 1995: 
x). Regionalism also emerges as a response to the urgent need to find new ways of 
confronting global forces. As a mechanism for the achievement of a new world order, 
regionalism is useful to combat the negative impact of globalism, to minimise 
excessive control and abuse by the state, to achieve a desirable world order goals, and 
to strengthen the regional structures of governance (Falk 1999: 64). To date, 
regionalism is a phenomenon that is spreading throughout the world, in both 
developed and developing countries, as can be seen in the recent institutionalisation of 
many regional groupings in the world. 
The pattern of the institutionalisation of RIAs at the global level is varied, and 
ranges from the highly institutionalised regionalism of Europe to the much looser 
2 Bjorn Hettne (1994) first coined the term new regionalism and later elaborated on this concept with 
Fredrick S6derbaum (see Hettne and S6derbaum 2000) to produce work on NRT. Further analyses of 
the theory will be provided in subsequent chapters. 
2 
forrn of regionalism seen in developing regions, such as Latin America, Africa, the 
Middle East, Southeast Asia, and the Asia-Pacific. This thesis focuses mainly on the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a regional organisation that is 
composed of ten countries, namely Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Brunei, Vietnam, Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia. The region itself has 
been described as dynamic due to 'a wide range of developmental settings and 
conditions both between and within states. These range from chaos and isolation 
to high development of technological and trade-driven economic development' 
(Ulack and Leinbach 2000: 1). However, these diversities, coupled with strongly 
nationalistic foreign policies, have meant that the process of regionalisation in the 
Southeast Asian region has progressed slowly. Specific attention within this thesis 
will be given to Indonesians' perspectives on their country's involvement in ASEAN. 
The rest of this chapter will be devoted to outlining the structure and organisation of 
this thesis, describing its objectives and how this research can contribute to the study 
of international political economy. 
1.2. Objectives of the research 
The main objective of this thesis is to analyse the dynamics of the relationship 
between nationalism and regionalism. In this context, the author proposes his main 
hypothesis that: 
Indonesian Nationalism and ASEAN regionalism stand in a symbiotic 
relationship to one another 
3 
In the past, the relationship between nationalism and regionalism has most often been 
characterised as contentious because the former has exhibited no more than offensive 
and aggressive policies towards regionalism (Breully 1985). However, it is important 
to note that the relationship between the two can sometimes be mutually reinforcing, 
which means that they stand in a symbiotic relationship to one another. Regionalism 
today should not always be understood as an alternative to nationalism, but more as a 
supplement to protect the role of the state in an interdependent world (Palmer 1991; 
AxIine 1994). To provide an empirical basis for this research, this thesis examines the 
case study of Indonesian nationalism and ASEAN regional integration, with specific 
reference to the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA). Both Indonesia and 
ASEAN were chosen because, over the years, the former's development has been 
shaped by evidence of nationalism, and the latter a strong commitment towards 
regionalism. 
Within the case study context, the thesis attempts to explore whether or not 
there is a shifting pattern of perceptions amongst Indonesian state and non-state 
actors 3 towards regionalism in Southeast Asia. Initially, the author assumed that in 
recent years a shift has taken place from a traditionally strong nationalistic attitude to 
a more outward-looking orientation that has manifested itself in opting for a stronger 
3 Non-state actors will henceforth be referred to as domestic actors and will include the business and 
academic communities, and pressure groups, such as civil society organisations (CSOs) and non- 
governmental organisations (NGOs). It is also important to make a distinction between CSOs and 
NGOs. According to the World Bank's (2000) Operational Directive 14.70, NGOs may be defined as 
'myriad of different types of organizations. At its broadest, it includes all groupings of individuals that 
fall outside the public and for-profit sectors, whether legally constituted or informal, established or 
transient'. NGOs, therefore, are a diverse group, yet the term NGO is often used interchangeably with 
that of CSO, which normally 'includes all associations and networks between the family and the state 
except firms [that] NGOs cannot represent' (Edwards 2000: 7-8). More specifically, CSOs are 'the 
wide array of non-governmental and not-for-profit organisations that have a presence in public life, 
expressing the interests and values of their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, 
scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations' (World Bank website, accessed 2003). Whilst 
organisations such as Friends of the Earth and Amnesty International are examples of NGOs, trade 
unions and religious or cultural groups are some examples of CSOs. 
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RIA in the Southeast Asian region. In analysing further the contemporary attitude of 
Indonesian state and non-state actors towards ASEAN, it was necessary to establish 
and locate the variables that motivate such shifts in attitudes to occur. In this context, 
the author has observed three related determining factors comprising: first, the 
regional economic crisis of the late 1990s; second, shared ideas between Indonesian 
and other (Southeast) Asian countries' ruling elites and interest groups in pursuing a 
regional community formation; and, third, greater awareness amongst state and non- 
state actors of the positive contributions that a strengthened RIA may bring. These 
three factors are analysed in more detail below. 
The first factor, the regional economic crisis has played a major role in 
opening the eyes of Indonesian domestic state and non-state actors about ASEAN 
regional integration. In contrast to the widely held assumption that ASEAN did little 
to deal with the regional economic crisis, the author contends that this was not the 
case. Amongst other things, delayed initiatives to eradicate the crisis came about 
largely as a result of the nature and structure of ASEAN as an organisation whose 
decisions and actions are dependent upon the consent of member countries. It was 
only logical that ASEAN member countries' reactions towards the economic crisis 
were to concentrate on domestic problems first before initiating any regional attempts 
to face the economic crisis. More recently, ASEAN and several other Northeast 
Asian countries have become more aware of this problem and are instigating plans to 
minimise the possibility of a future crisis. Some of these initiatives include serious 
discussions on further institutional, economic, and financial co-operation, which can 
be seen in the new ASEAN plus Three (APT), an attempt to expand regionalism to 
include not only the ten Southeast Asian countries, but Japan, South Korea and China 
5 
as well. As far as this particular initiative is concerned, discussions have included the 
possibility of the creation of an East Asian Free Trade Area (EAFTA) (Chung 2001: 
397) and further financial co-operation under the 2000 Chiang Mai Initiative 4 and the 
5 2003 Asian Bond Market Initiative (ABMI). 
Secondly, even long before the regional economic crisis began in 1997, there 
were intense discussions amongst academics and the ruling elites of various ASEAN 
countries to initiate a new level of regional community formation beyond AFTA. 
Some analysts have even noted the significant contribution of Chinese and Japanese 
economic networking to regional community formation in Southeast Asia, if not in 
East Asia (a region consisting of both Southeast and Northeast Asian countries) 
(Chung 2001: 407-12). 6 In recent years, both Japan and China have also been 
regarded as the centre of 'new Asian regionalism' (Katzenstein 2000: 359). The 
author, however, believes that significant movement towards the idea of regional 
community formation has in fact further intensified since the economic crisis of 1997. 
Amongst other things, the economic crisis has acted as a catalyst in advancing ideas 
of Western model of democracy in some ASEAN countries, which is particularly 
significant in Indonesia's case. Strengthening dernocratisation has led to the rapid 
development and expansion of the civil society movement in the region. Various 
4 Detailed analyses of the EAFTA and the 2000 Chiang Mai Initiative will be provided In Chapter 6. 
5 ABMI was initially endorsed at the ASEAN plus Three Deputies Meeting in Chiang Mai, Thailand, 
on 17 December 2002. The main objectives of ABMI is to develop efficient bond markets in Asia that 
would enable the private and public sectors to raise and invest long-term capital without currency and 
maturity risks. A review of ABMI 2003 can be obtained from the Asia Recovery Information Center 
website at: 
http: //aric. adb. or)z/docs/asiabondmarket/asean. asp 
6 See also Peng's (2002) analysis of the contribution of Japanese and ethnic Chinese economic 
networking to informal integration in East Asia. In this context, Peng defines informal integration as 
'integration through economic factors, facilitated by "natural" channels such as geographic proximity, 
ethnic ties, and industrial divisions of labor' (p. 425). 
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domestic non-state actors have become both more interested and concerned with 
regional level issues as part of the deepening internationalisation of their interests. 
Thirdly, many Indonesian state and non-state actors are now increasingly 
aware that their countries' future development rests upon the strengthening of existing 
regionalism. The recent development of ASEAN has made a positive contribution in 
the form of confidence building measures (Sopiee 1986: 222), which were one of the 
Association's most significant objectives in the past. ASEAN, amongst other things, 
has increased the bargaining power of Southeast Asian countries in many 
international fora. Although there is limited evidence to suggest that ASEAN was 
. -ble to bargain with various international institutions, such as the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank during the economic crisis, ASEAN has 
the potential to carry out such tasks if member countries opt for greater and stronger 
co-operation. However, the question remains as to whether ASEAN will respond to a 
host of new regional challenges (Smith 2000a: 41). The emergence of an 
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ethnonationalist movement, for example, has been a significant post-crisis concern 
amongst Indonesian state and non-state actors (Lay 2001). However, Indonesian state 
and non-state actors appear to hold the view that ASEAN has the potential to help 
Indonesian in resolving this domestic problem. 
Although Indonesian state and non-state actors' attitudes towards ASEAN 
have become more positive in recent years, there are still some as yet unresolved 
issues which may hinder the development of further RIA in the region. One issue 
particularly worth stressing concerns the Association itself, which has become more 
exclusive in terms of its relations with the majority of the Southeast Asian population. 
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The Association is still largely an elitist executive club for regional Foreign Ministers, 
if not leaders, whose decisions at the regional level do not necessarily correspond with 
the actual demands of the majority of the Southeast Asian population. There are, for 
example, many Indonesian non-state actors (particularly NGOs and CSOs) who 
believe that the implementation of AFTA is not feasible due to the Association's 
long-standing cardinal principle of non-interference. 7 The perpetuation of this 
principle could continue to be a major obstacle to greater economic co-operation, 
leading to bureaucratic dilemmas during the exchange of economic information 
amongst the member countries. 8 Secondly, further RIA attempts will also face 
challenges from external forces. These include particularly the West's fear that 
strengthened Southeast and East Asian regionalism might i eopardise the future of the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO)'s multilateralism (Higgot 2000: 256-9). The third 
major issue that may prevent a more open attitude amongst Indonesian state and non- 
state actors towards ASEAN regional integration is the fragmentation of the 
Indonesian state that has occurred as a result of strengthening ethnonationalist 
movements in various parts of the country. 
The above issues may have implications for the formation of strengthened 
regional integration in ASEAN for a number of reasons. To start with, regarding the 
aforementioned exclusivity of ASEAN as an institution, there are two levels at which 
a strong elitist nationalistic stance could exist. At one level, there are the policy 
makers whose eagerness to pursue the formation of stronger RIAs will vary 
7 The principle of non-interference prohibits ASEAN member countries to interfere in any issues which 
can be regarded as the domestic affairs of other members. This principle is also regarded as one of the 
key elements, along with the principle of quiet diplomacy, the non-use of force, and decision-making 
through consensus, of Asian value or the ASEAN way. For detailed analysis of the non-interference 
principle see Robison (1996), Ramcharan (2000), and Katsumata (2003). 
8 This does not include a number of attempts to harmonise ASEAN member countries' divergent 
policies (i. e. on labour, tax, social, etc), required in the process of deeper integration or co-operation. 
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depending upon their perception of the costs and benefits incurred by such 
arrangements. In Indonesia's case, policy makers' decisions have been strongly 
associated with the personal economic benefits that can be gained or lost through 
further ASEAN regional integration. The decrease in economic gains resulting from 
such arrangements would normally provoke a stronger nationalistic stance amongst 
those policy makers. In this context, nationalism often equates to the economic or 
capital gains that can be acquired or lost by policy makers or other interest groups. At 
another level, the very fact that the country's foreign policy decisions represent 
largely the individual interests of members of government has been a catalyst in 
promoting the nationalistic stance held by many Indonesian citizens. Consequently, 
the exclusive nature of a regional institution can widen the gaps between the 
govemments and the govemed. Secondly, in both the economic and the secunty field, 
ASEAN countries are still very dependent on the US, Japan, and the European Union 
(EU). Therefore, any attempts to promote further regionalism in Southeast Asia 
cannot afford to violate various established agreements that have been made 
individually between ASEAN member and non-member countries. Finally, without 
continuous and comprehensive initiatives to eradicate the ethnonationalist movement 
within the country, the Indonesian state will most probably not favour any Southeast 
Asian regionalism since both RIA and ethnonationalistic movements pose challenges 
to the established nation-state system. 
1.3. Contribution of the research 
This thesis aims to contribute towards better understanding of the relationship 
between nationalism and regionalism. More specifically, this thesis is linked strongly 
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to recent debates on NRT. Despite its flexibility and fluidity in characterising recent 
patterns of regionalism, the author believes that NRT still lacks the necessary 
comprehensive conceptual development to explain the nature of the relationship 
between nationalism and regionalism. In the past, most theoretical frameworks within 
the study of regionalism have focused upon the issue and process of the 
institutionalisation of a regional grouping. This study, however, will specifically 
address the issue of the gap between a regional institution and the citizens of its 
member states, which has often been ignored in most theses on the political economy 
of regionalism. 9 It is only logical to address this particular issue since nationalism has 
long been seen as a contending variable within international fora or arrangements. 
Whilst realising this, however, most scholars have failed to elaborate further on the 
dynamic relationship between nationalism and regional integration. ' 0 
Moreover, this thesis will provide some new dimensions to the study of 
contemporary Indonesian foreign policy, and foreign economic policy (FEP) in 
particular, in ASEAN. This is in contrast to past Indonesian foreign policy studies 
that have taken for granted that Indonesian nationalism will be a contending variable 
in the future of ASEAN regionalism. The central conclusion of this study, however, 
offers a contrasting view. Past studies on this issue, such as those conducted by 
Weistein (1976) and Anwar (1994) have nevertheless provided an essential starting 
9 The problem of the gap between citizens and regional institutions is best illustrated in the context of 
the European Union (EU). In recent years, the strengthening of the EU has led to an emerging 
'democratic deficit', a concept based on the notion that the EU lacks democracy due to its complex 
operational method. The EU is becoming increasingly remote from its citizens because Europeans put 
too much emphasis on the European Parliament, which is the only branch of the EU that is directly 
elected by the citizens (Moravcsik 2002). The debate over the EU's democratic deficit seems to raise 
further questions about the Union's social legitimacy (Smith 2003). 
10 Although a closer attempt at analysing domestic attitudes towards regionalism has been made by 
Haggard (1997), this study lacks any specific analysis of the dynamic relationship between nationalism 
and regionalism. Most recent publications on NRT, such as those produced by Hettne (1999) and 
Schulz et al (200 1 a), also do not provide any specific explanation on the dynamic relationship between 
the two variables. 
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point from which to study the subject as well as a valid analysis of the logic behind 
such nationalistic stances. It must be taken into account, however, that the study of 
intemational. political economy is not static, and thus has to be re-assessed within 
specified time periods and the international situations that exist at these particular 
times. The periods of Indonesian foreign policy in which Weinstein and Anwar 
carried out their respective research, for example, were set against a relatively stable 
intemational political economic context. Consequently, it is hoped that this study will 
offer new and important contributions to the analysis of Indonesia's foreign policy 
within the reformasill period. Finally, it is also hoped that this thesis' exploration of 
a case study that focuses on Indonesian nationalism and ASEAN's regionalism will be 
useful for future comparative regionalism research. 
1.4. Structure of the thesis 
There are three major questions that underlie this thesis. The first question is 
concerned with the reasons why regionalism has been one of the most important 
features of the global political economy in the last few decades. The second question 
focuses on why nation-states, particularly developing countries, employ a regional 
integration strategy (RIS) in international relations. The third question concerns 
domestic state and non-state actors' reactions and perspectives towards RIAs vis-ti-vis 
globalisation. Two main perspectives have emerged in recent writings on regional 
integration. On the one hand, there are scholars who see the development of regional 
integration as a stepping stone or building block towards greater multilateralism in the 
world trading system (e. g. Lawrence 1995; Summers 1991; Anderson and Blackhurst 
11 This period is marked by the regional crisis and followed with the resignation of Suharto as the 
President of the Republic of Indonesia on 21" May 1998. 
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1993). For Bhagwati (1995), on the other hand, regionalism can be seen as a 
stumbling block towards greater multilateralism in the world trading system. 
Accordingly, he insists on the persistence of multilateralism and global governance. 
From the mid- I 990s, the issue has become increasingly controversial owing to the 
substantial rise in the number of domestic non-state actors that simply reject the idea 
of regional integration and globalisation. 1 2 It is, therefore, necessary to explore each 
of these questions in order to comprehend the logic behind the creation of various 
regional groupings in the world as well as the logic behind regional actors' decisions 
in pursuing an RIS. To deal with all these questions, this thesis is divided into eight 
chapters which deal with specific issues concerning the theoretical background of 
regionalism and nationalism, as well as an analysis of the case study that focuses on 
the dynamic relationship between Indonesian nationalism and ASEAN regionalism. 
In Chapter 2 the author analyses the theoretical background within the study of 
regionalism and nationalism. The chapter will start with an analysis of the logic 
behind regionalism as a contemporary phenomenon. The second part of this chapter 
will focus on recent trends in regionalism in the world today and the theoretical 
background to regionalism. There are two main disciplinary perspectives in the study 
of regionalism, that have emerged from international relations (IR) and economics. 
Whilst IR perspectives on regionalism have experienced a ma or shift since their first i 
appearance following the Second World War (i. e. neo-realism to social 
constructivism), much economic analysis of regionalism is still focused upon the 
traditional Vinerian approach. In recent years, however, NRT has added a new 
12 Those who oppose regional integration, such as labour and environmental activists, tend to view 
regionalism as a similar phenomenon to that of globalisation, although on a smaller scale. Ideas about 
the surrender of sovereignty and the spread of the negative forces of capitalism can lead to scepticism 
about regionalism amongst the general public. 
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dimension in the study of regionalism. This new theoretical approach attempts to 
bridge the gap that exists between IR and economic perspectives on regionalism. 
Following the analysis of the theoretical background of regionalism, the third part of 
this chapter will focus on nationalism. More specifically, this part of the chapter will 
analyse the concept of nationalism and its application to international affairs. 
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 are concerned with the conceptual framework and 
research methodology respectively. The main focus in Chapter 3 is on the analysis of 
NRT. This chapter begins with an analysis of the relationship between NRT, as a new 
regionalism approach, and nationalism. This analysis aims to explore the dynamic 
relationship between nationalism and regionalism. Furthermore, this section is 
designed to fill the gap between established perspectives on regionalism and NRT, 
since most regionalism theorists have to date only mentioned the importance of the 
national domain but yet to provide any conceptualisation of this issue. In addition, 
specific attention within this chapter will also be given to an analysis of contemporary 
nationalists' interest in pursuing a regional integration strategy. Finally, Chapter 3 
will include a brief analysis of the relationship between NRT, Indonesian nationalism 
and ASEAN regional integration. Chapter 4 provides a detailed account of the 
research process undertaken in the making of this thesis, including data collection and 
the categorisation of respondents, as well as an analysis of preliminary research 
findings. 
Detailed analyses of Indonesian nationalism and ASEAN regional integration 
will be provided in both Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 respectively. Through a detailed 
examination of both the historical and contemporary perspectives on Indonesian 
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nationalism and foreign economic policy, this thesis seeks to establish the logic 
behind Indonesia's pursuit of RIS, despite its strong nationalist historical background. 
The primary focus of Chapter 6, however, is on ASEAN regional economic 
integration attempts, both past and present. Since this thesis is primarily concerned 
with AFTA, early ASEAN regional economic integration attempts, such as the 
ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangement (PTA), ASEAN Industrial Projects (AlPs), 
ASEAN Industrial Complementation (AIC) and ASEAN Industrial Joint Venture 
(AIJV), will only be analysed briefly. The analysis of AFTA will include a historical 
account of the trade agreement and its prospects and challenges within and beyond 
Southeast Asia. 
Chapter 7 provides a detailed analysis of Indonesian perspectives towards the 
country's involvement in ASEAN, with particular reference to AFTA. This 
investigation has been made possible through field research carried out during 2000- 
01, which involved research interviews conducted with representatives from various 
government agencies and domestic interest groups in Indonesia. Moreover, this 
section also analyses several contextual factors which have influenced public 
perceptions towards ASEAN at the present time. These include the regional crisis of 
1997, contemporary Indonesian nationalism and ethrionationalism, and the 
organisational structure of ASEAN. The subsequent sections in this chapter are 
divided according to the questions set during the field research. Finally, Chapter 8 
concentrates mainly on the findings of the study, which analyses the dynamic of the 
relationship between Indonesian nationalism and ASEAN regional integration 
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1.5. Conclusion 
The relationship between nationalism and regional integration has traditionally 
been viewed as conflictual, particularly since the latter can undermine the integrity of 
the former. This study offers a new approach to the study of regionalism and 
nationalism. The examination of Indonesia's relationship with ASEAN as a case 
study serves as a focal point in which the nature of the contending forces between 
nationalism and regionalism can be better comprehended. Indonesia is known 
traditionally as one of the most nationalistic country in the Southeast Asian region, 
which is not only due to her pride in the sheer size and richness of her natural 
resources, but also due to her long historical struggle against imperialism. Such 
attributes and historical background give Indonesia a sense of confidence in herself 
and, thus, over time, may be see to have produced excessive nationalism. Although 
ASEAN has existed for over three decades, it has as yet been unable to make any 
progress in further promoting Southeast Asian regionalism. Excessive emphasis on 
the national interests of member countries has further obscured the regionalisation 
process in the Southeast Asian region. 
In 1992, ASEAN member countries agreed to fon-n AFTA, which has the 
objective to increase the international competitiveness of ASEAN industries and to 
make the Southeast Asian region an attractive investment location. During the 
signing of this trade agreement, there were little opposition expressed amongst 
Indonesian domestic actors because Indonesian politics at the time treated the conduct 
of the Indonesian foreign economic policy as exclusive affairs of the President, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the military, and a handful of members of the academic 
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community. Recent developments within the region, however, depict a different 
picture where many Indonesian state and non-state actors have finally become more 
conscious about regional issues and problems. The conclusion of this thesis argues 
that although the majority of the Indonesian political elite remain supportive to 
AFTA, some Indonesian pressure groups, particularly NGOs and CSOs, are still 
concerned about this regional trade liberalisation scheme. Despite this, scepticism 
towards AFTA was not borne out as a result of the emergence of nationalist sentiment 
in Indonesia, but because of the lack of proper information disseminated to these 
pressure groups. For the majority of Indonesian state and non-state actors, ASEAN 
and its AFTA scheme remain part of Indonesia's national interest because they help to 
promote sustained economic development, the preservation nationalism and 
sovereignty, the enhancement of autonomy and bargaining in international arena, and 
the ability to resist the negative forces of globalisation. 
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Chapter 2: 
Understanding the Relationship between 
Regional Integration Arrangements and Nationalism 
2.1. Introduction 
The relationship between nationalism and regionalism is one major issue that has 
been neglected by political science (Shulman 2000: 365). Generally, however, the 
relationship between nationalism and regionalism has been characterised as contentious. 
For example, Breully (1985: 10) has mentioned that scholars often regard the term 
nationalism as referring to 'offensive and aggressive policies' in world politics. The 
main objective of this chapter is to revisit some of the theoretical backgrounds in the 
study of nationalism and regionalism, as well as to identify some of the gaps in the 
existing literature on each respective subject. Section 2.2 analyses the recent trend of 
regionalism in the world today. Subsequently, section 2.3. analyses different theoretical 
perspectives of regionalism. The theoretical analysis in this section is divided into two 
periods of regionalism; namely the old regionalism period and the new regionalism 
period. 1 Section 2.4. analyses different theoretical perspectives within the study of 
nationalism. Here, the principal focus will be given to the concept of nationalism and the 
development of nationalism in the international context. Meanwhile, section 2.5. 
identifies the gaps within the existing literature on both nationalism and regionalism. 
Finally, the chapter will conclude with a general analysis of main findings within the 
literature of regionalism and nationalism. 
' The old regionalism is also known as the 'first wave' of regionalism whilst the new regionalism can be 
referred to the 'second wave' of regionalism (Hettne 1999; Schulz et aL 2001) 
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2.2. Recent trends in regionalism in the global economy 
Figure 2.1. 
RTAs in force by date of notification 
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Source: WTO official website (accessed 2003) at: 
ht! p: //www. wto. orgýenglish/tratop e/region e/regfac e. htm 
There has been an increase in the number of formal regional organisations in 
recent years, which suggests a proliferation of regionalism amongst countries in the 
world today. The World Trade Organisation (WTO) (see figure 2.1), for example, notes 
that the GATT identified the existence of 124 RTAs during the period 1948-1994. Since 
the creation of the WTO in 1995, about 100 additional regional arrangements have been 
added to promote liberalisation of both trade and services. To date, there are 250 RTAs, 
of which 180, or roughly 72 percent, were operational as of February 2004, whilst the 
remaining 70 RTAs are still under negotiation. 2 The majority of the active RTAs are 
bilateral free trade agreements formed between an established regional grouping and a 
state, and FTAs that are fonned between two states (see figure 2.2. ). By 2002, the total 
number of RTAs had increased to 250, showing an increase of 130 since the creation of 
the WTO. A WTO (2000: 3) study also suggests that by 2005 the total number of RTAs 
2 These are the updated figures from the last WTO (2000) report. 
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could reach approximately 300 if those RTAs presently at the planning or negotiation 
stage are put into operation. 
Figure 2.2. 
Types of regional groupings, 
as of February 2004 
I 
0 Plurilateral Custom Unions 
M Bilateral Custom Union between 2 states 
0 Bilateral Custom Union between a regional grouping and a state 
0 Plunlateral Free Trade Agreements 
N Bilateral Free Trade Agreements between 2 states 
13 Bilateral Free Agreements between a regional grouping and a state 
0 Bilateral Free Trade Agreements between 2 regional groupings 
11 Plunlateral Preferential Arrangements 
M Bilateral Preferential Arrangements between 2 states 
E Plurilateral Service Agreements 
0 Bilateral Service Agreements between 2 states 
11 Bilateral Service Agreements between a regional grouping and a state 
Source: WTO official website (accessed 2003) at: 
littp: //www. wto. orgjeni, zlish/tratop e/region e/reRfac e. htm 
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Even with the increase in the number of RIM, the European Union (EU) remains 
the most comprehensive regional grouping in the world today. 3 It originated from the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSQ, and has progressed towards the 
establishment of the Single Market in 1993, introducing euro notes and coins on the Is' 
January 2002. At the moment, the EU seeks to open negotiations for further enlargement 
that will include Central and Eastern European countries. Apart from that, various 
regional groupings in Europe are also pursuing bilateral FTAs with non-European 
member countries (i. e. FTAs between the European Community (EC) and Morocco, EC 
and Israel, and between the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and Israel). 
During the first wave of integration, there was also an attempt amongst socialist states of 
Eastern Europe to form an RIA. The economies of Eastern Europe formed the Council 
for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) in 1949, which sought to accelerate economic 
development and the establishment of a more rational division of labour amongst the 
socialist states of Eastern Europe (Robson 1987: 2 19). 4 The grouping was composed of 
the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Albania, the 
German Democratic Republic (GDR), Cuba, Mongolia, and Vietnam as member 
countries. 5 Over the years, however, the aim of the CMEA was to counter the rival 
Western European's European Community (EC) and the European Free Trade 
3 Further details on the history of the EU can be obtained from the European Union On-Line official 
website (accessed 2002) at: 
littp: //europa. eu. int/abc/history/index en. htin 
4 The CMEA is also commonly known as COMECON in the West. 
5 Despite an initiative amongst Eastern European socialist states, by the 1970s and 1980s membership was 
expanded to include non-Eastern European socialists states. In 1976, the CMEA also gave observer and 
co-operant status to Iraq and Mexico. For further analysis on the involvement of Iraq and Mexico in the 
CMEA see Marer and Montias (1988). 
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Association (EFTA). The CMEA, however, ceased to exist in 1991, largely as a result of 
internal conflict and divergent national interests amongst member countries. 
In other regions, there are also examples of RIAs. In the Americas, for example, 
the North American Free Trade Agreement / Area (NAFTA)6 and the Southern Common 
Market Agreement (MERCOSUR - Mercado Comýn del 
SUr)7 have been the most 
significant ones to date. In Central America, there are also the Central American 
Common Market (CACM) and the Andean Group, which were established in 1960 and 
1969 respectively. Recently, however, there have been efforts to unite the economies of 
the Western Hemisphere, which will incorporate member countries of both NAFTA and 
MERCOSUR as well as other older regional groupings, such as the Andean Pact and the 
Central and Caribbean units (Phillips 2000: 288). This effort has materialised in the Free 
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), which was originated from a joint declaration made 
at the first Summit of the Americas that took place in Miami, in December 1994.8 The 
grouping will involve 34 countries in the region, all agreeing to a free trade area 
throughout the continent by 2005. 
6 Other forms of RIAs existed amongst North American countries prior to the creation of NAFTA in 1993. 
The first comprehensive one was the US - Canada Auto Pact of 1965. In 1988 this RIA was transformed 
into the Canada - US Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA), which involved a total free trade agreement 
between the two countries. Many elements within the CUSFTA were later incorporated into the NAFTA 
agreement, whilst Mexico was asked to join the agreement. 
7 Initially, during the first wave of regionalism, a number of FJAs were formed amongst Latin American 
countries, which include the Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA - 1960), and the Association of 
Latin American Integration (ALADI - 1980). Many of these RIAs, however, failed to succeed. 
MERCOSUR was finally established in 1995 and was initiated by two of the largest Latin American 
countries, Brazil and Argentina. The wish to deepen their relationship resulted from decades of mutual 
distrust between the two countries. The two countries drafted 24 bilateral protocols that symbolised a new 
political and economic reality for these two Latin American countries. By 1991, Paraguay and Uruguay 
had asked to join the agreement. Subsequently, the Treaty of Asuncion was signed in 26th March 1991, 
agreeing that the decision for the creation of a common market should be decided upon by 31 December 
1994. 
8A review of FTAA's progress can be found at the FTAA official website (accessed 2003) at: 
http: //www. ftaa-alca. org/View e. W 
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Africa, however, has the largest number of RIAs in the world, although most of 
which are still in the form of preferential arrangements. Amongst these are the 
Communalite Economique de LAfrique de L'Ouest (CEAO -1974), the Union Douaniere 
et Economique de LAfrique (UDEAC - 1964), the Communaute Economique des Pays 
de Grande Lacs (CEPGL - 1976), the Communaute Economique des Etats de LAfrique 
Centrale (CEEAC - 1983), the Communaute Economique des Etats de LAfrique 
Centrale (CEEAC - 1983), and the West African Community (WAC - 1978). In South 
Africa, ftirthermore, there are three main regional organisations, which include the South 
African Custom Union (SACU - 1969), the Southern African Development Co-ordination 
Conference (SADC - 1980) and the Preferential Trade Area for East Africa (198 1). In 
1994, the Preferential Trade Area for East Africa was transformed into the Common 
Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), which took the end objective to be a 
full common market (Od6n 2000: 255). 
A similar trend, however, was not reflected in Asia. The only comprehensive 
RIA in the region is ASEAN, which, at present, comprises all the Southeast Asian 
nations. Prior to the creation of ASEAN there were various different integration 
arrangements that existed amongst some Southeast Asian countries, but only in the very 
short-term. 9A more recent regional integration scheme in Asia is the South Asian 
Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC), formed in 1985 and consisting of 
9 The first of these was the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), which was created in 1961, composed of 
Thailand, the Philippines, and Malaysia as member countries. The second was Maphilindo, which was 
created in 1966, with member countries including Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia. These two 
projects were mainly based on security issues, and sought to contain the spread of Communism in the 
region. The existence of both ASA and Maphilindo, however, was rather short owing to continuous 
conflicts amongst the member countries of each respective Association. 
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Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Despite other 
trade liberalisation initiatives, SAARC is still the main tool that protects the political and 
security interests of South Asian countries. In 1993, member countries of SAARC 
agreed to form an ambitious regional trade agreement, the South Asian Preferential 
Trading Arrangement (SAPTA), which, subsequently, was put into effect in December 
1995. The SAPTA was hoped to act as a stepping stone to a more ambitioqs project to 
create the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) by the year 2000, or the latest by 2005 
(Muni 2000: 125). 
During the 1970s and 1980s, many of these regional groupings, particularly those 
formed amongst developing countries, failed to sustain their existence. One major 
problem encountered by these regional groupings was that they used an EC model 
(Langhammer and Hiemenz 1991: 173; Breslin et aL 2002: 3). The EC, which reflects a 
traditional Vinerian approach to integration, 10 is a very complex model for many 
developing countries. It requires economic heterogeneity and the willingness of member 
countries to pool their resources together, and also to surrender part of their sovereignty. 
To date, CACM and ASEAN are the only regional groupings amongst developing 
countries able to survive the transition period between the first wave and the second wave 
of regionalism. Another main obstacle to regional integration during the first wave of 
regionalism was the issue of forms of new identity (Jelin 1999: 47), as well as internal 
conflicts that thwarted cooperation (Banega et al. 2001: 235). Successful regional 
10 The Vinerian approach is further explained in the next section. 
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integration attempts, therefore, depend upon the success of participating governments In 
addressing these issues and not simply mirroring R1A attempts in other regions. " 
2.3. Theoretical perspectives on regionalism 
In recent years, interest in regionalism has been resurrected amongst scholars and 
policy-makers as a result of emerging patterns of this phenomenon in world politics. 
Analysis in this section will be devoted to different theoretical perspectives on 
regionalism, particularly those relevant to a study of regionalism in the Southeast Asian 
region. The analysis in this section will be divided into two frameworks; namely 'old 
regionalism' and 'new regionalism'. Within the old regionalism (first wave of 
regionalism), four international relations (IR) theories are relevant to our analysis of 
regionalism in Southeast Asia. These are (neo) realism, neo-liberal institutionalism, 
social constructivism, and structuralism. Another mainstream theory during the first 
wave of regionalism is based on an economic perspective. 12 However, the old 
regionalism period faded out in the late 1970s. In the wake of the re-ernergence of RIAs 
throughout the world during the early 1990s, or during the second wave of regionalism, a 
new line of theory has been introduced. Scholars commonly term this new theory the 
" This also applies to the socialist RIAs. The CMEA, for example, was unsuccessful because of internal 
political differences amongst member countries, and because of its inability to enhance the welfare level of 
member countries. In economic terms, for example, Finch (1988: 148) suggests that CMEA countries 
experienced welfare deterioration from trade integration and other forms of co-operation. In addition, 
Jovanovich (1992: 50) also argues that the USSR's egotistical behaviour led to internal conflicts amongst 
CMEA member countries. 
12 Generally, economists' analyses of regionalism are based on four different economic structures, namely 
Free Trade Areas (FTA), Custom Union, Common Market, and total integration or Optimum Currency 
Areas (OCAs). However, since the main focus of tl-iis thesis is on the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), 
specific concentration in this section will be given to FTA. 
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New Regionalism Theory (NRT). 13 This theory attempts to bridge the gaps between both 
the IR and economic perspectives upon regionalism. However, there are some existing 
limitations in the analysis of NRT, which are particularly evident in a vague and limited 
analysis of the relationship between nationalism and regionalism. This issue will be 
further explored and analysed in this chapter. 
2.3.1. Definitions and associative concepts of regional integration 
In general, regional integration arrangements (RIAs) can be described as 
agreements between nation-states, within a specified geographical area, to minimise 
barriers. 14 Such an agreement is normally created with the aim of achieving gradual 
moves towards an elimination of political boundaries between the participating states. In 
addition to the term of RIA, this thesis also uses the concept of a regional integration 
strategy (RIS). The two tenns differ in the sense that an RIS specifically refers to a 
strategy of regional integration used by domestic state and non-state actors to enhance 
their interests either at the domestic, regional, or international levels. Certain domestic 
actors (i. e. nationalists) may use an RIS for the purpose of, inter alia, enhancing their 
13 Some scholars, such as Schulz et al (2001), also term this new theory the New Regionalism Approach 
(NRA). However, for the rest of the thesis, the term NRT will be used. 
14 The ten-n RIA was primarily derived from the concept of regional integration. Although there are no 
clear historical accounts which indicate the exact time that the concept of regional integration was first 
initiated, Machlup (1977: 63) suggests that the 'concept made its first appearance in 1939 and 1942'. Thus, 
it is a relatively new terni, dating back to the World War H period. In addition, Machlup (1977: 61) also 
points out that the word integration itself was 'taken from the Latin word integratio, which [was] mainly 
used in the sense of renovation'. During its conception, the word integration was non-nally associated with 
industrial organisation, and referred to the act of combining business firms through agreements, cartels, and 
so on. By 1950, however, the terni regionalism had been given a specific definition by most economists as 
Ia process and as a state affair' (Balassa 1961: 1). Regionalism is regarded as a process because it 
encompasses measures designed to abolish economic discrimination between participating countries. At 
the same time, it is also viewed as a state affair due to the absence of various forms of discrimination 
between national economies. 
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country's bargaining power vis-6-vis world economic powers. Whilst this thesis 
primarily uses the tenns RIA and RIS, other scholars have also used other tenns, such as 
international economic integration (IEI)" and regional economic integration (REI). 16 
Although these three terms have been used interchangeably by most scholars from time 
to time, each term is significantly different from the others. To start with, it is important 
to note that when one speaks of regionalism, one must bear in mind that 'regionalism is 
regional' (Ethier 2001: 3), in that it specifies certain geographical limitations. Thus, there 
are differences between REI, IEI, and RIA. 
The term REI is mostly limited to discussions of regional integration in the 
context of economics. In this sense, REI is normally defined as 'the process of reducing 
the economic significance of national political boundaries within a geographic area' 
(Anderson and Blackhurst 1993: 1). Alternatively, it may also be 'loosely defined as any 
policy designed to reduce trade barriers between a subset of countries' (Winters 1999: 8), 
and as such reflects the notion within trade theory that a partial move towards freer trade 
will improve welfare amongst member states. REI is similar to IEI, which can be broadly 
defined as 'a state of affairs or a process [that] involves the amalgamation of separate 
economies into larger regions. [It is] more concerned with the discriminatory removal of 
all trade impediments between the participating nations and with the establishment of 
certain elements of co-operation and co-ordination between them' (EI-Agraa 1988: 1). 
15 The term used by some scholars, such as Tinbergen (1954), EI-Agraa (198 8), and Robson (1987). 16 Multilateral trade bodies, such as WTO use the term regional trade arrangements (RTAs). This term 
specifically refers to free trade agreements made between two or more participating countries. The WTO, 
however, regards RTAs as not specifically constrained by region per se. This is mainly due to the fact that 
many RTAs today do not necessarily involve countries within the same region. Further details on RTAs 
can be found at the WTO website (accessed 2003) at: 
http: ý,,, \; ý,,, Ný,. wto. orR/enizlisli/'tratop e/rei gion e/region e. htm 
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Although this definition of IEI mentions the word region, it is actually referring to 
international or global integration, which implies a larger geographical context than that 
of region. Finally, the concept of RIA carries a rather loose notlon of regionalism. It is 
limited to the context of region, rather than global or international, and it does not denote 
a specific form or nature of regionalism, such as economic integration. Therefore, for the 
remainder of this thesis, the term RIA is used since much of the analysis will not focus 
solely on economic integration, but also on the framework of the political and social 
integration of a region. After all, regionalism is not, and should not be, purely centred 
around the issue of economics alone, in spite of much discussions and empirical evidence 
that prove the notion that trade fosters the growth of regionalism and vice-versa. 
A distinction must also be made between regionalism and regionalisation when 
analysing RIA. Regionalism is primarily an 'ideology that we ought to live in 
geopolitical domains greater than states, though not worldwide. Regionalisation, [on the 
other hand], is the description of an empirical trend that ostensibly inspires or bears out 
this basic belief' (Pettman 1999: 18 1). In practical terms, regionalism consists of policies 
initiated by regional state actors to promote greater integration in a region (e. g. a state-led 
project, such as the formation of a growth triangle initiative). Meanwhile, regionalisation 
normally refers to regional activities that are initiated by regional non-state actors (e. g. 
market or business-led projects). Moreover, despite being specifically regional, RIA is 
often associated with the concept of globalism or globalisation. In line with his earlier 
definition of regionalism and regionalisation, Pettman (1999: 181) also proposes that 
globalism is an intention 'to live in ways that unite people worldwide, [whilst] 
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globalisation is the description of an empirical trend that ostensibly inspires or bears out 
this basic belief. Whereas the former is associated with a vision of a border-less world, 
the latter is often interpreted as being the process through which globalism could be 
achieved. Meanwhile, most economists associate globalism with 'the principle of non- 
discnminatory and multilateral free trade in promoting non-restrictive movements of 
various commodities, including those of goods and services' (Okita 1994: 72), whilst 
globalisation, on the other hand, 'involves more precisely a quantum leap in the 
transnationalisation of production, distribution of goods and services, and financial flow' 
(Tussie 1998: 82). Both terms refer to a form of international trade and economic 
liberalisation in which tariff barriers between countries are non-existent, which is also 
known as multilateralism, regardless of the region in which a country is located. 
There are some other important terms related to the notion of RIA and 
globalisation, many of which relate to economic perspectives on RIA. It is important to 
understand these definitions prior to analysing some of the mainstream theoretical 
frameworks of regional integration, particularly those related to economic issues. These 
ternis include the following: 'outward vs. inward looking policies; trade creation vs. trade 
diversion; and market integration vs. discriminatory integration' (Okita 1994: 72-5), and 
also homogenous vs. heterogeneous economies. Economists often refer to two different 
effects of regionalism on globalisation, seeing it either as a stepping-stone or a stumbling 
block (Bhagwati 1995a). Regionalism as a stepping-stone is nonnally equated with open 
regionalism (outward regionalism), whilst regionalism as a stumbling block is usually 
associated with that of a trading bloc (inward regionalism). Both terms are also related to 
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traditional RIA theory or the Vinerian trade creation and trade diversion theory. 17 An 
outward regionalism normally implies an RIA that proposes an open economy, and holds 
to the principle of trade creation both within and beyond the region. Meanwhile, the 
principal characteristics of inward regionalism can be seen in RIAs formed amongst 
countries that pursue a closed economic policy with a high level of protectionism, which 
leads to trade creation within the region, but trade diversion beyond the region. 
Debates on whether regionalism is a stepping-stone or a stumbling block have 
been lively amongst economists. On the one hand, there is an argument that regionalism 
should be seen as a stepping-stone towards global economic multilateralism since 
regional activities themselves are 'heavily influenced by increasingly regionallsed forms 
of capitalism' (Stubbs 2000a: 233). Moreover, it has also been suggested that the re- 
proliferation of regionalism in recent years has resulted from many countries' 'frustration 
[towards] multilateral approach within the [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT)] framework' (Srinivasan et aL 1993: 73). The VVTO has largely focused upon 
an individual country's preference in phasing out a protectionist policy. Meanwhile, 
regionalism could be a stumbling block in the sense that the rise of production networks 
and a single currency might eventually lead to the creation of competing blocs in the 
17 The concept of trade creation and trade diversion are primarily used in the advanced level of REI, 
particularly at the custom union level. In his analysis of the static measure of a custom union, Viner (1950) 
argues that, as a result of the introduction of a common external tariff (CET), trade with non-member 
countries will result in either trade creation effect or trade diversion effect. A trade creation effect occurs 
when the imposition of a CET does not distort trade with non-member countries. In this context, a lack of 
inefficient products within an RIA will be replaced with cheaper imports from non-member countries, 
which eventually lead to producer and consumer gains. A trade diversion effect, on the other hand, occurs 
when 'cheaper external imports being replaced by more expensive partner equivalent as a consequence of 
CET's imposition' (Dent 1997: 30) on non-member countries. A trade diversion effect, therefore, refers to 
higher levels of trades generated within an RIA rather than outside it. 
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world economy. Multilateral trade is argued to have gown faster in the absence of RIAs 
(Bhagwati 1995a). However, GATT rules specifically regulate the pursuance of RIA 
between countries. Article XXIV, Clause 4, in particular, includes some prerequisites in 
which an RIA can be formed. Member states of an RIA must recognises that 'the 
purpose of a custom union or a free trade area should be to facilitate trade between the 
constituent territories and not to raise barriers to trade of other contracting parties with 
such territories' (GATT 1947: 41). This particular regulation applies not only to those 
countries that wish to establish new RIAs, but also to all established RIAs that wish to 
strengthen their co-operation. Thus, GATT rules have made it clear that the formation of 
an RIA should not be made at the expense of multilateralism. 
Another important distinction has to be made between market and discriminatory 
integration. Market-led integration is a regional integration scheme where governments 
play a limited role in determining the direction of the market whilst discriminatory 
integration involves heavy interference from the government in determining the shape 
and size of a regional grouping. In market integration, market actors, such as 
transnational corporations (TNCs), are the most crucial players in determining the future 
of regionalisation in a defined region. Their actions are closely associated with the 
movement of capital, goods and services, as well as financial mobility. The nature of the 
economies of regional groupings can be characterised as either homogeneous or 
heterogeneous. Whilst a homogenous regional grouping includes member states that 
possess identical economic structures, a heterogeneous regional grouping normally 
consists of member states whose economic structures differ from each other. Lastly, 
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there are also some other terms, such as shallow integration and deep integration (Robson 
1993; Haggard 1995), that should also be acknowledged. Whilst shallow integration 
refers to regionalism in the form of trade in goods and services only (i. e. FTAs, such as 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Baltic Free Trade Area 
(BAFTA)), deep integration involves integration in the level of production (i. e. custom 
unions, such as the Southern Cone Common Market and MERCOSUR) and the 
Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM)). 
2.3.2. Mainstream old ()rirst wave) regionalism theories 
Any attempt made to transcend mainstream theorising in regionalism requires a 
comprehensive understanding of previous theoretical analyses of the subject. There were 
four mainstream theories that dominated the analysis of regionalism dunng the first wave 
of regionalism, including (neo) realism, neo-liberal institutionalism, structuralism, and 
social constructivism. Each of these theories falls within the sphere of IR analysis, and 
each demonstrates certain characteristics, in that they all reflect the international political 
economy in which they were developed. Neo-realism, for example, was developed 
through a belief in the importance of the nation-state system in international relations. 
Neo-liberal institutionalism, on the other hand, rejected this notion and challenged the 
(neo) realists' view by recognising new important forces in world affairs; namely non- 
state actors or agencies. The same approach is also applied to the other remaining two 
newer IR theories. Economists, such as Viner (1950), Tinbergen ('954), and Balassa 
(196 1), have also given us an equally important analysis of the first wave of regionalism. 
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REI theory is generally concerned with the deepening of regionalism through the free 
trade area (FTA), custom union, common market, and total integration. This thesis, 
however, pays particular attention to FTA. The aim of this section is to examine and to 
analyse each of these mainstream theories, as well as to highlight their relevance to our 
study on regionalism in Southeast Asia. 
Initially, regionalism was perceived as 'state-driven processes in response to the 
changing structural condition of the international economic system' (Dent 2001a: 733). 
This is the predominant view held by the majority of realists about the emerging pattern 
of regionalism in the 1950s and 1960s. For realists, regionalism is the pursuit of national 
interests by nation-states. Another predominant feature in realists' thinking is security. 
The international system is assumed to be anarchic and ran by egoistic actors, so that 
each state is forced to prioritise its own needs and interests as the basic means for its 
survival. 18 It is, therefore, necessary for a state to exercise power within the international 
arena. Its capacity to fulfil this role is normally determined by its military capability. In 
this sense, a state has the 'monopoly of legitimate violence' (Ldhteenmdki and Kdk6nen 
1999: 205), which can be used to contain both internal and external threats. This line of 
thinking, moreover, stresses the notion of the balance of power, whereby a strong country 
will act as a hegemon in order to minimise conflicts, or to foster co-operations, amongst 
nation-states. The elements of hegemonic power normally comprise 'control over 
materials, markets, and capital as well as competitive advantages in the production of 
18 The work of Thomas Hobbes (1968) was one of the main inspirations for the development of (neo) realist 
thinking. For Hobbes, human nature is selfish: life is a struggle of individual wills in a battle for survival. 
Accordingly, in an international system where forces capable of producing order are absent, it is inevitable 
that wars occur as a result of human fear, greed, and competition. 
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highly valued goods involving the use of complex or new technology' (Keohane 1984: 
32-3). However, whilst acknowledging the anarchic international system, realists also 
believe that the relationship between nation-states is hierarchical since each nation-state 
possesses a different level of resources, wealth, and power. In the context of regionalism, 
therefore, the realist perception tends to stress 'the outcome of a situation where the 
major power acts as either an imperialist, the player whose presence is to maintain the 
balance of power, or as a hegemon' (Hveem 1999: 91-92). 
As with realism, neo-realism considers the state as the main determinant in neo- 
realist analysis whilst, at the same time, the 'internal characteristics of nation-states [are 
considered] as irrelevant' (Dent 2001a: 732). Another major characteristic of this 
theoretical perspective is that states act rationally in order to acquire substantial power in 
the international arena. The main actors in this theoretical approach are the nation-states 
who make their decisions based on relative gains and losses, depending on the domestic 
concerns of their countries. The main departure of neo-realism from realism concerns the 
structure in which states function. Intense interaction amongst states enables a structure 
to develop that makes up the order or the arrangement of the international system (Waltz 
1979). Moreover, the international system is perceived as anarchic rather than hierarchic, 
as realists would have suggested earlier. The international arena is, therefore, 
unpredictable. With the collapse of the Cold War, Waltz (1993) added the concept of 
cyclical change within the neo-realist paradigm. In his view, the world observes the nse 
and the fall of the Great Powers. In this context, for example, he suggests that Germany 
or Western Europe, Japan and China will rise to rank as great powers alongside the US 
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(Waltz 1993: 50). Therefore, as a result of an anarchic international system, nation-states 
are more concerned with relative rather than absolute gains. ' 9 
The theoretical perspectives provided by realists and neo-realists are particularly 
important in explaining the rise of regionalism in Southeast Asia. The Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations' (ASEAN) member states, for example, opted for a regional 
strategy to cope with the changing international economic condition. ASEAN has often 
changed course to suit the unpredictable international political economic conditions. 
AFTA, for example, was introduced partly as a response to strengthening regionalism in 
Western Europe and North America in the early 1990s. There are, however, some main 
fallacies prevalent in both realist and neo-realist perspectives on regionalism. One main 
deficiency lies in the tendency of both theories to see the aggressive behaviour of nation- 
states, in the form of military actions, as a way to maintain peace. Thus, realism and neo- 
realism assume that regionalism is often shaped by political polarisation in the 
international system. Such political polarisation is best illustrated through observing the 
Southeast Asian region where, during the Cold War period, two main political ideologies, 
capitalism and communism, divided the region into two camps. On the one hand, some 
countries, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, joined ASEAN 
as the supporters of liberal capitalism, whilst, on the other hand, the socialist countries, 
such as Vietnam, proponents of communist based regionalism, joined the CMEA. 
Another major criticism of both theories is their emphasis on the importance of the 
nation-state in determining the international system (Underhill 1994: 26; Miller 1998: 
19 In this context, for example, Waltz (1979: 67) suggested that, in the near future, it is likely that both 
Japan and Germany could become nuclear powers. 
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77). Throughout the late twentieth century there were other actors, apart from the state, 
that played important roles in shaping and determining the international system. The 
significant rise of both civil society organisations (CSOs) and non-govemmental 
organisations (NGOs), for example, has been influential in determIning the state's 
behaviour in the international arena today. 
Another relevant theoretical framework for an analysis of Southeast Asian 
regionalism dunng the first wave regionalism period is neo-liberal institutionalism. 20 
Neo-liberal institutionalism perceives the emergence of regionalism differently to (neo) 
realists. Regionalism, according to this line of thinking, can be fostered through the 
formation of regional institutions or regimes (Keohane 1984; Grugel and Hout 1999). As 
with realism, however, neo-liberal institutionalism stresses the notion of individual self- 
determination and rationality. The expression of this notion has been best illustrated in 
the laissez faire principle of free trade and comparative advantage (Dent 200 1 a: 734). 
For neo-liberal institutionalists, 'the idea of politics is equated with the need to develop 
social institutions (such as the state and market) that conform more closely to a 
possessively individualist model of motivation and the propensity of ostensibly free 
individuals to pursue their material self-interest' (Gill 2000: 50). However, unlike (neo) 
realists who emphasise the importance of state actors, neo-liberal institutionalists are 
more concerned with non-state entities or actors, such as TNCs, NGOs and other 
international agencies. These entities have not only become major forces in international 
20 See in particular Moravcsik (1993), one of the main proponents of neo-liberal institutionalism. 
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political-economics, they have also become the main determining factors for governance 
in the international arena (Risse-Kappen 1995 ). 21 
Apart from an emphasis on non-state entities, there are several other main XF 
characteristics that embody neo-liberal institutionalism theory. The first is the theory's 
preoccupation with the notion of interdependency (Keohane and Nye 1977). 
Interdependency is generated through intense interactions amongst non-state entities or 
actors. Neo-liberal institutionalism treats interdependency amongst states as the main 
feature of an international regime in regulating specific policy issues (Rittberger 1993). 
Subsequently, an increased level of interdependency will generate greater demand for the 
formation of international (or regional) co-operations. The second major characteristic is 
the use of a bargaining system between states as well as functional incentiVes for 
institutionalisation to provide the outcome of inter-state bargains' (Moravcsik 1993: 517). 
The third characteristic prevalent in most neo-liberal institutionalist literature is the stress 
on the institutionalisation of such co-operation. 22 These international (regional) 
institutions are important because of their capacity to disseminate relevant information to 
the actors concerned, the promotion of transparency and monitoring, and to mediate 
divergent interests amongst different actors (Schulz et al 2001 a: 9). 
21 Despite this, neo-liberal institutional ists also concur with (neo) realism analyses, particularly with regard 
to the state's role in world affairs. Here, neo-liberal institutionalists also maintain that states play a 
determining factor in world affairs, and that they act with a unitary and rational manner. Moreover, neo- 
liberal institutionalism also agrees with the (neo) realists argument that anarchy is the major force that 
shapes the motives and actions of the states. For a further review on the differences between (neo) realism 
and neo-liberal institutionalism, see Grieco (1988). 
22 See also Moravcsik (1998) for his ambitious work on developing a theory of economic and political 
integration on the basis of intergoverm-nentalism. His work concentrates on national governments' pivotal 
responses to the increase of interdependence amongst national economies. Other attention is also given to 
the importance of international (regional) institutions in solving problems generated by economic 
interdependence. 
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There are some major deficiencies in the analysis provided by neo-liberal 
institutionalists. According to (neo) realists, for example, neo-liberal. institutionalism 
fails to take account of two major barriers in international co-operation, which include 
cheating and relative gains (Grieco 1988: 487). Neo-liberal institutionalism, however, 
argues that the problem of cheating in international affairs can be overcome through 
conditional co-operation. Despite this, neo-liberal institutionalism still fails to deal with 
the second problem of relative gains, which, according to the neo-realist school of 
thought, is a major characteristic in relations between states. Another main deficiency in 
this theory is its excessive reliance on the market and the principle of trade liberalisation. 
The results of the implementation of this approach can be seen across the world. There is 
a great deal of scepticism amongst the political elites of developing countries about the 
advantages of the unregulated nature of global capitalism (Bowles 2000; Phillips 2002). 
This has been particularly evident since the economic crises in the late 1990S. 
23 Despite 
these criticisms, the neo-liberal institutionalist explanations of the rise of regionalism 
have provided insights. In the Asia-Pacific region, for example, the formation of the 
Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) has been driven by increased 
interdependency not only amongst countries in the region, but also amongst non-state 
entities and actors. The forum itself has become the only major institutionalised 
mechanism to facilitate economic growth, increasing co-operation, trade, and investment 
in the Asia-Pacific region. The same also applies to the relationship between Europe and 
Asia under the framework of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). This forum was also 
23 Breslin et al (2002) also add that, with regard (in respect) to the Asian regional economic crisis of 1997, 
the underlying task (question) is not to find a regional solution to the economic crisis, but also to question 
(on) the advantages that can be accrued by pursuing neo-liberalism per se. 
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formed as a response to 'growing complex interdependency between the two regions' 
(Dent 2001 a: 734). 
Another important theoretical perspective on regionalism during the first wave 
period was structuralism. This theory's perspective on regionalism is based on the 
importance of economic, political, and social structures (Wallerstein 1979; Chase-Dunn 
1989; Halliday 1994). In its broadest sense, structuralism analyses a large scale system 
through a thorough examination of the functions and relations of the small constituents 
that make up that system (Underhill 2000: 17). Primary analysis within structuralist 
perspectives is drawn from Marx and Lenin. In Marx's view, for example, economic 
structure is the strongest single influence on society. 24 Based on his observations of the 
production structure inherent in capitalism and the dynamics that produce classes, Marx 
contended that such conditions would lead to class struggle, and, subsequently, revolution 
and the next stage of history. Marx's idea was further expanded by Lenin (1966), who 
regarded imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism. 25 According to Lenin, 
imperialism is a transitional stage that the world must pass through to reach 
communiSM. 26 This theory advocates the refon-n of the structure of global capitalism, 
particularly for the sake of developing countries (Isaak 1991: 3). The tendency for 
capital flow to come from developing countries to developed countries, for example, is a 
24 See, for example, Marx and Engels (1955: 5). 
25 Lenin's analysis, Imperialism: Ae Highest Stage of Capitalism, was first published in 1917. It is 
important to note that an earlier comprehensive analysis on the role of economics in imperialism was first 
developed by John Hobson (1965). In Hobson's view, imperial expansion was primarily driven by the 
desire to search for new markets and resources, as well as to seek the opportunity for investment overseas. 
26 This theoretical doctrine has been adopted by a number of socialist countries. Russia under Joseph Stalin 
and China under Mao Zedong, for example, adopted a centralised system to achieve the transformation 
from capitalism and imperialism to communism. . 
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result of trade terms that are structured against the poor (Prebisch 1964). Moreover, 
structuralists also find an asymmetry between the centre and the periphery areas (Singer 
1950; Prebisch 1951). The asymmetry between the two areas emerges as a result of 
imbalances between the excessive demand made by the centre, or developed countries, 
for manufactured and industrial goods and the demand made by the periphery, or 
developing countries, which specialise in agriculture and other basic natural resource 
production. This structural imbalance will result a trade gap between the two respective 
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areas. 
Two major contemporary variants of structuralist perspectives have been 
dependency theory 28 and the modern world-system theory or global social theory. 
Dependency theory began to emerge during the 1970s and attempted to expand previous 
structuralist thinking on the divide between developed and developing countries. This 
theory holds that 'the economy of certain countries is highly conditioned by the 
development and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected' (Dos 
Santos 1970: 23 1). According to dependency theory, the gap that exists between the 
centre and peripheral areas is normally sustained due to the dependency of developing 
countries on developed countries to supply capital, technology, trade, and so on. In a 
similar line of argument, modem world-system theory contends that 'world politics 
27 Structural or trade imbalance normally refers to the incapacity of peripheral areas, or developing 
countries, to earn enough from exports to cover the cost of imports. Developing countries normally require 
imports for the purpose of development. For a further review on structural or trade imbalance see Tussie 
(1987: 22-37). 
28 Dependency theory was developed largely by analysts within the Economic Commission on Latin 
America (ECLA). This theory was later developed by other scholars, particularly those associated with the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), who were dissatisfied with the 
assumption that the failure of development in many developing countries was a result of religion, culture 
and tradition, which acted as a bulwark against modernisation. Further analysis of dependency theory can 
be found in Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (1990: 249-52) and Ghosh (2001). 
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occurs within a world-system dominated by the logic of global capitalism' (Hobden and 
Jones 1999: 126). One such prominent thinker is Wallerstein (1974), who argues that the 
world economy acts as a determining factor in the international system. Some of the 
main characteristics within the modem world system, according to this line of theory, are: 
first, a single division of labour that makes nation-states mutually dependent upon each 
other for economic exchange; second, the accumulation of profit through the sale of 
goods; and third, the functional areas or socioeconomic units within the world system. 29 
Unlike dependency theorists, however, the modem world-system theory emphasises the 
concept of the core to represent a geographical region made up of nation-states, all of 
which play an important role in the modem world system. Due to the varying degrees of 
bourgeois interests in each of these countries, all nations have different elements of core, 
periphery, and semi-periphery. Consequently, it is the core states that have the capacity 
to dominate the peripheral states through the unequal exchange between them. 30 
More recent analyses of structuralism have also been developed through an 
analysis of two kinds of power in the international political economy, namely structural 
power and relational power (Strange 1994: 24). Within this context, structural power 
refers to the power that shapes and determines the systematic structures within which 
other actors must operate. Relational power, on the other hand, is the direct exertion of 
29 Moreover, Wallerstein (1991) also argues that a world system analysis is the appropriate mode of 
analysis to explain all social phenomena over time. 
30 Throughout the late 1980s, however, Wallerstein's work received stiff criticism by a number of scholars. 
For example, Chase-Dunn (1989) believes that the inter-state system is equally important in determining 
the international system. In his view, the capitalist mode of production has a single objective in which both 
politico-military and exploitative economic relations play key roles. Another criticism of Wallerstein's 
view is also present in Abu-Lughod's (1989) work, particularly with regard to the framework of the world 
system during the sixteenth-century. In her view, during the medieval period Europe was peripheral w1iilst 
the core region was the Middle-East. 
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the power of international actors on the behaviour of other actors. Within a global 
political economy where competition is evident between state and international capitalist 
forces (i. e. TNCs), structural power counts more than relational power. Structural power 
in an international economic structure, as Strange (Strange 1994:. 29-30) further 
postulates, emerges from four sources, including security, production, finance, and trade. 
Those who possess such power will be able to change the range of options available to 
others. In this context, not only are international capitalist forces able to influence the 
policies pursued by international organisations, but they are also able to influence the 
environment in which economic activities take place (Dent 2001 a: 736). Structuralism is 
useful to explain the failure of regional economic integration in Southeast Asia. The 
economies of ASEAN member countries, for example, have been greatly dependent upon 
the economies of non-member countries, particularly the US, Japan, and the EU. 
Moreover, structuralism would view that the formation of AFTA, with its open economic 
policy, would further consolidate ASEAN member economies with those of North 
American, European, and Northeast Asian economies. This condition, in turn, will 
further marginalise other global peripheral regions, such as African countries. 
In recent years, regionalism has also been explained through the adoption of a 
social constructivist point of view. Social constructivism was developed during the early 
1990S 31 and has become the backbone for the development of NRT. Social 
constructivism is mainly concerned with the notion of culture and identity, both of which 
have been undervalued in other mainstream regionalism theories (Lapid and Kratochwil 
31 Prior to 1989, the tenn social constructivism was hardly used. Most scholars used the term structuration 
theori, to relate to a constructivist approach in IR theory. This is particularly apparent in the works of 
Giddens (1979), Ruggie (1983), Wendt (1987), and Dessler (1989). 
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32 1996) . The core analysis of social constructivism, however, is similar to (neo) realism 
and neo-liberal institutionalism in that they all emphasise the notion of rationalism (Smith 
1997: 183). Additional similarities also exist between social constructivism and neo- 
liberal institutionalism in the sense that both theories are concerned with the norms and 
beliefs that shape the behaviour of international (regional) actors (Hette and S6derbaum 
2000: 460). Moreover, social constructivism can also been seen as structuralism in the 
sense that it stresses 'the interests of individual states are in an important sense 
constructed by the structure of the international system' (Baylis 1997: 204). 33 The 
underlying difference between social constructivism and other IR theories is that the 
former argues that norms and beliefs are socially constructed and not exogenously given. 
In general, social constructivism offers a comprehensive understanding of 
4material incentives, inter- subjective structures, and the identity and interests of the 
actors' (Hurrell 1995: 72). In its broadest sense, social constructivism 'places emphasis 
both on material forces and on its standings, including norms, that emerge from social 
interaction' (Adler and Barnett 1998: 10). For social constructivists, the meaning of 
material resources for human actions can only be acquired through the structure of shared 
knowledge in which they are embedded (Wendt 1995: 73). 34 In the social constructivist 
ý2 In recent years, however, the notion of culture and identity has also been predominantly used by neo- 
liberal institutionalists. For further analysis of the importance of culture and identity in neo-liberal 
I nstitutionalists' perspectives see, inter alia, Caporaso (1992) and Zaccher and Matthew (1995). 
33 One major difference between structuralism and social constructivism is the latter's argument that 
structure has no existence or causal power apart from when it acts as a process. As a result, structure does 
not explain the outcomes. For further analysis on the differences between the two theories see, inter alia, 
Wendt (1992). 
34 For Ruggle (1998: 4), social constructivism allows for the formation of various international (regional) 
agencies not only as the enactment of pre-programmed script, but as a reflection of social creation, within 
structured constraints. 
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view, norms, culture, and ideas are ideational factors that should operate above any 
functional utility they may have, which would include the way in which they shape the 
identity and interests of the actors (Wendt 1994; Katzenstein 1996). In the framework of 
international affairs, social constructivism holds that 'the system of states is embedded in 
a society of states, which includes sets of values, rules, and institutions that are 
commonly accepted by states' (Ruggie 1998: 11). This condition, in turns, enables the 
system of states to function properly. In Wendt's (1992) analysis, for example, 
international anarchy is not fixed since it does not reflect self-interested state behaviour. 
Social constructivists, therefore, view anarchy as the reflection of selfish identities and 
interests and the product of interactions amongst states. 
In reference to regionalism, social constructivism argues that a region is socially 
constructed and, as such deals specifically with the concept of a region (Schulz 2001 a: 
The term is most often used in the geographical sense to denote a certain 
geographical area. However, as Nye (1968: VI) points out, 'region is an ambiguous term 
There are [no] absolute [or] nationally defined regions. Relevant geographical 
boundaries vary with different purposes ... [A] relevant region for security may not 
be 
one for economic integration'. Indeed, as a concept, a region is relative matter. As 
Schulz et al (2001 a: 14) have added, the socially constructed character of a region also 
implies that 'regionalisation can be deconstructed', as it can be constructed. It is also 
important to note that some regions are too loosely defined. Again, by taking an example 
from the Asia-Pacific geographical area, Palmer (1991) insists on certain geographical 
limitations of this particular region. Due to the region's vast geographical size and its 
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cultural and racial heterogeneity, it is almost irrelevant to regard the Asia-Pacific area as 
a region. It should instead be regarded as a 'series of regions' (Palmer 1991: 21). 
Moreover, when one analyses the concept of a region, it is also imperative to note some 
of the characteristics that make up a region, which include geographical proximity, social 
and cultural homogeneity, shared political attitudes and behaviour, and economic 
interdependence. These are the elements that make up a sense of regional identity. 
These elements may seem vague and abstract, yet they provide clearer guidelines than 
those of modem frontiers. In addition, social constructivists also argue that the 
institutionalisation process within regionalism is very much related to intense interactions 
conducted amongst actors (Smith 1997: 185). In this context, regionalisation is 
considered aprocess. Through an understanding of various inter- subjective structures, it 
is possible that the interests and identities of international (regional) actors could change 
overtime. 
2.3.3. Economic perspectives upon free trade areas 
Neoclassical economic analyses of regionalism are generally based on the 
orthodox theory of REI (Schulz et al 2001a: 10). The underlying concept within the 
study of REI has been the theory of the customs union, which refers to the creation of the 
advanced stages of REI in linear succession. These stages nonnally include the 
formation of a preferential trading agreement (PTA), FTA, customs union, common 
market, and, finally, economic and political union (Ballasa 1961; Robson 1987; EI-Agraa 
1997; Jovanovich 1998). As with most other regional groupings in the world, with the 
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exception of the EU, REI in Southeast Asia has only advanced at the FTA level. In the 
past ASEAN has also practised economic co-operation under the framework of the 
ASEAN Preferential Trading Agreement (ASEAN-PTA) in 1977. In the early 1990s, 
however, ASEAN countries agreed to form a more advanced level of economic co- 
operation in the form of AFTA. This framework of economic co-operation was only 
implemented in January 2002. It is for this reason that the main focus of this section is 
given to an economic analysis of FTAs. 35 
Whilst mainstream IR theories place much emphasis on institutional factors, 
economic analysis of regionalism define regionalism in terms of the movement of capital, 
goods, services, and labour. International trade theories have evolved from the 
seventeenth and eighteenth century mercantilist approach, such as absolute advantage 36 
and comparative advantage, 37 and the early twentieth century factor endowment theory. 38 
These traditional international economic theories, however, are deficient in some 
3S It is still highly speculative to assume that REI in Southeast Asia will advance to any level beyond the 
FTA. Amongst other things, this problem is a result of the lack of will amongst ASEAN member 
governments to surrender part of their sovereignty. At an advanced level of REI, a regional grouping must 
suppress any discrimination in commodity movements as well as impose an equalisation of tariffs towards 
non-member countries (custom union), abolish restrictions on factor movements (common market), 
han-nonise national economic policies amongst member countries (economic union), and, finally, unify 
monetary, fiscal, social, and countercyclical policies (total economic integration). Many of these 
requirements are still too difficult to achieve in ASEAN. For further analysis on each of these stages see, 
inter alia, Balassa (196 1) 
36 The concept of absolute advantage was based on Adam Smith's most influential work, The Wealth of 
Nations (1776). Smith analysed the consequence of economic freedom, covering issues such as self- 
interest, the division of labours, the function of market, and the implication of the laissezJaire economy. 
For a detailed analysis ofAdam Smith's works see also Smith et al (1986). 
37 The theory of comparative advantage was developed by a British MP and economist, David Ricardo, in 
the early nineteenth century. For a detailed analysis of Ricardo's work see Sraffa and Dobb (195 1). 
38 Factor endowment theory was developed by Bertil Ohlin (1933), in his work Interregional and 
International Trade. In this work, he developed an earlier theory introduced by his mentor, Eli Heckscher, 
and his own earlier doctoral thesis. The factor endowment theory is now known as the Heckscher-Ohlin 
theory and has become the basis for many contemporary economic theories, such as the regional economic 
integration theory developed by Viner (1950) and Balassa (1961). 
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respects, particularly in their emphasis upon individual actions in initiating trade and the 
assumption that perfect information disseminates amongst economic actors. In addition, 
these traditional theories do not explain the issue of the transfer of goods or FDI, 
technology, management, and marketing (Bende-Nabende 2002: 26). In spite of these 
shortcomings, these theories have proved useful in providing initial analyses for the 
development of contemporary REI theory. This is evident in the development of the 
comparative advantage and factor endowment theories. Whilst the comparative 
advantage theory perfected the absolute advantage theory by introducing the term 
specialisation, the factor endowment theory corrected other previous theories by focusing 
upon land, labour, capital, technological, and management. The theory of comparative 
advantage has underpinned the development of recent REI theories by insisting on global 
free trade as the first best policy of realising free trade. Under a global free trade 
condition (i. e. tariff free global trade), trade-creation is encouraged through tariff level 
cuts between all countries. In this context, each country is assumed to produce only the 
goods that it can produce more efficiently than other countries. This leads to optimum 
efficient production on a global scale if the neo-classical assumptions of comparative 
advantage theory hold true, namely a constant return of scale, no transport costs, perfect 
competition market conditions, etc. This theory is essential within the study of REL A 
grouping that decides to co-operate economically aims to achieve welfare enhancement. 
As mentioned earlier, prior to achieving a condition of total economic integration, 
countries in a region normally conduct an FTA, or in a simpler form, a PTA. A PTA 
normally exists when member countries charge each other lower tariffs than those they 
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charge non-members (Schulz et al. 2001 a: 10; Bond 2001: 16). However, it is important 
to note that PTAs normally involve one or more types of economic integration, including 
FTA, customs union, etc. Generally, economists differentiate between two types of 
PTAs: Partial Preferential Trading Agreements (PPTAs) and Full Preferential Trading 
Agreements (FPTAs) (Grether and Olarreaga 1998: 9). PPTAs generally refer to trade 
preferences that are granted to either specified products or unilaterally to a set of member 
countries by more developed member countries. At this stage, member countries are 
more concerned with their tariff barrier levels than with the free movement of goods. 
FPTAs, on the other hand, refer to trade preferences that include ftill product coverage 
and where all members grant preferential access to other members. 
PPTAs normally involve a significant decrease of tariffs between member 
countries through a product by product base and / or sectoral based mechanisms. Some 
examples of PPTAs that involve product by product based mechanism can be found in 
the 1977 ASEAN PTA and the more recent South Aftican PTA. Examples of sectoral 
based PPTAs, on the other hand, can be found in the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) of 1951 and the US - Canada Auto Pact of 1965.39 FTAs normally 
fall within the category of PPTAs. In other circumstances, FTAs may also be formed as 
an addition to previously established PPTAs. In this context, FTAs normally involve the 
initial equalisation of various trade barriers between different states, nonnally at much 
lower rates than those imposed during the PTA level. The transformation of the ASEAN 
39 The US - Canada Auto Pact of 1965 provided free trade for trucks, cars, and auto-parts between the two 
countries. Apart from that, this Pact was also formed to facilitate free trade on cars for the US Big Four 
auto manufacturers, General Motors, Ford, Chrysler, and American Motors (The Marxist Leninist Daily 
2001). By 1999, two-way trade between the two countries rose to US$104.1 billion from an initial US$715 
million in 1964. Nowadays, the Auto Pact has been incorporated into NAFTA. 
47 
PTA into AFTA is a case in point whereby AFTA can be seen as an extension of the 
former. Unlike the more advanced stages of REI, however, both PTAs and FTAs do not 
require member states to harmonise trade policies amongst themselves. 
An FTA has two basic features, which include, first, the ability of each member 
country to fix its own tariff rates against non-member countries; and, second, the use of a 
country of origin mechanism as a determination of intra-trade. The country of origin 
mechanism is useful 'to limit trade deflection, [which] is a redirection of imports through 
the country with the lowest tariff for the purpose of exploiting the tariff differential' 
(Robson 1987: 23). At the FTA level of regional integration, it is true that trade 
deflection is likely to emerge (Dent 1997: 27), which is primarily due to the divergent 
rates imposed on the third countries. Thus, trade deflection occurs when member 
countries with more protectionist external policies are circumvented. The rule of the 
country of origin is particularly useful in determining the country origin of the traded 
goods. Therefore, 'free trade performs the same function for international trade as 
competition laws in domestic economies' (Oxley 1990: 194). 
Another major constraint in employing an FTA is that it generates unequal prices 
for the products being offered to consumers. This is mostly due to the price differences 
between products produced within an FTA region and products imported from non- 
member countries. As both Panagariya and Duttagupta (2001: 41) maintain, the 'free 
mobility of goods produced within the union ensures there is a single union wide price 
for them. However, goods imported from outside [an FTA] pay different duty. ' 
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Therefore, at this stage, whilst tariff levels between member countries equalise, tariff 
levels posed to non-member countries are not yet uniform. This condition normally 
enables producers to enjoy cheap prices for products coming from other FTA member 
states. However, this depends on the external tariffs set by member countries towards 
non-member countries. As a result of the different tariff levels posed to non-member 
countries, prices of products coming from these countries will vary greatly. Therefore, 
producers in a member country could only enjoy cheaper prices for goods coming from 
other member countries if the former set high external rates on imports from non-member 
countries. 
In the global context, there are also some costs and benefits incurred through the 
creation of PTAs and / or FTAs (Edmond Verbiest 2002: 2-3). In terms of benefits, 
firstly, the creation of either a PTA or an FTA enables a group of countries to deal with 
more complex issues of trade and regional co-operation (Freund 2000). Secondly, the 
creation of PTAs and FTAs also increases domestic competition, which can lead to 
greater productive efficiency amongst domestic producers. As a consequence, thirdly, 
the quantity and quality of goods available in the economy improves. Fourthly, these 
trade agreements may also foster greater economic regionalism amongst member 
countries. Fifthly, such agreements offer countries the opportunity to liberalise their 
economies in a limited and smaller scale than those agreements made at the multilateral 
40 level. In terms of its costs, firstly, PTAs and FTAs can be interpreted as an easy way 
40 An illustration of the benefits accrued from the implementation of PTAs or FTAs can be observed from 
the experience of the US and Mexico through their involvement in NAFTA. During the first year of 
NAFTA's implementation, in 1994, bilateral trade between the US and Mexico grew from US$ 84.7 billion 
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out for policy-makers who are reluctant to actually commit to trade liberalisation 
measures, but face an increasing domestic pressure for trade liberalisation. Secondly, 
there is the fear of what Bhagwati (1995a) calls the spaghetti-bowl phenomenon. This 
phenomenon refers to the situation whereby products in a particular country enjoy access 
on varying terms based on their country of origins. If this occurs, then the fear is that 
such PTAs and / or FTAs can lead to an inward-looking regionalism. 41 
2.3.4. New regionalism theory (second wave) 
The global tendency towards regionalism started to fade away during the late 
1970s, and only re-emerged during the early 1990s. The resurrection of interest in 
regionalism in this latter period did not only prevail amongst policy-makers and 
academia, but also amongst a wider spectrum of non-state actors, particularly business 
executives. In light of increasing interest in regionalism, political- scientists began to 
search for possible explanations for the proliferation of regionalism at the time. Aside 
from social constructivism, which had largely developed since the dismantling of the 
Cold War, a new theory was created to explain 'the second wave of regional co-operation 
and integration' (Hettne 1999: 8). This theory was later called the New Regionalism 
(in 1993) to US$ 102.6 billion. Subsequently, in 1995, the bilateral trade between the two countries rose to 
US$ 112 billion whilst Mexico's exports to the US amounted to US$ 66.7 billion. Meanwhile, the Influx of 
direct investment to Mexico rose to US$ 10.9 billion in 1994 from an annual average of US$ 2.6 billion 
between 1985 until 1990. Therefore, since the formation of NAFTA, North American countries have 
become competition-oriented and have become an attractive investment location. For further assessment of 
the benefits accrued by Mexico and the US fi-om NAFTA see Schirm (2002: 140-1). 
41 For further analysis on the way country of origin mechanisms enhance protectionism, see Krueger 
(1993). 
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Theory (NRT). 42 NRT's princiPal difference from other mainstream theories lies in its 
conceptual approach in defining an RLA,. It is particularly concerned with the issue of 
regionalisation, or the degree of regionness, where the 'ultimate outcome [is the creation 
ofl a region-state' (Hettne 1999: 11). It describes a voluntary evolution process in which 
nation-states are transformed into a supranational community. Although NRT is quite 
similar to other mainstream theories in respect of the voluntary transformation process, 
NRT is largely connected with the broader theoretical debate within IR and international 
political economy (IPE) (Schulz et al 2001a: 12-3). In addition, NRT also emphasises 
that the roles of non-state actors in regionalism is central to its analysis. Accordingly, 
NRT theorists, such as Hettne and Inotai (1994), argue that regionalism is not merely the 
institutionalisation. of a regional project or regional organisation, nor is it merely a state 
mechanism. Rather, it has to be seen as a process, or as a regionalisation process. This 
process will enable the states involved to gradually transform their relative heterogeneity 
and lack of co-operation into an increased demand for co-operation, integration, 
convergence, coherence and shared identity (Schulz et aL 2001 a: 5). The new 
regionalism, then, is heterogeneous in character, encompassing a wide range of issues, 
actors, and institutions involved in the process of regionalisation. 
42 One major early work on NRT was developed by Hettne and Inotai (1994), a research project sponsored 
by the United Nations University (UNU) and the World Institute for Development and Economic Research, 
and was summed up in their work entitled New Regionalism: Implications for Global Development and 
International Security. Subsequently, Hettne, Inotai and Sunkel elaborated further the concept of NRT by 
editing five publications, entitled: (1) Globalism and the New Regionalism (1999); (2) National 
Perspectives on the New Regionalism in the North (2000a); (3) National Perspectives on the New 
Regionalism in the South (2000b); (4) Ae New Regionalism and the Future of Security and Development 
(2000c); (5) Comparing Regionalism: Implications for Global Development (200 1). Another important 
study focusing on the new regionalism phenomenon has also been conducted by Palmer (1991), with 
specific reference to the Asia-Pacific region. 
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Departing from two most influential theoretical analyses of global social theory 
(the modem world-system theory) and social constructivism, NRT has been developed to 
inform a more 'comprehensive, interdisciplinary, and [to provide a] historically based 
social science' (Hettne and S6derbaum 2000: 460). The modem world-system theory has 
been particularly important to the development of NRT since this theory attempts to 
bridge the gap that exists between development theory and IPE approach (Hettne and 
S6derbaum 2000: 459). The political economy dimension of modem world-system 
theory enables an analysis of historical power structures and their contradictions, as well 
as an analysis of the changes and transformations expressed in normative terms to take 
place (Murphy and Tooze 199 1; Hettne 1995; Cox with Sinclair 1996). 43 In addition, 
whilst the modem world-system theory highlights the dichotomy between micro and 
macro regionalism, NRT attempts to bridge such a gap. 44 More importantly, however, 
global social theory has been useful to NRT analysis because it abandons the idea of the 
state centrist detenninant. Social constructivism, on the other hand, has influenced the 
development of NRT because of its emphasis upon the relative nature of a region. 
Moreover, by departing from social constructivism, NRT also attempts to transcend hard 
structuralism (Hettne and S6derbaum 2000: 459), as an emphasis is placed on the process 
(Wendt 1992) of regionalisation. In this context, therefore, the focus of regionalism 
43 As cited in Hettne and Sbderbaum (2000: 459). 
44 The modem world-system theory has also been useful in the development of NRT because it 
concentrates upon the big process of macro-regionalism, or regionalism between the three core regions, 
which include Europe, North America, and the Asia Pacific (triad regionalism). Examples of both macro 
and irkro regionalism are best illustrated by bjendal (2000: 1), who postulates the 'maximalist and 
minimalist versions of regionalisation'. The maximalist form of regionalism is associated with the concept 
of macro-regionalism, such as in the case of the Asia-Pacific, European, and the American regionalisms. 
The minimalist form of regionalism, on the other hand, is associated with the concept of micro-regionalism, 
such as in the context of ASEAN, or, alternatively, it can also be viewed in the context of the growth 
triangles whereby close trade co-operations amongst provincial or district areas of member countries in an 
RIA occur. 
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studies is placed on the agency and actors responsible for the formal institutionalisation 
of a regional grouping or a regional project. 
Moreover, the analysis of NRT has been developed through the detailed 
examination of the difference between the first wave and the second wave of regionalism 
or integration (Palmer 1991; Hettne 1994; 1999; Bhalla and Bhalla 1997; Hettne and 
S6derbaum 2000). The first wave of regionalism, according to this line of thinking, was 
primarily characterised by international bipolarity, an institutional drive to regionalism, 
inward-looking economies, economic discrimination against the rest of the world, 
emphasis on intra-regional trade, and membership of only one regional grouping. The 
first wave of regionalism was much influenced by two political ideologies, capitalism and 
socialism. The bipolar global political system that existed during the first wave of 
regionalism, between mid-1950s until late 1980s, was mainly associated with the notion 
of hegemony, which although it may 'contain social conflict, [and] it does not eliminate it 
altogether. [Alternatively, it can be said that] hegemony is not a stable condition; it is 
always being created and undermined' (Mittelman 1996a; 1999: 47). 45 Hegemonic 
Stability Theory (HST) grew during the 1970s as a result of heated debates over a 
possible US decline as a hegemon, which, in turn, would pose a problem of how to 
preserve the trade system from protectionist state policies (Bajo 2001: 23). Secondly, 
45 Hegemonic stability theory primarily derives from the (neo) realists' analysis (Dent 2001a: 733) and is 
considered one of the variations within the liberal IPE perspective (Balaarn and Veseth 1996: 51). Within 
the realm of (neo) realists' analysis, HST contends that there is a tendency for a hegemonic state to play a 
stabilising role within the international economic system. A hegemon tends to exploit its techno-industrial 
superiority through exports to foreign markets. Within the sphere of liberal IPE perspective, FIST looks at 
the state and market in the global economy and holds that international markets work best when certain 
international public goods (i. e. free trade, peace and security, a balance of power, and sound international 
payment system) are present. Thus, a hegemon is likely to support an open and free trading system. For 
detailed analyses on HST see, inter alia, Kindleberger (1973), Gilpin (1975), and Krasner (1983). 
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many RlAs during the first wave of regionalism were primarily set up under governirnent 
initiatives to create a system of regional peace and harmony. The logic behind the 
formation of RIAs at the time was mainly concerned with creating political cohesion 
amongst member countries in a region. ASEAN, for example, was primarily founded for 
strategic and security reasons to end conflicts in the Southeast Asian region (Wanandi 
2000: 25). Concern for other crucial aspects of integration, such as social and cultural 
aspects, was limited. Aside from the fact that an RIA was primarily triggered by the 
patterns of trade within a defined region, a state generally discouraged the involvement of 
non-state actors in detennining their regional policies. 
Thirdly, many states' strongly nationalist economic policies prevailed during the 
first wave of regionalism. Within this type of policy, the direction of the market was 
largely detennined by the state and its policies. In a country where strongly nationalist 
economic policy prevails, such as those in Latin America and Asia, import substitution 
industrialisation (ISI)46 is normally seen as the predominant economic mechanism for the 
protection of national industries. ISI itself, as Dicken (1992: 177) posits, was normally 
aimed 'to protect a nation's infant industries so that the overall industrial structure could 
be developed and diversified and dependence on foreign technology and capital reduced'. 
In this type of trade strategy, the state normally imposes high tariff barriers on certain 
industrial sectors through various means, including quotas, licences, multiple exchange 
rates, and so on. This particular trade strategy eventually drew many critics. In Dicken's 
(Dicken 1992: 178) view, for example, ISI can be described as 'a haýf vmy 
46 IS, strategy was initially developed by an Argentine economist, Raul Prebisch (Miller 1998: 151-2). 
This strategy forms an integral part of the implementation process of the dependency theory. For an 
analysis of Prebisch's contribution to the development of dependency theory, see also di Marco (1972). 
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industrialisation or as getting stuck at the consumer goods stage'. This is particularly 
common in a small domestic market where local production of consumer goods cannot 
attain an appropriate economy of scale, which leads to high domestic prices. Others, 
such as Genberg and De Simone (1993: 178-9), are more concerned about the delayed 
adjustment that ISI produces in the light of an external shock. Nevertheless, the majority 
of small countries throughout the world employed such a strategy (Hewitt et al. 1997: 
19). As this economic nationalism spread, it became subsumed within a wider regional 
context, leading to the creation of regional trade bloc (Hewitt et aL 1997: 21). Within 
such a context, third countries are normally neglected by members of a regional grouping 
in the process of trade liberalisation. 
Another important characteristic of first wave regionalism is that many regional 
groupings at the time were mainly composed of countries that were economically 
competitive (homogenous) in nature. At the same time, intra-trade intensity was also 
used as a benchmark in many scholarly analyses on the development of these regional 
groupings. Economists, such as Kemp and Wan (1976), examined the type of countries 
that can be the most desirable partners to form an RIA with. The appropriate level of 
intra-trade suitable for the promotion of further integration is normally supported with 
conditions of high economic diversity amongst member countries. Whilst one country 
might have, for example, a comparative advantage in the production of manufacturing 
goods, another country's comparative advantage may rest in the richness of its natural 
resources. These complementary economic conditions amongst member countries will 
lead to efficiency and eventually to higher intra-trade level. In stark contrast with these 
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conditions, however, many RIAs during the first wave of integration were homogenous in 
nature, which therefore led to slow progress towards deeper integration, such as in the 
case of ASEAN, or led to their demise, such as that in the case of CMEA. 
Finally, a variety of policies were pursued by most states when determining the 
appropriate regional grouping they wished to join. VA-fflst some countries preferred to 
join only one RIA, others pursued a strategy of overlapping membership. This can be 
seen in the case of RIA attempts in Latin America. During the late 1960s, whilst all Latin 
American countries were members of LAFTA, some had also formed an alternative RIA 
such as the Andean Pact. Amongst other things, this situation existed mainly as a result 
of the frustration held by some member countries over slow regionalism in LAFTA 
(Finch 1988). Moreover, geographical position did not necessarily hinder the pursuance 
of RIA amongst countries in different regions of the world. Initially, when international 
trade was not yet as fully intensified as it became during the 1980s onward, states tended 
to form RIAs with their closest neighbours. Some exceptions in this pattern, however, 
can be found in the case of CMEA, where membership include those non-Eastem 
European countries, such as Cuba, Mongolia, and Vietnam (Hewitt et aL 1997: 18). 
In the view of many NRT theorists, however, recent regionalism differs to the 
first wave of regionalism in that it takes place in a multipolar world order spontaneous 
process; is open and outward oriented; and is a multidimensional process with the 
involvement of non-state actors (Hettne 1999: 7-8; Bhalla and Bhalla 1997: 21). Firstly, 
the collapse of communism transformed the world order system from a bipolar into a 
56 
multipolar system in which regional groupings play important roles. This international 
political condition has led to the re-emergence of regionalism, particularly with the 
strengthening of European integration, which signifies the importance of regional rather 
than global interdependencies. Secondly, recent regionalism has been described by NRT 
theorists, such as Hettne (1994; 1999) and Schulz et al. (2001a), as a spontaneous 
process in the sense that it is not merely process instigated by institutions, but involves a 
number of other actors all contributing to the process of regional integration. A third and 
equally major transformation is the recent intensification of global economic activities. 
This has prompted nation-states to form regional groupings in order to contain the forces 
of globalisation, but also to remain open according to their commitment towards 
multilateralism (overlapping commitment). Lastly, the involvement of non-state actors 
has been crucial in the promotion of regionalism. According to Hettne (1999: 7), because 
the new regionalism is a more spontaneous process from within and from below, non- 
state actors (i. e. TNCs and non-governmental organisations (NGOs)), are increasingly 
becoming the main proponents for regional integration. 
The relevance of NRT analysis towards the regionalisation process in Southeast 
Asia has been significant. The region itself has been recognised as a testing ground for 
both old and new waves of regionalism in the so-called Third World (Palmer 1991: 59). 
Although the formation of ASEAN in 1967 has done little to promote deeper integration 
amongst Southeast Asian countries (Wong 1989: 121), this regional grouping has been 
able to achieve substantial success in some areas of co-operation, particularly in the 
security field. The Southeast Asian region, with its diverse political and socio-cultural 
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backgrounds, as well as its heterogeneous economies, presents many obstacles to the 
emergence of formal regionalism amongst ASEAN member countries. However, as 
Palmer (1991: 12) convincingly reminds us, 'regionalism may be well advanced even if it 
has not led to the establishment of major organizational form'. This has been the case 
with the regionalisation process in Southeast Asian region. With its limited capacity to 
foster deeper integration amongst Southeast Asian countries, ASEAN has to rely on the 
concept of regionalisation from within the region. Demand for deeper regional co- 
operation has not only existed amongst state actors, but also amongst non-state actors. In 
the global economic context, the region is both committed to maintaining an open 
economic regime whilst at the same time, exercising overlapping memberships with other 
regional groupings. One recent study conducted by Lloyd (2002), for example, has 
indicated that there has been an increase in the demand for formal regionalism in the Asia 
Pacific, involving one or more countries from the Southeast Asian region. All these 
factors suggest that the Southeast Asian region has become one of the major players in 
the promotion of new regionalism across the world. 
2.4. Different theoretical perspectives on nationalism 
Contemporary analyses of nationalism have paid little attention to the relationship 
between nationalism and regionalism and / or globalism (e. g. Halliday 1997: 360; 
Shulman 2000: 365). Traditionally, nationalism is generally regarded as detrimental to 
both regionalism and globalism. For many IR scholars, such as Cobban (1969) and 
Roessingh (1996), nationalism can be considered as a territorial ideology, which is 
internally unifying and externally divisive. States that are not homogenous in culture and 
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language are undermined from within and assaulted from without. It is, however, 
important to point out that nationalists today confront a complex set of considerations 
when dealing with various international forces. It is, therefore, incorrect to assume that 
all nationalists are uniformly hostile to regionalism or globalism (Shulman 2000: 365). 
Nationalism today does not necessarily pose a threat to regionalism, and can, in certain 
circumstances, be seen as a stepping-stone towards both regionalism and globalism. 
Whatever the case, nationalism is still an important element within the international 
system and a major constituent in determining the future of regionalism and further 
global integration. The primary focus of this section is to analyse the existing literature 
on the relationship between nationalism and regionalism. 
2.4.1. The concept of nationalism 
Unlike the concept of RIA, which grew only during the post Second World War 
period, nationalism is much longer. In fact, it evolved even before the conception of the 
47 Westphalian State system in 1648 . Nationalism, 
for some, has been regarded as 'the 
most successful ideology in human history' (Birch, 1989: 3). The word nationalism 
derives from the Latin word of 'natio [that] was used by the ancient Romans to refer to 
foreigners. Later it was used to refer to the assembly of nobles and clergy drawn from 
particular people' (Zematto, 1944), 48 which differs from our use of the word nationalism 
47 For Koht (1947: 265-66), however, the concept of a nation was established far before the conception of 
the Westphalian State system, or after the dissolution of the Roman Empire. 
48 Quoted from Oomen (1997: 4). 
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today. In its original classical sense, nationalism was also associated with 'the word 
nasci, [which] means a tnbal-ethnic group, a people born in the same place and territory' 
(Oomen 1997: 28). 50 It was only in the late eighteenth and nineteenth century that the 
debate on nationalism started, particularly amongst political philosophers who attempted 
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to investigate the concept as it manifested during that period. 
Different scholars have interpreted nationalism in different ways, which has led to 
a continuous debate about nationalism in both theory and practice. In general, however, 
distinctions should be made between some of the associative terms related to nationalism. 
These terms include a nation, a nation-state or a country, people, national, and, finally, 
nationality. 52 A nation is generally understood to be 'a social group that shares a 
common identity, history, language, set of values and beliefs, institutions, and a sense of 
territory. Nations do not have to have a homogenous ethnic culture but [it] usually 
exhibits a sense of homogeneity' (Balaarn and Veseth 1996: 456). Subsequently, as 
Balaam and Veseth (1996: 456) further point out, a nation-state or a country generally 
refers to 'a legal concept describing a social group that occupies a territory and is 
organized under a common political institutions and an effective government [sic]'. The 
people, furthermore, refer to the members of the nation-state, and they often denote a 
49 However, Sturzo (1946: 5) also stresses the errors and fallacies in the term nationalism and showed the 
error in connecting patriotism with nationalism. The word nationalism was first used during the nineteenth 
century, soon after the birth of the three 'isms': liberalism, socialism, and communism. All four words 
have highly respectable origins. The words national, social, liberal, and communal were originally 
adjectives. 'Ism' was added to these adjectives, thereby transfonning them into nouns, so liberal became 
liberalism, social - socialism, common - communism, and national became nationalism. 50 The Latin word nasci literally means to be born. For a general analysis on the historical meaning of the 
word nation and nationalism see, for example, Haywood (2000: 251-56). 51 See, for example, Renan (1882) with his published work of Ou'est-ce Ou'une Nation? (What is a 
Nation? ). 
52 Early distinctions between these different terms were made by the Royal Institute of International Affairs 
(RIIA) in its published work Nationalism: A Report (1939) 
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specific political unit, which is the state, and an ethnological unit, the race. Moreover, 
the word national characterises the whole body of citizens as distinct from any section or 
locality within the given area. It is normally used to describe certain issues that cover the 
entire nation-state, i. e. national policy, national ideology, etc. National, then, becomes 
nationality by virtue of the people's membership to a nation. Finally, nationalists are 
those who support nationalism in the sense described above. A nationalist, alternatively, 
may also refer to someone who tends to exalt devotion to his or her nation at the expense 
of all other considerations. 
In the field of intemational political- economy, the tenn economic nationalism is 
often used as an as an associative term to that of nationalism. Generally, economic 
nationalism is a mercantilist ideology that emphasises the partnership between the state 
and market (Balaam and Veseth 1996: 452). The term itself was widely used during the 
interwar years of the twentieth century (Heilperin 1960: 17). 53 Since then the concept of 
economic nationalism has been interpreted through various theoretical discourses (i. e. 
realist, liberal, and Marxist), most of which focus on the way in which production, 
exchange, consumption, and investment are governed by the state's interests (Crane 
1998: 56-7). According to realists, for example, economic nationalism is logical because 
the state must turn all national economic activities to its national advantage in order to 
minimise its relative material losses in the international arena (Gilpin 1987: 3 1). For neo- 
liberalists, on the other hand, economic nationalism is viewed as something that does not 
53 The study of economic nationalism, however, began in the nineteenth century. One of the most 
ystem of prominent scholars during that period was Friedrich List (1789-1846), who wrote The National S 
Political Economy (1904). Since then, many scholarly analyses of economic nationalism have drawn upon 
List's work. For a comprehensive analysis of List's concept of economic nationalism see, for example. 
Levy-Faur (I 997a; 1997b). 
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fit with liberal ideals of economy and development (Koffman 1990). 
54 Finally, from a 
Marxist standpoint, economic nationalism is simply the expression of capitalism that is 
conditioned by historical forces (Cox 1987). 55 Regardless of these different 
interpretations of the concept of economic nationalism, the term more generally refers to 
the 'proclivity of the state, firms and individuals for economic decisions, actions and 
alliance formation that seeks to advance the nation's domestic or international position at 
the potential commercial expense of foreign national or international interests' (Dent 
2002a: 25). 
Current debates around nationalism have given rise to other contemporary tenns 
associated with the concept of nationalism, which include forced nationalism and 
ethnonationalism. Whilst forced nationalism refers mainly to the 'extension, or a merger, 
of boundaries of states, [and is] related to homogeneous cultures between the states 
involved' (Hechter 2000: 15-17), ethrionationalism refers to the promotion of 'the 
principle of self-determination and the politics of opposition of an ethno-nation or a 
people, and challenges the state to change its discriminatory policies and oppressive 
behaviour' (Jalata 2001: 285-6). Forced nationalism is also often associated with the 
notion of irredentism, 56 which can be identified as the 'desire to reconstitute or redeem 
the unity and integrity of a particular ethnic group, historic entity or community' (Christie 
1996: 13 1). A forced nationalism or irredentism, then, might manifest as the annexation 
54 For other liberals' view on economic nationalism see also Johnson (1967). Although Johnson contends 
that economic nationalism does promote national identity, he also maintains that the pursuance of this 
policy does not produce real economic advancement. 55 For other Marxist inspired works on economic nationalism see also Arrighi (1994). 56 The doctrine of irredentism, according to Mayall (1990), derives from the Italian, irridenta. This word 
was associated with those territories, Trente, Dalmatia, Trieste, Fiume, all of which were culturally Italian, 
but remained under Swiss or Austrian rule and were unredeemed after the unification of Italy in 1861. 
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of a nation to become part of another, more powerful, nation (i. e. Indonesia's annexation 
of East Timor in 1975). Thus, geographical boundaries can be changed over time 
depending on the political relationship between a country and its neighbours, signifying 
the relativity of the nation-state concept. Ethnonationalism, on the other hand, is 
associated with the concept of secessionism from a large political unit under the nation- 
state due to differences in political ideology, language, unequal distribution of incomes, 
race, and cultural or historical backgrounds from the rest of the country. A major 
example of ethnonationalism can be seen in the experience of Canada in dealing with its 
province of Quebec. Because of their cultural differences Quebecois insist on being 
separate from the rest of Canada. This sense of provincial or smaller scale nationalism is 
called ethnonationalism. 
2.4.2. Nationalism in internationalpolitical economy 
Early studies of nationalism in the international politics have been linked closely 
with the rise of nation-state systems (Carr 1945; Cobban 1969), wars and tensions 
between nation-states (Howard 1991), and secessionist movements that are often 
characterised by ethnic and religious conflicts within a nation-state (Horrowitz 1985; 
Mayall 1990). From the 1970s onward, however, the focus of international politics 
shifted from military to economic issues (Katzenstein 1978a). The increasing 
intemationalisation of economic activities over recent years, particularly through 
regionalism and globalisation, has undermined the coherence of nation-states' nationalist 
ideology. In the late twentieth century, for instance, there have been claims that 
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6nationalism has become an anachronism' (Heywood, 2000: 256). Indeed, any 
interpretation of the relationship between nationalism and RIA or globalisation will often 
be contentious since RIA and globalisation normally act as a destabilising factor to 
nationalism. Not only do the processes of both RIA and globalisation require a nation- 
state to lower its barriers and allow outside influences within its sovereign borders, but 
they may also produce clashes between and within nation-states. It is, therefore, hardly 
surprising when nationalists pursue a strategy that undermines regional or global projects. 
Traditionally, one key variable in analysing the dynamic of nationalism in 
international politics and economics is the concept of national interest (Krasner 1979). 57 
Despite its wide use in foreign economic policy (FEP) analysis, the meaning of the term 
national (economic) interest remains vague (Frankel 1970: 15). Nevertheless, as Frankel 
(1970: 31-33) describes, national interest can be classified into aspirational, operational, 
and explanatory and polemical. At the aspirational level, national interest is seen as an 
ideal set of goals which, if possible, the state wishes to achieve. At the operational level, 
the national interest can be understood as the total sum of interests and policies actually 
pursued by the state. Finally, the explanatory and polemical level of national interest 
refers to the interrelationship between the aspirational and operational level. It is at this 
final level that the concept of national interest proves most significant since the distance 
between the two levels determines political dynamism. For Rosenau (1968: 34), 
however, the concept of national interest can be defined as both an analytical tool or as an 
57 As mentioned earlier, the concept of national interest is also central in neo-realists' analysis. In 
Morgenthau's (1952: 961) view, for example, international politics can be seen as a process in which 
national interests are adjusted. Accordingly, policy-makers 'think and act in terms of interest defined as 
power' (Morgenthau 1978: 5). See also Thompson and Myers (1984) for the assessment of Morgenthau's 
political philosophy on national interest. 
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instrument of political action. As an analytical tool, the national interest is the 
benchmark which the adequacy of a country's foreign policy is analysed. As a political 
action, on the other hand, the national interest can be described as the way in which such 
a policy is justified. At both levels, the concept simply means what is best for the society 
of a nation. As a whole, however, it is right to suggest that national interest is 'of great 
significance to the survival of the state' (Fifield 1979: 20). 
It is, however, very difficult to determine a nation-state's national interests. Such 
difficulty primarily stems from the miscalculation or misinterpretation of the 'perception, 
priority, and permanence' (Fifield 1979: 19) of various domestic interest groups in the 
country. The perceptions of domestic interest groups are shaped by various factors, 
including geopolitics, history, and social and economic factors. Furthermore, the national 
interest only specifies the state's FEP objectives, not the way in which the state 
implements such aspirations (Katzenstein 1978b). It is for this reason that, as 
Katzenstein (1978b: 297-306) further postulates, it is necessary to distinguish between 
policy objectives and policy instruments when analysing a state's FEP. Here, policy 
objectives imply certain values that are ascribed to a state and the society in a country. 
Thus, great vanations in policy objectives are only to be expected between different 
nation-states. Policy instruments, on the other hand, determine the success of such 
objectives in the process of policy implementation. There are vast array of policy 
instruments that a state can utilise, including licenses, tariffs, quotas, fiscal policies, tax 
credits, etc. 
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Apart from its emphasis on the concept of national interest, traditional analysis of 
FEP has also focused on the international factors that influence the way in which FEP is 
formulated, whilst ignoring the importance of domestic structures (Katzenstein 1978a). 
Here, it is useful to utilise the three approaches to FEP formulation proposed by 
Ikenberry et al. (1988: 1-2). The first approach is a system-centred, and explains a 
nation-state's FEP as a function of the attributes or capabilities of that nation-state 
relative to other nation-states. In this context, government officials respond to a set of 
opportunities or constraints that their country confronts at a specific point in time and, 
thus, international systems condition the state's FEP. The second approach is a society- 
centred, and views the fonnulation of a nation-state's FEP as either reflecting the 
preferences of the dominant group or class in society, or as resulting from the struggle of 
influence amongst various interest groups or political parties. This approach is most 
applicable to a democratic society. Here, FEP is a reflection of the ideal of the majority 
of the population, which is then transformed into policy by the policy-makers. Finally, 
the third, or state-centred, approach shows the state to be the most important independent 
variable in the FEP formulation process, where FEP is mainly employed by the state 
under an autocratic political system. In this context, the objective of FEP formulation is 
associated with the justification of policy-makers' will to pursue a certain course of 
action. Such action is assumed to represent the best interests of the majority of the 
population. 
Another important analytical framework that focuses on the relationship between 
national domestic constituencies and international policy-making processes has been put 
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forward by Putnam (1988) in his two-level game analysis. In his theoretical framework, 
Putnam (Putnam 1988:. 434) asserts that 'at the national level (level II), domestic groups 
pursue interests by pressuring the government to adopt favourable policies, and 
politicians seek power by constructing coalitions amongst those groups. At the 
international level (level 1), national governments seek to maximise their own ability to 
satisfy domestic pressures, whilst minimising the adverse consequences of foreign t: ý 
development'. 58 Putnam's argument stresses the sovereign nature of the state, whilst 
pointing out that nation-states have to realise the increasing interdependencies between 
one another themselves. Neither level of the game should be ignored for to do so would 
result in conflicts between the constituents in either the domestic or international arena. 
A variation to Putnam's two-level game theory was offered by Guerreri and Padoan 
(1989: 21-9), who hold that a win-set situation is characterised by 'popularity and 
reputation'. Whilst popularity depends on the ruling regime and ideological preferences, 
the reputation of a country depends on the country's ability to resist external or 
international pressures. With regard to the way in which international (or regional) 
economic integration policy might be pursued, Guerreri and Padoan (1989 24-5) propose 
that 'this can be done in two, not mutually exclusive, ways'. One is to conduct an 
outward looking strategy, which requires a government to be strong internationally, 
whilst the other is to conduct an inward looking strategy, which requIres strong domestIc 
conditions. National economic policy choices with regard to a country's involvement in 
an RIA or any other multilateral arrangement would depend on the definition of that 
country's long-terin goals and strategies and the relationship between the state and its 
constituencies. Such national choices are characterised in tenns of the supply and 
58 For a detailed explanation of the two-level game theory analysis see also Evans et al (1993). 
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demand of the policies. Whilst it is the state that supplies the policy in exchange for 
popularity, interest groups are those who determine the demand. 
In recent years, scholarly analysis of FEP has attempted to explore further the 
importance of domestic structure in the FEP formulation process. Amongst others, 
Dent's (2002a) analysis of contesting actor-based influence is Particularly useful. From a 
domestic perspective, Dent (2002a: 24-5) asserts that the process of FEP formulation is 
contingent upon: first, state bureaucratic power, culture, and dynamics; second, level of 
democratisation; third, internationalisation. of civil society; and, fourth, economic 
nationalism. Firstly, state bureaucratic power, culture and dynamics determine FEP since 
policy-makers have the ability to develop their own predilection towards the setting of 
specific policy objectives. A strong emphasis on state bureaucratic power, culture and 
dynamics generally occurs in a state-centric society where constituents hold limited 
influence over FEP fonnulation. Secondly, the formation of the state's FEP is also 
dependent upon the level of democratisation in the society. Countries with a higher level 
of democratisation are more likely to be influenced by constituents in the FEP 
formulation process. Thirdly, the level of a civil society's influence over FEP is also 
dependent upon their knowledge regarding international political and economic 
conditions. More outward-looking societies are more likely to assert a greater stake in 
the FEP formulation process, and vice-versa. Fourthly, the level of economic nationalism 
also plays an important role in determining the FEP of a state. Nationalist economic 
measures are invariably implemented through strong industrial policies or the 
implementation of high import barriers (i. e. protection), much of which are applied to 
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infant strategic industries within a country. There are also some cases where the huge 
assets of foreign firms may be confiscated after their operation inside a country for some 
time. At other times, foreign firms may not be allowed to enter a country to invest in 
large industries since these industries are seen to serve only the interests of local 
economic or political constituents. 
It is, therefore, clear that an analysis of contemporary FEP is incomplete when a 
focus upon domestic structure is neglected (Katzenstein 1976: 2). A country's FEP can 
either be economically nationalist or liberal in nature, or somewhere in between, 
depending upon the immediate interests of domestic constituents. However, the recent 
nationalist interest in RIA and globalisation have varied, at least since the post Cold War 
period, depending upon the degree to which such schemes are seen to serve the interests 
of a nation. It is important to note that there are times when nationalists may also express 
strong support for their country's involvement in a regional co-operation scheme, or even 
in a multinational arrangement. Whilst the issue of sovereignty marks the foundation of 
much of the criticism attached to RIA, it is also important to stress that 'when two or 
more countries sign a treaty, they agree to do and / or not to do specified things. 
Therefore, it is not a valid criticism of any international treaty to say that it entails a loss 
of national sovereignty' (Jovanovich 1992: 10). Furthermore, there are also times when 
nationalists may express great interest in regionalism, especially as a means to promote 
their nation autonomy, identity, and unity (Shulman 2000). Nevertheless, nationalist 
support for regionalism and globalisation only exists when it is seen to serve their 
national interests. 
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2.5. The gap within the existing literature concerning the relationship between 
regionalism and nationalism 
Limited attention has been given to the dynamic nature of the relationship 
between nationalism and regionalism. Nationalists' reactions towards regionalism are 
often hostile whilst most proponents of regionalism insist that nationalism should be 
weakened or overcome (Shulman 2000: 365). This hostile attitude has been prevalent 
amongst nationalists since 'the increase in the volume of trade, migration and cross- 
border financial transactions, the emergence of regional trading blocs, and the global 
reach of TNCs signal the erosion of national borders' (Goff 2000: 533). This thesis, 
however, argues that there are ways in which a symbiotic characteristic can be established 
in the relationship between nationalism and regionalism. Moreover, previous studies on 
nationalism and regionalism tend to treat the two as mutually exclusive. As a result, most 
previous studies fail to explain why convergence can emerge from the seemingly 
divergent national interests of the states involved in a regional grouping (Schirm 2002: 
8). 
Regionalism theories themselves are fragmented in their view towards 
nationalism; all placing different weight upon the concept of nationalism. Although 
(neo) realists regard states as the most important players in the international arena, they 
fail to pay attention to other major domestic constituents (i. e. nationalists or liberals) that 
also have the potential to change the course of the state's FEP. Meanwhile, both the neo- 
liberal institutionalists and the structuralists have been too preoccupied with the issue of 
global capitalism. Moreover, both social constructivists and NRT theorists are correct to 
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propose that regionalism is a process. However, both theories have been vague in their 
explanation of the way in which the institutionalisation of regional projects or activities 
must take place in order to create a specific market or economy (Bajo 2001: 42). In 
addition, although NRT theorists have constantly maintained that the relationship 
between nationalism and regionalism is symbiotic (Hettne 1999; Schulz et al. 2001 a), 
their explanations are still flawed and lack significant depth on this particular issue. 
Finally, REI analysis of free trade areas has been too preoccupied with intra regional 
trade as the benchmark of regionalism. REI theory has an implication, particularly on the 
results of implementation (Lawrence 1995: 7). If, for example, tariffs have been 
removed, problems can emerge where the countries involved have different regulatory 
policies. Thus, changing a regulatory policy within a country can affect the social policy 
of other member countries. 
Gaps also exist in previous analyses of nationalism, mainly because scholars, such 
as Geertz (1963) and Connor (1978) of nationalism have been too preoccupied with the 
notion of commonality amongst people within a specific geographical area. Such 
commonality is seen to derive from common language, race, tradition, historical 
background, and even religion. 59 Although this analysis is important in explaining why 
nationalism persists even in modem times (Birch 1989: 3), it fails to explain the 
supportive role that nationalism can play within the growing pattern of regionalism. 
Moreover, nationalism has been dubbed as an agency of destruction (Cobban 1969: 249) 
59 For an analysis of the main narratives on nationalism see, for example, A. D. Smith (2000: 2). Here, 
Smith observes that the narratives of nationalism can be summarised into four paradigms, including 
primordialism, perrenialism, modernism, and ethnosymbolism. Whilst the former two are mainly 
concerned with the question of which element, nationalism or a nation, comes first, the latter two are 
concerned with the contemporary development and the fragmentation of nationalism. 
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that often acts as a catalyst in propagating wars between nation-states. In the view of 
Fukuyama (1989), for example, nationalism has emerged as one of the most potentially 
powerful ideological rivals to economic liberalism. It is, however, possible to find some 
common ground between nationalists and regionalists. As will be argued throughout this 
thesis, nationalists do not necessarily feel hostile towards regionalism. 
The final gap that will be addressed in this thesis is the fact that most existing FEP 
literature focuses on the context of developed countries. Much of the FEP analysis, from 
Katzenstein (1976; 1978a; 1978b), Hawley (1983), Ikenberry et al. (1988), Hocking and 
Smith (1997), to more recent analyses, such as Dent (2002a), have focused primarily 
upon the formulation of FEP in developed countries and newly industrialised economies 
(NIEs) . 
60 An attempt to bridge this gap has been provided by Shulman (2000) who tries 
to analyse the FEP of nationalists in both India and Ukraine. However, analyses of this 
subject in the context of Southeast Asian developing countries have been limited. Many 
analyses, particularly with reference to Indonesia, have been subsumed into the context of 
foreign policy in general. 61 It is, therefore, necessary to provide a new focus upon the 
formulation of FEP in developing countries in order to examine and understand current 
debates on the new pattern of regionalism. 
60 Although Dent (2002a) attempts to make a universal application in his analysis of FEP, his case study 
focuses on the newly industrialising countries of Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia, such as Singapore, 
Taiwan, and South Korea. 
61 See in particular, Leifer (1983) and Anwar (1994; 2000; 200 1 a). 
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2.6. Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a detailed theoretical analysis of the relationship 
between regionalism and nationalism. The analysis has demonstrated that the 
relationship between nationalism and regionalism is dynamic. This chapter began with 
an analysis of the various different perspectives that prevail within the theoretical study 
of regionalism. Regional integration theory has gradually transformed since its first wave 
into a second wave of integration. Many regional integration theories during the first 
wave were dominated by (neo) realist, neo-liberal institutionalist, and structuralist points 
of view. Each perspective provides a different focus on regionalism. Realists and neo- 
realists, for example, focus upon the state's aggressive behaviour, and argue that 
regionalism emerges as a result of political polarisation in world politics. Meanwhile, the 
neo-liberal institutionalist analysis rests on the principle of market and trade 
liberalisation, and offers the theory that regionalism emerges as a result of an increasing 
economic interdependency amongst countries in a specific region. Structuralists, on the 
other hand, challenge the neo-liberal institutionalist idea, and hold that an increasing 
pattern of regionalism will only further marginalise a peripheral region. Another analysis 
of the emerging pattern of regionalism looks instead through the lens of economics, and 
this approach has become a common focus for the study of the various regional groupings 
forming throughout the world. Despite some fallacies within these approaches, such 
theones provide useful stepping-stones for further studies of RIA. 
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New political science analyses have emerged since the end of the Cold War. Both 
social constructivism and NRT attempt to provide a mediating status for regionalism, 
particularly in reference to the much-debated conflict between nationalism and 
globalisation. The recent proliferation of regionalism is a response to the new challenges 
that states have met in the international arena. From such a viewpoint, regionalism is 
functional and fully compatible with the concept of national interest (Schinn 2002: 10). 
The emergence of regionalism does not mean the full erosion of the nation-state system. 
Such an analysis would propose that the emergence of regionalism is logical in that it can 
provide strategies for nation-states when dealing with globalisation issues and effects. 
The role of regionalism within the world order, as Falk (1999: 80) asserts, 'is to help 
create a new equilibrium in politics that balances the protection of the vulnerable and the 
interest of humanity as a whole against integrative, technological dynamic associated 
with globalism'. Therefore, regionalism can be seen as a middle ground that is able to 
accommodate the notions of both nationalism and globalisation. 
The analysis of nationalism presented in this chapter has focused upon te 
literature provided by the discipline of international political economy. Largely 
speaking, the traditional literature interprets nationalism in terms of feelings about the 
country in which one is born and resides. Such feelings stem from the establishment of a 
commonality amongst the people that live within a particular area or region. An analysis 
of nationalism at the level of international politics and economy, however, suggests that 
contemporary nationalism constitutes a much more complex issue. This is particularly 
true when nationalism is examined vis-a-vis regionalism and / or globalisation. Whilst 
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the traditional approach to nationalism focuses upon the concept of nation building and 
the modem nation-state, contemporary literature on nationalism places greater emphasis 
on inter-state relations. The dynamic relationship between nationalism and regionalism is 
significant in the case study that will be presented in this thesis. Indonesia's position in 
ASEAN is seen as problematic, because whilst the country is seen to have the potential to 
be the region's leader, domestic economic, social and political problems render It 
incapable. Despite this, the Association continues to exist and has conducted an initial 
form of economic integration through the implementation of AFTA in 2002. 
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Chapter 3: 
Nationalists and Regional Integration Strategy 
3.1. Introduction 
The global political economy is continuously changing and in today's world, 
globalism and regionalism exist alongside growing nationalism and etlinonationalism, in 
spite of their apparent contradiction of each other (Bereciartu 1994; Halliday 1997; 
Ldhteenmdki and Kdk6nen 1999). Given today's increasing international economic 
integration, nationalists, like other domestic actors, are being forced to change or adjust 
their ideas and strategies. Nationalists are 'by no means uniformly hostile to free trade 
and close economic ties with other states or nations' (Shulman 2000: 364). This chapter 
provides a detailed analysis of the factors that motivate nationalists to support or to 
pursue a regional integration strategy (RIS). More specifically, it offers a detailed 
theoretical framework to analyse the symbiotic nature of the relationship between 
nationalism and regionalism. This symbiotic relationship refers to the notion that the 
existence of both nationalism and regionalism can be mutually beneficial, although in 
some cases one variable benefits at the other's expense, or, in other cases, neither 
variable benefits at all. 
In order to facilitate this argument, the New Regionalism Theory / Approach 
(NRT / NRA) is used as an analytical tool to examine the symbiotic nature of the 
relationship between the two variables. This is because NRT persists in stressing the 
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flexible and fluid nature of recent patterns of regionalism. Consequently, the analysis in 
this chapter is divided into three sections. The first section focuses upon a broad 
explanation of the position of nationalism as a new focus within NRT analysis. The 
second section analyses the ways in which nationalists pursue an RIS. The examples in 
this section reflect the experiences of Indonesian nationalists in dealing with an RIS. 
Finally, the relationship between Indonesian nationalism and ASEAN's efforts to build 
up regionalism is presented and analysed as empirical evidence to explain the symbiotic 
nature of the relationship between nationalism and regionalism. 
3.2. Nationalism as a new domain in New Regionalism Theory analysis 
Although analyses of nationalism in NRT analysis are not uncommon, there has 
been no specific explanation of the nature of the relationship between regionalism and 
nationalism in the literature of NRT (see, for example, Palmer 199 1; Hettne 1999; Schulz 
et al. 2001). However, NRT's emphasis on the multidimensionality, heterogeneity, 
flexibility, and fluidity of regionalism today allows us to expand the current analysis of 
NRT beyond the regional-global nexus. With the increasing involvement of domestic 
actors in current international affairs, it is imperative to include the domestic domain in 
an analysis of the new regionalism. In the view of one of the main proponents of NRT, 
Hettne (1994: 1), the current 'process of globalisation and regionalisation [can be] 
articulated within the same larger process of global structural change'. This view, 
however, neglects the importance of the domestic domain in its analysis of regionalism. 
It is for this reason that the current analysis of NRT is expanded to argue that 'regions 
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and regionallsation. must be understood in a global perspective, as well as that in the 
interrelated global -regional-national-local levels' (Schulz et aL 2001a: 13-14). 
Regionalism is, indeed, a complex subject, and, as such, it should be treated in a 
multidisciplinary fashion, as there are no fixed definitions that can be attached to the 
tenn. 
By the late 1990s, a more comprehensive approach was introduced to explain the 
global-regional-national-local nexus in NRT analysis to include the 'world (global) 
system, interregional relation, the region, and the sub-national level' (Hettne 1999: 14-5). 
At the world (global) level, NRT analysis is concerned with the decline of the hegemonic 
powers, particularly in the context of the transformation from bipolarity to multipolarity. 
The emergence of a multipolar world order implies an increasing pattern of regionalism. 
At the interregional level, emphasis is placed upon the idea of action and response, or 
interaction that emerges between different regional groupings in the world. Moreover, 
this level of analysis also suggests a greater interdependency between different RIAs 
throughout the world. Furthennore, a regional level analysis stresses the process of 
homogenisation in terms of culture, security, economic policies and political systems. 
More importantly, this level of analysis maintains that a region often constitutes arenas 
for both the competing and converging national interests of member countnes. Finally, at 
the sub-national level, primary analysis is made of the argument that the process of 
regionalisation is triggered by various forms of disintegration at the sub-national level. 
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One of NRT's major ideas that is useful to explain the relationship between 
regionalism and nationalism is the notion of the spontaneous process of regionalism, 
which primarily refers to the actors that are involved in the regionalisation process 
(Hettne 1999: 9; Schulz et aL 200 1 a: 13). During the first wave of regionalism, there was 
a tendency for state actors to play a dominant role in deten-nming the future of regional 
projects, including the process of institutionalisation. This has not been the case with the 
second wave of regionalism, which is because of the overwhelming domestic and global 
issues that states now have to handle. It is for this reason that the 'international 
community has had to come to accept the legitimacy and activity of several types of 
influential non-state actors' (Shaw 1994: 140) at both international and national levels. 
Since the second wave, non-state actors have begun to enter into the process of 
promoting regionalism. In the past, social actors, such as the religious community and 
transnational corporations (TNCs), have played an important role in informal 
transnational, if not regional, activities. Today, however, this role has been expanded to 
include new actors, such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society 
organisations (CSOs), both of which are equally active in promoting greater interactions 
between citizens of different countries. ' The regionalisation process from within has 
been particularly evident in Southeast Asia in recent years. Apart from the recent 
expansion of a number of ASEAN-affiliated NGOs, 2 the first ASEAN People's Assembly 
1 The rise of NGOs and CSOs is not actually a new phenomenon. International organisations (10s), such as 
the UN, have been promoting such organisations for the past fifty years. One of the main factors that drive 
IOs to support these non-goverrimental agencies is the fact that their actions can be felt directly or 
indirectly by both their endorsers and recipients (Gordenker and Weiss 1996: 17). Moreover, Makito 
(1999: 177) also argues that one of the main factors that drive states to allow non-state actors to promote 
regionalism is the fact that many domestic non-state actors, particularly NGOs and CSOs, are 'naturally 
issue-oriented or even issue specific'. By being issue-oriented or issue specific, NGOs and CSOs are in a 
position to act as major advisory groups for the state. 
2 Refer to Appendix I for a detailed list of current ASEAN-affiliated NGOs. 
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(APA), which was held in Batam, Indonesia, in 2000, was a recent example of the push to 
include non-state actors in the regionalisation process. 3 
Another major feature of NRT analysis that is useful to explain the symbiotic 
nature of the relationship between regionalism and nationalism is the transition from 
protectionism, which was prevalent during the first wave of regionalism, to a more 
outward and more market-oriented form of regionalism (Palmer 1991; Bhalla and Bhalla 
1997; Hettne 1999; Hettne and S6derbaum 2000). The recent intensification of global 
economic interactions has pushed countries to ease off on the high economic barriers that 
they used to impose in the past. Hence, the new regionalism has been generally 
characterised by an open economic system, which is being driven mainly by the markets 
and technology (Barry and Keith 1999). In fact, one of the main alms when the concept 
of new regionalism was launched was to avoid the kind of regionalisation that would 
limit the scope for global economic liberalisation (Od6n 1999: 164). This more open 
world economic system is best illustrated in the recent World Bank (2001) report, which 
indicates that substantial cuts in tariffs levels have been made since the late 1980s or 
early 1990S. 4 It is, however, a matter of controversy as to whether an open economic 
system actually prevails in the global trading system today. In Ethier's (2001: 5) 
3 The first APA was initiated by the ASEAN Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS). 
The Institute currently has eight members, including the Brunei Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Cambodian 
Institute for Co-operation and Peace (CICP), the Indonesian Centre for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS), the Laos Institute for Foreign Affairs, the Malaysian Institute for Strategic and International 
Studies (ISIS), the Philippines' Institute for Strategic and Development Studies (ISDS), the Singapore 
Institute of International Affairs (SIIA), Thailand's Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS), 
and Vietnam's Institute for International Relations (11R). The APA was based on the rationale that 
community building in Southeast Asia must include all sectors of society. It was deemed imperative that 
ASEAN, as a regional institution, must be made relevant to the ordinary citizens of each of the member 
states (ASEAN-ISIS 2000). 
4 Refer to Appendix 2 for data on the level of tariff barriers since the collapse of bipolarity in the late 
1980s. 
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analysis, for example, since 'a dramatic move to free trade between member [countries] 
is not central, the degree of liberalisation is usually modest'. Nevertheless, the tendency 
towards a more open or more market-oriented regionalism amongst most RIAs today 
suggests a shift of attitude amongst state and domestic actors in each RIA member 
country towards an increasing pattern of globalisation and regionalisation. 
In the Southeast Asian context, one major fundamental shift that indicates the 
transformation away from the first wave of regionalism to the second wave of 
regionalism in the economic field is the region's pursuance of an open regionalism 
concept (Palmer 1991; Hallet and Braga 1994). However, unlike regionalism elsewhere 
in the world, the open regionalism concept in Southeast Asia has not been associated with 
advanced integration schemes, such as the common market, but cross-border investments 
and a flexible and a well-functioning financial system (Od6n 1999: 161). The demise of 
the Cold War, in particular, had a definite impact on ASEAN countries, enabling them to 
expand their activities beyond the region. Amongst other factors, the intensification of 
regional economic trade, particularly since the early 1990s, has made it possible for 
ASEAN countries to enhance economic co-operation with countries beyond Southeast 
Asia. One example of this is the interest shown by ASEAN member countries to become 
involved in Asia-Pacific regionalism, under the auspices of the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Co-operation (APEC). A more recent example of the tendency of ASEAN member 
countries to pursue a more outward and open economic policy with external parties is 
their involvement in the ASEAN plus Three (APT) mechanism. To date, however, APT 
has been regarded with scepticism by the West since membership has included countries 
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that should have been members of the failed East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC), 
which was first proposed to safeguard the interests of East Asian countries in various 
multilateral negotiations (Leong 2000: 71). Beyond East Asia and the Asia-Pacific, 
ASEAN countries have also begun to rectify the weakness in their relations with the 
European Union (EU) by conducting closer bilateral efforts on both sides and by using 
the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) as a framework for inter-regional co-operation (Dent 
2001b: 25) .5 These examples suggest that the attitudes of Southeast Asian state and non- 
state actors today have transformed, and are more accommodating of the emerging 
patterns of regionalisation and globalisation. 
More importantly, however, NRT's ability to explain the symbiotic nature of the 
relationship between nationalism and regionalism can be seen through the theory's 
emphasis upon the gradual transformation of a nation-state into a region-state (Hettne and 
S6derbauni 2000: 462-8). More comprehensively, both NRT theorists maintain that the 
new regionalism can be explained as a gradual transformation from nation-states into a 
regional space, regional society, regional community, and, finally, a region-state (refer to 
fig. 3.1. ) (Hettne and S6derbaum 2000: 462). These phases allow us to construct a 
general idea on how a region evolves into a more formalised institution, which is similar 
5 ASEM is comprised of ten Asian nations, fifteen European nations, and the European Commission. The 
prime motive for this meeting grew from the recognition of the need to strengthen the linkage between 
Europe and Asia. The first meeting was held on 1-2 March 1996, in Bangkok, and was followed up in 
London, on 3-4 April 1998. Prior to the creation of ASEM, however, both Southeast Asia and countries of 
the then European Community (EC) had a long-standing partnership, and such a relationship has been 
regarded as a model for a group-to-group inter-regionalism (Lukas 1989; Mols 1990). Although ASEM 
has different, even conflicting, agendas to other regional groupings that ASEAN countries are involved in, 
such as APEC, both forums allow the East Asian policy makers to consolidate political and economic 
communication with North America via APEC and the EU via ASEM (Higgot 1999: 194). Further 
information on the background to ASEM's creation can also be found at the ASEM official website 
(accessed 2003) at: 
http: //as-em. inter. net. th/asem-info/backp, round. htnil 
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to the process of the formation of the nation-state system. At the regional space level, 
NRT analysis maintains that a region is composed of a group of people sharing similar 
historical antecedents, cultures, and values. 6 It is at this level that regional actors and 
organisations conduct regional projects that will act as a basic foundation for a more 
complex form of regionalism. Eventually, regional space evolves into a regional society 
in which interaction between groups from two or more different geographical locations 
within a region takes place. However, interactions at this level tend to be minimal and 
largely informal. The process of regionalisation becomes more complex with the 
introduction of a regional community, which implies the intensification of the interaction 
between those groups in the different geographical locations. At this point of the 
regionalisation process, the institutionalisation of various domestic non-state actors, such 
as the highly sophisticated traders and civil society groups, begins to take place. Through 
either conscious or unconscious acts, these actors start to play various roles in promoting 
regionalism. It is only within the region-state level that regionalism is finally 
institutionalised, and much of this is derived from a voluntary reaction towards the 
intensification of regional actors' interactions, rather than an involuntary reaction, such as 
in the case when a state initiates regionalism. Therefore, within the Eramework of NRT 
analysis, the institutionalisation of a regional grouping implies an evolutionary process 
from a nation-state to a region state. 
6 In Charrier's (2001: 315) analysis, the evolution from countries to a region also implies 'the recurrence of 
the concept of the region over time in a cultural context, both within the region and beyond It. ... 
Thus 
regional spaces develop an increasingly durable identity over time by the very fact of being repeatedly 
recognized as such in contemporary culture [sic]'. 
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Figure 3.1. The evolutionary process of regionalism 
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To sum up this analysis of NRT, it is important first of all to pinpoint some of the 
main characteristics of the theory. The first characteristic is that NRT attempts to be 
more critical and reflective than previous international relations theories by drawing upon 
a more comprehensive range of social sciences (Schulz et aL 2001c: 235). NRT, 
therefore, attempts to transcend the problem-solving theory associated with the state- 
centric and rationalist episternologies (Schulz et al. 2001c: 235). As a result, the new 
regionalism can be characterised as a more heterogeneous, comprehensive, 
multidimensional phenomenon, which is concerned with the state, market, and social 
actors, and covers a whole range of economic, cultural, political, security-related, and 
environmental aspects (Murphy and Tooze 1991; Hettne 1995; Cox 1996; Hoogvelt 
1997; Payne 1998; Schulz et aL 2001 a). This theory is particularly useful for studying 
the relationship between nationalism and regionalism primarily because of NRT's 
flexibility in comprehending the relationship between the two variables. The new 
patterns of regionalism do not necessarily imply a reduction of the nation-state's 
capacity, but can be seen as an extended form of nationalism. In this context, the nation- 
state is an entity that is given a specific function within larger global political structures 
(Hettne 1994: 36). 
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3.3. Nationalists' interests towards regional integration strategy 
Although the concept of nationalism has been discussed at great length in many 
NRT analyses, not much attention has been paid to the analysis of the relationship 
between nationalism and regionalism in NRT. 7 The contemporary wave of regionalism is 
only perceived as an extended form of nationalism (Seers 1983; Hettne 1999), or as an 
instrument that supplements and enhances the role of the state. This section of the 
chapter will provide expansion on the current analysis of NRT by arguing that the nature 
of the relationship between regionalism and nationalism is symbiotic. To begin with, it is 
important to start with an analysis of the importance of trade in diplomacy. As with 
bilateralism and multilateralism, RIA is essentially a form of diplomacy (Schiff and 
Winters 1998). Consequently, it is important to ask why trade might be used as a 
diplomatic measure (Winters 2001). One premise is that trade tends to increase 
understanding and harmony between partners, and the implementation of an FTA could 
be particularly beneficial if domestic actors hold such values in high regard (Schiff and 
Winters 1998). The second premise is that trade diplomacy in the regional context would 
encourage a higher degree of trust amongst the participating states (Bastian 1996). The 
third possible premise is that, in the politico-military context, an increase in trade 
amongst countries in the same alliance will allow member states to raise defence 
expenditures (Mansfield 1993). 8 In a specific reference to RIAs, Fawcett and Hurrell 
7 The prevailing hypothesis in much NRT literature is that globalism and regionalism stand in a symbiotic 
relationship (see, for example, Hettne et al. 1999), particularly since the new regionalism is analysed 
through the global structural transformation process (Schulz et al. 2001 a). 
8 This view, however, was challenged by Schiff and Winters (1997) for two reasons. The first is the fact 
that the very action of trade generates security benefits, regardless of the income effects that such actions 
may produce. The second is Mansfield's fallacy in assuming that the lowering of trade barriers would 
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(1995) also hold that the promotion of an RIA amongst different states is logical since 
this strategy allows the states involved to pool their sovereignties, enabling member 
states to acquire greater leverage to manage global pressures. 
Any analysis of the symbiotic nature of the relationship between nationalism and 
regionalism should draw upon the wide range of literature that specifically analyses the 
domestic rationale behind regionalism, 'much of which highlights interest group politics 
and societal pressures' (Mansfield and Milner 1997: 12). Some of this literature has 
focused on the distributive consequences accrued by domestic politics in pursuing certain 
(foreign) economic policies (Caves 1976; Pincus 1977; Baldwin 1985). This line of 
study analyses the degree of support or opposition towards certain (foreign) economic 
policies, which is largely dependent upon the costs and benefits to be gained by the 
domestic politics. Certain foreign economic policies are pursued if the benefits accrued 
by domestic groups exceed those of the costs, and vice-versa (Mansfield and Milner 
1997: 12). Other literature analyses the interactions between social and state actors. 
Here, Krasner (1979), in particular, contends that the fonnulation of an (foreign) 
economic policy is intended to advance the nation-state's national interests. On the other 
hand, however, Magee et aL (1989) and Grossman and Helpman (1994) maintain that the 
formulation of (foreign) economic policy is strictly intended to advance the personal 
interests of the policy makers (i. e. to maintain political power or to secure economic 
resources for personal use). 
allow member states to generate income gains. For Schiff and Winters, however, trade preferences based 
on income should always be considered ambiguous (second best). 
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There are a few hypotheses that have been developed to analyse the reactions of 
politico-economic actors to regionalism. One hypothesis, for example, focuses upon the 
type of domestic pressure groups capable of pushing for protectionist measures in a 
regional trade liberalisation process (Hoekman and Leidy 1993). In this context, 
Hoekman and Leidy divide domestic industrial sectors into two types, namely holes and 
loopholes. Whilst some domestic actors support the protectionist measures attached to all 
domestic industries (also called holes), others are satisfied with the provisions that allow 
for only temporary protection such as import restrictions, import subsidies, etc (also 
called loopholes). Other scholars, such as De Melo and Panagariya (1993), argue that the 
4preference dilution effect' and the 'preference- asymmetry effect' may limit the power 
and the rent-seeking behaviour of domestic pressure groups. The preference dilution 
effect implies that the larger the political community, the less influence can be exerted by 
domestic pressure groups on the policy-making process. The preference asymmetry 
effect, on the other hand, allows for compromises on a specific issue to take place 
amongst different state actors and domestic pressure groups across a region. 
Another argument focuses on the formation of an RIA as a response of policy 
makers to domestic pressures. In Milner's (1997: 76-77) view, the formation of regional 
trade agreements can be seen as a government's attempt to balance consumer interests 
with the pressures that emerge from private economic agents, such as firms. For Cohen 
(1997: 65-7), it is the conflict between the state and social actors that has to be 
considered. He maintains that the formation of a currency region tends to reduce a 
govemment's ability to finance public spending via inflation. In this case, it is likely that 
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private economic actors would want to switch their investments from a local currency to 
investments in a foreign currency. However, Cohen also reminds us that certain 
segments of society would find it easier to make such an adjustment than others (Cohen 
1997: 73). 9 Another attempt to link patterns of regionalism with domestic economic 
conditions is provided by Haggard (1997), who argues that deeper integration in Latin 
America, in comparison to the Asia-Pacific region, has been facilitated by Latin 
America's numerous domestic economic crises. These crises have fostered a greater 
demand for formal institutionalisation to take place in Latin America than in the Asia- 
Pacific region. Nonetheless, most of the aforementioned literature fails to provide any 
distinct focus on the attitudes of nationalists towards the formulation of a state's foreign 
economic policy (FEP) in an RIA. 
In order to establish a more constructive analysis on the Interests of nationalists 
towards an RIS, it is necessary to first of all identify the four types of nationalism, which 
include generic nationalism, state-centred or bureaucratic nationalism, economic 
nationalism, and ethnonationalism. Firstly, generic nationalism is associated with the 
concept of nationalism as a political, cultural, and ethnic ideology (Heywood 2000: 254). 
This type of nationalism involves using the nation's ideal to further specifically political 
ends (political nationalism), defending or promoting a national language, religion, or way 
of life (cultural nationalism), and practicing distinctiveness and exclusivity (ethnic 
nationalism). Within the context of this thesis, generic nationalism will be regarded as a 
popular expression of nationalist sentiment amongst the general public within a country. 
9 According to Cohen (1997: 73), the groups most capable of making such an adjustment are those that fall 
within the higher income group. 
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Secondly, bureaucratic nationalism refers to the nationalist expression that is prevalent 
amongst the political-elite and decision makers within a country. Central to an analys's 
of bureaucratic nationalism is the materialist and instrumentalist explanation or 
approachlo to the dynamism of romantic nationalism (Gellner 1964; Nairn 1977), " which 
primarily argues that the nation was invented by political elites (bureaucratic units) in 
order to legitimise their power (Hobsbawn 1983). 12 Thirdly, echoing an earlier analysis 
in Chapter 2, economic nationalism can be described as an expression of nationalism 
amongst political and economic actors within a country with the purpose of reducing 
foreign economic control in their country (through the imposition of high tariff barriers, 
quotas, the nationalisation of foreign finns, etc). Fourthly, ethnonationalism refers to the 
'emotional identification of a [smaller] group [within a nation-state] which shares culture, 
values, language, and genealogical line to real or fictive ancestors' (Andaya 1997: 13 1). 13 
Ethnonationalism is normally a weapon with which to challenge the established nation- 
state, particularly in response to discriminatory or oppressive policies directed towards 
the ethno-nations. 
14 
10 This explanation or approach is also known as the Marxist approach to the rise of nationalism. 
II For Gellner (1964), in particular, nationalism generally appeals to the educated, upper-middle classes. 
Nationalism, however, arises mostly in peripheral areas where the mobilisation of the masses is more likely 
to take place. Such mobilisations would normally be able to reach the developmental goal of those local 
educated bourgeoisie. 
12 Other scholars, particularly Anderson (1983) and Breully (1985), also employ a Marxist approach to 
bureaucratic nationalism. In Anderson's view, for example, the modem nation is an artefact of an imagined 
political community. He identifies print capitalism and new genres of newspapers and novels as tools used 
by the political elite to portray a nation as homogeneous. Similarly, Breully identifies the modem 
bureaucratic state as the genesis of nationalism. Breully also noted that during the seventeenth century 
nationalism seemed to offer the best solution to the conflicts prevalent between states and society. 
13 In the Malay-Indonesian context, it could be described as suku, which literally means ethnic group. 
14 By using a typology of ethrionationalism, or secessionism, based on levels of economic and educational 
Progress or backwardness, Horrowitz (1985) demonstrates that ethnonationalism is most likely to occur 
amongst groups in poor regions rather than groups in more developed regions. 
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Figure 3.2. 
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Moreover, all forins of nationalism can either be expressed romantically or 
logically. Romantic nationalism here is defined as a form of nationalism that feels pride 
in the achievements and the conventional values of the nation. In the Indonesian context, 
romantic nationalism would involve excessive pride about the historic struggle against 
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General cxpresýýion of 
nationalism 
imperialism, the richness of natural resources in the country, and the geographical size 
and large population of the country. These normally generate an inward-looking attitude 
amongst Indonesian nationalists. In the international arena, this attitude is characterised 
by arrogance and hostility to other nations. For example, the hostility expressed by the 
Indonesian government towards Malaya' 5 in the early 1963 was partly motivated by the 
long-standing expansionist sentiment held by many Indonesian nationalist leaders 
(Gordon 1966; Reinhardt 1971). The decision made by Sukarno, the Indonesian 
President at the time, to crush Malaya was viewed by some section of the Indonesian 
politics, particularly the army, as part of his nationalist cause (Smith 2000a: 11). Logical 
nationalism, on the other hand, is a more moderate form of nationalism. In the 
Indonesian context, logical nationalism would suggest a more outward approach towards 
international affairs and a more pragmatic approach in the use of Indonesian foreign 
policy. The expression of logical nationalism can be illustrated in the increase use of 
regional integration strategy (RIS) amongst Indonesian policy-makers in the early 1990s 
as a response to the strengthening of regionalism in Western Europe and North America 
(Hill 2000: 85). 
The relationship between nationalism and regionalism is symbiotic; the two 
variables can sometimes be mutually reinforcing, and sometimes mutually exclusive and 
conflicting. In order to understand this relationship further, it is necessary to analyse the 
attitudes and preferences of domestic actors. This analysis will be confined to contexts in 
which the state is attempting to conduct closer economic ties with foreign nations through 
the pursuance of an RIS, and on the support or opposition of domestic actors towards 
is Malaya today is known as Malaysia. 
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such an agreement. Particular attention here will be given to any nationalist reactions to 
such an agreement. Nationalists are one of many domestic groups that may adjust or 
change the state's FEP. Although previous international relations studies have tended to 
identify nationalists as opponents of FTAs, over recent years nationalists have not 
necessarily been hostile to free trade and closer economic ties with other states (Shulman 
2000: 365). As with other domestic actors, nationalists today have to adjust to the 
ongoing and intense pressures of globalism. and regionalism. Consequently, it is possible 
to identify general incentives that nationalists may benefit from by supporting an FTA. 
Nationalist support towards the promotion of an RIA is dependent upon many 
factors, as outlined above. It is, however, important to identify some of the main benefits 
that nationalists may accrue by pursuing an RIS. Here, the works of Shulman (2000) and 
Falk (1999) are particularly useful to explain the nationalists' interests towards the 
pursuance of an RIS. However, these analyses can be further explored and expanded. 
On the whole, nationalists pursue an RIS for the purpose of. - first, the achievement of 
sustained economic development; second, the promotion of national unity, identity and 
culture; third, the promotion of the state's autonomy in international fora; fourth, the 
formation of regional collective action to contain the negative forces of globallsm and to 
achieve regional governance through positive globalism and regionalism; and, fifth, the 
elevation of the nation-state's bargaining power at the international level (refer to fig. 
3.3). Some of these points can be interrelated. 
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Figure 3.3. 
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The achievement of sustained economic development 
The first major motive behind nationalist support for an RIS is the promise of 
sustained domestic economic development. Economic development has been one of the 
major objectives of various regional groupings throughout the world. From more 
advanced regional groupings, such as the EU, to less institutionalised. ones, such as 
NAFTA, ASEAN, and MERCOSUR, these groupings all have economic development as 
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part of their stated objectives. Although regionalism as a development policy has been 
tried in nearly all parts of the world, it has been a failure as far as development is 
concemed, much of which is due to excessive concems with trade (Hettne 2001: 14). 16 
Since the late 1990s, however, NRT has been trying to promote regionalism as a 
development policy by broadening the concept of development regionalism. In this 
context, development regionalism can be defined as 'concerted efforts from a group of 
countries within a geographical region to increase the complementarity and capacity of 
the total regional economy as well as finding the right balance between function and 
territory' (Hettne 2001: 14). The new wave of regionalism, therefore, provides a new 
alternative for nationalists to achieve sustained domestic economic development. In this 
context, instead of focusing upon the promotion of regional autarky and the creation of 
trade blocs (or inward-looking development), more emphasis is placed on the co- 
ordination of production, improvement of domestic infrastructure, and making use of the 
available complementarities as a regional development strategy (or development from 
within) (Hettne 2001: 16). 
One fundamental aspect of domestic economic development through RIS is the 
notion of economic openness (Pernia and Quising 2002: 4). Economic openness here is 
defined as a ftill engagement in international trade (Lipsey and Chrystal 1999: 578), 
which allows the free movement of goods and capital and limits import protectionist 
16 Certain literature links regionalism and development, notably development integration theory, which has 
focused on two sets of distributive instruments that promote economic development, namely compensatory 
mechanisms (i. e. transfer tax system, budgetary transfer, etc) and corrective mechanisms (i. e. planned 
industrial strategy, common investment code, etc) (Schulz et al. 2001: 11). For further analysis regarding 
the development integration theory, see also AxIine (1977), Robson (1987: 198-214), and Haarlov (1988: 
23). 
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quotas and foreign exchange controls. Nationalists today are, therefore, not solely 
associated with the promotion of protectionist policies but are keen to pursue trade 
liberalisation measures. One main factor behind this transformation is that nationalists 
have had to change or adjust their strategies to bolster their countries' power, prestige, 
and prosperity in an increasingly economically interdependent world (Crane 1999; 
Shulman 2000; Helleiner 2002; Pickel 2003). The notion of economic openness is 
particularly important because it is held to promote, inter alia, domestic economic 
competitiveness and economic growth. A country is said to be competitive if it is willing 
to 'meet the test of international markets while simultaneously maintaining and 
expanding the real incomes of its citizens' (OECD 1992: 242). Countries within a region 
normally pursue an RIS to push for greater efficiency in some of their domestic 
industries, thus enabling them to compete in the global markets. Subsequently, improved 
efficiency will allow these countries to experience economic growth. 
Moreover, in a multicultural society, the achievement of economic development 
through RIS, particularly through trade liberalisation mechanism, may not only stimulates 
prosperity and wealth throughout the country, but also reduces ethnonationalist 
sentiments. One of the reasons why certain areas within a country might demand greater 
autonomy is the failure of the central government to meet the demand of these ethno- 
nations' functional needs in tenns of strategic planning, co-ordination of governmental 
and non-govenuriental activities, and large-scale public service delivery (Parks and 
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Elcock 2000: 87). 17 Unequal economic distribution as conducted by the central 
government may trigger the demand for greater autonomy, or even independence, 
amongst the members of the ethno-nation. Therefore, an RIS or, specifically, trade 
liberalisation mechanisms may appeal to nationalists because they can act as a stimulant 
to economic growth and as an appeasement of nationalist sentiments amongst the 
members of the ethno-nation. Likewise, the quest for autonomy or sovereignty will be 
less attractive to the population of the ethno-nation if their functional demands are met. 
However, it is also important to note that the strengthening of economic institutions and 
the financial sector in the ethno-nation can pose a challenge to the established nation- 
state (Martin 1997: 255). With improved domestic economic development, ethno-nations 
will be able to lessen their economic dependence upon the central government. Thus, 
areas within a country that possess strong cultures that are distinct from the rest of the 
country will be more inclined to demand greater autonomy, if not full independence 
(Shulman 2000). 18 
17 Another main reason behind a region's demand for greater autonomy, as Park and Elcock (2000: 87) 
assert, is the development of strong, distinctive cultures and identities, which lead these ethno-nations to 
demand a specific title as a national region or stateless nation. 18 Quebec is the most commonly cited case to illustrate an ethno-nations' support for trade liberallsation for 
the purpose of lessening their economic dependence upon the central government's economy (Meadwell 
1993; Martin 1997; Shulman 2000). Although Quebecois nationalists initially expressed resistance towards 
free trade in the 1970s (Meadwell 1993: 223), they have supported trade liberalisation strategies since the 
1980s. Since the introduction of NAFTA in 1994, for example, the US has been perceived by Quebecois 
nationalists as a counter-balance towards the excessive English-Canadian dominance over Quebec. To 
date, greater integration amongst North American countries, under the auspices of NAFTA, has indeed 
lessened Quebec's dependence on English-Canada. For example, Quebec interprovincial trade increased to 
$ 69.41 billion whilst international trade increased to $ 112.12 billion in 1996, from an initial $61.33 billion 
and $60.20 billion respectively in 1988 (Interprovincial Trade in Canada 1998: 70-74). 
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Although in the Southeast Asian context the pursuit of RIS has not been 
specifically aimed at promoting economic development per se, 19 the prevalence of 
support for ASEAN from the region's nationalists is largely due to the Association's 
capacity for fostering peace and stability in the region. Consequently, governments in the 
region are able to concentrate upon economic development in their countries . 
20 Through 
the existence of ASEAN, for example, some major economies in Southeast Asia, such as 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, have achieved tremendous economic 
growth since the 1970s onward, which has led to rapid modernisation and an 
improvement in welfare in the region (World Bank 1993a). Economic growth in 
Southeast Asia, particularly prior to the economic crisis of 1997, was not only able to 
ease conflicts between states in the region, but also domestic conflicts. Indonesia is a 
prime example of the way in which Southeast Asian countries have used ASEAN as a 
means to promote national unity. Indonesians are comprised of nearly five hundred 
ethnic groups, practice nearly all the major religions, and speak nearly six hundred 
languages and dialects (Kooistra 2001: 5). The Indonesian political elite during 
Suharto's New Order regime perceived enhanced economic integration through ASEAN 
as an exploitation of the country's huge natural resources with very little to be gained in 
return (Smith 2000a: 24). In recent years, however, there has been growing support for 
greater economic integration in the region, particularly at the broader East Asian level 
from amongst the Indonesian political elite, owing to perceived benefits that Indonesia 
may accrue from such an arrangement (Hill 2000: 92). The Indonesian nationalists are 
19 See, for example, ASEAN Secretariat (1993) or visit the ASEAN Secretariat official website (accessed 
2003), at: 
20 Xvww. q,; eans(eLc. orgi 
I 2374.1h 
I ss, t years , as Parsonage (1997: 253) asserts, the 
focus on accelerating economIc 
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development -has been considered the main source of solidarity in the region. 
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concerned by the increasing threat of national disintegration in the country. Greater 
economic co-operation at the regional or broader East Asian level is hoped to bring about 
greater prosperity throughout the country. This, in turn, may bring about greater political 
and economic stability and minimise conflicts amongst Indonesian ethno-nations. 
3.3.2. Thepromotion of national unity, identity, and culture 
The second major motive behind nationalist support of RIS is national unification 
and the promotion of national identity and culture. To start with, it is widely recognised 
that a principal nationalist objective is to unite all members of a nation both politically 
and emotionally (Shulman 2000: 371). This is because nationalist ideology reflects a 
sense of bonding or affiliation amongst a group of people as a result of political, cultural, 
and ethnic similarities (Heywood 2000: 254). For nationalists, an RIS may help to 
achieve this objective through its capacity to unite members of a nation that live in the 
homeland community and the diaspora community (Shulman 2000: 37 1). 21 People tend 
to move from one place to another in search of better living conditions. Today, the global 
pattern of migration is not only stimulated by increasing globalisation, but also by the 
various violent conflicts, economic crises, and natural disasters that emerge throughout 
the world (National Intelligence Council 2001: 3). At the turn of the new millennium, for 
example, there were about 150 million migrants worldwide, which amounted to 30 
21 Homeland community here Is defined as a community that is identified with a particular group of people 
or ethnic group. The members of a homeland community are born and reside in the same area, region, 
state, or territory throughout their lives. The diaspora community, on the other hand, is a community 
whose members have become dispersed from their original homeland community. 
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million more than in the previous decade. 22 This trend, coupled with the historical 
vagaries of state boundary formation, has resulted in the fragmentation of members of 
nations (Shulman 2000: 371). For nationalists, an RIS may act to unite the fragmented 
members of each respective nation. Amongst other things, an increase in multinational 
linkage allows closer contact and communication between the dispersed members of a 
nation. One of the most widely cited cases where members of a nation linked together 
within a region is the Chinese community in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Southeast Asian 
countnes (Dobson 1998: 28-30; Yeung 1999; Peng 2002: 430-2). The ethnic business 
network in the East Asian region can be regarded as a form of informal economic 
integration, which facilitates economic transactions and the exchange of information 
between the fragmented members of a nation. Therefore, national unification amongst 
members of a nation who live in multiple states can be promoted through the pursuance 
of an RIS, and vice-versa. 
The objective of national unity is, therefore, a crucial element in understanding 
ited nationalist support for an RIS. Southeast Asian states, for example, have benefi 
greatly from RIS, such as ASEAN, in that an RIS can help maintain the national unity of 
the established states in the region. Indonesia, in particular, is one example. Although 
few studies exist that specifically analyse the direct contribution of ASEAN towards the 
maintenance of the national unity of its member countries, one motive behind Indonesia's 
support of ASEAN, as mentioned earlier, was the country's need to maintain domestic 
stability (Anwar 1994). The achievement of regional peace in the region has had a 
22 As reported by the BBC News (2000). For further infonnation visit: 
http: /, "news. bhc. co. uk/I/hi/world/europe/1003324. stm 
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knock-on effect on economic development in each member state and, therefore, towards 
the promotion of national unity amongst countries in the region. One significant aspect Is 
ASEAN's policy of non- interference, which primarily stems from 'traditional notions in 
international relations of equality of the sovereignty of states ... and the consequent right 
to exclusive sovereignty' (Ramcharan 2000: 60). The adoption of the Treaty of Amity 
and Co-operation (TAC), which highlights mutual respect for independence, sovereignty, 
23 
equality, territonal integrity, and national identity of all nations , 
is particularly central 
to the promotion of Indonesian national unity. The promotion of regional security in the 
Southeast Asian region has enabled Indonesia to focus on its economic development, and, 
in turn, reduce the social unrest that often jeopardises domestic stability in the country. 
Moreover, national unity and territorial integrity have become two main concerns 
of the Indonesian government since the economic crisis in 1997. Strong support from 
amongst Indonesia's immediate neighbours is crucial for the maintenance of national 
unity and territorial integrity in the country. During the Third ASEAN Informal Summit 
in 1999, for example, the Singaporean Prime Minister, Goh Chok Tong, highlighted how 
important it was for ASEAN leaders to support the integrity of Indonesia (Singapore 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1999). A Joint Statement was also signed amongst the APT 
Foreign Ministers in Bangkok on 24"'-25h July 2000, which highlighted support for 
Indonesia's sovereignty, national unity, and territorial integrity. 24 Furthermore, ASEAN 
member countries were equally supportive when Indonesia attempted to crush the 
23 See Chapter 1, Article 2 of the Treaty of Arr-ýity and Co-operation, which was signed on 24h February 
1976, or visit the ASEAN Secretariat officlal website (accessed 2003) at: 
http: //www. aseansec. orR/1 217. htm 
Z4 As reported in the ASEAN Secretariat (2000a) official website at: 
http: //wwN, v. aqeansec. orR/597. htm 
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separatist movement in Aceh in 2003 (Baker 2003). The Thai Foreign Minister, Sihasak 
Phungketkeow, for example, stated that Thailand 'would not allow any separatist 
movements to use Thai territory to cause trouble for ASEAN neighbours'. '5 Initially, 
however, there were mixed feelings amongst ASEAN members when peace talks 
between the Indonesian government and Aceh broke down (Tan 2003). Singapore and 
Malaysia, in particular, expressed regret over the breaking down of the peace talks 
between the two sides and expressed hope that a peaceful resolution could be found to 
resolve the conflict in Aceh. On the whole, however, no country in the region would 
want to see the break up of Indonesia as such an event would bring about instability and 
the possibility of a refugee crisis in the region (Smith 2000a: 72). The existence of 
ASEAN is, therefore, crucial for the maintenance of Indonesia's national unity and 
tenitorial integnty. 
A, part from the promotion and the maintenance of national unity, nationalists also 
pursue an RIS for the promotion and the expansion of their national identity and culture 
worldwide. Identity is an important term used by nationalists everywhere, along with 
unity and autonomy (Hutchinson and Smith 1994: 5). For most modem nation-states, a 
national identity can be interpreted as having a membership in a people, which is a 
26 fundamental characteristic of a nation (Greenfield 1992: 7-9) . The notion of identity 
in 
nationalism emphasises 'a complex set of themes about us, our homeland, nations (ours 
and theirs), the world, as well as the morality of national duty and honour' (Billig 1995: 
25 As quoted in The Nation (2003), or visit The Nation official website at: 
-p 
id=4L&themLe--LA&uLsrsess--I&id=14529 b ww I. M/ .h3? clid=4 ýt! P'/ý-.. ý/ýýww-ýNL. nationniultiMmedia. ýc a newLLp 26 -- L- See also Tivey (1981) and Greenfield (1992) for a detailed analysis of a nation's self-confidence. Both 
scholars hold that prestige and success bring self-confidence. National identity is, therefore, a matter of 
dignity. 
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It is, therefore, what members of a nation share which differentiates them from other 
nations. National culture, on the other hand, is the main feature of national identity, and 
plays an important role in shaping a nation. As a result, it is in the nationalist interests to 
preserve and to enhance their culture. Whilst the pursuit of an RIS may impinge upon a 
nation's culture (Martin 1997), nationalists can benefit from such a strategy because it 
promotes their national identity regionally (Shulman 2000: 372). One process through 
which such an objective may be achieved, as Shulman further asserts, is cultural 
diffusion, 27 which enhances a nation's culture through a closer relationship with other 
nations, particularly those at close geographical proXiMity. 
28 
One of the strategies that countries have used to promote their identity and culture 
today is tourism. In Southeast Asia, tourism has become an important 'source of 
economic development, foreign exchange, and employment generation' (Hall 2001: 13). 
For Indonesian nationalists, RIS plays an important role in promoting their identities and 
cultures abroad. In order to achieve this, Indonesian nationalists may support the way in 
which ASEAN promotes regional tourism. It is more and more clear that 'cross border 
cooperation is of obvious importance for the mutual strengthening of the tourism 
industries of neighbouring countries' (Grundy-Warr and Perry 2001: 64). As a result, 
" The use of the term diffusion was prominent as early as 1893 and was used to refer to the notion that 
most folklore was primarily borrowed from an Old World centre of high culture, such as Egypt, 
Mesopotamia, India, and so on. Today, the term diffusion is used to describe acculturation, which means 
the transmission of culture from one community to another. For a detailed analysis of the concept of 
cultural diffusion see, for example, Wescott (1998). 28 This is, however, not always the case. In Shulman's view (2000: 372), for example, the process of 
cultural diffusion is most successful when a nation's culture is transferred to other nations that share a 
similar culture. Nevertheless, it is also argued in this thesis that, nowadays, the process of cultural 
diffusion does not necessarily require a close similarity between one culture and another, although close 
geographical proximity does allow the process of cultural diffusion to take place natur-ally. The recent 
increase in the use of information technology means that today members of a nation may access other 
culturally distinct cultures from their own without having to be similar or geographically close. 
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during the Eighth ASEAN Summit in November 2002, ASEAN member countries signed 
a landmark Framework Agreement on ASEAN Co-operation in Tourism to boost the 
regional tourism industry, to facilitate domestic and intra-regional travel amongst 
member countries, and to hannonise visa procedures for international travellers. 29 
Another attempt to promote tourism at the regional level has also been made through the 
ASEAN Tourism Forum (ATF), which is an annual meeting attended by individuals or 
entities involved in the ASEAN tourism industry with the objective of promoting the 
ASEAN region as a tourist destination. 30 In recent years, there has also been an attempt 
to incorporate tourism as an integral part of the Southeast Asian growth triangle 
initiatives (Chang and Raguraman 2001: 50-5 1). The co-operation of the Indonesian and 
the Singaporean govenunents in the Riau islands of Batam and Bintan has been a leading 
example of the incorporation of the tourism industry in the growth triangle initiative 
(Grundy-Warr and Perry 2001: 65). 
For Indonesian nationalists, regional integration strategy in the context of the 
promotion of national identity and culture abroad contains some negative and some 
positive aspects. On the negative side, the promotion of an RIS can be perceived as a 
threat to national identity due to the increased penetration of foreign cultures amongst the 
population of the country (Martin 1997). This has been particularly evident amongst 
Indonesian youth who have been influenced by the heavy consumerism in foreign 
products and cultures. Many Indonesian youths today use foreign products to gain status 
29 As reported by the ASEAN Secretariat (2002a), or visit the ASEAN Secretariat official websIte at: 
http: //www. aseansec org/ 131 59. htm 
" For details on the ATF main objectives, see the ATF (2003) official website at: 
ITIPWwww atP-003. com/obiective/index. htm] 
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and prestige; they drive a Jaguar and wear Armani shirts (Priyono 2003). Such fashions 
make traditional Indonesian culture appear less attractive to Indonesian youth. Another 
negative impact from the promotion of Indonesian identity and culture abroad through an 
RIS is the erosion of ethnic culture and economic and environmental degradation. This 
has been evident in the Tanah Toraja, in Sulawesi, where, without concerted efforts from 
both the government and local leaders, it would be impossible to preserve the Toraja's 
culture and identity (Hall and Page 2000: 16). Meanwhile, economic and environmental 
degradation as a result of the incorporation of tourism in an RIS is best illustrated in the 
case of the Singapore, Johor, Riau (SIJORI) growth triangle initiative. Large-scale resort 
development initiated by many Singaporean investors in both Riau and Johor, for 
example, has raised concerns over environmental and economic degradation in these two 
areas (Business Traveller Asia Pacific 1997). Singaporean tourists are perceived by 
locals in Riau and Johor as arrogant and ma or contributors to pollution and inflation i 
(Lim 1999). 31 
On the positive side, however, there are two main objectives that the Indonesian 
nationalists wish to achieve through the promotion of national identity and culture 
abroad, namely political and economic objectives. The political objective includes the 
promotion of the Indonesian multi-ethnic character both at the national and the 
international level. At the national level, this can be used as propaganda to promote 
national unity amongst different ethno-nations in Indonesia. At the international level, 
the multiethnic character can be used as a symbol to attract international visitors (Wall 
2001: 320). Therefore, the Indonesian goverment stands to gain substantially through 
31 As quoted in Chang and Raguraman (2001: 61). 
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the promotion of national identity and culture abroad. Meanwhile, the economic 
objective of the Indonesian government to promote national identity and culture lies in 
the increase of economic development, particularly in the peripheral areas of the country. 
Hence, it is not surprising that, as Hall (2001: 19) points out, 'national tourism policies 
and plans are usually a deliberate tool of regional development strategies and / or broader 
trade policies'. The achievement of even economic development throughout the country 
is seen to minimise, possible conflicts between different ethno-nations in the country. 32 
Therefore, although RIS may impinge upon Indonesian culture, the Indonesian 
nationalists benefits from this strategy through the promotion of national unity and 
economic development. 
3.3.3. The promotion of the state's autonomy in the international arena 
The third motive behind nationalist support for an RIS is the promotion of their 
autonomy in the international arena. 33 One central analysis here rests upon the Principle 
of collective self-determination, which is used by a nation as a whole to minimise foreign 
32 However, it has also been widely acknowledged that the 'celebration of the manifestation of cultures 
living in peripheral locations may be viewed as encouraging [ethnonationallsml' (Wall 2001: 321). 
Through the promotion of regional tourism, for example, many Indonesian ethno-nations can hope for not 
only the promotion of their identities and cultures abroad, but also economic development. The 
incorporation of tourism in the Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines East ASEAN 
Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA) and the Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand Growth Triangle (IMT-GT), for 
example, has allowed some of the most restive Indonesian provinces, such as Maluku, Papua, and Aceh, to 
expect economic gains, particularly in terms of investment opportunities (PATA 1999). With sustained 
economic growth, Indonesian ethno-nations can lessen their economic dependence from the Indonesian 
government. As a result, the promotion of ethno-nation's identities and cultures through tourism may also 
be used as a leverage to increase resistance towards the Indonesian government. 33 The ten-n autonomy, according to Heywood (2000: 118), literally means 'self-rule or self-government'. 
Autonomy implies a substantial degree of independence and states, institutions, or groups can 
be said to be 
autonomous if they enjoy a substantial degree of independence. 
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intervention in the domestic affairs of a nation (Shulman 2000: 369). 34 As with the 
aforementioned point on unity, the drive for national self-determination can also be 
stimulated by economic motive. Although isolationist economic policy, such as 
protectionism, may contribute to the self-determination, or independence, of a nation in 
the international arena (Shulman 2000: 369), economic nationalism does not necessarily 
lead to real economic improvements (Johnson 1967). However, what has become clear 
in recent years is that both regional economic integration and globalisation are better 
means to promote wealth than economic autarky (Yergin and Stanislaw 1998). Since the 
end of the Second World War, countries around the world have gradually moved towards 
liberalisation. 35 With regard to the Asian region, in 1999, the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB) issued a report that suggests the existence of a strong link between economic 
openness and growth. Such factors are behind the motives driving nationalists to conduct 
closer economic ties with other nations. 
Indonesian nationalists perceive ASEAN as a 'vehicle for a more autonomous 
regional order' (Anwar 1994: 212). This objective is particularly important because it 
coincides with the Indonesian free and active (bebas aktij) foreign policy. This policy 
does not imply that 'Indonesia would necessarily adopt a neutralist stance but would 
34 Other scholars, such as Hutchinson and Smith (1994: 4), have also observed that nationalists are always 
keen proponents of popular freedom and sovereignty. It is, therefore, imperative that the people or 
menibers of a nation should be liberated from any foreign interference, be able to determine their own 
destiny, be masters in their own house, be able to control their own resources, and obey only their own 
inner voice. 35 The WTO official website indicates that the relationship between world trade and economic growth since 
the Second World War is evident through the cut in industrial products tariff nates (refer also to Appendix 2 
for levels of tariff barriers since the end of the Cold War). By 1999, for example, tariffs on industrial 
products in developed countries had fallen sharply and averaged at less than 4 percent. For further WTO 
analysis on economic growth and open trade see the WTO official website (accessed 2002) at: 
http: //www. wto. orR/enp-lish/thewto e/whatis e/tif e/fact3 e. htm 
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establish a foreign policy course that was independent of great power concerns' (Smith 
2000a: 9). Throughout the post-independence period, mistrust of the intentions of these 
great powers has been evident amongst Indonesian leaders. During the inception of 
ASEAN, many members of the Indonesian political elite perceived the creation of the 
Association as evidence of increasing regional independence (Anwar 1994: 54). 
Moreover, the objective of Indonesian nationalists of creating a more autonomous 
regional order also reflects the Indonesian government's concerns about the maintenance 
of Indonesian domestic security and territorial integrity from external threats (Anwar 
1992: 13). It is quite fortunate that Indonesia's neighbours share similar concerns and, as 
such, are willing to adopt a similar approach to Indonesia in dealing with external 
powers. It is for this reason that Indonesia's policy of national and regional resilience is 
incorporated into ASEAN. Whilst national resilience is built on the foundation of 
economic development, regional resilience subsequently emerges once national resilience 
has been achieved and countries in the region are able to co-operate fully with each other. 
It is at this point that 'ASEAN countries will truly be able to become the master in their 
own house, no longer needing the political and military protection of foreign powers' 
(Anwar 1994: 213). 
3.3.4. Collective action to contain the negative forces of globalisation and to achieve 
regional governance 
The fourth motive behind nationalist support of an RIS is the formation of 
collective actions with neighbours for the purposes of containing the negative forces 
derived from the process of globalisation and for the purpose of achieving governance at 
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the regional level. To start with, the concept of globalisation is controversial (Rupert 
2000: 43) and most debates have centred upon the issue of the threatened existence of the 
nation-state. The idea that globalisation will lead to a borderless world and the end of the 
nation-state (Ohmae 1990; 1995) has been challenged by both academics and the mass 
media. Some scholars, such as Van Ruigrok and Van Tulder (1995), Hirst and 
Thompson (1996), Coleman and Underhill (1998), view the globalisation thesis as 
exaggerated, believing that it is far too early to announce the emasculation, or even the 
disintegration, of the domestic institution as a significant focus in international economic, 
social, and political activities. Nevertheless, the process of globalisation poses profound 
challenges to the nationalist objectives of national unity, international autonomy, and the 
preservation of their identity. After all, globalisation has been perceived as the process 
that 'subverts the [established] state's capacity to act in the interests of its citizens' 
(Stubbs 2000c: 197). Although the globalisation process may have led to global cultural 
homogenisation, it has also unleashed a cultural pluralism, particularly within nation- 
states themselves (Mittelman 1996b: 7-8). The explosion of cultural pluralism has given 
ethnonationalist movements a new start as a potent force to challenge the established 
nation-states. Since the end of the Cold War, for example, twenty-six new countries have 
been established, some of which were bom out of ethnonationalist movements. One 
prominent example in the Southeast Asian region is East Timor, 36 which gained its 
independence from Indonesia on the 30th August 2002.37 
36 East Timor today is known as Timor Leste. 37 Not all ethnic conflicts have resulted in the creation of a new nation-state. Some examples in Southeast 
Asia are the Acehnese resistance against the Indonesian government and the conflict between the 
Philippines government and the Moro Islamic movement. There is a similar tendency in Africa, where 
internal conflicts have been prevalent but new countries have not been born. One prime example is the 
conflict between the Oromos and the Ethiopian government (Jalata 2001). 
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However, it should also be noted that the impacts of globalisation can either be 
regarded as positive or negative depending upon the criteria being used to define each 
teim. In an attempt to define the composition of positive globalism, Falk (1999: 69) 
asserts that the term mainly refers to: 
'the democratising of global institutions, creating accountability and 
responsiveness to more democratic social forces and establishing 
proceduresfor wider participation by representatives of diverse people'. 
Consequently, negative globalism, as Falk further postulates, would point to: 
'the conjuncture of largely non-accountable power and influence exerted 
by [transnational entities] and their collaborators with the ideology of 
consumerism and a development ethos weighted almost entirely toward 
return on capital mainly achieved by maximising growth'. 
As with other domestic actors, nationalists today face intense pressure from the 
globalisation process, particularly from its adverse effects. 38 It is for this reason that 
nationalists favour RIS to contain the negative forces of globalisation. Although 
regionalism has not yet emerged as a potent source to contain negative globalisation 
(Falk 1999: 72), it has achieved positive results in transcending the state's role to serve 
the interests of its citizens. Amongst other things, regionalism has been able to act as a 
forum to mitigate and to minimise conflicts, not only between states in a region, but also 
when internal conflicts emerge as a result of ethnonationalist movements. To date, there 
are a number of examples to illustrate the success of a reglonal grouping In mit, gating 
conflicts at the national level. In Africa, for example, the EconomIc Community of West 
38 However, this is not to suggest that nationalists themselves are not collaborators with these non- 
accountable international actors. As with other political groups, nationalists often need the financial and 
other support from these international entities to achieve their objectives. 
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African States (ECOWAS) was successful in mitigating the fourteen year old civil war in 
one of its member countries, Liberia. 39 In Southeast Asia, however, little evidence exists 
to suggest that the regional grouping has had any success at mitigating conflicts at the 
national level. Nevertheless, ASEAN has been able to prevent conflict in the region 
through its adherence to the principle of non-interference, which makes it unlikely that an 
ethnonationalist movement in one country will be supported by other ASEAN member 
states (FfP 2002: 1). Southeast Asian countries, in fact, gave their support to the 
existence and the strengthening of the established nation-state system in the region. As a 
consequence, ASEAN states often involve non-members to mediate in domestic conflicts 
that arise between the central government and ethno-nations. 40 
Meanwhile, collective actions amongst states in a region may also act as a catalyst 
to achieve governance at the regional level. The tenn governance, in general, refers 
mainly to a social function that aims to produce collective choices in regard to matters 
that concern a specific group of people (Young 1995). Regional governance, therefore, is 
39 ECOWAS sent its troops to Liberia to resolve the conflict between the Liberian government, led by 
Charles Taylor, and members of the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the 
Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL). The peace deal was signed in Ghana, on 19 th July 2003. 
For ftirther details concerning the Liberian civil war and ECOWAS' involvement in the peaceful resolution 
to the conflict, visit the BBC News (2003a) official website at: 
http: //news. bbc. co. uk/l/hi/world/africa/3162089. st 
4" The EU's involvement in the restoration or consolidation of democracies in Southeast Asian countries, 
such as Cambodia and East Timor, is a prime example of the use of inter-regional initiatives to resolve 
conflicts between the central government and ethno-nations. For further information concerning the EU's 
involvement in conflict resolution in the Southeast Asian region see the European Union Online website at 
http: //europa. eu. int/comm/external relations/cambodia/intro/index. htm (for Cambodia, accessed 2003), and 
ht! P: //europa. eu. int/comm/extemal relations/east timor/index. htm (for East Timor, accessed 2003). 
In other cases, interregional initiatives to mitigate domestic conflicts have taken the form of formal 
pressure. One such example is the EU's arms embargo on Indonesia over East Timor. The EU was 
reported as taking a very pro-East Timorese stance vis-ti-vis the Indonesian government. The embargo was 
imposed following the spread of violence in the former Indonesian province after the East Timorese general 
election on 30'h August 1999. The embargo was later lifted on 17th January 2000 after the Indonesian 
government and the EU reached an agreement that the Indonesian government would seek peaceful 
solutions to other ethnonationalist movements in Indonesia (Reuters 1999). 
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'the set of social functions concemed with making collective choices [amongst] people 
delineated by geographical proximity and other shared notions of sameness. ... [It is 
also] also concerned with the regime that constitutes the set of fundamental rules for the 
intergovenunental institutions in the narrow sense' (Bods 2002: 49). Regional 
governance is important nowadays as a result of the greater complexities that states have 
to confront. The increasing desire for regional governance amongst states is partly a 
result of the fact that governance is more difficult to achieve at the global level than at the 
regional level. If, for instance, globalisation involves an extension of liberal values as the 
premise of policy making and an expansion of transnational elite networks working 
through a set of inter-linked international institutions, global governance, then, will create 
an explicit superstructure to facilitate these processes (Laux 2000: 268). The problem is 
that globalisation and its superstructure will not necessarily accommodate every state's 
interests and concerns. In this context, globalisation, as a historical epoch, will result in a 
new set of 'winners and losers' (Reich 2001: 117). This is not to say that regionalism is 
not also problematic since, after all, regionalism also involves divergent national 
interests. However, convergence at the regional level is easier to achieve since most 
states are located within a similar geographic location, which suggests that their concerns 
and interests will be more uniform, although perhaps differing in context and scope. 
Regionalism, with its relatively smaller number of participants, is, therefore, preferable to 
multilateralism in two respects (Jovanovich 1998: 113). Firstly, member countries can 
enjoy cosier relationships, which makes monitoring easier to carry out. Secondly, 
friendly or positive co-operation within the group will offer a more conducive 
III 
environment for the exchange of favours, mutual agreements, and dispute settlement to 
take place. 
There are two possible ways in which regional governance can be achieved, 
which are the promotion of positive globalism and the promotion of positive regionalism 
(Falk 1999: 76-9). The promotion of positive globalism, which includes democratisation, 
accountability, and responsiveness to democratic social forces, is a means to avoid 
centralism. Within this context, regionalism can be perceived as the 'complementary and 
subordinate tools of global governance, shaped within the UN and contributing to either 
effectiveness or legitimacy or some combination of these' (Falk 1999: 77). It is 
imperative that the promotion of governance at the global level must also be forged at the 
regional level. Here, the promotion of positive regionalism, which contributes towards 
the goals of global governance at the regional level, is crucial. Yet finding any evidence 
of the promotion of positive globalism and positive regionalism in the ASEAN context is 
a difficult task. Throughout its existence, ASEAN has been far from transparent or 
accountable to the citizens of its member countries. However, given its willingness to 
change its organisational structure and its elitist tendencies, it is likely that regional 
groupings such as ASEAN will become more democratic and more responsive to the 
diverse needs of the citizens of its member countries. 41 
Nationalists may perceive regional governance as an important element to contain 
the negative forces of globalisation. On the economic front, nationalists, in spite of their 
doctrine of economic nationalism, are not only concerned with trade protectionism and 
41 See Chapter 7 for a further analysis of ASEAN's organisational structure and its elitist tendencies. 
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industrial policy (Crane 1998: 74). In the age of globalisation, nationalists have come to 
see the logic of pursuing more liberal economic policies that will enhance the 
competitiveness of nationally based industries and increase the attractiveness of their 
country for the potential investments of TNCs (Helleiner 2002: 3 10). Moreover, most 
countries in the world today are pushed to pursue an open economic policy that will 
encourage higher incomes and economic growth (Meier 1984; Frankel and Romer 1999; 
Anoruo and Ahmad 1999). 42 However, this is not to suggest that nationalist economic 
policy is no longer valid for nationalists. As mentioned earlier, nationalists today have 
changed or adjusted their strategies to bolster their countries' power, prestige, and 
prosperity. Regionalism offers considerable opportunities for nationalists through its 
processes of collective action to tackle the various conflicts of interest that emerge 
between domestic industries and the forces of globalisation. A regional institution, for 
example, will allow competitiveness to flourish as a result of the research funding made 
available for the development of local industries, a better organised. industrial policy 
(Sally 1995), and the protection of local firms with long-term investments from the 
volatility of the intemational financial system (Hveem 2000: 77-8). Indonesia's position 
in AFTA is a case in point. Despite its poor economic performance as a result of the 
1997 economic crisis, the country maintains its commitment to the agreement. After all, 
the elimination of tariff barriers amongst Southeast Asian countries allows member 
countries to enjoy greater production efficiency and long-term competitiveness (ASEAN 
Secretariat 2002: 2), and thus generates economic incentive for Indonesian nationalists. 
42 In recent years, substantial analyses, such as those produced by Gundlach (1996), have been made on the 
impact of openness on the economic growth of developing countries. Most developing countries in the past 
supported the import substitution industry (ISI) mechanism that favoured protectionism. Initially, the open 
economic policy was challenged by economic nationalists who favoured protectiorusm. For the views of 
economic nationalists on the open economic policy see, for example, Myrdal (1957) and Prebisch (1962). 
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3.3.5. The elevation of the nation-state's bargaining position in the international 
arena 
Nationalists' fifth, or final, motive in supporting an RIS is to elevate their 
country's bargaining power at the international level. As with other domestic actors, 
nationalists may want to increase the bargaining power of their country vis-ci-vis other 
countries, particularly in the framework of multi lateralism. It has been asserted that 'a 
nation's prospects in international negotiations depend principally on its bargaining 
power' (Hoekman and Leidy 1993: 258). Nevertheless, although concern over 
bargaining power is one reason why countries pursue an RIS, there has been little 
analysis of this issue in the regional integration literature. One exception is the regional 
economic integration (REI) analysis, which argues that countries, particularly small and 
developing ones, pursue a regional integration strategy to increase their bargaining power 
in economic relations (Robson 1987: 196). It is, however, necessary to analyse the two 
main objectives that underlie a country's desire to elevate their bargaining position in 
international relations. The first objective is that countries may desire to promote their 
national goals, such as an increase in domestic economic welfare, through international 
relations. Here, as mentioned earlier, an RIS may play an important role in promoting 
economic competitiveness and growth in its member countries. The second objective 
may be inspired by the state or other domestic actors' defensive reasoning that an 
increase in bargaining power in international relations will enhance their country's ability 
to counter the combined weight of regionalism pursued in other regions (Ravenhill 200 1: 
15-6). 
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However, one important aspect in the issue of bargaining power is the relative 
size of the regional grouping, instead of its absolute size, vi . s-a-vi .s its trading partners 
(jovanovich 1998: 87-113). It is important to note that a regional arrangement implies 
'both a decision to include and a decision to exclude countries' (Padoan 1997: 130). In 
economic terms, for example, many countries pursue an RIS as an insurance that will 
protect them against possible trade bloc wars (Baldwin 1993; Perroni and Whalley 1994). 
Another analysis suggests that the external effects of integration may also trigger an 
enlargement process to take place (Mattli 1999: 59-64). 43 Here, a successftil regional 
integration project creates a demand amongst non-member countries to join the 
established regional grouping (Dent 1997: 90). 44 Alternatively, negative external effects 
created by the establishment of a regional grouping, such as the diversion of trade, 
investment, and aid, may equally increase the demand amongst non-member countries to 
join the established regional grouping. Although the question of number optimality 
depends upon changes in the international enviromnent, the increased size of an alliance 
normally increases the member countries' capacity to resist outside threats (Padoan 1997: 
120-30). There can be no doubt that the size of a regional grouping is crucial. This 
applies not only to regional groupings composed mainly of developing countries, but also 
those composed of developed ones. The recent move by the EU to expand its 
43 This external effect of integration can also be termed the multiplier effect (see, inter alia, Pederson 
1994). This analysis argues that the lure to join an established regional grouping is greater when the critical 
mass of established regional groupings' members grows. 44 It is also possible that non-member countries' demands to join an established regional grouping may be 
rejected. As a result, as Mattli (1999: 43) further postulates, non-member countries may form their own 
regional grouping. 
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membership eastward, for example, proves that the Union still wishes to strengthen its 
role in world affairs. 45 
For Indonesian nationalists, the issue of bargaining power is central to enhancing 
the country Is interests in the international arena. It is for this reason that Indonesia 
strongly supported the enlargement process within ASEAN. It has been acknowledged 
that ASEAN's best achievement to date has been its efficacy as a united bargaining bloc 
in international diplomacy (Ravenhill 1995: 860-1; Anwar 2001b: 37). As a larger group, 
not only will ASEAN improve its position in Asia (i. e. vis-6-vis China), but it will also 
increase its bargaining power against some of the major powers, such as the US and the 
EU. Throughout the 1990s, a number of initiatives have been taken by Indonesia to 
enhance its bargaining position in the international arena, particularly APEC. Indonesia 
was also indirectly involved in discussions over the proposed EAEC, which was a fearful 
reaction to the fortification of Europe following the adoption of the Single European Act 
of 1987 and the steady move towards Europe 1992 (Mattli 1999: 168). Unfortunately, 
the initiative was abandoned after the US objected to APEC's East Asian member 
countries' proposals (Alvstam. 2001). In recent years, it has become more likely that 
ASEAN will concentrate on strengthening APT cooperation to improve external relations 
(Abidin 2001: 27 1), and, as a result, policy-makers in Indonesian hope to become 
involved in activities within the APT framework. Amongst other things, this hope has 
45 Apart from increasing the bargaining power of the Union in world affairs, the benefits of enlargement 
also include: (1) peace, stability, and prosperity throughout Europe; (2) the boosting of economic growth, 
(3) a better quality of life for the Union's citizens; (4) an increase in cultural diversity. For further 
information regarding the EU's enlargement, visit the European Union online official website (accessed 
2003) at: 
http: //europa eu. int/comni/eniargement/arRuments/index. htm 
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been fuelled by the slow progress of liberalisation under the WTO, the enlargement 
process within the EU and the growing pan-American move to create the Free Trade Area 
of the Americas (FTAA), and, finally, the economic crisis of 1997 (Harvie and Lee 2002: 
125). 
3.4. The relationship between ASEAN regionalism and Indonesian nationalism 
For quite some time now ASEAN has been regarded as the most successful RIA 
forined amongst developing countries. The Southeast Asian region itself is dynamic as a 
result of its heterogeneous historical backgrounds, levels of economic development, and 
social patterns. More importantly, however, the dynamism of the Southeast Asian region 
is also due in part to an upsurge of nationalism, the growing interdependence of the 
global economy, and a new burst of regional co-operation, both outward-looking and 
inward-looking (Palmer 1991: 22). 46 There is a definite correlation between ASEAN 
regionalism and Indonesian nationalism. For Indonesia, ASEAN has been a vehicle to 
promote its national interests at both regional and international levels. In order to 
illustrate further the relationship between the two ideologies, it is necessary to define 
ASEAN, AFTA, and Indonesian nationalism. To start with, ASEAN, in the simplest 
terms, can be defined as a regional grouping of Southeast Asian countries, which was 
established amongst the five Southeast Asian countries of Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, on 8"' August 1967, in Bangkok, Thailand. The 
46 In addition, Palmer also describes the region as the laboratory for the study of the new regionalism, as 
was the case with Western Europe's experience during the first wave of regionalism. 
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Bangkok Declaration of 1967 47 spells out the objectives of the regional grouping, which 
include, inter alia, (1) the acceleration of economic growth, social progress and cultural 
development in the region; (2) the promotion of regional peace and stability; (3) the 
promotion of active collaboration and mutual assistance in the area of economic, social, 
cultural, technical, scientific, and administrative fields. 48 Throughout the 1980s and 
1990s, however, membership has been expanded to include Brunei Darussalam (1986), 
Vietnam (1995), Laos (1997), Myanmar (1997), and Cambodia (1999). Although the 
acceleration of economic growth was one of the prime motives behind the formation of 
ASEAN, another major focus was strategic and secunty co-operations (Wanandi 2000: 
25). 
Furthennore, AFTA is a reflection of the need for Southeast Asian countries to 
integrate the economies of the region into a single production base and to create a 
regional market for 500 million people (ASEAN Secretariat 2002: 1). AFTA is, 
therefore, aimed at making the Southeast Asian region a free trade area. This trade 
scheme is an extension of previously established forms of economic co-operation which 
have been pursued since the mid-1970s. Starting with the ASEAN Preferential Trading 
Agreement (ASEAN-PTA), intra-ASEAN trade was 'liberalised at the pace that was 
acceptable to all ASEAN members' (Wong 1989: 205-6). Following the creation of the 
ASEAN-PTA, the Southeast Asian region saw the emergence of various regional 
economic projects, such as the ASEAN Industrial Project (AIP), the ASEAN Industrial 
47 Also known as the ASEAN Declaration. 48 Quoted from the ASEAN Secretariat official website (accessed 2002) at: 
WNvw. aseansec. or2/64. htm 
Refer to Appendix 3 for details about the Bangkok (ASEAN) Declaration of 1967. 
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Co-oPeration (AIC), and the ASEAN Industrial Joint Venture (AIJV). Today, aside from 
AFTA, ASEAN economic co-operation is further extended through the promotion of the 
ASEAN Investment Area (AIA), and Growth Triangle (GT) schemes, such as BIMP- 
EAGA, IMS-GT, IMT-GT, the West-East Corridor (WEC) Mekong Basin River Growth 
Triangle, and SIJORI. 49 All these economic co-operation schemes currently being 
promoted are for the purpose of accelerating economic growth in the region. 
Meanwhile, Indonesian nationalism is a form of nationalist expression amongst 
Indonesians that has been developing for nearly a century. 50 In the beginning, 
nationalism was used as an instrument to resist foreign colonial power in Indonesia. 
Indonesian nationalism, however, has dominated much of the country's post-colonial 
economic history. According to Robison (1997: 29-30), for example, four major agendas 
characterise the economic structures and policy frameworks in Indonesia, namely 
economic nationalism, economic populism, predatory bureaucratism, and economic 
liberalism. Firstly, economic nationalism in Indonesia stemmed from the desire to 
transform the economy from low value-added industrial production to a technologically 
advanced industrial economy. The Indonesian economy has been charactensed by strong 
state intervention and trade protection. Secondly, economic populism is a form of 
economic nationalism that focuses on small business co-operatives and is heavily 
49 GT schemes were developed through the Growth Centre Theory (Lim 2001: 196-7), which attempts to 
narrow the wealth gap between central and peripheral regions or areas. This theory maintains that it is 
possible to achieve growth in both the central and the peripheral regions or areas. Whilst it is the centre 
that provides the peripheral with the capital injection needed for growth, the centre also depends on the 
peripheral as suppliers of raw materials for industrial needs in the central regions or areas. 50 The October 28,1928 Sumpah Pemuda (Youth Pledge) was a turning point in the promotion of 
Indonesian national identity. The delegates involved in this congress were representatives of many 
Indonesian political and ethnic groups. The congress resulted in the adoption of the Indonesian national 
language of Bahasa Indonesia, the Indonesian national anthem of Indonesia Raya (Great Indonesia), and 
the Indonesian flag of red and white. 
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influenced by anti-Chinese xenophobia. Although economic populism was used as a tool 
to oppose the growing pattern of conglomeration, this ideology also played an important 
role in reinforcing political and social order in the political and military hierarchy. The 
third major agenda within the Indonesian economy was predatory bureaucratism, which 
can be defined as the appropriation of public authority by political and bureaucratic 
interests, or, sometimes, by powerful families. A high level of predatory bureaucratism 
prevents nationalism from producing significant results from economic industrialisation, 
such as the economic success stories in South Korea or Japan. Fourthly, liberalism has 
been another key agenda in Indonesia's domestic economy, but it has received little 
support from amongst the domestic bourgeoisie due to the benefits that this group accrue 
from the state's heavy protection of their business activities. 
Moreover, during the post-colonial period, Sukarno, Indonesia's first President, 
regarded colonialism and global capitalism as the twin evils of the colonial order. As a 
result, Sukarno pursued an economic ideology that was a hybrid of nationalism and 
socialism, which elevated trade barriers and discouraged foreign investments (Smith 
200 1 a: 1). Following Sukarno's removal from office in 1967, Suharto, with his New 
Order regime, conducted one of the most successful stabilisation programmes anywhere 
in modem history (Booth 1998: 178). Indonesia began a trade liberalisation programme, 
which eased the restrictions on foreign trade and investment. Despite this, the switch 
from socialism to a capitalist or free market regime was never properly realised because 
of the widespread, deep-seated mistrust of market liberalism amongst the majority of 
Policy makers in the country (Hill 2000: 95). In actual fact it was economic nationalism, 
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economic populism, and predatory bureaucratism that triumphed over economic 
liberalism. On the whole, therefore, the Indonesian economy during the post-colonial era 
was characterised by the rhetoric of free trade on the one hand, and the apparent necessity 
of economic nationalism on the other. Indonesia's commitment to trade liberalisation 
was at best half-hearted, and many in the policy-making circle remained unconvinced of 
the benefits that might accrue through closer integration at the global level (Booth 1998: 
203). 
The economic turmoil following the economic crisis of 1997 brought few changes 
to the way in which Indonesian state actors and domestic economic actors perceived the 
importance of economic nationalism. The Habibie administration's attempt to promote 
the Ekonomi Kerakyatan (People's Economy), for example, illustrated how important 
economic nationalism was to certain domestic actors in Indonesia (Smith 2001 a: 7). 51 
However, all the Indonesian governments during this period have remained fully 
committed to the trade liberalisation programme, at both regional and global levels. One 
important question to be answered is why Indonesia has been pursuing this strategy 
despite the country's strong tendency towards economic nationalism. The first 
outstanding factor that has driven Indonesia towards a rather liberal strategy is the 
economic crisis itself. Since the resignation of Suharto, Indonesia has had to comply 
with agreements made with the IMF and the World Bank, which include the promotion of 
an open market policy and privatisation across various different sectors. The IMF. in 
March 2003, completed its eighth review of the Indonesian economy and has approved 
51 The concept of the People's Economy was developed by the Minister of 
Co-operative, Small, and 
Medium Enterprises, Adi Sasono, during the Habibie administration. This concept will be analysed in 
Chapter 5. 
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the disbursement of a further US$ 469 million. 52 The necessity to secure loans from 
these international agencies is clear to all Indonesia's post-crisis leaders. To that end, the 
pursuance of inward-looking economic measures would be highly unfavourable to the 
domestic economy, at least for the time being. 
The second factor that drives Indonesia towards a liberalisation strategy is the 
growing tendency towards greater regional economic integration in the Asian region, as 
well as trade liberalisation measures brought about by the WTO. Throughout the 1990s, 
in particular, Indonesian policy-makers began to take a serious interest in regional 
economic integration, especially with Japan and other Asian NIEs. Two main factors 
have contributed to the drive amongst Indonesian policy-makers towards trade 
liberalisation at the regional level. The first is the econonlic growth of the East Asian 
region. In trade related matters, Japan and other Asian NIEs have been the major 
benefactors of Indonesia's exports, accounting for 50-60 percent of the countries total 
exports, well in excess of the 25-40 percent destined for the EU-US (Hill 2000: 85). The 
second is that these trade figures illustrate the growing complementarity between a low 
wage but resource rich Indonesia and high wage economies such as Japan and other 
Asian NIEs. 
It is, therefore, clear that a profound relationship exists between ASEAN 
regionalism and Indonesian nationalism. To start with, it is important to reiterate the 
basic proposition of NRT theorists which has emphasised the symbiotic relationship 
52 As reported in the IMF News Brief (2003), or visit the IMF official website at: 
http: //www. imf. or, i4/extemal/np/sec/pr/2003/prO343. ht- 
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between nationalism and regionalism. The proliferation of regionalism today should not 
be perceived as a distinct alternative to the promotion of national interests and 
nationalism, but rather as an element that enhances and protects the role of the state at 
both international (Palmer 199 1; Axline 1994; Schulz et al 200 1) and domestic levels. In 
the case of Indonesia, although there is a strong tendency towards inward-looking, 
protectionist economic measures, Indonesian policy-makers are beginning to comprehend 
the greater benefits that their country could gain by pursuing a much more liberal 
economic programme. Although ASEAN countries play only a small part in Indonesian 
trade overall, ASEAN represents, nevertheless, the first and foremost circle of 
Indonesia's diplomatic relations. Regional economic integration with Japan and other 
Asian NlEs has, in fact, been propagated through ASEAN. This explains the recent 
expansion of ASEAN into APT, as well as the incorporation of the ASEAN membership 
into APEC. 
3.5. Conclusion 
This theoretical analysis has demonstrated the symbiotic relationship between 
nationalism and regionalism. In particular, this conceptual framework has shed light on 
the possible benefits that nationalists may accrue by conducting an RIS. Nationalists 
pursue an RIS for various reasons. Firstly, nationalists may fmd an RIS appealing 
because of its ability to stimulate economic development. Accordingly, a nation may 
acquire greater respect and prestige in the international arena as a result of sustained 
economic development. Moreover, sustained economic development may also enable a 
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state to minimise the potential threat of national disintegration. Secondly, an RIS is also 
useful in helping nationalists unite the fragmented members of a nation. Amongst other 
things, increased regional linkage allows closer contact and communication between 
those who live in the homeland and those who live in the diaspora community. Thirdly, 
nationalists pursue an RIS in order to achieve international autonomy, thus, enabling 
them to minimise the potential threat of excessive foreign intervention in their domestic 
affairs. Fourthly, nationalists benefit from an RIS in that it can contain the negative 
forces of globalism. through the promotion of positive regionalism and globalism, which 
includes democratisation, accountability, and responsiveness to democratic social forces. 
Finally, nationalists pursue an RIS to elevate their bargaining power in international 
arena so that they could enhance their overall interests at the global level. 
There is no doubt that both nations and nationalism will continue to survive in 
spite of global and regional transfon-nations (Hoffman 1966; Strange 1995; Smith 1995). 
Therefore, the relationship between nationalism and regionalism is not necessarily always 
contentious. The case study of the relationship between Indonesian nationalism and 
ASEAN regionalism proves useful in illustrating the way in which nationalist policy- 
makers use regionalism as a way to enhance their country's power, prosperity and 
prestige in the international arena. Although economic regionalism has been 
overshadowed by the quest for economic competitiveness in the region, ASEAN has 
managed to expand its economic interests to include Northeast Asian countries (as 
demonstrated by the APT). In recent years, inter-regionalism has also intensified through 
the increased promotion of the ASEM. All these factors suggest that the relationship 
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between nationalism and regionalism is no longer contentious. Nationalist doctrine, 
instead, should be perceived as a symbiosis element in the emergence of regionalism. 
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Chapter 4: 
Research Methodology 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter describes the research methodology used in this thesis. Three 
specific issues will be analysed in this chapter, including the evolution of the research 
and the process of data collection, the categorisation of respondents, and analysis of 
preliminary research findings. This thesis mainly focuses upon the perceptions held by 
Indonesian state and non-state actors towards ASEAN's attempts at regionalism. This 
focus was chosen for several reasons. Firstly, such a focus gives insight into the 
contemporary perspectives of Indonesian state and non-state actors towards ASEAN's 
regionalism attempts, particularly with regard to AFTA. Secondly, it provides a 
background for the contesting standpoints regarding the formation and the realisation of 
AFTA of various different groups in Indonesia. Thirdly, it makes it possible to address 
some important issues that have been neglected in the past. The ASEAN regionalisation 
process has relied too much on inter-state relations and economic co-operation, whilst 
ignoring the importance of other relevant factors, such as social co-operation. Fourthly, it 
is only after addressing such issues that a potential conflict resolution mechanism, which 
would serve the interests of both the state and pressure groups in Indonesia, can be 
established. Finally, this focus provides the author with a suitable foundation from which 
to propose a number of alternatives for the improvement of ASEAN regionalism 
initiatives. 
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4.2. Research evolution 
During the initial stage of the research, the author focused mainly on the existing 
literature of regionalism, particularly literature relating to the Southeast Asian region. 
From a review of the early literatures, the author observed two I in important elements withi 
regionalism in Southeast Asia, which are trade issues and the foreign economic policies 
(FEP) of ASEAN member countries. The recurrence of these two important elements is 
logical for two reasons. First, is the fact that trade and economics are still the main 
benchmarks used by Regional Integration Arrangement (RIA) theonsts to measure the 
level of integration in a region; second, most regional groupings are still undertaking 
economic measures as part of their regional integration strategy (RIS). In the view of the 
author, however, trade and FEP cannot fully explain the rise and the development of 
regionalism. As the research progressed, a missing dimension in the existing studies of 
regionalism was found. That missing dimension is an exploration of the relationship 
between nationalism and regionalism. For the purpose of this research, that dimension is 
explored alongside the other already established dimensions, such as trade and FEP, in an 
RIA. 
Indonesia is used as a case study that represents the national domain in which to 
explore the relationship between nationalism and regionalism. In the past, some 
international relations scholars writing about Indonesia, such as Wenstem (1972) and 
Anwar (1994), used foreign policy as an analytical framework, whilst stressing the 
iMPortance of the attitudes of the political elite in offering a historical account of 
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Indonesia's foreign policy. Both Weinstein and Anwar focused their research on the 
perceptions of the Indonesian political elite towards ASEAN by conducting primary data 
collection in the 1960s and early 1990s respectively. They carried out their research 
during two very different periods. The first of these periods was when Indonesia became 
independent under its first president, Sukarno, otherwise known as the Old Order period. 
The second was the New Order period under the leadership of Suharto. This is the period 
in which ASEAN was formed. Research interviews were conducted with members of the 
political elite in both periods. Their research findings provide a useful historical analysis 
of Indonesian foreign policy in ASEAN, and shed light on this analysis of the present 
state of ASEAN and in what ways it has been affected by the recent economic crisis. 
With regard to the process of this research project, the author initially 
hypothesised that Indonesian nationalism has been going through a revival process, 
which was triggered primarily by the regional economic crisis that began in 1997. This 
assumption is based upon an interpretation of various events that took place from 1997 
onward that may have influenced Indonesian foreign policy in ASEAN. The devaluation 
of many Southeast Asian currencies had two contrasting consequences for Indonesia. On 
the one hand, the event brought about greater democratisation in the country's political, 
social, and economic systems. On the other hand, the economic crisis also generated a 
defensive reaction amongst Indonesians. This upsurge of nationalism was exacerbated by 
the threat of national disintegration (Leifer 2000: 154). The Indonesian provinces of East 
Timor (Timor Leste), Aceh, West Papua and Maluku were demanding independence, 
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unless greater provincial autonomy was granted by the central government. 1 East Timor 
was an exception in that the East Timorese had been demanding independence since their 
incorporation into Indonesia in 1977. The UN monitored election in December 1999 
over the fate of East Timor came as a major blow for many Indonesians, who realised 
that separation was inevitable. The separation of East Timor from Indonesia produced a 
knock-on effect throughout the country, with provinces such as Aceh, West Papua, and 
Maluku also demanding independence, and such conditions brought with them the 
possible threat of a rise in nationalist sentiment in the country. 
The impact that these domestic events had on the ASEAN regionalisation process 
was significant. The relevance of the Association had begun to be questioned during the 
height of the economic crisis. ASEAN was criticised for failing to effectively address the 
domestic crises experienced by each member country (Tay and Estanislao 2000). 
Although the majority of Indonesians have traditionally shown a rather indifferent 
attitude towards ASEAN in the past, there were hopes that regional initiatives proposed 
by the Association would help to alleviate the economic crisis. Furthermore, the 
Indonesian political elite and other pressure groups (i. e. academics and business 
community, CSOs, and NGOs) expressed their concern over the country's continued 
leadership of the Association. As Indonesia experienced rapid political transforniations 
following the economic crisis, regional observers throughout Southeast Asia and beyond 
were concerned about the possible change of direction in the conduct of Indonesian 
foreign policy in ASEAN (Smith 2000b). After assuming the presidency, both President 
Habibie and President Wahid did in fact attempt to change the course of the country's 
1 East Timor and Aceh, however, rejected the Indonesian government's offer of special autonomy. 
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foreign policy. The inefficiency of ASEAN as a tool for solving the regional crisis 
particularly frustrated both Indonesian leaders. As a result, Indonesia underwent a 
transformation in its foreign policy, by changing its focus to a wider international arena 
beyond that of ASEAN. 
It is, however, inappropriate to suggest that ASEAN is no longer significant for 
the majority of Indonesians. The field research interviews conducted amongst various 
Indonesian state and non-state actors reveal that there is still support for the Association. 
The majority of Indonesians nowadays appear to be frustrated over their previous 
governments' persistence in protecting the country's national interests and sovereignty in 
an excessive manner. Inward looking foreign policies in Indonesia in the past have been 
formulated to serve the interests of leaders, the political elite, and the military. Indonesia, 
to date, has played an insignificant role in most intemational fora, and has had little 
influence even over other ASEAN countries' foreign policies. Although national pride 
over the past struggle for independence and the sheer size of the country still persists, the 
desire for further regionalisation in Southeast Asia is nonetheless common amongst 
Indonesian domestic state and non-state actors. The economic crisis is one factor that has 
caused a transformation in Indonesians' perceptions of ASEAN. Democratisation, as a 
result of the economic crisis, has enabled the general public to participate more in 
determining the course of Indonesian foreign policy. Various Indonesian non-state actors 
appear to have developed a greater awareness of the importance of regionalism in 
Southeast Asia. 
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The author's hypothesis was further developed following field research camed 
out in Indonesia. By observing the current perceptions held by Indonesian state and non- 
state actors, as well as analysing the existing literature on NRT, the author has developed 
a new hypothesis in which the relationship of nationalism and regionalism can be 
regarded as symbiotic, at least with regard to the contemporary relationship between 
Indonesia and ASEAN. This is a distinctive new analysis in comparison to past studies 
on Indonesia and ASEAN, in which Indonesians attitudes towards the Association have 
been described as passive. In order to observe the shifting pattern of Indonesian domestic 
state and non-state actors' attitudes towards ASEAN, the author has carried out primary 
data collection and analyses. The findings of the field research are analysed qualitatively 
in order to contribute to an interpretation of contemporary events in both Indonesia and 
ASEAN. Accordingly, a descriptive research method is employed in order to observe 'an 
object, a set of conditions, a thought system, or a class of events at the present time' 
(Nazir 1999: 63) currently being studied. With regard to the case study used in this 
thesis, the author observed the set of conditions and thought processes in which 
Indonesians perceive their country's contribution towards ASEAN and AFTA. 
The case study presented in this thesis is employed primarily to evaluate larger 
variables from a smaller unit. Whilst this method may seem similar to the methods used 
in other research projects, the underlying difference is that the respondents interviewed 
represent a wider cross section than before in order to challenge the conventional 
assumption that the relationship between nationalism and regionalism is contentious. In 
their field research, Weinstein (1972) and Anwar (1994) focused mainly on the attitudes 
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of the political elite and officials from both the foreign ministry and military 
establishment. Both scholars found that the Indonesian perception of regionalism during 
the early and later periods of the New Order government was largely one of indifference. 
The current process of democratisation in Indonesia has meant that research interviews 
should now be conducted with a wider cross section of domestic constituencies, including 
non-state actors. Specific attention here is given to the motives and rationales of 
Indonesian state and non-state actors that lie behind the continued support of their 
country's involvement in ASEAN. Another focus examines how Indonesian state and 
non-state actor have interpreted the Association's current regional integration initiatives, 
pnmafily AFTA. This thesis, as a whole, has been designed to identify any potentially 
contentious perceptions held by state and non-state actors regarding their country's 
position in a regional grouping. The information used in this analysis has come mainly 
from secondary sources, including documents from both the ASEAN Secretariat and 
various Indonesian government institutions, media reports, and past publications on the 
subject. In addition, primary data collected during the research interviews has also been 
used. 
4.3. Data collection, categorisation of respondents, and research finding analysis 
Data regarding the perceptions of Indonesian domestic state and non-state actors 
about their country's involvement in ASEAN was gathered during field research carried 
out in Indonesia between September 2000 and September 2001. Fifty-two respondents 
from forty-two institutions were interviewed, which included thirteen government 
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institutions, four business associations, five academic institutions, thirteen pressure 
2 
groups, and seven foreign embassies (including the ASEAN Secretariat). Most of the 
research interviews were conducted in Jakarta, whilst a handful of respondents from 
Surabaya 3 also expressed their interest in being interviewed. Attempts were also made to 
conduct interviews with employees of government institutions in several district towns 
surrounding Jakarta, particularly in the industrial area of Tangerang. 4 However, due to 
the respondents' personal or fornial constraints, the interviews were not given. The 
remaining respondents were chosen because of their familiarity with the subject, their 
roles in the policy making process, the degree of their representativeness in the 
institutions they work for (i. e. decision-makers or those directly involved in the policy- 
making process), as well as their availability to participate in a research interview. 
During the research interview, each respondent was asked a set of open-ended 
questions to find out the following: 
I- The respondents' general perceptions of the regionalism process in Southeast Asia; 
2. The extent to which, according to the respondents, nationalism is detrimental to the 
regionalism process in Southeast Asia; 
3. The respondents' perspectives on the development of AFTA and Indonesia's 
readiness to enter the scheme; 
The respondents' perceptions of the process of information dissemination about 
ASEAN and its AFTA scheme; 
Refer to appendix 4 for a complete list of all respondents interviewed in this research. 3 Surabaya is the second largest city in Indonesia, situated on the east coast of Java. 4 Tangerang is a regency area in the newly established province of Banten. Banten has recently obtained 
provincial status following the introduction of the Regional Autonomy Laws in 1999 
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5. The extent to which, according to the respondents, various recently issued national 
regulations, such as the Regional Autonomy Law (RAL), would have an impact on 
the ASEAN regionalism process; 
6. The respondents' views on other domestic and international trade issues including 
leadership changes, the country's involvement in the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO), and so on. 5 
Table 4.1. 
Characteristics of 
I Maximalist Converizence Minimalist I 
Regionalist / Internationalist 
Support ASEAN and believe that 
ASEAN is important for 
Indonesia 
Support AFTA 
Indonesian nationalism is 
strengthened through increased 
commitment in ASEAN and its 
AFTA scheme 
ASEAN increases Indonesia's 
international autonomy, 
bargaining power, and its ability 
to contain the negative forces of 
globalisation 
There is limited information 
about ASEAN / AFTA 
disseminated to the public 
RAL has a negative impact on 
New nationalism (i. e. logical 
nationalism over romantic 
nationalism) 
Support ASEAN as long as it 
improves Indonesia's national 
interest 
Positive, but remain cautious 
about AFTA 
ASEAN and its AFTA scheme 
serve Indonesia's national 
interests 
ASEAN's ability to promote 
member countries' international 
autonomy, bargaining power, and 
to contain the negative forces of 
globalisation has only been 
significant since the economic 
crisis of 1997 
Information is available to the 
public, but the dissemination 
process should be expanded 
Potential negative effect of RAL 
on AFTA 
Nationalist 
Oppose ASEAN because 
Indonesia is still a relatively poor 
country 
Oppose AFTA 
Indonesian nationalism is 
weakened as a result of an 
increased regionalisation process 
ASEAN's contribution towards 
Indonesia's international 
autonomy and bargaining power 
has been mmimal, as has its 
ability to contain the negative 
forces of globallsation 
There is sufficient information 
about ASEAN / AFTA, and no 
improvement is needed in the 
dissemination process 
RAL does not affect AFTA 
Subsequently, the chosen respondents were grouped into three different categories 
in accordance with their answers. The three categories include maximalist, minimalist, 
and convergence. The respondents whose views fell somewhere in between the 
5 The detail of the questions posed during the interview are listed in Appendix 5. 
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minimalist and maximalist groups will hereafter be referred to as the convergence group. 
Those respondents categorised in the maximalist group were either regionalists or 
internationalists who supported greater regionalism in Southeast Asia or held a 
commitment towards complete liberalisation at the global level. More specifically, 
maximalists supported the Indonesian government policy of using ASEAN as the main 
pillar of the country's foreign policy. In addition, maximalists argued that Indonesian 
nationalism has hindered the progress of regionalism in Southeast Asia. Despite the slow 
progress of ASEAN regionalism, maximalists also maintained that Indonesia is still better 
off with than without ASEAN. Those categorised within the maximalist group also 
supported the existence of AFTA and believed that this framework of economic co- 
operation would improve Indonesia's bargaining power in international fora and will 
increase the country's competitiveness in the global economic system. Through better 
standards of welfare, they believed that Indonesia would be able to solve its domestic 
problems, including the threats posed to national unity by ethnonationalism, and would 
be better placed to promote its national culture abroad. 
Despite their support of Indonesia's foreign policy in ASEAN, maximalists also 
felt that the attempts made to disseminate information on this subject have been 
inadequate. Maximalists also argued that if no attempts were made to address this 
problem, the ftiture of regionalism in Southeast Asia would be uncertain. Moreover, 
maximalists believed that the implementation of the RAL would have a significant 
negative impact on the implementation of AFTA. As a result, respondents in the 
maximalist category felt that the government should concentrate on the effect of RAL 
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towards AFTA, and vice-versa, so that the implementation of AFTA would not be 
interrupted. This group of respondents also believed that the new the recent 
transformation of Indonesian leadership (i. e. from Suharto, Wahid, Habibie, to 
Megawati) has brought changes to Indonesian foreign (economic) policy. More 
specifically, maximalist respondents argued that the Indonesian governinent has shifted 
significantly its foreign policy to an international, rather than regional, outlook. Finally, 
some maximalists also supported the idea of improved economic co-operation beyond 
ASEAN (i. e. ASEAN plus Three (APT) or Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEQ 
and suggested that Indonesia should remain committed to multilateral arrangements 
under the auspices of the VVTO. 
Meanwhile, those respondents categorised as minimalists can be considered 
extreme nationalists. Generally, these respondents showed great reservation about 
regionalism and multilateralism. Minimalist respondents opposed the process of 
regionalism in Southeast Asia because they felt that Indonesia was still poor, both 
economically and politically (i. e. minimal experience in practicing full democracy). The 
minimalist respondents were thus against any governmental policies to improve 
regionalism in Southeast Asia. More importantly, minimalists did not believe that the 
underlying purposes of RIS have been realised through ASEAN. Although they agreed 
11 in with maximalists that ASEAN has been successful in maintaining peace and stability i 
the region, they still felt that the Association had failed to produce other forms of co- 
operation. They felt, for example, that Indonesia's bargaining position in the 
international fora was still weak, and that the country's national interests were often 
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sacrificed to the interests of a foreign state or international institutions. In addition, 
ininimalists did not believe that ASEAN promotes economic growth in the region. They 
felt that the economic growth experienced during the pre-economic crisis period was 
primarily a result of economic assistance from countries outside ASEAN and the heavy 
pursuance of economic nationalism. Despite being more nationalistic than other 
respondents, minimalists believed that nationalism no longer exists. They argued that 
Indonesia has been contaminated by foreign culture through the recent processes of 
economic liberalisation. Therefore, they would ask that the government do more to 
promote and to preserve Indonesian nationalism. 
Respondents in the minimalist category were also opposed to the AFTA scheme. 
They argued that the implementation of this particular scheme is likely to have 
detrimental effects on the overall domestic economy. As a result, they supported any 
possible moves to postpone the implementation of AFTA until, at least, Indonesia 
achieved a state of autarky. Minimalists saw the dissemination of information regarding 
ASEAN and AFTA as irrelevant as the subject, in their view, was of little significance to 
the majority of Indonesians today. Indonesians were more concerned about the many 
domestic problems that have resulted from the economic crisis. They believed that 
sufficient information regarding ASEAN and AFTA had been disseminated, and no 
improvement was needed. Respondents within the minimalist category also believed that 
Indonesian foreign (economic) policy had remained unchanged despite the leadership 
changes in recent years. Finally, minimalists did not agree that the implementation of 
R-AL would have any impacts on AFTA. After all, they felt AFTA was of no 
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significance for the country and that the scheme merited little attention. On the whole, 
therefore, in the perception of minimalist respondents, Indonesia would be better off 
focusing on its immediate concerns, particularly measures to alleviate the economic 
crisis. 
Finally, those respondents categorised within the convergence group were those 
whose views fell somewhere in between those of the nationalists and regionalists and / or 
internationalists. In general, respondents in the convergence category expressed a view 
that can be described as a new form of nationalism, or new nationalism. Convergence 
respondents, or new nationalists, held rather pragmatic views as regards Indonesian 
foreign policy in Southeast Asia. Generally, they perceived the emergence of 
regionalism in Southeast Asia as positive. As such, they regarded regionalism as a way 
to improve Indonesia's national interests. The majority of respondents categorised within 
the convergence group also emphasised logical nationalism over romantic nationalism. 
In this context, Indonesian nationalism should be used, for example, to promote the 
economic competitiveness of the country rather than as a tool to oppose foreign entities 
or individuals. However, although in theory respondents within the convergence group 
regarded regionalism as positive, they also felt that the process of regionalisation in 
Southeast Asia had been limited, largely as a result of ASEAN member countries' 
excessive preoccupation with their respective national priorities. Respondents in this 
category also believed that AFTA could help to promote economic growth in the country. 
At the same time, however, they felt that this form of economic co-operation should be 
approached cautiously since full trade liberalisation might have detrimental effects on the 
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Indonesian economy overall. Moreover, although the ASEAN Secretariat and the 
Indonesian government have provided substantial information to the public regarding 
AFTA, respondents in the convergence category also believed that the wider public 
audience, particularly local CSOs and NGOs, should be included as well. Finally, 
respondents within the convergence category were concerned about the potential effects 
of the RAL on the implementation of AFTA. The majority of respondents in this 
category believed that it would be hard to implement AFTA if the issues surrounding the 
implementation of RAL were not addressed properly. 
The questions outlined above were intended to gain an insight into the 
contemporary perspectives of Indonesian state and non-state actors towards ASEAN and 
AFTA. With regard to the first question, the author tried to find out the respondents' 
general perceptions of ASEAN and its AFTA scheme. Whilst maximalist respondents 
viewed positively the existence of regionalism in Southeast Asia to date, minimalist 
respondents expressed their opposition towards the concept of regionalism in general. 
Meanwhile, those respondents categorised within the convergence group held more 
moderate and mixed views on the existence of regionalism in Southeast Asia. Not only 
did Indonesian state and non-state actors place a high value on the existence of ASEAN, 
6 
a similar view was also held by the majority of foreign representatives interviewed. The 
second question deals with the respondents' views on the relationship between 
nationalism and regionalism. In the view of those placed within the maximalist camp, 
6 Foreign representatives (i. e. officials from the ASEAN Secretariat and foreign embassies) were 
interviewed due to their ability to provide an outsider view towards the relationship between nationalism 
and regionalism in Southeast Asia. More importantly, interviews with foreign representatives were useful 
to gather infon-nation concerning the experiences of their countries in dealing with nationalism and 
regionalism. 
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Indonesian nationalism can be strengthened through the country's commitment in 
ASEAN and its AFTA scheme, whilst those in the minimalist camp argued Indonesian 
nationalism was weakened as a result of increased regionalisation and / or globalisation. 
processes. Generally, however, the majority of the respondents expressed a convergence 
point of view, arguing that Indonesia's involvement in ASEAN is in the country's overall 
national interests. 
All the respondents were also asked about their perceptions of the development of 
AFTA and their country's involvement in the scheme. To start with, as outlined in 
Chapter 3, it is necessary to differentiate between ASEAN and AFTA, as each represents 
a different concept and sets of impacts on Indonesia. Whilst ASEAN is generally 
regarded as a regional institution, AFTA is understood to be one mechanism used by the 
Association to enhance the process of regionalism. The ma ority of respondents thought i 
that Indonesia's participation in AFTA to be a delicate matter. In fact, most non-state 
actors indicated that the country was not ready for AFTA and should pull back from the 
arrangement. Most government officials held a maximalist view, and fully supported 
AFTA. However, it is important to note that the personal views of these state actors 
differed from their official views. The majority of goverrimental officials expressed their 
full support of AFTA out of a sense of professional duty, which commits them to support 
any governmental policies made at the ASEAN level. Another major issue examined 
during the research interviews was the extent to which the ASEAN Secretariat and the 
relevant Indonesian government institutions have disseminated information regarding 
ASEAN and AFTA to the general public. The public's lack of support of ASEAN and its 
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activities in the past can perhaps be blamed on the failure of these attempts at information 
dissemination. Whilst the majolity of governmental. officials believed that they, along 
with the ASEAN Secretariat, had provided adequate information to the public regarding 
AFTA, the majority of non-state actors were not satisfied. Although there is a wide range 
of infonnation available regarding ASEAN and AFTA, the majority of non-state actors 
believed that the available infonnation is still highly technical and too expensive. 
Finally, the last two questions dealt with current issues within the domestic, 
regional, and international spheres. Within the domestic sphere, the economic crisis has 
triggered various economical, political and social problems throughout the country. 
These problems, and the way in which the Indonesian government has handled them, are 
thought to have complicated the ASEAN regionalisation process. One major concern 
expressed by the majority of respondents was the threat of national disintegration in 
Indonesia. Accordingly, the Indonesian government introduced the RAL to minimise the 
possible threat of national disintegration. Prior to carrying out the fieldwork, the author 
had hypothesised that the RAL would have a substantial negative impact on the 
implementation of AFTA, at least in the short-term. The fieldwork confirmed this 
hypothesis by revealing that the majority of Indonesian state and non-state actors both 
agreed that AFTA would be difficult to implement, unless further measures to address 
domestic problems were taken. Issues such as the changes in Indonesia's national 
leadership and its involvement in other multilateral organisations were also introduced to 
the respondents. The first issue is important in detecting a possible shift in the conduct of 
Indonesian foreign (economic) policy as a result of the new leadership. The majority of 
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Indonesian state and non-state actors saw few changes in Indonesian foreign (economic) 
policy, which emphasises the importance of regional co-operation, although the 
government focus has now been expanded to secure aid from various international 
organisations and other countries beyond the Southeast Asian region. 
4.4. Conclusion 
This chapter has described the process in which the relationship between ASEAN 
regionalism and Indonesian nationalism was researched. Drawing upon a wide range of 
literature as well as observations on the current situation with regard to ASEAN 
regionalism, Indonesian FEP and nationalism, the author was able to identify a number of 
important factors that are relevant to an analysis of regionalism in the Southeast Asian 
context. The notion of nationalism, in particular, has been an important influence upon 
the formation and the development of Southeast Asian regionalism. Using in depth 
observations of the perceptions of Indonesian state and non-state actors, as well as 
analyses of the existing literature on Indonesian nationalism and the NRT, a main 
hypothesis concerning the symbiotic relationship between nationalism and regionalism is 
developed in this thesis. This chapter has also identified the ways in which the 
infonnation was obtained through research interviews and developed. The 
categorisations described in this chapter will help the reader to fully understand the 
current perceptions held by Indonesian state and non-state actors of regionalism, which 
will be further analysed in subsequent chapters. 
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Chapter 5: 
Indonesian Nationalism and Foreign Economic Policy 
5.1. Introduction 
Nationalism in Southeast Asia has been characterised as 'reactive and creative as 
well as constructive and destructive' (Tarling 1998: 75). Nationalist movements in the 
region have varied throughout history. For Indonesia, nationalism has been a major 
feature of the country's foreign economic policy (FEP) during the post- independence 
period. During the first fifteen years after independence, for example, Indonesian 
economic policy moved in line with the inward-looking policies of the government 
(Paauw 1969; Myint 197 1), which was evident, for example, in the process of 
nationalisation. that took place between 1957-1964 (Hill 2000: 109). The emergence of 
the New Order government in 1966 heralded in a major liberalising reform of the 
Indonesian economy as well as a shift towards regional economic co-operation within the 
framework of ASEAN. Despite this, the Indonesian economy remained closed as 
inward-looking economic policies continued to prevail during this period (Hill 2000: 65). 
The present Indonesian economy is similar to that of the early independence period in 
that Indonesian economic policy-makers are still 'deeply concerned about potential 
foreign control of the economy (Linnan 1999: 2). 
The objective of this chapter is to provide an analysis of the dynamics of 
Indonesian nationalism and FEP, and, specific attention is given to both histoncal and 
contemporary aspects of Indonesian nationalism and FEP. The first section, or section 
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5.2, analyses the way in which nationalism played an important role in shaping the 
fonnation of Indonesian FEP in the past. Such analysis is crucial because it helps to 
explain the contemporary nature of Indonesian FEP. More specifically, this section 
analyses Indonesian nationalism and FEP in two periods. The first is the Old Order 
period, which was during the Sukarno administration. The Old Order government was in 
power from 1949, or the year in which the transfer of sovereignty from the Netherlands to 
the Republic of the United States of Indonesia (RUSI)' took place, to 1966 when Sukamo 
was removed from office. The New Order government, led by Suharto as the second 
Indonesian President, lasted for three decades, from 1967 until 1998. Here, attention is 
given to the New Order government's attempts to stabilise the domestic economy through 
the normalisation of diplomatic relations with the West and Indonesia's immediate 
neighbours. Another major focus in this section is the government's attempts to enhance 
regional economic co-operation within the ASEAN framework. Meanwhile, the second 
section, or section 5.3, analyses the present state of Indonesian nationalism and FEP. 
This section analyses in particular the role that nationalism played during the Indonesian 
economic crisis in 1997 and the threat of national disintegration following the economic 
crisis. 
In November 1946, under the Linggadati Agreement, Indonesian leaders and Dutch representatives 
agreed on the formation of RUSI with the Dutch crown as the head of state, following the Netherlands' 
recognition of the Republic of Indonesia's authority in Java, Sumatra, and Madura. Initially, however, 
Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta had proclaimed Indonesia's independence on 17 th August 1945, but the 
Dutch were reluctant to recognise Indonesia as an independent state at the time. As a result, major conflicts 
between Indonesia and the Dutch broke out from the time Indonesian leaders proclaimed their country's 
independence until the signing of the Hague Agreement in November 1949. Soon after the signing of the 
Hague Agreement, Indonesia received de jure and de facto recognition from the following countries: 
Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen (dejure), Australia, Britain, the 
Republic of China, India, the Netherlands, Pakistan, the Philippines, and the US (defacto). On 17th 
August 1950 RUSI was transformed into a unitary state, and is presently known as the Republic of 
Indonesia. 
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5.2. The history of Indonesian nationalism and foreign economic policy 
As with most other countries in Southeast Asia, Indonesia 2 experienced colonial 
domination. 3 The lengthy Dutch colonial presence in the East IndieS4 (some 350 years) 
led to a nationalist movement throughout the arch'Pelago. During colonial times, 
Indonesia's FEP was subject to the interests of the colonial powers. When the Dutch 
gained substantial control of the country, it was the Dutch East India Company (VOC - 
Vereenigde Oostandische Compagnie) that mainly had control of economic policy in the 
East Indies. In international trade, the East Indies, as a colony, was transformed into an 
exporting economy (Glassburner 1971: 14). Coupled with the emergence of new export 
staples, the East Indies export trade grew dramatically in response to the growing markets 
in Europe and North America (Booth 1998: 203). Subsequently, during the Japanese 
occupation between 1942 and 1945, the Indonesian economy progressed in the same 
direction as that of the Dutch occupation. Japanese anned forces were able to secure 
supplies of strategic raw materials (Booth 1998: 47) to aid Japan economically in her 
Cif C. 
5 ftirther expansion throughout the Asia-Pa 1 
One of the most prominent features of the Indonesian economy during the post- 
independence period is the emergence of economic nationalism. Shortly after 
independence, for example, the Indonesian government introduced the so-called Benteng 
2 As according to Smith (200 lb: 80), the name Indonesia derives from the Greek word Indos Nesos, which 
simply means Indian islands, and gained popular usage amongst nationalists for its non-colonial etymology 3 Thailand, which was never colonised, is the exception. 4 Indonesia was previously known as the Dutch East Indies. The name Indonesia gained popularity in the 
early 1900s and became the official name of the country following the Youth Pledge of 1928, which 
romoted Indonesian national identity. 
However, Glassburner (1971: 3) also notes that the Indonesian economy during the Japanese occupation 
was even more inward-looking and economic growth was further inhibited. 
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system in 1950, which was intended to promote native Indonesian businessmen (Mackie 
1971: 47). Subsequently, following the introduction of Guided Democracy in 1957, the 
expropriation of foreign capital began to take place. During this period, many 'Dutch 
trading and estate enterprises, the core of Dutch colonial capital, were expropriated 
together with Dutch shipping, banking and industrial enterprises' (Robison 1986: 79). 
The New Order government in 1966 made changes in the way economic nationalism was 
implemented. The New Order government's main priority in its economic stabilisation 
programme was to curb the rate of inflation that it had inhented from the previous 
government (Thomas and Panglaykim 1973: 145). As a result, Indonesia implemented an 
open-door economic policy, which 'aimed at producing maximum economic growth and 
relying heavily upon investment by international corporate capital' (Robison 1986: 13 1). 
However, these economic policies lasted only until 1975, when there was a resurgence of 
economic nationalism (Robison 1986: 13 1). The New Order government began to take a 
more active role in foreign policy, particularly within the regional context, following the 
end of the Cold War in the late 1980s and the resurgence of regionalism in both Western 
Europe and North America. In any case, the New Order government pursued a rather 
pragmatic approach in its overall conduct of FEP 
5. ZI. Nationalism andforeign economicpolicy during the Old Orderperiod 
As mentioned earlier, the Old Order period falls between the transfer of power 
from the Netherlands to the government of the RUSI in 1949 and the attempted coup 
d'etat in 1965. On the whole, the period between 1949 and 1965 can be seen as a time 
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, in which the Dutch colonial economy was dismantled and new socio-econornic and 
political forces gathered themselves within Indonesia' (Robison 1986: 36). Indonesia's 
economic policy during this period can be split into two phases. The first phase was from 
1950 until 1957, during which time parliamentary democracy was implemented and the 
domestic economy was largely controlled by foreign and ethnic Chinese private business 
interests (Glassbumer 1971: 4). The second phase was between 1957 and 1965, during 
which time the Guided Democracy policy was introduced and the concept of economic 
nationalism was strengthened. As a result, Indonesia's economic policy became inward- 
looking, as attempts to minimise foreign economic domination, particularly Dutch-owned 
capital, prevailed. Despite Indonesia's formal independence for nearly a decade, the 
Dutch were still largely in control of the relatively small but highly commercialised and 
industrial sectors, such as plantation agriculture, oil, and import trade (Thomas and 
Panglaykim 1973: 39). In the export and import sectors, for example, a mere five Dutch 
companies, including The Bomeo-Sumatra Company (Borsumy), George Wehry and Co., 
Internationale Credie en Handelsvereeniging (Internatio), Lindeteves, and Jacobean van 
den Berg, controlled some 60 percent of operations (Allen and Donnithorne 1957: 60-3). 
The pursuit of economic nationalism during the first phase of the Old Order 
period is best illustrated by the term Indonesian isation, which refers to the process used 
to replace 'Dutch officials and managers by Indonesian nationals in the government 
bureaucracy and private firms in Indonesia' (Lindblad 2002: 2). The Indonesian 
government at the time intended to bring indigenous Indonesians into the more complex 
sectors of the economy to lessen the domination of the Dutch and ethnic Chinese in the 
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domestic economy. More specifically, Sutter (1959: 2) has outlined nine institutional 
changes that took place during this period. These were: (1) transfer of formerly colonial 
public enterprises to the Indonesian govemment; (2) establishment of state enterprises; 
(3) transfer of private alien enterprises to the Indonesian government; (4) increased 
government control over alien business; (5) transfer of private alien enterprises to 
Indonesian and their organisations; (6) establishment of new enterprises in sectors 
previously virtually closed to Indonesians; (7) increased Indonesian equity ownership in 
corporations established by aliens; (8) increased participation in the management of alien 
companies; and (9) return of landholdings by alien enterprises to the Indonesian 
community. 6 Shortly after the declaration of independence, various organisations were 
established to implement the Indonesianisation policy, which included the National 
Trading Bank of Indonesia (BDNI - Bank Dagang Negara Indonesia) and some twenty 
other newly established enterprises in the provisional capital of the Republic (Muhaimin 
1990: 3 1). The establishment of new organisations to foster an indigenous capitalist class 
continued until the early 1950s, which is evident in various business organisations such 
as the Union of Indonesian Exporters (PEKSI - Persatuan Eksportir Indonesia), the 
Indonesian National Association of Importers (IKINI - Ratan Importir Nasional 
Indonesia). 
Two governmental plans were particularly important in realising the 
Indonesianisation process that took place during the Old Order period, namely the 
Benteng programme 7 and the Economic Urgency programme. The Benteng programme 
6 As quoted in Linblad (2002: 3). 
The name Benteng literally means fortification. 
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was first implemented by the Natsir cabinet (1950 - 1951) and was enthusiastically 
prosecuted by the Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinet (1953 - 1954) (Robison 1986: 44). Through 
this economic programme, the Indonesian government aimed 'to protect the 
economically weak by reserving certain commodities and from specified countries that 
could be imported by Indonesians only' (Thomas and Panglaykini 1973: 48). During its 
initial phase in 1950, Djuanda, the Indonesian Minister of Prospenty at the time, 
announced that special protection would be given to national importers to help them 
compete with their foreign counterparts. Thereafter, the programme altered the focus 
from national importers to indigenous Indonesians (bangsa Indonesia ash) and stipulated 
that 70 percent of the equity should be owned by Indonesians, excluding the ethnic 
Chinese (Widihandojo 2000). Meanwhile, the Economic Urgency programme was 
launched in 1951 by Prof. Surnitro Djojohadikusumo who was Minister of Trade and 
Industry at the time. 8 In essence, this programme was introduced as a guide for 
government activities in the agricultural and industrial sectors (Thomas and Panglaykim 
1973: 49). Similar to the Benteng programme, the Economic Urgency programme was a 
plan for industrial projects that involved extensive economic intervention in an attempt to 
establish indigenous industries (Djojohadikusumo 1954). 
Both the Benteng and the Economic Urgency programmes, however, failed to 
produce any substantial results. In Chalmers' (1997: 10) analysis, for example, both 
programmes 'serve to indicate the essential weakness of both private Indonesian capital 
and the state in the 1950s'. Three main factors contributed to the failure of both 
programmes. The first was the ambivalent attitude of Indonesian leaders towards foreign 
8 The Economic Urgency programme was later known as the Sumitro Plan. 
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capital. On the one hand, the Indonesian government at the time resented the fact that 
foreign capital still dominated the Indonesian economy even after the granting of 
independence. The continued confrontation with the Dutch over the West Irian issue also 
fuelled nationalistic sentiment amongst Indonesian policy-makers vis-6-vis foreigners. 
On the other hand, the Sukarno administration publicly admitted that foreign capital and 
management had an important role to play in strategies for the economic development of 
an independent Indonesia (Linblad 2002: 17). The second factor contributing to the 
failure of both programmes was the overwhelming predominance of ethnic Chinese 
capital in the domestic economy. Although joint ventures between Indonesian and 
foreign nationals were encouraged, many companies that pursued such a strategy were 
owned and managed by ethnic Chinese (Booth 1998: 259). The third factor contributing 
to the failure of the Benteng and the Economic Urgency programmes was the fact that 
there were favourable international economic conditions for the exporters of primary 
materials as a result of the Korean War (Chalmers 1997: 11). Indigenous Indonesians 
thus failed to recapture their lost territory within the domestic economy despite the 
Benteng and Economic Urgency programmes. 
The pursuit of economic nationalism was further strengthened through the 
introduction of Guided Democracy (the second phase of the Old Order period) in 1957.9 
Guided Democracy was uniquely Indonesian and largely associated with the concept of 
9 Despite its widespread use in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Guided Democracy concept had actually 
been developed by Sukarno in the early twentieth century when Indonesia was struggling to break free 
from colonial domination. The concept was referred to in a thesis that Sukarno wrote in 1926 concerning 
the possibility of co-operation between nationalism, Islam, and Marxism (Agung 1973: 283), which later 
became the basic principle of the Guided Democracy concept. 
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musyawarah and mufakat, " which is a process of decision-making traditionally practiced 
in Indonesian villages (Reindhardt 1971: 55). In principle, the Guided Democracy 
concept may also be referred to as Socialisme ti la Indonesia, in that it rejects liberal 
thinking and places great emphasis on a collectivist organisation of the economy, based 
on the family principle, or the gotong-royong (mutual assistance) method (Mackie 197 1: 
44-5 1). The most significant feature of this system is the overwhelming power invested 
in the political leadership because of the heavily paternalistic relationship between the 
leaders and the citizens. The decisions made by political leaders are seen as a reflection 
of the general interests of the public, thus allowing the supreme leader to take any 
necessary actions to solve any domestic crises. Sukarno had great influence during the 
introduction of this system after he had revoked the provisional constitution of 1950 and 
reinstated the older constitution that was established shortly after the declaration of 
independence. With reference to domestic politics, Sukarno believed that liberal 
democracy, which resulted in the emergence of numerous political parties and the 
conflicts that ensued between them, was not suitable for Indonesia. Following the 
introduction of the provisional constitution in 1950, the threat of disintegration as a result 
of the different views of political parties, particularly the Communists and religious 
groups, was looming. Sukarno finally introduced the new concept through the gotong 
royong cabinet and the National Council that represented all the major constituencies in 
the country. 
10 The ten-n musyawarah is largely associated with the notion of consensus within a mufakat, or a meeting. 
As Hill (1994: 280) notes, the concept of musyawarah signifies 'the recognition of consultation amongst all 
household heads before community decisions were made'. These social forms continue to be used to this 
day. 
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The introduction of the Guided Democracy system produced substantial impacts 
on the development of Indonesian foreign policy. During this period, Sukarno was 
regarded as both the 'draftsman for the blueprint of Indonesia's foreign policy and the 
driving force in its execution (Agung 1973: 284). After launching the Asia-Africa 
Conference in 1955,11 Sukarno believed that he had wide support from the leaders of 
other less developed countries (LDCs), and 'launched himself as the champion of the 
New Emerging Forces (NEFOS) in Asia, Africa, and Latin America against the Old 
Established Forces (OLDEFOS) in the West' (Anwar 1994: 21). According to scholars, 
such as Bunnel (1966) and Legge (1972), Indonesian foreign policy during the Guided 
Democracy period was largely influenced by Sukarno's fervent nationalist idea that 
continuous anti-colonial struggle should be part of governmental strategy. Sukarno was 
convinced that colonialism and imperialism still prevailed in most parts of the world. It 
is for this reason that Indonesia had an active, yet militant foreign policy, particularly 
towards the West. 
Nationalism was equally reflected in the general conduct of Indonesian FER One 
key aspect of Guided Democracy in the area of economy was the concept of the Guided 
Economy. As with Guided Democracy, Guided Economy gave substantial power to 
President Sukarno as the designated administrator of the national economy. Economic 
nationalism within the Guided Economy framework did not only include 'the 
appropriation of the colonial economy, [but also] an attempt to build a national import 
substitution industrial section' (Robison 1990: 39), which meant that the state assumed a 
II The Asia-Africa Conference was held in Bandung in April 1955 and attracted delegates from 24 nations. 
Some prominent world leaders, such as Chou En-Lai, Nehru, and Nasser, also attended the Conference. 
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dominant role in the domestic economy. Although there is no authoritative definition of 
Guided Economy, its components can be seen in the Eight Year (Development) Plan of 
1960 and the Economic Declaration of 1963, which include the strengthening of the role 
of the state in the national economy, the expropriation of foreign capital, and an attempt 
to create a more self-sufficient and more industrialised economy by replacing the colonial 
import / export economy with indigenous businesses (Robison 1986: 71). 12 Sukarno was 
able to draw support for his controversial foreign policy amongst Indonesian domestic 
constituents who were themselves frustrated by the continued Western domination of the 
Indonesian economy. As Weinstein (1976: 294) observes: 
,I. n its trade and aid relations with the outside world, Indonesia looked 
almost entirely to the West; at home, Western capital still played a very 
important role in the country's economic life. [Meanwhile] the Dutch still 
occupied West Irian, a constant reminder that even the struggle for formal 
sovereignty remained incomplete'. 
Indonesian FEP at the time, as with its foreign policy in general, was dominated by 
6 an apparent leftward drifts in domestic politics and a corresponding alignment 
internationally, especially in relations with the People's Republic of China' (Leifer 
198 3: 6 1) and the Soviet Union. 13 
On the whole, however, the Sukarno goverrunent paid little attention to the overall 
economic policy of the country (Chalmers 1997: 14). The Indonesian government was 
12 The fort-nalisation of the Guided Economy system was Initiated through other nationalistic economic 
policies. One economic policy that stood out was the Nationalisation Bill of 1958, which ended Dutch 
control over the modem sector of the Indonesian economy (Thomas and Panglaykim 1973: 56). The anti- 
Dutch boycott, however, had officially begun in October 1957, and resulted in the confiscation of some 246 
Dutch private investments. 13 The socialist approach in the Guided Economy system, however, was not particularly a result of 
Indonesia's political drift towards the Left. Indonesia's fervent opposition to liberal capitalism was 
stipulated in the country's constitution of 1945, which stated that 'the economy shall be organised as a 
common endeavour based on the principle of the family system'. 
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too engrossed with the West Irian issue and with Malaya's proposed plan to gain 
independence from the British. Whilst the West Irian issue was settled through the 
Bunker Plan, 14 a confrontation with Malaysia became inevitable, particularly following 
Sukarno's announcement of the Crush Malaysia (Ganyang Malaysia) campaign in 
15 September 1963 . The Indonesian economy soon deteriorated along with Sukarno's 
plans to wage a war against Malaya. As Booth (1998: 65) observes, although GDP 
growth was positive from 1958 - 1965, it was still much lower than in the 1950 - 1957 
period. More importantly, Pauker (1962: 617) notes that by 1961 Indonesia was 
experiencing high inflation due to high deficits in the rising national budget from Rp. 
1.56 billion in 1956 to Rp. 16.65 billion in 1961, and with the figure expected to rise to 
F-p. 37 billion by the end of that year. The US government, wishing to counteract Rp 
Sukarno's military advances into West Inan and Malaya, pledged US$ 325 million in 
economic aid through the Humprey recovery plan to which would be added US$ 81 
million from the IMF (Agung 1973: 446). Sukarno, however, preferred his militant 
foreign policy and discarded the West's help in economic rehabilitation. 
Steps to end the conflict between Indonesia and Malaysia were taken when 
Macapagal, the President of the Philippines, proposed creating an organisation 
14 The Bunker Plan was named after the US diplomat Ellsworth Bunker, who proposed that the Netherlands 
give up West Irian to the UN administration, and a plebiscite held to decide the future of the territory. The 
transfer of West Irian from the Netherlands to the Indonesian government formally took place on 15th 
August 1962, 
15 The Crush Malaysia campaign was a result of Sukarno's irritation over the continued existence of 
colonialism in the Southeast Asian region. Some scholars, such as Reinhardt (1971: 129) and Gordon 
(1966), argue that the confrontation with Malaysia was an implementation of the long-standing 
expansionist sentiment held by many Indonesian nationalist leaders. The validity of this argument was 
given weight by one of the Indonesian leaders, Yamin (1959: 131-32), who maintained that a greater 
Indonesia would include the Malayan peninsula within the projected nation. On the whole, however, 
Malayan independence was seen by most of the Indonesian elite as an 'alien-inspired polity designed to 
perpetuate colonial economic and military interests in Southeast Asia which, by their nature, posed a threat 
to the viability and regional role of Indonesia' (Leifer 1983: 75). 
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comprising Malaysia, the Philippines, and 1ndonesia (Maphilindo) in 1963 . 
16 Later that 
year, serious talks began between the Foreign Ministers of the three countries. However, 
establishing Maphilindo was not an easy task. The Indonesian government, for example, 
received stem criticism from domestic political groups regarding the country's 
involvement in talks about the creation of Maphilindo. The Indonesian Communist Party 
(PKI - Partai Komunis Indonesia), in particular, announced their formal opposition to 
any regional initiatives that involved Malaysia, as well as the whole idea of Maphilindo. 
One of the reasons was that many in the PKI leadership, particularly Dr. Subandrio, had 
been influential in Sukarno's decision to implement the Crush Malaysia campaign. The 
talks soon ended after the Federation of Malaysia was formally established in September 
1963. This event was marked by a mob attack on the Malaysian embassy in Jakarta, and 
Indonesia soon decided to break off its diplomatic relations with Malaysia. 
In sum, Indonesian foreign policy during the Old Order period was mainly 
nationalistic in character, with a leftist orientation. In many ways it could be argued that 
Indonesian FEP was a reflection of the country's foreign policy in general. There were 
several reasons for this. The first was that Indonesia at the time had only just emerged 
from its colonial experience. This provided a ftindamental basis for nationalist 
sentiments against anything foreign from amongst Indonesian policy-makers, and 
explains the implementation of inward-looking economic policies. The Benteng and 
16 Maphilindo, however, was not the first regional organisation in the Southeast Asian region. In 1955 the 
US initiated a military pact of eight nations, the Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO), to check 
the Communist expansion in the Asia and Pacific region. This grouping involved Great Britain, the 
Philippines, France, Thailand, Pakistan, Australia, New Zealand, and the US. Subsequently, in 1961, 
another regional organisation, the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) was established between Malaysia, 
the Philippines, and Thailand. This organisation, however, became defunct following the Sabah conflict 
that emerged between Malaysia and the Philippines. 
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Economic Urgency programmes exemplify the staunch nationalist attitude amongst 
Indonesian policy-makers. Under these programmes, the nationalisation of foreign 
enterprises took place, particularly those owned by Dutch and ethnic Chinese private 
businessmen. Another reason was the leftward drift within the political spectrum in 
Indonesia. After successfully establishing himself as the supreme leader of the Republic, 
Sukarno was able to give vent to his rhetoric of anti neo-colonialism, colonialism, and 
imperialism (Nekolim), 17 which clearly indicated his suspicion of the West. Throughout 
the implementation of Guided Democracy, Indonesian foreign policy was radicalised and 
brought towards a closer relationship with the major Communist powers, particularly 
China (Anwar 1994: 2 1). 
5.2.2. Nationalism andforeign economicpolicy during the New Orderperiod 
The failed coup d'6tat of 1965 marked the fall of Sukarno and the ascension of 
Suharto's New Order government. 18 If Sukarno played a major role in influencing 
Indonesian foreign policy during the Old Order period, Suharto was the main determinant 
of Indonesian foreign policy during the New Order period. General Suharto soon took 
charge of the govenunent following the neutralisation of President Sukarno in July 1966 
and brought radical changes to Indonesian national policy. As the new leader, 'Suharto 
[was] serious and dedicated, yet also somewhat distant and devious in pressing his 
17 Nekolim was a terin first coined by General Achmad Yani. 
Is The coup began on 30'h September 1965 with the arrest and execution of six leading generals. The coup 
was blamed on the PKI, which led to the killing of 500,000 members of the PKI in the following next 
month (Smith 2001b: 77). Some scholars, such as Chalis (2001: 82), argue that the coup was a subversive 
attempt sponsored by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which has been very active in conducting its 
operafion to remove President Sukarno since August 1965. To date, however, the circumstances 
surrounding the coup remain unclear. 
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policies. Delicacy and ritual [seemed] to mark his style of authority and he [was] 
committed to a compromising mode of operation' (Reinhardt 1971: 141). In order to 
carry out many of its objectives, the New Order government conducted 'a notable 
reduction in the degree of pluralism within the system and not an assumption of power by 
new elements' (Leifer 1983: 111). One of the main determinants that ensured the long 
tenure of Suharto's Presidency was his emphasis on placing the military at the centre of 
Indonesian politics and daily life, as demonstrated by the Indonesian military's adoption 
of the dual function (dwifungsi) system. 19 
This system, as Kooistra (2001: 11) asserts, 'allowed the [military] to place 
members of its 'socio-political wing' alongside govenunent officials right down to the 
village level. The idea was to keep in touch with local communities, explain to people 
how great it was to be Indonesian'. Suharto realised that the military had consistently 
played a significant role in Indonesian politics since the independence period. The 
military, and particularly the army, which had assumed command of the political heights 
of the Republic, had been of great political importance from the onset of the national 
revolution. Another important political element within the New Order period was the 
Functional Group (Golkar - Golongan Karya), which was a government- sponsored 
ftinctional group that became the main Indonesian political party during the Indonesian 
New Order period. 20 Thus, the President, the armed forces, and Golkar became the main 
19 Dwi fungsi, or dual function, is the Indonesian army's main doctrine that legitimises the military's 
involvement in political and social affairs. General Nasution was the first to introduce this doctrine through 
his 'Middle Way' speech in November 1958. Although the dual function doctrine was implemented from 
the 1960s onward, it was not made law until 1982. 
20 Golkar was first established in October 1964. 
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political players during the New Order period to determine Indonesian national and 
foreign policies. 
With regard to foreign policy, 'the New Order leadership had three key aspects: 
namely, strong anti-communism, a commitment to stability and economic development, 
and a pragmatic international outlook' (Anwar 1994: 35). Indonesian FEP had a similar 
direction. The first way in which the New Order government incorporated these aspects 
into Indonesian foreign policy was through appointing Adam Malik Foreign Minister 
(Leifer 1983: 113 )2 1 and by granting the Sultan of Yogyakarta 22 the position of Economic 
Minister. The major aim of Indonesian FEP at the time was to restore the country's 
credibility in international fora. It was only through the implementation of such policies 
that Indonesia would be able to acquire the necessary aid to restore the country's ailing 
economy. Upon resuming his position in the Ministry of Foreign Affair, Malik 
immediately declared Indonesia's intention to repair the country's relationship with 
Malaysia and to rejoin the UN, which were finally achieved in August and September 
1966 respectively. Indonesia's credibility was gradually restored, particularly in the eyes 
of the US and Japan who finally granted an emergency credit of US$ 59 million and US$ 
30 million respectively (Palmer 1978: 27). 23 Indonesia's relationship with its major 
21 Adam Malik initially served as Indonesian Ambassador to Moscow during the Sukarno administration. 
He was a well-known politician from the small but influential Murba party. As Anwar (1994: 35) observes, 
the 'appointment of Malik, who had close links with the Soviet Union was probably partly to convince the 
intemational community, especially the non-aligned countries, that despite the massacre of communists, 
Indonesia was not about to enter the Ame6can camp', thus confirming Indonesia's continued commitment 
to a free and active foreign policy. 22 Also known as Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX The Sultan had previously held various important positions 
dufing the Sukarno administration and had continuously identified with the banned Indonesian Socialist 
Party (PSI - Partai Sosialis Indonesia). He was also largely responsible for the rescheduling of Indonesia's foreign debt following his appointment as Economic Minister. 23 West Germany later offered funds of US$7.5 million, the Netherlands US$18 million, and Singapore 
US$32.7 million in aid. 
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creditors was later formalised through the creation of the Inter-Governmental Group on 
Indonesia (IGGI) in February 1967. The Netherlands' led initiative aimed to co-ordinate 
the multilateral aid given to Indonesia. 24 The major creditors of Indonesia were 
convinced that the stability of Southeast Asia would be ensured if Indonesia could 
achieve political and economic stability. 
The major economic policies issued by the New Order government can be 
divided into three periods, all of which had substantial impacts on the Indonesian 
govenunent's FEP. The first was from 1966 - 1973 when the New Order goverm-nent 
concentrated on the issue of economic rehabilitation and recovery. The government 
priority in this period was to re-establish its relationship with its most major Westem 
donors as well as to manage the inflation level. The second period was between 1974 
and 1985, when Indonesia attained rapid economic growth. The sustained growth of the 
economy was particularly significant following the rise of the international oil price in 
the mid-1970s. 25 However, the Indonesian economy dunng this period was also 
highlighted by strong economic nationalism, economic populism, and a strong resurgence 
of predatory bureaucratism. 26 As a result, this period saw a substantial increase in 
indigenous-led enterprises as well as the rise of protectionist policies, particularly trade 
and investment policies. Subsequently, the fall in the intemational. oil pnce in the mid- 
1980s forced the Indonesian government to cut back on its expenditures and to introduce 
24 IGGI membership consisted of Australia, Belgium, Great Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Switzerland, and the US. IGGI was later transformed into the Consultative 
Group on Indonesia (CGI) in March 1992 as a result of Indonesia's rejection of continued Dutch leadership 
and membership of the group. 
25 Indonesia is one of the world's major oil producers and a member of the Organisation of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
26 See Chapter 3 for definitions of these terms. 
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a major economic reform, which concentrated on tax and banking policies. Finally, the 
third period runs from 1986 until the recent economic crisis. Within this penod 
Indonesia conducted a rather active FEP, particularly through its commitment to various 
regional and international economic integration arrangements. There were, however, 
some substantial setbacks for the Indonesian economy, which included an increase in the 
practice of predatory bureaucratism amongst the New Order leadership as well as 
Suharto's continued reliance on certain technocrats. 
Figure 5.1. 
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During the first period, from 1966 until 1973, a major concern of the New Order 
, government was to restore the deteriorating economy of Indonesia (Reindhardt 197 1: 
141-2; Leifer 1983: 112-3). As a result, Indonesian economic policy at the time was 
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influenced by a laissez-faire approach, which aimed at increasing economic growth and 
attracting foreign investment (Robison 1986: 131). In 1967, for example, the Indonesian 
government issued the Foreign Investment Law No. 1/ 1967, which made the investment 
climate more attractive by providing substantial incentives, such as tax holidays, certain 
guarantees, etc, to foreign investors. 27 This was the New Order government's response 
towards the decline of the Indonesian economy. When the New Order government took 
control, the inflation level was 'accelerating, output was stagnating, poverty and hunger 
were widespread, and a tiny minority with access to import licenses were enriching 
themselves [whilst] incomes ... were declining' (Booth 1998: 71). In 1965, the inflation 
level exceeded 500 percent (refer to figure 5.1. ), whilst the price of nee rose as much as 
900 percent (Leifer 1983: 113). In the capital alone, the cost of living index rose from 
166 in 1959 to 269,000 in 1965 (refer to table 5.1. ). Moreover, Indonesia's total debt 
reached 'about [US]$2,300 million, of which about half was a Soviet and East European 
military debt. The immediate forecast, for 1966, was of foreign exchange earnings of 
$430 million (including oil) and minimum import requirements of $560 million; not to 
mention a debt servicing of $530 million' (Palmer 1978: 6-7). 
Between late 1958 and 1965, the Indonesian annual growth rate for net national 
products was 1.7 percent per annum, which was lower than for the 1950 - 1957 period. 
This percentage indicated a decline in the per capita income, as the population grew at 
around 2 percent per annum (Nugroho 1967: 539). In addition, the new Indonesian 
government also faced major problems concerning the balance of payments. In order to 
27 The law, however, did not apply to several crucial sectors, including the oil, gas, banking, insurance, and 
leasing sectors. 
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restore the Indonesian economy, the New Order government reallsed that it was 
necessary for Indonesia to acquire foreign aid and to reschedule its foreign debts. The 
government turned for help to some prominent Indonesian economists (Booth 1998: 74), 
who later become the main architects behind the Indonesian economic boom of the 
198 OS. 28 These economists soon approved the government's decision to acquire external 
funding. The Indonesian economy eventually made substantial progress throut,:,,, h the 
implementation of various economic policies, such as an improved tax collection system 
and the government's focus on non-agricultural sectors (Sundrum 1986: 58), particularly 
the manufacturing and construction sectors. 
Table 5.1. 
Cost of living index in Jakarta, 
1959-1966 
End of the year Index Percentage of 
increase* 
1959 166.0 19.4 
1960 215.0 29.5 
1961 380 76.7 
1962 976.0 156.8 
1963 2,226.0 128.1 
1964 5,234.0 135.1 
1965 36,347.0 594.4 
1966 268,733.0 639.4 
Notes: Compared with the end of previous year 
Source: National Development Information Service (1977: 18) 
Apart from the economic restoration of the country, there was also a major shift in 
Indonesian foreign policy during the first phase of the New Order penod, particularly 
with regard to the government's perspective on regional order and stability. The shift 
was not only evident in the non-nalisation of the relationship between Indonesia and 
28 This group of economists included Prof. Sumitro and Sjafruddin, who were at the time teaching at the 
University of Indonesia. This group was later known as the Berkeley Mafia as most of them were trained at 
Berkeley University, USA. 
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Malaysia, but also in Indonesia's support of the creation of a regional forum in Southeast 
Asia. Following the signing of the final agreement to end the conErontation, the 
representatives of both Indonesia and Malaysia continuously conducted various 
discussions on the possibility of the forination of a regional grouping. Both sides decided 
to put the issue on the agenda during their fonnal talks at the end of May 1966 (Gordon 
1969: 110). Many Indonesian politicians at the time were convinced that co-operation In 
the region would prevent future conflicts and promote regional prosperity. in his 
statement before the House of Representatives (MPR - Majelis Permusyawaratan 
Rakyat) on 16"' August 1966, General Suharto (1966: 48) stated that: 
'If one day an integrated Southeast Asia can be established, this part of 
the world then may stand strongly in facing outside influences and 
intervention from whatever quarter it may come, be it of an economic 
nature, or a physical military intervention (SiC) . 
29 
Suharto's argument soon drew widespread public support. Most people believed that 
regional co-operation would act as a much needed bulwark against the forces of neo- 
colonialism (Anwar 1994). Suharto was also greatly influenced by other Indonesian 
anny leaders, who also thought that a regional grouping in Southeast Asia was necessary, 
largely for strategic purposes. More importantly, however, Indonesia, as a member of 
ASEAN, was determined that its development would be oriented towards programmes 
that strengthened its national resilience and promoted stability in all fields 
(Panglaykiml977: 38). Despite the fact that Indonesia was known as the most 
nationalistic country in the region, it held, and still holds, a vision of an integrated 
Southeast Asia. Despite this, little attention was given to the development of ASEAN at 
29 As quoted in Leifer (1983: 119). 
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the time. It was not until the second phase of the New Order period that strengthened co- 
operation, particularly in the field of economics, was fostered amongst Southeast Asian 
countnes. 
Throughout the period between 1974 and 1985 Indonesia saw an increase in 
economic growth at an average of 7 percent per annum (Booth 1992: 1). At the same 
time, however, Indonesia experienced another surge of economic nationalism within the 
second phase of the New Order economy. Such nationalistic sentiment was partly fuelled 
by the Malari Riot of 1974,30 which gave added impetus to the momentum of public 
dissatisfaction with foreign capital (Chalmers and Hadiz 1997: 7 1). 3 1 This resurgence of 
economic nationalism at the time can be characterised as a 'complex movement 
influenced less by a declining petty bourgeoisie demanding state protection against the 
superior forces of foreign capital than by emerging political and economic forces 
demanding the removal of political and economic constraints upon their potential 
development' (Robison 1986: 147). Realising that it was impossible to control 
nationalist discontent, the Indonesian government introduced measures that would benefit 
indigenous Indonesian businessmen. Amongst other things, all new foreign investments 
at the time were required to open as joint ventures with local businesses. More 
specifically, all new foreign investors were required to offer Indonesian businessmen a 
30 The Malan Riot started on the 15'h January 1974, during the arrival of the Japanese Prime Minister, 
Kakuei Tanaka. A public demonstration of tens of thousands of people led to looting and violence. Today, 
this I Incident is also referred to as the anti-Japanese riot of 1974. 31 During the period leading up to the Malari Riot, Robison (1990: 145) points out that, 'associations and 
newspapers representing Muslim-oriented indigenous small capital had conducted a public and virulent 
anti-foreign, anti-Chinese campaign in an effort to halt their deteriorating position' in the domestic 
economy. 
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share of as much as 20 percent of equity holding initially, and this was to be expanded to 
51 percent within ten years of operation. 
The re-emergence of economic nationalism during the second phase of the New 
Order government was caused by two factors. Firstly, Indonesia became increasingly 
dependent on foreign aid, particularly from international financial institutions, such as the 
IMF, World Bank, and other foreign advisers (Arndt 1984: 42). The Indonesian public 
resented the fact that Indonesia had to sell out its natural resources to serve the interests 
of foreign capitalists. Aside from that, indigenous Indonesians, mainly Muslims, were 
also unhappy with Indonesia's open-door policy at the time, arguing that they could not 
compete with their foreign counterparts. Secondly, the boom in oil prices in 1974 - 1975 
also played a major role in shifting the orientation of New Order economic policy- 
makers' towards more inward-looking policies. The Indonesian government, for 
example, was able to increase the corporate tax on oil from Rp. 344 billion in 1973-74 to 
H-p. 8,627 billion in 1981-82 (from 35.6 to 70.6 percent of total revenue) (Robison 1990: 
144). The excess revenue accrued from the oil sector allowed the Indonesian government 
to implement more inward-looking economic policies. 
Four institutions were particularly important in promoting economic nationalism 
(or statist-nationalist ideology) during the second phase of the New Order period, namely 
the Indonesian Gas and Oil Company (Pertamina - Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak 
dan Gas Bumi Negara), the Ministry of Industry and Trade (Depperindag - Departemen 
Industri dan Perdagangan), the Investment Co-ordination Board (BKPM - Badan 
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Koordinasi Penanaman Modao, and the Centre for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS) (Chalmers and Hadiz 1997: 72). Pertamina was actually a state corporation but, 
from when the New Order government took control until 1975, it was 'a fiefdom 
controlled by a military officer directly responsible to the President in pursuit of a variety 
of nongovernmental interests' (Robison 1990: 15). Apart from its involvement in non- 
governinental activities, such as allocating drilling leases to foreign companies, 
Pertamina often used the 'state's authority to force foreign capital to support Indonesia's 
own development' (Chalmers and Hadiz 1997: 72). On the other hand, the Deppermdag 
promoted economic nationalism through the maintenance of tight regulations in 
Indonesian investment laws, and BKPM was established during the New Order period to 
study various investment applications from abroad. 32 Indonesia's trade and regulatory 
policy regimes had often been the Me noire of liberal economists (Hill 1990: 226), in 
that the investment process was often heavily bureaucratised. The last major institution 
that promoted the notion of economic nationalism was CSIS, which was a private 
research institution established with business funding. It had close links with Golkar, the 
State Intelligence Co-ordinating Agency (BAKIN - Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara), 
and a military organisation called the Special Operation Service (OPSUS - Operasi 
Khusus). 33 The CSIS intellectuals were part of the nationalist bureaucrats who longed for 
32 Initially, the Indonesian government created the Foreign Capital Investment Advisory Board (BPPMA - 
Badan Pertimbangan Penanaman Modal Asing) following the enactment of the Foreign Investment Law 
No. I/ 1967. In the following year, 1968, the Indonesian government felt that it was necessary to improve 
the institutions involved in the investment process. To that end, the BPPMA was transformed into the 
Technical Committee on Investment (PTPM - Panitia Teknis Penanaman Modal). The task of the PTPM 
was not only to advise the President regarding the implementation of foreign investment, as was the case 
with the BPPMA, but this new institution was also responsible for the study and evaluation of investment 
applications. BPPMA was later changed into BKPM in 1973 as a result of the further need to improve the 
co-ordination of investment perrnits as well as the need to improve investment promotion. For a more 
detailed history of the BKPM, visit the BKPM official website (accessed 2003) at: 
ýt-tP': //w-wwE.. bkpi-inL. go. idibkpni/bk m. php? mode--bacgq, &inf6 id=90 33 - -ftý- __ OPSUS was shut down in 1985 following attempts to restructure the organisation. 
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state-led national capitalism, which would be integrated at the political level with 
authoritarian corporatism (Robison 1986: 134-5; 148). These four institutions were 
cornerstones for the formalisation of economic nationalism in governmental economic 
policy. 
The fall in the oil prices in the first half of the 1980s forced the Indonesian 
government to take structural adjustment measures. By 1985, the revenue collected from 
corporate oil taxes totalled a mere Rp. 6,338 billion (or about 57.1 percent of total 
revenues) (World Bank 1993b: 185), which represented a decline of about 13.5 percent 
from the 1981 - 1982 period. Coupled with rising debts and a sudden decline in 
economic growth, Indonesia ended its decade of oil-financed growth and abundance (Hill 
2000: 16). Due to the worrying state of the Indonesian economy, 'the World Bank began 
to press the Indonesian government to liberalise its economy and place less emphasis on 
[ISI]' (Chalmers and Hadiz 1997: 92). The World Bank, which had played a very 
important part in the policy-making networks during the first phase of the New Order 
period, was now growing uneasy about the state intervention mechanisms that had 
operated during the 1970s. The Indonesian government responded to the World Bank's 
concern by introducing a series of reforin packages in the mid-1980s, which included the 
deregulation of the financial and trade sectors, the relaxation of foreign investment 
regulations, and the introduction of a privatisation process (Robison 1997: 34). However, 
this reform package was not entirely successful for two reasons. The first reason was that 
the Indonesian government persisted 'with a policy of import restrictions through more 
systematic and comprehensive licensing' (Booth- 1998: 197). Although the Indonesian 
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government took progressive steps in tariff reduction, foreign investments still had to 
include a minimum domestic equity, whilst foreign investors continued to be excluded in 
a range of sectors, particularly some of the still-lucrative import substitution areas 
(Robison 1990: 113). The second reason was the fact that many Indonesian domestic 
business groups had become increasingly comfortable with the nationalist economic 
policies introduced during the previous decade (Robison 1997: 35). Due to the 
bureaucratic capitalism that had emerged in the previous decade, it was only large 
conglomerates with close connections to governmental officials that were capable of 
making offers for corporations previously under the control of the government. 
The second phase of the New Order period also saw major changes in the way the 
Indonesian government conducted its FEP, particularly as regards regional economic co- 
operation within the ASEAN framework. Starting with the ASEAN Preferential Trading 
Agreement (ASEAN-PTA) in 1977, the following decade saw increasing regional 
economic co-operation in Southeast Asia, which was evident in initiatives such as the 
ASEAN Industrial Joint Ventures (AIJVs), ASEAN Industrial Projects (AIPs), and 
ASEAN Industrial Complementation (AIC). The first discussion to initiate such co- 
operations began during the Fourth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in 1971, where 
General Carlos Romulo, the Foreign Minister of the Philippines at the time, pointed out 
how important it was for the Association to have a new sense of direction rather than 
being simply a tool to bridge the political divide between the major powers. As a result, 
a plan to create an ASEAN Common Market was submitted, and the 1970s was declared 
the Decade of Development for ASEAN. In response to General Romulo's idea, the 
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Indonesian government agreed to get involved in an enhanced regional economic co- 
operation. At the same time, however, the Indonesian government remained convinced 
that 'it would seem more realistic for the ASEAN states to proceed with a more selective 
approach to co-operation' (Kartadjoemena. 1976: 206). With increasing public demand 
for a nationalist economic approach, the Indonesian government maintained that it 
'would like first to have a better grasp and control of the national economic life in order 
that the country's economic and social development could be directed towards the 
national objectives chosen' (Kartadjoemena 1977: 77). Given the strong influence that 
Indonesia had over the Association at the time, most of ASEAN's early attempts at 
economic co-operation failed to succeed. 
Major economic liberalisation began to take shape again in the third phase of the 
New Order period (1986-1997). The economic policies introduced during this period 
were more market oriented, and the private sector was given the role of achieving 
economic growth (Gray 2002: 3). A more significant development that occurred in 
Indonesian economic policy was the shift from ISI to a more export oriented approach. 
The Indonesian government devalued the rupiah in 1986 to support the national export 
sectors. In the following year, a reform package was introduced to further reduce import 
barriers, remove export licenses and other barriers, improve incentives for foreign 
investors, and to revive the moribund domestic share markets (Booth 1988). Although 
the national economy appeared rather bleak in both 1987 and 1988, the Indonesian 
govenu-nent was able to provide a more optimistic forecast for the coming decade at the 
end of 1989 (Booth 1992: 23). The Indonesian government's forecast was correct. 
169 
Investment values in 1994, for example, reached as much as US$ 39.9 billion from about 
US$ 23 billion between 1990 and 1993. On the whole, Indonesia experienced a major 
economic boom during this period, and this was to last until the economic crisis in 1997. 
As a result of major economic refonn in the mid-1980s, Indonesian pursued a 
more active FEP. The Indonesian government at the time were interested in enhanced 
economic co-operation in the Southeast Asian region, if not at the Asia-Pacific level. 
This indicated a major shift of interest amongst Indonesian FEP-makers from the 
traditional concentration on the Northern hemisphere to the Asian region, particularly 
Japan and the Asian Newly Industrialising Economies (NIEs). In Hill's (2000: 85) 
analysis, three rationales can explain such a shift. These were 'the rapid growth of the 
Northeast Asian economies; the ever stronger economic complementarities between a 
low-wage but resource rich Indonesia alongside the resource poor, high-wage economies 
of Japan and the NIEs; and political-institutional changes which have gradually 
weakened old ties to Europe in particular'. Another important factor that drove Indonesia 
to become more supportive of regional integration strategy (RIS) was the strengthening 
of regionalism in both Western Europe and North America. As a result, Australia's 
proposal to introduce regional trade liberalisation. at the Asia-Pacific level was welcomed 
warmly by Indonesian policy-makers, and, subsequently, Indonesia became one of the 
APEC founders. In ASEAN, talks began on the possible development of established 
economic co-operation through AFTA, which was finally introduced in 1992. 
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To sum up, the New Order goverm-nent made substantial changes to Indonesian 
FEP. Throughout its existence, the New Order government was committed to various 
forms of economic policy. From 1965 until 1974, economic liberalisation measures were 
undertaken by the New Order government. Subsequently, from 1975 until 1985, 
economic nationalism became a response to the domestic business interests who had 
enjoyed hardly any benefits from economic liberalisation. Following the stabilisation 
period after the oil price shocks of 1981 and 1985, the New Order government once again 
introduced liberalisation measures between 1986 and 1997. Economic growth reached its 
peak before the economic crisis of 1997. Since the economic crisis began the 
government has been blamed for the collapse of the Indonesian economy, but an open 
mind should be kept when analysing the Indonesian New Order government. On the 
whole, since the New Order government took control, Indonesia was able to develop its 
economy through the implementation of a number of effective economic policies. 34 The 
real per capita GDP, for instance, trebled in just one generation, whilst poverty levels 
decreased (Hill 1994: 56-7). During the last phase of the Guided Democracy period, the 
average growth of real per capita GDP was only -0.4 percent. In contrast, the New Order 
govenunent was able to increase average real GDP growth by 8.1 percent by 1995. The 
New Order government was also successful in reducing poverty (Hill 1994: 57). In Java 
alone, the poverty level was slashed from 61 percent in the mid-1960s to only 10 percent 
by the 1990s. In various provinces outside Java poverty was reduced from 52 percent in 
the mid- I 960s to only 7 percent by the mid- 1 990s. 
34 Suharto later proclaimed himself the Bapak Pembangunan, or father of development, in Indonesia. 
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5.3. Contemporary Indonesian nationalism and foreign economic policy 
The economic crisis in 1997 marked the fall of the New Order government. By 
October 1997, Indonesia was forced to seek assistance from the IMF to counteract the 
-- 35 economic crisis. However, questions regarding President Suharto's health and 
increasing opposition and protests from different groups within society demanding 
political change exacerbated further the economic deterioration of the country. Indonesia 
was suddenly transformed from a miracle economy, which had been heralded by many 
foreign economists as a development model for other developing countries, into a melt- 
down economy, dependent on various international financial institutions and donor 
countries for its survival (Thee Kian Wie 2001: 164). Subsequently, leadership changes 
saw the appointment of Bachruddin Jusuf Habibie, then Abdurrahman Wahid, and finally 
Megawati Sukamoputri as Indonesian Presidents over a five-year period. This analysis 
of contemporary Indonesian nationalism and FEP is based upon these last three 
Presidential penods. There were two important problems that challenged the Indonesian 
leaders following the demise of the New Order government, namely economic recovery 
and the threat of national disintegration. Consequently, Indonesian FEP was directed 
both towards the alleviation of the economic crisis and towards protecting national unity. 
35 The IMF-supported programme was initiated by the first Letter of Intent (Lol), which was submitted to 
the IMF on the 31" October 1997 and was approved by the IMF on the 4th November 1997. The first Lol 
was built around three areas, which included: (1) economic reforms in the real sector, including improved 
transparency in governance; (2) a strategy for comprehensive financial restructuring that would include the 
closure of insolvent banks; (3) a strong macroeconomic policy for balance of payment stability. For a 
detailed analysis of the first Lol signed between the Indonesian government and IMF see, inter alia, 
Djiwandono (2003: 200). 
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Habibie was appointed the third Indonesian President following Suharto's 
resignation on 21" May 1998, which had been forced by the massive demonstrations that 
took place throughout the country. Habibie had been one of Suharto's most trusted 
followers throughout the existence of the New Order government. Initially, he had been 
appointed as the Minister for Research and Technology in 1978, a position that he held 
until his appointment as Vice-President in March 1998. During his time as the Minister 
for Research and Technology, he was known as an eccentric, an arrogant technolog who 
was an advocate for notoriously expensive state-led projects that aimed to make 
Indonesia technologically self-sufficient. His views were criticised both within and 
outside Indonesia. When the news of his appointment as Vice-President was broadcast in 
January 1998, the value of the rupiah fell drastically (Hill 2000: 280) to around Rp. 
17,000 against the US$. After assuming the Presidency, Habibie wanted to include 
foreign policy in his overall agenda, but could not do so owing to the short tenure of his 
office and the fact that the post of vice president was vacant. Regardless of such 
setbacks, Anwar (2000: 2), a political and foreign affairs adviser to the President, has 
described Habibie's three overall objectives. These were laying 'the foundation for 
Indonesia's democratisation', resolving 'the East Timor issue once and for all', and 
securing 'international assistance for Indonesian economic recovery'. These three 
objectives were central to Indonesian foreign policy during Habibie's Presidency. In 
essence, these objectives were aimed at freeing Indonesia from the various foreign 
pressures that stood in the way of the government's attempt to achieve sustained 
economic recovery. 
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Habibie faced an immense challenge when he took the Presidency, particularly 
with regard to alleviating the economic crisis and trying to establish the foundations for 
democracy in Indonesia. By 1998, Indonesia's economic growth had contracted to an 
average of - 15 percent, from an annual average of 7 percent per annum prior to the 
economic cnsis. The value of the rupiah was also weakened against the US$, from Rp. 
2,400 in July 1997 to an average of Rp. 16,000 - Rp. 17,000, when Habibie took over 
(Abrash 1998: 1; Sunderlin et al. 2001: 767). The financial sector, in particular, was in a 
dire state with the total external debt of Indonesian private banks and businesses reaching 
as much as US$ 73 billion, whilst the Indonesian government owed a further US$ 66 
billion. Moreover, unemployment, as a result of the contraction in the real sector of the 
economy, began to soar and inflation hit its highest level ever at about 80 percent (Abrash 
1998: 1). The deepening economic crisis and the independence crisis in East Timor 
triggered nationalist sentiment in the country. Searching for possible scapegoats to take 
the blame for the economic crisis, the Indonesian authorities and media alike pointed 
their fingers at currency speculators (Henderson 1998: 155). The Indonesian Minister of 
Justice reportedly threatened that any currency speculators found conducting activities 
that might destabilise the country's economy would be guilty of subversion, whilst, at the 
same, a campaign of defend the rupiah, defend the nation was championed by the 
Indonesian media (Henderson 1998: 155). In economic terms, therefore, the Habibie 
administration faced the challenge not only of stabilising the economy, but also regaining 
the confidence of foreign investors in light of heavy political instability and the possible 
re-emergence of economic nationalism. 
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The appointment of Adi Sasono, a former Islamic NGO activist, as the Minister of 
Co-operatiVes, Small, and Medium Enterprises also raised fears over the possible re- 
emergence of economic nationalism in Indonesia. In the past, he had developed the 
concept of the Ekonomi Kerakyatan (People's Economy), which can be defined as a 
participative economy, which allows fair and equal access to all members of society in 
the processes of production, distribution, and national consumption without sacrificing 
human resources and the environment to support the people (Sasono 1999). 
36 In 
pnnciple, the concept of the People's Economy involved activities conducted from the 
people, by the people, and for the prosperity of the people. Members of the business 
community saw People's Economy as a signal for another wave of the nationalisation of 
foreign and ethnic Chinese capital. However, economic nationalisation was not the main 
aim of Sasono with regard to the concept of the People's Economy. In an interview with 
Asiaweek (1998), he emphasised that the main intention of the Habibie administration 
was not to 'nationalise [foreign-owned or ethnic-Chinese] assets, but ... to 
limit the 
degree of ownership, which can create social tension'. He further argued that 2 percent 
of Indonesians, most of whom were ethnic Chinese, controlled about 61 percent of the 
national GDP, which was not a healthy economic condition. True refonn within the 
framework of the People's Economy, according to Sasono, would include the 
empowerment of the small and weak in order to create a strong middle class. Far from 
proposing a racist economic policy, Sasono's idea of the People's Economy, if 
implemented properly, would indeed foster not only economic stability, but also soc, al 
equality for Indonesia. 
36 As quoted in Thoha (2000). 
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During the Habibie administration, Indonesia's relations with one of its closest 
neighbours, Singapore, went sour despite the administration's commitment to improvi ing 
relations with Indonesia's immediate neighbours (Anwar 2000: 2). The ethnic issue was 
once again the main theme behind the conflict between the two countries. Not only had 
this conflict undermined the special relationship that had been built over the years 
between the two countries, it also jeopardised the flow of future financial aid from 
Singapore to Indonesia. The conflict began with Habibie's irritation at the slow response 
of Singaporean leaders towards his appointment as the third Indonesian President. It 
seemed to indicate that the Singaporean leaders expected Habibie's tenure to be short 
owing to his close association with the foriner President Suharto. The relationship 
between the two countries worsened when a row between Habibie and the Singaporean 
leaders broke out over sensitive ethnic issues in Singapore, and in Indonesia itself. 37 In 
an interview with Taiwanese China Times, Habibie accused Singapore of discriminating 
against the ethnic Malays, particularly in the military (Suh 1999). The Singaporeans 
reacted furiously towards this accusation and were only calmed following a statement by 
the Indonesian Education Minister, J. Sudarsono, that President Habibie was misinfonned 
about the level of Malay representation in the Singaporean military service. In actual 
fact, however, the conflict between the two countries was mainly a result of the 
frustration of the Indonesian elite about Singapore's overall contribution to help 
overcome the economic crisis in Indonesia. 
37 These ethnicity issues have often been used as political propaganda in Southeast Asian politics, 
particularly in Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia. The racial diversity of these countries had apparently 
claimed the lives of many ethnic Chinese Indonesians, as evidenced by the May 1998 race riots in 
Indonesia. Since then the international community, particularly China and Singapore, had blamed the 
Indonesian government for failing to provide fair treatment for the Indonesian Chinese community. 
Although most national constitutions in Southeast Asian countries, with the exception of Malaysia with its 
New Economic Policy (NEP), do not specify special treatment for specific ethnic groups, racial issues 
continue to be used as propaganda by both the Singaporean and Indonesian governments. 
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Despite this major setback, Habibie's FEP was quite successful overall. Apart 
from his full commitment to the IMF's prescriptions, 38 the success of Habibie was also 
due to his ability to promote political democracy in Indonesia, which allowed the country 
to regain the necessary support from the international community to alleviate the 
economic crisis. The first move by the Habibie administration to achieve this objective 
was to release political prisoners taken by the New Order goverranent and to guarantee 
freedom of speech for the press (Anwar 2001a: 8). The second major move of the 
Habibie administration to gain international support was to raise the issue of the future of 
East Timor. On 21" September 1999, President Habibie gave a speech before the 
People's Representatives Assembly (DPR - Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat), which revealed 
the President's policy on the question of East Timor (Mizuno, 2003: 117-18). For 
Habibie, the question of East Timor, which had been a major embarrassment for 
Indonesia since its incorporation into the country, was particularly important to 
Indonesia. Habibie also believed that, by raising the question of East Timor, the 
international community would be more inclined to provide much needed aid and 
assistance to Indonesia during the economic crisis. Despite the resurgence of strong 
nationalistic sentiments, particularly amongst military officers and opposition leaders 
(Leifer 2000: 154), the Habibie administration continued to pursue this strategy. The 
third major move to secure economic support from foreign donors and international 
financial institutions was Habibie's intention to hold a fair and open election. 39 Finally, 
38 As reported by the BBC News (1998), or visit the BBC News official website at: 
http: //neNý, s. bbc. co. uk/l/hi/events/indonesia/latest news/119700. stm 
'9 On IP November 1998, Habibie instructed his Minister of Home Affairs, Syarwan Hamid, to conduct a 
feasibility study on the implementation of a democratic election in the near future. Subsequently, the 
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at the regional level, during his short tenure, Habibie managed to make close contact with 
Mahathir Mohammad, the Malaysian Prime Minister. As a result, the future of ASEAN 
regionalism, and the progress of AFTA in particular, was no longer in jeopardy despite 
the strained relationship between Indonesia and Singapore. 
Table 5.2. 
Annual economic indicators 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
GDP at market prices (Rp. * bn) 532.6 625.5 1002.3 1119.4 1308.6 
GDP (US$ bn) 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 
Real GDP growth 8.0 4ý5 -13.2 0.1 4.8 
Consumer price inflation (avg. %) 7.0 62 58.4 20.5 3.7 
Population (m) 196.8 199.9 204.4 2093 212.6 
Exports of goods fob (US$ m) 50188 56298 50371 51424 65507 
Imports of goods fob (US$ m) 44240 46223 31942 30598 41001 
Current account balance (US$ m) -7663 -4889 4096 5785 7072 
Foreign exchange reserves excl gold 
(US$ ni) 18251 16587 22713 26445 22458 
Total external debt (US$ bn) 128.9 136.2 147.5 142.5 143.8 
Debt service ration, paid ('/, o) 36.8 30,0 33.2 32.6 25.3 
Exchange rate (avg) Rp: US$ 2342.3 2909A 10013.6 7855.2 8421.8 
Source: Economist Intelligencc Unit (2001: 5) 
Abdurrahman Wahid finally took over the presidency following the 1999 election 
despite the fact that his party, the National Awakening Party (PKB - Partai Kebangkitan 
Bangsa) ranked only fourth in the election poll. 40 As with Habible, Wahid was 
government appointed a group compnsing mostly of academics, also known as the Group of Seven, to 
assist in the drafting of new election laws. Indonesia finally experienced one of the most fair and open 
elections to be held in a developing country and became the third largest democracy in the world. 40 The final result of the 1999 election was as follows: the nationalist Indonesian Democratic Party for 
Struggle (PDI-P - Partai Demokrasi Indonesia untuk Perjuangan) gained 153 seats; the incumbent Golkar 
took 120 seats; the Islamic United Development Party (PPP - Partai Persatuan Pembangunan) took 58 
seats, the Islamic PKB 51 seats; National Mandate Party (PAN - Partai Amanat Nasionao 34 seats, and 
lastly the Islamic Crescent Moon and Star Party (PBB - Partai Bulan Bintang) gained 13 seats. Although 
his party ranked only fourth during the election, Wahid gained enough popular support to become the 
fourth Indonesian President heading a coalition government formed between his own party, Golkar, PAN, 
PBB, and another Islamic party, the Justice Party (PK - Partai Keadilan). Wahid was appointed President 
wililst Megawati took the vice-presidency post. They were sworn in on 20 th and 21't October 1999 
respectively. 
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considered eccentric, whilst at the same time different from Habibie in that he was 
considered a more moderate Islamic leader and a stronger supporter of democracy and 
pluralism. Shortly after his appointment as the head of state, President Wahid set out the 
main themes of his FEP, which included the promotion of foreign investment and free 
market reforms (Seymond 1999). This was President Wahid's nationalist appeal to build 
a stronger Indonesia in the face of the economic crisis. In addition, President Wahid also 
called for closer ties with Japan, China, and the member countries of ASEAN. The 
market reacted positively to the appointment of Wahid as the leader of Indonesia. The 
Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSE), for example, experienced a resurgence with a peak of US$ 
63.7 billion after the news of Wahid's appointment as the new President was broadcast 
(Smith 2001b: 7). Moreover, the country achieved substantial growth of 0.1 percent by 
the end of 1999 from - 13.2 percent in the previous year, whilst the rupiah was stabilised 
at between Rp. 7,800 to Rp. 8,000 to the dollar (refer to table 5.2). 
Another major FEP theme in the Wahid administration was a commitment to fully 
support the IMF rescue loan package, which was linked with the IMF Lol. The 
disbursement from the IMF was important because it could be 'taken as a measure of 
market confidence in the progress of economic reform. Therefore, ... the credibility of 
Indonesian economic reforms [was] reflected in the successful and consistent 
implementation of the IMF progranune' (Feridhanusetyawan 2003: 238). The first Lol 
agreed between the Wahid administration and the IMF was signed on the 20ffi January 
2000. This required the Indonesian government to achieve price stability in the market, 
to push for various restructuring measures including those related to corporate and 
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banking policies, to rebuild key public institutions, to implement economic and social 
policies, and, finally, to manage natural resources. 41 However, the IMF did not enjoy a 
close relationship with the Wahid administration for long (Sadli 2003). The Indonesian 
government missed many deadlines and its commitment towards the agreed Lol was 
questioned (Feridhanusetyawan 2003: 238). The Wahid administration was also unable 
to maintain a close relationship with other international financial institutions and foreign 
donors (Sadli 2003: 190-3). The World Bank, the ADB, and the Japanese government, 
for example, have traditionally provided major development aid for the Indonesian 
government. However, during the Wahid administration, the World Bank scaled down 
Indonesia's rating from a 'high case' to a 'low (or base) case', which led to the 
incomplete disbursement of the much needed financial aid for economic recovery. These 
institutions claimed that they were dissatisfied over the progress of the Wahid 
administration whilst in power (Sadli 2003: 190- 1). They were particularly unhappy with 
the Wahid administration's handling of the decentralisation process (i. e. Regional 
Autonomy Law - RAL), regarding the amount of freedom given to local authorities 
regarding taxes and expenditure in their districts, which might damage central 
government balances. President Wahid is often cited as having criticised these 
international financial institutions for helping his political opposition by delaying the 
disbursement of the loans. 42 Therefore, throughout its short existence, the Wahid 
administration failed to create a suitable enviromnent for the reform packages offered by 
these intemational financial institutions. 
41 For further details concerning the content of the 20 January 2000 LoI, visit the IMF official website 
(accessed 2002) at: 
h! lp: //www. ii-nf org/extemal/NP/1,01/2000/idn/01/index. htm 
"' As reported in the Down to Earth (2000-2001) official website at: 
ht! p: //dte. gn. apc. orjz/AuI l. htm 
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Despite unstable relationships with some foreign donors, the overall FEP of the 
Wahid administration did encourage foreign investments and private sector growth in the 
country, which was a direct reflection of the administration's commitment to alleviating 
the economic crisis. Although the Foreign Capital Investment Law of 1967, which gave 
substantial incentives to foreign investors (i. e. tax holidays, etc), was still in effect as the 
basis for foreign investment in the country, the Wahid administration had amended the 
law to suit the overall objective of its FEP. Amongst other things, one major amendment 
was to remove unnecessary bureaucratic procedures that were considered problematic by 
foreign investors. In the past, for example, apart from dealing with the BKPM, foreign 
investors were also required to work closely with the relevant technical departments, such 
as the Ministry of Finance (MoF), the Directorate General of Custom and Excise 
(DGCE), the Ministry of Justice (MoJ), and so on. 43 The new investment regulations, 
however, meant that foreign investors could deal directly with BKPM. In addition, the 
Wahid administration also speeded up the Initial Investment Approval (IIA), which had 
previously taken a few months, to a maximum period of 15 working days. Nearly all 
industries were reopened, except for those industries stipulated in the Presidential Decree 
No. 96 / 2000, which were open to investment under certain conditions. The sectors that 
remained absolutely closed included mining and fishing, industry and trading, 
communications, and the energy sectors. 44 
43 Quoted from the official website of the US Embassy in Jakarta (2000): 
ht! P: //Www. iisembassyiakarta. orR/econ/invest/investment2OOO-2. html#Al 
The Presidential Decree No. 96 / 2000 can be read on the official BKPM website (2000) at: 
ht! p: //www bkpm. jzo. id/bkpm/dni. php? mode=baca#ATTACHMENT`/`201 
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In order to implement an FEP that was accommodating to foreign investment, 
President Wahid attempted to make significant changes to the overall conduct of 
Indonesian foreign policy. Internally, a radical change was made in the Ministry of 
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Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Dr. AM Shihab , an outsider to the MFA bureaucracy, was 
chosen as the Foreign Minister. Externally, inspired more by 'Sukarno nationalism and 
high profile foreign policy than by Suharto's low profile' (Anwar 2003: 77), President 
Wahid shifted the overall Indonesian foreign policy by playing the Asia Card, in an 
attempt at lessening Indonesia's dependence on the West (Smith 2000b: 498). Apart 
from that, President Wahid also expressed his desire for a more international outlook or 
ecumenical foreign policy. This international outlook with regard to foreign policy was 
evident through his frequent travel abroad. The prime motive behind his policy was to 
provide the international community with comprehensive information regarding the real 
situation in Indonesia. Through this policy, the Wahid administration hoped that they 
would be able to regain the confidence of international investors. In a speech at a 
conference marking Indonesian National Press Day in Jakarta, Dr. Shihab (2000) 
reiterated President Wahid's foreign policy and maintained that Indonesian foreign policy 
would be geared to the economic situation, and to the realities of globalisation and 
interdependence. 
President Wahid's first foreign visit was made shortly after his appointment as 
Indonesian President. He visited Indonesia's neighbouring countries, including 
Singapore, Cambodia, and Myanmar on 6h, 7th, and 8h November respectively. The visit 
45 Dr. Shihab was previously a scholar of comparative religions at the University of Harvard's Divinity 
School. Despite his appointment as Indonesian Foreign Minister, Shihab never had any experience in 
conducting diplomatic relations. 
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to Singapore was made for two reasons. The first reason was to restore the old bilateral 
relations that had been strained during the Habibie Presidency. The second reason was to 
persuade Indonesian business people who had transferred their wealth to Singapore 
during the economic crisis to return to Indonesia. Within four months of his Presidency, 
President Wahid visited nearly 26 countries, which made him the Indonesian head of the 
state who had conducted the most foreign visits within such a short space of time (Smith 
2000b: 505). Throughout this time, he gave voice to numerous controversial ideas that 
were often unrealistic or too difficult to implement. For example, following his visits to 
China and India in late 1999 and early 2000 respectively, Wahid proposed establishing a 
triangular relationship between Indonesia, China, and India, aimed at lessening their 
dependence upon the West. However, sceptics have commented that although such a 
proposal is interesting, it is also challenging as a result of the bilateral problems that still 
exist between India and China (Anwar 2000: 5). Aside from that, President Wahid also 
proposed a West Pacific Forum, which would include Indonesia, Australia, New Zealand, 
Papua New Guinea, and East Timor (Anwar 2003: 78). Not only were these proposals 
too ambitious, costly, and potentially ineffectual, such new fora would also have 
undermined ASEAN and its recent economic regionalism attempt, AFTA. 
On the surface, President Wahid implemented quite controversial foreign policies. 
Some scholars, such as Smith (2000b) and Anwar (2000), however, are sceptical, and 
suggest that Indonesian foreign policy during the Wahid administration was far more 
orthodox than others have indicated. Although the President was able to gain enormous 
support from the international community for Indonesia's efforts at national integration, 
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Indonesian foreign policy during the Wahid administration remained quite conventional 
and its main ideas were similar to the foreign policy conducted by the New Order 
government (Smith 2000b: 523 ). 46 Although President Wahid's frequent travels were 
quite successful during the early stages of his administration, most of his later foreign 
visits were ineffective (Anwar 2000: 4-5). Furthermore, Anwar indicates three main 
reasons for the failure of President Wahid's foreign policy. Firstly, with mounting 
domestic problems, President Wahid's frequent travels abroad led to conditions of 
lawlessness and lack of governance in the country. Secondly, it was illogical for 
Indonesia to conduct an ecumenical foreign policy when the country needed to focus on 
its immediate geo-strategic interests. Thirdly, President Wahid had to face allegations 
that pointed to his involvement in numerous scandals, which undermined the authority of 
his leadership in the govenunent, MPR, and DPR. Moreover, it should be added that 
President Wahid's insistence on the Asia Card was overly ambitious. Economically, 
Indonesia was still dependent upon the West for financial assistance and had been even 
before the economic crisis. As a result, Indonesia would hardly benefit by conducting an 
FEP that was hostile towards the West. 
The Wahid administration finally came to an end because of the opposition 
leaders' irritation over the inconsistency that the President had shown as leader of the 
country. It was decided through a vote in the Parliament that the President should step 
46 The fori-ner Indonesian Foreign Minister, Alwi Shihab, further confirmed that ASEAN remained the 
cornerstone of Indonesian foreign policy and that Indonesian foreign policy was very much in line with the 
New Order's. For further details of Shihab's comments on Indonesia's foreign policy see Time Asia 
(1999), or visit the Time Asia official website at: 
http: lýk\ýNv\v. tii-ne. com/time/asia/magazine/99/1108/indonesia. interview. html 
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, and Megawati was sworn in to become the fifth Indonesian President on 23d 
July 2001. As with her predecessors, the Megawati administration inherited the 
challenges of maintaining the country's integration, alleviating the economic crisis, and 
ensuring long-term pol't1cal stability in the country. Her policy with regard to national 
integration was coherent and comprehensive. In this context, she insisted that national 
unity should be placed as a priority in her national agenda. As with her father, Sukarno, 
President Megawati has also known as a staunch nationalist who was reluctant to 
jeopardise the current geographical existence of the country by allowing any separatist 
movements within the country. The Megawati administration had been particularly 
relieved by the fact that its policy of national integration was ftilly supported by the 
world's major powers, particularly the US. The US, under the Clinton administration, 
had initially suspended its military aid to Indonesia due to the human rights violations 
that took place under the New Order goverment. Recently, however, both sides have 
tried for reconciliation and have resumed their military relations. This reconciliation was 
demonstrated by President Megawati's visit to the US shortly after the September I I' 
tragedy, which made her the first head of the state to visit the US after the event. The 
Bush administration expressed its wish 'to enlist Indonesia [as the] host to the world's 
largest Muslim population in the fight against terrorism' (Gershman 2001: 1). 48 
However, as Gershman points out, US support of an integrated Indonesia might 
undermine the democratisation process in Indonesia because the Megawati administration 
is now capable of implementing stem, or even violent measures, to maintain the 
integration of the country. 
4' The assembly voted 591 to 0 to remove President Wahid from the office. 48 The Bush Administration has also provided further support for the Indonesian military following the 
terrorist bomb attack on Bali in October 2002. 
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Figure 5.2. 
Three concentric circles of Indonesian foreign policy 
Source: Smith (2000a: 18) 
In terms of improving economic conditions, Megawati appears to have put the 
appropriate FEP in place. One key feature of the Megawati administration's overall 
foreign policy has been a return to the traditional concentric circle formula (refer to 
figure 5.2. ), which was abandoned by the Wahid administration that favoured instead the 
ecumenical approach to foreign policy (Anwar 2003: 78). This formula has identified 
ASEAN as the highest priority of Indonesian foreign POIICY. 49 Accordingly, President 
Megawati appointed Dr. Hasan Wirayuda as Foreign Minister, a senior career diplomat 
with vast experience of diplomacy who had served in the MFA since the mid- 1970s. 
Soon after taking over from Dr. Shihab, the new Foreign Minister stated that the main 
Indonesian foreign policy was to restore relationships with neighbouring countries, thus, 
once again, emphasising the importance of ASEAN. Dr. Wirayuda's first step was to 
visit Singapore to conclude some major economic discussions for further bilateral co- 
49 The concentric circle, according to Smith (2000a: 17), places ASEAN as the first circle of the Indonesian 
foreign policy, whilst the member countries of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the West are 
placed as the second and the third circles of Indonesian foreign policy. 
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operation (Manning 2001: 2). Afterwards, President Megawati visited all nine ASEAN 
countries to reassure regional leaders that she could handle Indonesia's problems as well 
as re-establish strong relationships with other ASEAN countries. Therefore, the overall 
foreign policy of the Megawati administration was, and is, moderate and very much in 
line with that of the New Order govermnent. 
Indonesia's return to the concentric circle foreign policy formula dismissed 
speculation that Indonesia would abandon AFTA and other ASEAN regional economic 
integration initiatives. During her speech at the inaugural meeting of the ASEAN 
Business Advisory Council (A-BAC), in Jakarta on lOh April 2003, President Megawati 
pointed out that much could be gained from enhanced economic co-operation in the 
region. Specifically, she stressed that each ASEAN country should outline their own 
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potential and realise these potentials by teaming up with other ASEAN countries . 
In 
the same speech, President Megawati also called upon other ASEAN countries to expand 
their market to include the member countries of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). 
Later on in the year, the Indonesian MFA also announced some adjustments made to the 
concentric circle formula of Indonesian foreign policy. ASEAN and the Western 
countries remain within the first and the third circles of Indonesian foreign policy overall. 
Major adjustments, however, have been made to the second circle, which indicates that 
Indonesia will concentrate its foreign policy on the member countries of the Pacific 
Island Forums (PIFs), the Southwest Pacific Dialogue, and the Tripartite Consultation 
between Indonesia, Australia, and Timor Leste, and the three close economic partners of 
so As reported by the Business ASEANNewsletter (2003: 6), or visit its online version at: 
http: //www. a. -.; eansec. orR/viendfasp? file=/pdf/ba jun03. pd 
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Indonesia, which include Japan, China, and South Korea. 51 The adjustments made to the 
concentric formula indicate Megawati's realisation of the growing need to strengthen 
regional economic co-operation with the countries of the Southwest Pacific and Northeast 
Asia. In this way Indonesian FEP is decided according to the overall foreign policy of 
the country. 
In order to fulfil her overall FEP objectives, President Megawati appointed a 
number of economic experts in her cabinet. The appointments of Prof. D. Kundjorojakti 
as the Co-ordinating Economic Minister and Dr. Boediono as the Minister of Finance 
were central to the process of economic recovery due to their impeccable credentials in 
the international arena. Their international reputations will be useful in helping to 
reactivate the suspended IMF / World Bank loans of US$ 400 million, which were 
suspended during the Wahid administration. Equally important for political stability in 
the country was the appointment of Dr. H. Haz as the Vice-President and the well- 
respected S. B. Yudhoyono as the Minister of Political and Security Affairs. The 
appointment of these two individuals will limit possible political manoeuvnng from both 
Islamic political groups and the military. 52 In sum, Megawati achieved a 'balance 
between political representation and professional expertise [within] the new cabinet' 
(Manning 2001: 2). The economic and political team within Megawati's cabinet has 
been a positive sign for economic recovery. To date, although economic growth has been 
lower than in 2000 and 2001 (refer to table 5.2. and table 5.3. ), the economy is expected 
to grow at a moderate level in subsequent years. 
51 As reported by the official website of the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2003) at: 
http: //www. deplij., go. id/2003/detail. php'? doc=ef35e4al99bl 86650361 e5bd3b7d 173 
"2 Dr. Hamzah Haz is from the PPP whilst Susilo B. Yudhoyono is from a military faction. 
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Table 5.3. 
inuonesian economic inclicators cluring Megawati's Fresiaency 
Item 2001 2002 2003* 
GDP growth 3.3 3.0 3.6 
Gross domestic investment / GDP 17.0 17.0 17.0 
Gross domestic savings/ GDP 25.5 23.0 21.0 
Inflation rate (consumer price index) 11.5 13.1 7.7 
Money supply (M2) growth 17.5 18 18 
Fiscal balance GDP ** -2.3 -2.5 -0.5 
Merchandise export growth -9.8 10.5 8.0 
Merchandise import growth -12.2 10 10 
Current account balance / GDP 3.1 1.5 0.7 
Note: Expected 
For 1999, the ratio of the fiscal balance relates to I't April -31" March. 
For 2000, the ratio is estimated on an annual basis for I't April - 31" 
December. Thereafter, the ratio refers to calendar year data. 
Sources: Asian Development Bank (ADB) (2002). 
Although the foreign press has often described Megawati's cabinet as the dream 
tean? (Sadli 2003: 185), the economy of Indonesia has remained unstable. As was the 
case with President Wahid, the market reacted positively when the news of Megawati's 
Presidency was broadcast. At the time, the rupiah was impressively strengthened at 
around Rp. 8,500 to the US dollar from around Rp. 11,500 dunng the last days of 
President Wahid's office. However, the rupiah weakened again by the end of 2002 at 
around Rp. 8,940 against the US dollar, and only appreciated again by the beginning of 
2003 to Rp. 8,210 (Economist Intelligence Unit 2003: 10). Meanwhile, Indonesia also 
experienced major problems with foreign investments. Although investments improved 
in the second and third quarters of 2002, they remained about 20 percent below the pre- 
crisis level (Waslin 2003: 10). In a press release issued in February 2003, the BK-PM 
Chairman, T. Teormon, made a statement about the current investment performance of 
189 
Indonesia, and added that the approved foreign and domestic investment levels for the 
year 2003 will be the lowest since the economic crisis began in 1997 . 
53 
The main obstacles to investment in Indonesia were international as much as 
domestic. At the international level, aggressive US foreign policy towards Afghanistan 
and Iraq has had a damaging effect on the Indonesian economy. These two events 
stimulated threats and demonstrations against the US and its allies in Indonesia (Anwar 
2003: 75). At the domestic level, issues such as regional security, law enforcement, 
labour market problems, the overlapping responsibilities of central and provincial 
government, regulatory burdens, and distortions in the tax system remain major problems 
to be confronted by potential investors in Indonesia (Bappenas 2003). 54 In response to 
gloomy international economic conditions and domestic economic uncertainty, the 
Megawati administration declared the year 2003 as Indonesian Investment Year. During 
the launching of the programme in early 2003, President Megawati promised that her 
administration would create a favourable climate for investment and would continue to 
introduce reforrns in various sectors, particularly the fiscal and economic sectors 
(Sulistyowati 2003). This programme was hoped to trigger more conducive conditions 
for the recovery of the national economy. Amongst other issues, improvements in the 
year 2003 and subsequent years will include a revision of the investment laws, tightened 
security, as well as an attempt to co-ordinate the regulations of the central and provincial 
govemments. 
53 For further details regarding the BKPM Chairman's report on Indonesian investment performance visit 
the BKPM (2003) official website at: 
I'ttP: 'ý'\N, ww. bkpm. go. id/bkpm/pubs. php? mode=read&info ld=133 
)4 As quoted in Waslin (2003: 10). 
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In sum, the collapse of the Indonesian economy in 1997 brought significant 
changes in the way that nationalism and FEP were integrated by the state. The 
conventional approach of implementing economic nationalism was no longer applicable. 
Faced with an ever-increasing dependency on various international financial institutions 
and other foreign donors, all the post-economic crisis Indonesian governments were 
forced to follow stringent measures to secure loans from these international institutions. 
The agreements made between these Indonesian governments and the IMF through the 
signing of Lol, in particular, have been particularly demanding. However, there have 
also been debates amongst the Indonesian political elite as to whether Indonesia should 
continue its relationship with the IMF, which officially expired of the end of 2003 
(Economist Intelligence Unit 2003: 22). On the one hand, the Indonesian political elite is 
concerned that the Indonesian government will continue to lose its sovereignty by 
following IMF measures. On the other hand, the presence of the IMF has, indeed, 
improved the macroeconomic condition of Indonesia. Although the final outcomes have 
yet to be seen, the Indonesian public has shown growing dissatisfaction towards the 
IMF's stringent conditions. As regards Indonesian FEP in ASEAN, the shift of 
leadership from Wahid to Megawati allowed Indonesia to return to its more traditional 
focus on its immediate neighbours. As a result, Indonesia remains committed to the 
progress of ASEAN economic regionalism, particularly AFTA. After all, it has always 
been in the interests of Indonesia to put ASEAN at the cornerstone of its overall foreign 
policy. 
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5.4. Conclusion 
This chapter has dealt with two fundamental issues, namely Indonesian 
nationalism and FEP. It is clear that, from crisis to crisis, and from government to 
government, nationalism has played and still plays a major role in shaping Indonesian 
FEP. The first section of the chapter provided a detailed analysis of Indonesian 
nationalism and FEP during the post-independence period. This historical analysis is 
crucial because it allows for greater understanding of policy-makers' attitudes when 
making certain political decisions (Weinstein 1976: 362). During the Sukarno 
administration, in particular, nationalist doctrine was the major determinant of 
Indonesia's hostile FEP. The large-scale expropriation of Dutch and ethnic Chinese 
capital was conducted to Promote indigenous capitalists. The demise of the Old Order 
government led to an economic deterioration that forced the country to seek assistance 
from various international financial institutions. The subsequent Indonesian goverm-nent, 
led by Suharto, did not use economic nationalism until the increase in oil prices in 1974. 
Another economic adjustment was needed after the sudden collapse of the oil price in 
1985. In response, the New Order government reacted wisely by allowing trade 
liberalisation to take place, which helped to create an economic boom afterwards. In the 
early 1990s, Indonesia once again had a more active FEP- International relations were 
diversified and economic co-operation at the regional level was strengthened. 
The sudden emergence of the economic crisis in 1997 brought significant changes 
to the Indonesian government's FEP. Indonesia was once again forced to seek assistance 
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from both the IMF and the World Bank. Fear of reawakened economic nationalism grew. 
However, despite their nationalistic ideals, Indonesian policy-makers were no longer able 
to impose protectionist measures due to the IMF's stiff conditions for economic recovery, 
which demanded the removal of trade and investment barriers (Feridhanustyawan 2003: 
236). At the regional level, Indonesia's relations with its immediate neighbours were at a 
low point. The economic crisis stimulated debate on the future relevance of ASEAN 
(Tay and Estanislao 2000). During the Habibie administration, Indonesian policy-makers 
were frustrated by the lack of assistance provided by the Association during the crisis. 
As a result, friction emerged between Indonesia and its immediate neighbours, 
particularly Singapore. Indonesia's relations with its neighbours improved following the 
change of leadership from Habibie to Wahid. However, questions arose as to whether 
President Wahid's ecumenical foreign policy would undermine the existence of ASEAN 
and attempts for regional economic integration. It was only during the Megawati 
administration that Indonesia returned to its concentric circle forniula, which redirected 
Indonesian FEP towards the member countries of ASEAN. 
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Chapter 6: 
Indonesia in the ASEAN Free Trade Area 
(AFTA) 
6.1. Introduction 
The ASEAN Free trade Area / Agreement (AFTA) is an agreement to liberallse 
trade amongst the member countries of ASEAN. This agreement was initiated in 1992 
and was first implemented in January 2002. Specifically, AFTA has the objective 'to 
increase the international competitiveness of ASEAN industries and [to make] the 
ASEAN region an investment location' (Tongzon 2002: 182). In the early 1990s, the 
Southeast Asian region saw significant changes as a result of global political and 
economic conditions. These new situations resulted in alterations in the way in which 
ASEAN conducted its economic co-operation. There were also calls to use the term 
economic integration in the region from economists from both within and outside the 
region during this period (Chirativat et al. 1999: 30). The major catalyst for such calls 
was the demise of the Cold War, which resulted in an increase in the formation of 
regional groupings throughout the world. Significant moves towards regional economic 
integration were strengthened not only within ASEAN, through the creation of AFTA, 
but also in terms of the Association's external relations, with the most significant move 
being the creation of the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) and possible 
economic integration with the Northeast Asian countries of Japan, China, and South 
Korea through ASEAN Plus Three (APT). 
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The main objective of this chapter is to provide a detailed analysis of AFTA. The 
primary focus of the chapter is the evolutionary process and the current development of 
AFTA as well as Indonesians' initial perspectives towards the creation of this regional 
trade scheme. This chapter is divided into six main sections. Section 6.2 analyses the 
historical background to AFTA. More comprehensively, this section explores the 
rationales that drove ASEAN leaders to promote enhanced economic integration in the 
region. In addition, this section will also provide an analysis of some of the basic 
mechanisms that have been used in the implementation of AFTA. Section 6.3 and 
section 6.4 analyse the prospects and challenges that confront the implementation of 
AFTA and other economic co-operation initiatives beyond this agreement. Issues such as 
the regional economic crisis, membership expansion, and the incorporation of the three 
Northeast Asian countries, Japan, China, and South Korea, into the ASEAN framework 
(i. e. APT) are some of the major challenges that ASEAN will face in the future. 
Meanwhile, section 6.5 provides an analysis of the Indonesian political elite's perceptions 
of the creation of AFTA in the past. Finally, section 6.6. presents a conclusion and 
highlights some of the main findings of this analysis of AFTA. 
6.2. The history of AFTA 
AFTA was first proposed at the Eighteenth ASEAN Economic Ministerial 
Meeting (AEM), which took place in the Philippines on the 28'1' - 30t" August 1986. At 
that time, the Filipino delegation proposed a reduction in tariffs as well as the imposition 
Of common external tariffs (CET), which were intended to drive ASEAN into forming a 
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Custom Union. Indonesia and Singapore, however, rejected this idea for two contrasting 
reasons (Bowles 1997: 222). On the one hand, Indonesia was not very keen on either the 
idea of imposing a deadline to phase out tariffs, nor CET. Singapore, on the other hand, 
rejected the idea on the grounds that it did not wish to impose CET in its already tariff- 
free international trade. It was only at the Twenty-Second AEM in 1990, in Bali, 
Indonesia, that ASEAN Economic Ministers agreed upon the application of a Common 
Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) scheme on selected industrial items, such as 
fertiliser, pulp, and cement. By November 1990, the first Interim Technical Working 
Group (ITWG) meeting was held in Jakarta to further discuss the idea of AFTA. A year 
later, Thailand proposed the formation of AFTA during the ASEAN Senior Official 
Meeting (SEOM) in Kuala Lumpur. 
There were two main motives that propelled ASEAN leaders to the pursuit of a 
trade liberalisation strategy. These were: first, the changes in the international political 
economy during the late 1980s and the early 1990s and ASEAN's desire to maintain its 
position as an important organisation in light of these changes; and second, the rise in the 
influence of economic actors' interests throughout the ASEAN region and their 
predisposition towards regional trade measures (Bowles and Maclean 1996: 327). To 
begin with, it was substantial change in the international arena that acted as the catalyst in 
making AFTA a reality in ASEAN. Some of the most important international political- 
economic changes that occurred during the 1980s were the appreciation of the Japanese 
Yen, the economic rise of China and the new emerging markets of the fon-ner Soviet 
bloc. The appreciation of the Japanese Yen began since the signing of the Plaza Accord 
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in 1985, which led to substantial increases in Japanese investment in Southeast Asia. 
Japanese finns supported the idea of a free trade area in the Southeast Asian region due to 
possible cost minimisations in the production process and capital movement across the 
region (Webber 2001: 349). Meanwhile, the rise of the Chinese economy and the newly 
independent states of the fonner Soviet Union in the early 1990s also posed a threat to the 
overall competitiveness of the Southeast Asian states (Yew 2000: 382; Lim 2001: 191-2). 
It is for these reasons that ASEAN countries agreed to establish AFTA in 1992. 
Other contributing factors that led to AFTA were the rise of new trading 
arrangements in North America and the strengthening of regional economic integration in 
Western European countries (Means 1995: 149-53). Southeast Asian countries were 
concerned about the possible trade-diversion effects that these regional groupings would 
pose towards the economies of Southeast Asia. A study conducted by Michigan State 
University, for example, estimated that the formation of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) would produce a trade-diversion effect of about US$ 484 million, 
which would account for about 4 percent of ASEAN's total exports to North America. 
The trade-diversion effect would likely reach 8 to 12 percent of Southeast Asian exports 
in food, chemicals, textiles, metals, and electronics sectors. ' To address this threat, 
ASEAN countries devised with three possible solutions. The first was that each 
individual country should support the GATT system and the completion of the Uruguay 
Round. The second was to enhance regional economic integration, whilst the third 
I As quoted in Means (1995: 149). However, Means also notes that analysts came to rather diverse 
conclusions about the impacts of NAFTA on Southeast Asian exports. A Canadian study, for instance, 
forecast that the trade-diversion effects would be less than 0.5 percent of all East Asian exports to the US. 
A similar study conducted by the East-West Centre in Honolulu also claimed that the trade-diversion effect 
would affect less than I percent of ASEAN's total exports, which may vary for individual countries. 
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possible solution was to take initiatives to enhance economic co-operation with the North 
American and European integration mechanisms. Over time, it was clear that the third 
option was more feasible for ASEAN since member countries had longed for greater 
economic co-operation in the region, and had been unable to conduct such measures in 
the past for various political reasons. 
Economic actors also played an important role in pushing the formation of AFTA. 
The role of the ASEAN Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ASEAN-CCI) was 
particularly crucial in influencing the governinents of Southeast Asia to create AFTA 
(Bowles 1997: 221). Following the surge of trade liberalisation in the mid-1980s, 
ASEAN economic actors began to realise the increasing diversification of the production 
structure and complementarity of ASEAN economies, which were a result of the growing 
activities of transnational corporations (TNCs) and the strengthening industrialisation 
process within most ASEAN countries (Tongzon 2002: 182). More importantly, 
however, ASEAN economic actors were worried about the aforementioned threats that 
might jeopardise the competitiveness of the Southeast Asian economies. In Malaysia, for 
example, economic actors were concerned about China and its capacity to alter both the 
strategic balance and the economic growth patterns of Southeast Asia (Means 1995: 163). 
Economic actors in both Singapore and Indonesia, on the other hand, worried about the 
future trade-diversion effects from NAFTA and the EU. Indonesian economic actors, in 
particular, feared that the creation of NAFTA would bring about major changes to the 
general system of preferences (GSP), which would affect Indonesia's exports to North 
American markets (Means 1995: 168). It is for these reasons that ASEAN economic 
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actors pushed the ASEAN member govermnents, through the ASEAN-CCI, to create 
AFTA. 
In addition, AFTA was also created to replace or to complement the previous 
economic co-operation initiatives that were conducted by ASEAN, particularly the 
ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangement (ASEAN-PTA), ASEAN Industrial Project 
(AIP), ASEAN Industrial Complementation (AIC), and the ASEAN Industrial Joint 
Ventures (AIJV) schemes. 2 Apart from a lack of economic complementarity, the failure 
of these schemes was due primarily to divergent national interests as well as the high 
levels of bureaucracy in ASEAN member countries. The ASEAN-PTA, for example, 
was a failure because it was effectively negated by a vast exclusion list (Lim 2001: 185). 
Although the number of items set in the inclusion list had expanded to 18,907 by 1986, 
the scheme was unable to significantly increase intra-regional trade. In fact, Chng's 
(1985: 33) examination proves that the trade flows of 1981 that covered some 9,000 
preferences only accounted for about 10 percent of total ASEAN intra-trade. 
The problem of divergent national interests was particularly clear in the case of 
both the AIP and AIC schemes (Suriyamongkol 1988: 118; Lim 2001: 189). The 
allocation of projects under the AIP initiative, for example, generated conflict amongst 
2 Initial discussions regarding the implementation of economic co-operation initiatives in ASEAN began at 
the Fourth AMM in 1971. As mentioned in Chapter 5, it was General Romulo, the President of the 
Philippines, who initiated closer economic co-operation amongst ASEAN member countries. General 
Romulo's view was later supported through an ASEAN-United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
Project that involved 41 international experts assisting ASEAN to conduct closer economic co-operation. 
This two year long project finally resulted in the Kansu Report, which became the major backbone for 
ASEAN co-operation in industrial development, agriculture and forestry, transport, finance, monetary, and 
insurance services. The Kansu Report also suggested that the creation of a Common Market was overly 
Optimistic, and that member states of ASEAN should foster its infant industries through the use of ISI 
Policies (Soesastro 2000: 204). 
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member countries. This was particularly evident in the allocation of the Diesel Engine 
Project in Singapore, which later drew criticism from Indonesia who was also trying to 
develop a similar line of production (Anwar 1994: 76). 3 On the whole, therefore, there 
was a lack of compatibility in production facilities in all ASEAN member countries (Rao 
1996). Furthermore, the AIC scheme also encountered similar problems because 'most 
ASEAN members have their own domestic automotive industries in collaboration with 
[vanous] multinational corporations' (Lim 2001: 189). 4 Meanwhile, the implementation 
of the AIN was not supported by a strong enough bureaucratic process at both the 
national and regional levels (Narongchai 1992). The process of approval, for example, 
sometimes took up to one year or more, which made the scheme appear unattractive. In 
Indonesia alone, the business community was not particularly interested in ASEAN 
projects, although this can be explained by the fact that ASEAN governments themselves 
were reluctant to disseminate proper information to the business communities in the 
region (Pangestu et al. 1992: 335). To date, however, only the ASEAN-PTA and the 
AIN schemes are complimented by the CEPT scheme. Those products covered under 
the ASEAN-PTA scheme may be transferred to the CEPT scheme 5, whilst products 
3 The conflict between Indonesia and Singapore resulted in the latter's insistence on having only a1 percent 
stake in Indonesia's Urea Project. Another dispute also prevailed between Indonesia and the Philippines 
over the production of superphospate. To date, only the Urea projects in Indonesia and Malaysia have 
continued, which is largely due to the fact that the allocated plants in both countries were commercial long 
before the AIP scheme was initiated. 4 Due to such problems, the AIC scheme was later replaced with the Brand-to-Brand Complementation 
(BBC) scheme, which allowed ASEAN member countries to provide incentives for automotive 
multinationals to relocate their production to lower cost countries within the Association. To date, the BBC 
scheme remains the most successful amongst all ASEAN's economic co-operation initiatives prior to 
AFTA. 
5 However, it is important to note that concessions under the CEPT scheme should not be less favourable to 
the PTA concessions, which existed as of 31" December 1992. Moreover, all products covered under the 
ASEAN-PTA scheme, but are not transferred to the CEPT scheme, will continue to enjoy the existing 
Margin of Preference (MOP), or the ASEAN-PTA's main mechanism, as of 31" December 1992. 
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covered by the latter may be allowed to slide in accordance to the benefits of the AIN 
scheme (ASEAN Secretariat 1993). 
In light of these new international challenges, the heads of ASEAN states finally 
agreed on the establishment of AFTA during the Fourth ASEAN Summit in Singapore in 
1992, with the main objective of increasing 'ASEAN's competitive edge as a production 
base geared for the world market' (ASEAN Secretariat 1993: 1). In order to implement 
AFTA, the ASEAN Economic Ministers also agreed on the CEPT as the main 
mechanism in which intra-regional tariffs and non-tariff barriers would be removed 
within a fifteen-year period. In 1993, member countries agreed upon the moderation of 
the CEPT scheme whereby all manufactured goods would reach tariffs of between 0-5 
percent by 2008.6 However, due to deepening economic challenges, ASEAN countries 
also agreed to reduce the target date for the realisation of AFTA by five years, from 2008 
to 2003, during the Twenty-Seventh AEM meeting in Chiang Mai. 
The CEPT scheme is composed of four main product categories, which include 
the inclusion list (IL), temporary exclusion list (TEL), sensitive list (SL), and general 
exception list (GEL), all of which fall within either the Fast Track Programme or the 
Normal Track Programme of tariffs reduction. Under the Fast Track Programme it was 
agreed that all products with tariff rates above 20 percent would be reduced to 0-5 
6 Apart from all manufactured goods, CEPT also covers capital goods and processed agricultural products. 
The CEPT, however, does not cover unprocessed agricultural products, including agricultural raw materials 
and all agricultural products that involve minimal change from original products. Further details on the 
implementation of AFTA and the CEPT scheme can be obtained from the AFTA Reader, published by the 
ASEAN Secretariat (1993). 
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percent level within ten years (January 2003 )7 whilst those with tanff rates of 20 percent 
or below would be reduced within a period of seven years (January 2000) to 0-5 percent 
level. Under the Normal Track Programme, on the other hand, items with tariff rates 
above 20 percent can be cut in two ways. Firstly, the tariff rates of these products can be 
reduced to 20 percent in five to eight years, and, secondly, the tariff rates are reduced to 
0-5 percent in seven years. Finally, those goods with tariff levels of 20 percent or below 
are reduced to 0-5 percent within ten years. It is hoped that, eventually, the average tanff 
rates attached to inclusive products will reach 2.68 percent (refer to table 6.1. below). 
Table 6.1. 
-- AI 
-- -- -- 
Average Ar iA Eir ii arm Kates 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Brunei 1.35 1.29 1.0 0.97 0.94 0.87 
Indonesia 7.04 5.85 4.97 4.63 4.20 3.71 
Laos 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
Malaysia 3.58 3.17 2.73 2.54 2.38 2.06 
Myanmar 4.47 4.45 4.38 3.32 3.31 3.19 
Philippines 7.96 7.0 5.59 5.07 4.80 3.75 
Singapore 0.0 0,0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Thailand 10.56 9.75 7.40 7,36 6.07 4.64 
Vietnam 6.06 3.78 3.30 2.90 2.89 2.02 
ASENN 5.37 4.77 3.87 3.65 3.25 2.68 
Source: ASEAN Secretariat official website (accessed 2003) at: 
http: //www. aseansec. org/13 100. htm 
The inclusion list category is largely composed of products that are undergoing 
immediate liberalisation under the CEPT programme, and should be included in the Fast 
Track Programme tariff-reduction measure. Meanwhile, the temporary exclusion 
category is composed of products that were protected for a short-tenn period and then 
transferred into the inclusion list by January 1996 in order to reach the tanff level of 0-5 
7 This, however, vanies for new ASEAN members whereby Vietnam would have to comply with this 
agreement by 2006, Laos and Myarimar by 2008, and Cambodia by 2010. 
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percent. The sensitive list, on the other hand, is made specifically to reduce tariff rates 
for agricultural products as well as other non-tariff bamers. The sensitive list exists 
because ASEAN economies are composed mainly of agricultural producers and 
consumers. Therefore, some ASEAN countnes, such as Indonesia and Thailand, may 
wish to postpone trade liberalisation for their agricultural products. Lastly, the general 
exception list category involves all products that are excluded from the trade 
liberalisation programme for national security reasons. Unlike its predecessor, Margin of 
Preferences (MOP), that only covered about 19,000 items, before February 2000, the 
CEPT had covered about 53,026 items, or about 82.5 percent of total ASEAN trade. At 
present, the six major ASEAN countries have submitted 42,939 items on to the inclusion 
list out of a total of 43,636 items (refer to table 6.2. below). 
Table 6.2. 
ULVI' Frodtiet List for the Year ZUUU, ANLAN IU 
Country Inclusion Temporary General Sensitive List Total 
List- Exclusion Exclusion 
List List 
-unei 6,276 - 202 14 6,492 
donesia 7,158 21 69 4 7,252 
alaysia 9,092 - 63 73 9,228 
fflippines 5,571 35 27 62 5,695 
ngapore 5,739 - 120 - 5,859 
iailand 9,103 - - 7 9,110 
inibodia 3,114 3,523 134 50 6,821 
los 1,247 2,126 90 88 3,551 
yanmar 2,356 2,987 108 21 5,472 
etnam 3,573 984 219 51 4,827 
SEAN Total 53,229 9,676 1,032 370 64,30', 
Nource- ASEAN Secretanat official website (accessed 2003) at: 
littp: //www. aseansec. orp/13 100-htm 
Since the implementation of AFTA on I't January 1993, there have been 
sitm, ificant initiatives to improve the level of economic co-operation amongst ASEAN 
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countries. One of these additional measures has been the introduction of the ASEAN 
Industrial Co-operation (AICO) scheme and ASEAN Investment Area (AIA), which was 
introduced during the Fifth ASEAN Summit in Bangkok on 15"1' December 1995. Both 
schemes were expected to complement the progress of AFTA. The establishment of 
AICO was primarily to replace the unsuccessfid BBC and AIN schemes, and the 
objective of the new scheme was to promote investment from technology-based 
industries (Lim 2001: 190). The AICO scheme is essentially open to all ASEAN 
companies with two main requirements. First, the co-operation should be incorporated 
and operated in ASEAN countries. Second, the ASEAN nationals involved in the co- 
operation should own at least 30 percent of the equity. 8 Third, resource sharing, such as 
technology and market sharing, has to take place between the involved parties. The 
scheme is based on the earlier established CEPT progrannne, particularly with regard to 
the rules of origin, which requires a minimum of 40 percent ASEAN content. The AICO 
scheme became effective on I" January 1996, whilst ASEAN's newest members, Laos 
and Myamnar, agreed to join the scheme in 1997. The Fifth ASEAN Summit also 
endorsed an important AIA document with the objective of enhancing greater investment 
in the region. Under the AIA agreement, ASEAN countries agreed to commit themselves 
to lower tariff barriers in line with the AFTA scheme, an improved liberalisation of 
Various strict regulations, and to making an effort to provide the necessary incentives for 
foreign investors coming into the region. 
8 This requirement, however, may be waived under certain circumstances. Consultation between the 
involved parties is normally carried out to settle such differences. 
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6.3. Prospects and challenges for AFTA 
There have been many scholarly analyses on the challenges and the future 
prospects of AFTA since its implementation in 1993. Proponents of AFTA primarily 
argue that the deepening of regional economic integration in the region will 'help to 
attract foreign investment and ... strengthen Southeast Asia's global trading position' 
(Petri 1997: 191). Such an analysis draws largely upon the insistence that AFTA is not 
an isolationist policy enforced by ASEAN member countries to create a trading bloc, as 
some have previously suggested. In addition, Chirathivat (1999: 31) maintains that 
AFTA will enable member countries to extend and to combine their natural resources, 
thereby limiting national barriers. Equally important is the fact that the formation of 
AFTA can help the Association prepare itself for further regional and global trade 
liberalisation programmes. This, in turn, will help member states to realise the necessity 
of having ASEAN, in that it helps them to address and solve various regional issues and 
problems. Moreover, AFTA was deemed crucial in increasing ASEAN's global 
competitiveness. In Soesastro's (2000: 24) analysis, for example, ASEAN represents 
more than AFTA and the objectives of free trade are not merely to increase intra-regional 
trade or to support regional import substitution schemes. AFTA is only a stepping-stone, 
which enables the Association to achieve a necessary competitive edge in the global 
economy. This is why ASEAN continues to expand its economic co-operation 
framework, which can be seen in the concept of AFTA Plus. The AFTA Plus concept 
involves mainly the expansion of agreements made within the AFTA framework. To 
date, such expansion includes the formation of various measures to reduce tariff and non- 
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tariff bamers for products that are not covered by the onginal CEPT agreement, which 
can be seen in the aforementioned enhanced economic co-operation initiatives, such as in 
service, intellectual property, AICO, AIA, custom harmonisation, etc. Therefore, 
according to such an analysis, AFTA is a necessary stepping-stone towards greater 
economic co-operation in the region and to prepare ASEAN for further global 
multi lateralism. 
Table 6.3. 
ASEAN-6 ExDorts 1999-2001 * 
ntra 
- 
1 ASEAN Trade Extra ASEAN Trade Total Exp orts 
99 9 2000 2001 1999 2000 2001 1999 2000 2001 
BD** 375 634 775 1,965 1,529 2,775 2,340 2,163 3550 
Ind 8,278 10,883 9,507 40,387 51,240 46,810 48,665 62,123 56,317 
Mal 21,885 24,408 21,024 622,402 73,745 67,007 84,287 98,153 88,031 
Phi 4,989 5,982 4,986 30,047 32,095 27,164 35,036 38,077 32,150 
Sin 29,369 37,783 32,815 85,355 100,668 88,871 114,724 138,451 121,686 
Tha 9,901 15,099 14,356 46,208 54,154 50,761 56,109 69,253 65,117 
Note: Value in thousand US$ 
** Brunei Darussalam 
Source: ASEAN Secretariat official website (accessed 2002) at: 
littp: //202.154.12.3/trade/publicvi ew. asp 
There are also many critics of AFTA. Some of the important critics are Imada et 
al. (1991), who have pointed out the prevailing heterogeneous nature of ASEAN 
economies. It is hypothesised that such an economic condition will result in economic 
competitiveness rather than complementarity, which is an inadequate measurement for 
any regional economic integration scheme. Although tanff levels in ASEAN countries 
are relatively low by comparison to other developing countries, the region is only able to 
generate roughly a 20 percent intra-trade level, most of which is owing to its bilateral 
206 
economic relationship with Singapore. 9 On the positive side, however, the competitive 
nature of ASEAN economies also means that it is very unlikely that ASEAN will 
generate a trade diversion effect to third countries. Table 6.3 demonstrates ASEAN 
exports within and beyond the region. 10 Other scholars, such as Denoon and Colbert 
(1998: 516), have also concentrated on the issue of the trade-creation and trade-diversion 
effects of AFTA and the relative size of the ASEAN economies. Owing to the small size 
of the ASEAN market, the level of trade-creation and trade-diversion effects will also be 
small in this region. Therefore, ASEAN will benefit more if the Association remains in a 
larger economic co-operation scheme, such as APEC. Another critic of AFTA is 
Pangestu et al. (1992), who are concemed with the scheme's ability to provide a larger 
market in the region through intra-trade and investments. These scholars argue that 
AFTA will remain a matter of mere political rhetoric despite member countries' 
agreement on the realisation of AFTA by specified dates. The long process of 
negotiations on the products included will remain the most significant problem during 
AFTA's implementation phase. Another major problem is the excessive number of items 
included in the exclusion category, which ftirther undermines the effectiVeness of 
AFTA's progess. 
After over a decade since AFTA was first initiated, ASEAN remains committed 
to its regional economic liberalisation programmes. Nevertheless, there have been 
substantial challenges facing the Association during the phase of tariff liberalisation, 
9 According to Imada et al. (1991: 4), for example, in the absence of Singapore, the total of intra-ASEAN 
trade only amounted to 5 percent. However, Plummer (1997: 206) also adds that it is difficult for a 
regional grouping to meet the normal determinant of a 50 percent intra-trade level. To date, it is only the 
EU that has exceeded that mark, although this level was reached through 40 years of co-operation. Even 
the US led economic integration, NAFTA, has only been able to achieve a 33 percent intra-trade level. 10 See also Appendix 6 for details concerning ASEAN's 5 major trading partners as of 2001. 
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which include the issue of membership expansion, the regional economic crisis, and the 
expansion of ASEAN economic regionalism within the framework of APT. The first 
important challenge was the entrance of new members into the Association. There has 
been great concern over the entrance of ASEAN's four new members, particularly with 
regard to politics and security (Takeshi 1999). More specifically, there is fear about the 
impact of the inclusion of new members into the ASEAN trade liberalisation. process 
under the AFTA scheme. One problem is that the admittance of Vietnam, Laos, 
Myanmar and Cambodia into ASEAN might sabotage the Association's earlier efforts to 
achieve meaningful integration (Bello 1997). Enlargement might jeopardise the already 
established development of AFTA since it is largely driven by political factors. Another 
problem is that the process of enlargement means that the Association will have to adopt 
measures and schemes that are acceptable for the new members (Akrasanee 2000). The 
new members are quite fortunate in that the AFTA schedule remains flexible. However, 
their entrance into the Association could also be detrimental to ASEAN since AFTA will 
have to be modified to suit the interests of the new members. On the other hand, in his 
comparative study of the EU's and ASEAN's enlargement processes, Pomfret (1998: 8) 
concludes that the entrance of new members into the Association will be generally 
beneficial for the Association, apart from some minor discussion regarding the new 
member countries' lack of experience in dealing in the WTO type tariff reduction 
measures. At the same time, internal trade disputes between the old and the new 
members will be minimal since the issue of intra-trade remains an issue of only minor 
importance for ASEAN. One major benefit that the enlargement will bring is the 
enhancement of ASEAN's international bargaining position in international fora. 
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The second issue that challenges the progress of AFTA is the regional economic 
cnsis of 1997. The economic crisis is particularly important especially where ASEAN's 
post-crisis role is concerned (Tay and Estanislao, 2000). ASEAN's perfonnance in 
alleviating the economic crisis has been limited, if not poor, and few measures to deal 
with the crisis have been implemented. In his analysis of the theoretical and empirical 
implications of the economic crisis on the Southeast Asian regionalisation process, 
Ruland (2000: 428) argues that the 'emerging symptoms of crisis were regarded as purely 
national problems'. His analysis primarily stems from the fact that prior to the economic 
crisis much of ASEAN's policy mix was closer to a realist standpoint than to an 
institutionalist pole of a realism / institutionalism continuum. Since ASEAN's inception, 
efforts to conduct economic co-operation have been largely driven by political factors. 
This has been the primary reason behind the Association's poor performance in 
implementing the necessary measures to handle the economic crisis. The impact of the 
economic crisis on the progress of regionalism in Southeast Asia has been significant. In 
mainland Southeast Asia, for instance, Ruland (2000: 437) believes that the economic 
crisis will jeopardise various sub-regional mechanisms, such as BIMP-EAGA, IMS-GT, 
IMT-GT, SIJORI, etc, due to a lack of investment, aside from the fact that co-ordination 
of these projects has been largely absent. A similar argument has also been posed by 
Webber (2001: 365), whose analysis of ASEAN and APEC during the economic crisis, 
postulates that although 'there will be no 'funeral' for ASEAN or APEC, there is a high 
risk that the two organisations will remain to a greater or lesser extent incapacitated'. 
With regard to ASEAN, Webber holds that the crisis has led to the loss of Indonesia as 
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ASEAN's natural leader, whilst, at the same time, ASEAN's efforts at collective action to 
manage the crisis have been overshadowed by the relatively low economic development 
of ASEAN member countries. 
ASEAN has indeed been rather slow in taking measures to alleviate the economic 
crisis, and it took more than six months for the Association to actually come out with any 
concrete measures to deal with the economic crisis. Two initial steps were the Hanoi 
Plan of Action (HPA) and the Statement on Bold Measures, which were finalised during 
the Sixth ASEAN Summit in Hanoi, on 15 th _ 16th December 1998.11 During the Summit, 
ASEAN's Heads of States collectively agreed on various issues to enhance greater 
economic and financial co-operation in the region. Specific to the economic crisis, 
ASEAN leaders also agreed upon the introduction of the ASEAN Surveillance Process 
(ASP), as well as the enhancement of the process of ASEAN economic integration 
through the acceleration of AFTA's schedule. The ASP deals mainly with efforts to 
maintain regional macroeconomic and financial stability tbrough the liberalisation of the 
financial service sector, the intensification of co-operation in money, tax and insurance 
matters, as well as the plan to develop an ASEAN capital market. Although the ASP 
might be effective in alleviating the economic crisis, it is difficult to implement owing to 
the conflicting political and national interests of each member country. Since its 
conception, it has been suggested that the scheme's survival is largely dependent upon 
member countries' willingness to step aside from their national political considerations 
and interests (Monzano 2001: 96). As an institution, it is widely acknowledged that the 
II For further details on the content of the ASEAN Sixth Summit, especially on the Hanoi Plan of Action 
and Statement of Bold Measures, refer to the ASEAN Secretariat (1999). 
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'ASEAN Secretanat [is] nothing more than a glorified post office' (Anwar 2001b: 39), 
which lacks the necessary authority to implement any regional policies without prior 
consent from member governments. Moreover, staff members of the ASEAN Secretariat 
often complain about the member countries' inability to pass on the necessary and 
accurate information in a timely fashion. Therefore, it is unlikely that the Secretariat 
could issue any warning signs to prevent a possible future economic crisis in light of the 
heavy bureaucracy that exists at the national level. 
Meanwhile, enhanced regional economic integration was envisioned in the 
Statement of Bold Measures, which called for the acceleration of the AFTA schedule. 
Under this initiative, the six original signatories of AFTA had to agree to advance the 
implementation of AFTA to 2002 from the originally agreed date of I't January 2003. 
Moreover, member countries were required to reach a consensus on at least 90 percent of 
all products included in the CEPT scheme to meet the tariff requirement of 0-5 percent by 
2000, which would account for nearly 90 percent of total ASEAN trade. The logic of 
such a policy lies in the realisation. that the region desperately needs to regain the 
confidence of both the business community and international investors. In line with the 
acceleration of AFTA's schedule, ASEAN also reiterated its earlier intention to 
implement the AIA to 'attract greater FDI into the region from both ASEAN and non- 
ASEAN sources. [it is also hoped that] the goal of a liberal and transparent investment 
environment for ASEAN investors by 2010, and all investors by 2020' (Heinrich and 
Konan 2001: 143) can be achieved. Specifically, Article 4 of the Framework Agreement 
on the AIA sets out several guidelines for the improvement of the region's investment 
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climate. 12 Firstly, ASEAN will co-ordinate its investment co-operation programme to 
generate investments from both ASEAN and non-ASEAN investors. Secondly, all 
ASEAN investors will receive national treatment by 2010 whilst all other investors will 
receive this privilege by 2020. Thirdly, member countries must also commit themselves 
to opening all their industries to ASEAN investors by 2010 and other investors by 2020. 
Fourthly, ASEAN will also allow the private sector to play a greater role in various 
activities related to ASEAN investment issues and any other ASEAN activities. Finally, 
member countries also agree to promote various measures to allow the freer flow of 
capital, skilled workers, and technology amongst ASEAN members. 
Further attempts to improve the investment climate are also spelt out in the 
Statement of Bold Measures, which specifies several additional short-term measures in 
relation to the AIA scheme. These measures include: first, a minimum three year 
corporate income tax exemption or a minimum 30 percent corporate investment tax 
allowance; second, 100 percent foreign equity ownership; third, duty-free imports of 
capital goods; fourth, domestic market access; fifth, a minimum industrial land leasehold 
period of thirty years; sixth, employment of foreign personnel; and seventh, speedy 
custom clearance. At the institutional level, the AIA Council has been set up to monitor 
the progress of the AIA. However, it is important to note that each member country is 
expected to develop its own investment policy, which will nonetheless be subject to 
continuous review by the AIA Council every two years. As with the AFTA, member 
countries are expected to place their industries either on the TEL or the SL. All the 
12 For further details on the Framework Agreement on the AIA visit the ASEAN Secretariat official website 
(accessed 2003) at: 
htip: //www. a-, eansec. org/2280. htm 
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original ASEAN-6 countries and Myanmar are expected to phase out thel In in ir indust 'es i 
the TEL category by 2003 whilst the remaining three members are expected to achieve 
this goal by 2010. Therefore, the implementation of AIA is hoped to improve the 
investment climate in the ASEAN region, which has deteriorated as a result of the crisis. 
Total ASEAN FDI has slumped from US$ 27 million prior to the economic crisis to a 
mere US$ 14.3 million in 1999 (refer to table 6.4. ). To date, the progress of AIA is 
expected to go in line with that of AFTA. It is for this reason that 'most members' 
sensitive list will be fairly short, as the terms of AFTA provide for tariffs to be below 5 
percent in most sectors by 2002' (Freeman 2001: 85). 
Table 6.4. 
Foreign direct investment in ASEAN, 1990-99 
in million US$)* 
1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Cambodia - 150.8 293.6 204.0 121.0 125.5 
Indonesia 1093.0 4346.0 6194.0 4677.0 -356.0 -2745.0 
Lao PDR 4.0 95.4 160 86.0 45.0 79.0 
Malaysia 2333.0 4178.2 5078.0 5136.5 2163.4 1552.9 
Philippines 530.0 1478.0 1517.0 1222.0 2287.0 573.0 
Singapore 5574.7 7206.4 8984.1 8085.2 5492.9 6984.3 
Thailand 2444.0 2068.0 2335.9 3894.7 7315.0 6213.0 
Vietnam 16.0 2349.0 2455.0 2745.0 1972.0 1609.0 
Total FD1 11994.7 21871.4 27017.6 26050.4 19040.3 14391.2 
Note: *Brunei and Myanmar are not included 
Source: Asian Development Bank - ADB (2001a: 71) 
6.4. Prospects and challenges for Southeast Asian regionalism beyond AFTA 
Southeast Asian RIA, whilst facing the challenge of the regional economic crisis, 
is also facing the new prospect and challenge of ASEAN's proposed expansion to include 
the three Northeast Asian countries, namely Japan, South Korea, and China, in the 
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framework of APT. The idea was initiated by the Malaysian Prime Minister, Dr. 
Mahathir and was developed in the early 1990s. The idea proposes greater economic 
integration in the East Asian region through the formation of the East Asia Economic 
Caucus (EAEC), 'whose memberships would exclude all the Westem members of APEC 
including Australia, Canada, and the US' (Acharya 2002: 28). 13 There have been many 
attempts to include the three Northeast Asian countries in ASEAN's regional integration 
discussions during meetings held under the auspices of the ASEAN-Europe Meeting 
(ASEM). It was expected that a strong impetus for the formation of a regional 
mechanism might come from the Northeast Asian countries through such an informal 
meeting (Soesastro 2000: 221), but this initiative failed to bring together the Southeast 
and Northeast Asian countries. Concrete moves towards the creation of APT began in 
1997, when the three Northeast Asian countries were invited to the Second ASEAN 
Informal Summit in Kuala Lumpur. At that time the Foreign Ministers of the countries 
involved agreed to meet annually to strengthen the foundation of the APT. A year later, 
during the Sixth ASEAN Summit, President Kim Dae-Jung of South Korea proposed the 
creation of the East Asia Vision Group (EAVG), which would provide a long-term vision 
for East Asian regional co-operation. In addition, it was also suggested that an East Asia 
Study Group (EASG) should be established to conduct a feasibility study on EAVG. The 
Northeast Asian countries involved finally sent positive signals after their Economic and 
Finance Ministers met with their Southeast Asian counterparts to discuss the possibility 
of APT in April 1999. Initial efforts at co-operation began in 2000, following the Fourth 
ASEAN Finance Ministers' Meeting (AFMM), whereby ASEAN countries agreed with 
13 The EAEC was originally known as the East Asian Economic Group (EAEG). Initially, the EAEG was 
developed to pool the pan-Asian sentiments towards the Western members of APEC. EAEC, however, was 
developed as a compromise solution placed within APEC (6jendal 2001: 168). 
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their Northeast Asian counterparts to conduct financial co-operation, otherwise known as 
the ASEAN Swap Arrangement (ASA). This mechanism sought to prevent or to 
minimise the possibility of future economic crises. 
After a three-year feasibility study, the EAVG's report was finally approved by 
the EASG and became the fundamental vision for greater co-operation in the region. 
There were three main areas of co-operation highlighted in the report, which included 
economic, financial, and institutional co-operation. In the area of economic co-operation, 
it was suggested that the APT should establish the East Asia Free Trade Area (EAFTA) 
as well as calling for the establishment of an East Asia Investment Area (EAIA) as an 
extension of the already established Southeast Asian AIA. Another important 
recommendation also included the formation of the East Asian Monetary Fund (EAMF), 
in line with Japan's prior suggestion to create an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) at the 
onset of the regional economic crisis in 1997. For some observers within the region, the 
development of APT, especially during the recent economic crisis, is seen as a 'fresh 
infusion of political stability and economic dynamism' (Alatas 2001: 1). Moreover, 
Alatas also holds that enhanced regional economic integration under the APT mechanism 
is logical for several reasons. First, it increases economic interdependence and 
complementarity in the region. Second, both regions have previously signified their 
intentions to implement such a co-operation. Thirdly, it is a response to the challenges 
that globalisation poses to the East Asian region. Some examples of economic 
interdependence and complementarity in the region can be found in various analyses of 
the Japanese and Overseas Chinese network building throughout Asia (Sang-Ho 2001: 
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407-12). Both regions have indeed already indicated their intentions to implement 
greater co-operation and as far back as the 1960s, Japan proposed the idea of East Asian 
regional institutions, which would strengthen regional economic co-operation in the 
region. Throughout the 1960s there were several regional economic arrangements in the 
Asia-Pacific region, such as the Pacific Economic Co-operation (PEC), the Asian 
Development Bank (AIDB), the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC), the UN initiative of 
the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), the Ministerial 
Conference on Economic Development in Southeast Asia (MCEDSEA), and so on. 
Some of these projects failed to succeed either due to internal conflicts amongst the 
countries involved or serious objections from the West. 
There can be no doubt that the fonnation of APT provides a sound base for 
enhanced regional economic integration in the East Asian region. Aside from the highly 
complementary nature of the grouping, APT can also act as leverage for member 
countries in the international fora. However, internal conflicts amongst countries in each 
respective region remain a major problem for the future of APT. Some major constraints 
within the Northeast Asian region reflect those in the Southeast Asian region. As with 
the countries of Southeast Asia, the relationship amongst Northeast Asian countries has 
been blanketed by conflicts and the issue of excessive nationalistic interests. The deep 
mistrust between Northeast Asian countries, as a result of their shared histories, which Is 
evident in the case of Sino-Japanese relations, has been a major setback to the process of 
regionalism (Cai 2001: 15). During much of the twentieth century, for example, Japan's 
colonisation of Northeast Asia left an 'indelible, brutal imprint on a generation' (Dent 
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2002b: 5). Another important factor worth noting is that, unlike their counterparts in 
Southeast Asia, regionalism has largely been absent in the history of Northeast Asian 
countries. 14 Furthermore, it is also important to question the extent to which APT would 
accommodate additional new members in East Asia, such as Taiwan and North Korea. 
To date, Taiwan has been participating as an observer in the APT framework whilst 
discussions on the involvement of North Korea have been largely absent. The inclusion 
of these new members would present a new challenge, and may threaten the continued 
existence of APT. The Sino-Taiwanese relationship, for example, has recently soured by 
the sale of US weapons to Taiwan. Meanwhile, despite South Korea's implementation of 
the Sunshine Policy' 5 towards the neighbouring North Korea, it is still unclear if North 
Korea will guarantee reciprocity in security and other areas to its southern neighbour 
(Sang-Ho 2001). 
In addition to the APT framework of co-operation, Japan, South Korea, and China 
have recently proposed a bilateral FTA with either ASEAN or each individual country 
within the Association. During the Eighth ASEAN Summit on 5th November 2002, in 
Phnom Penh, for instance, the ASEAN-China Framework Agreement on Comprehensive 
Economic Co-operation was signed between China and its Southeast Asian partners. The 
agreement, which was implemented on Is' July 2003, aims to liberalise trade on goods 
14 The exception to this is the Tumen River Area Development Programme (TRADP), which is primarily 
concerned with large-scale transport and energy infi-astructure projects (Dent 2002c: 7 1). 15 The Sunshine Policy was first introduced by the South Korean President, Kim Dae Jung, in order to 
underline the peaceful management of the the division of the Korean Peninsula. Previous South Korean 
governments had sought the containment of North Korea. This policy envisions greater interactions 
bet\veen South Korean and North Korea through the funnelling of economic assistance and diplomatic 
favours from South Korea to North Korea. For further information regarding the Sunshine Policy visit the 
The Korean Times (2003) official website at: 
http:,,,,, "/ww. korea. net/report/kt/xcontent. asp'? color--RW&cate=02&serial no=20020524025 
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and services, as well as create a transparent and liberal investment regime between all 
parties. This ASEAN-China FTA will open up a market for nearly 1.7 billion consumers, 
with a combined GDP of US$ 1.5 trillion and a two way trade level of US$1.2 trillion. 16 
Prior to the signing of this agreement, both Japan and South Korea also announced their 
interest in negotiating bilateral FTAs with some ASEAN countries. In early 2002, for 
example, Japan signed a bilateral FTA with Singapore, which was implemented on 30th 
November 2002. The agreement is historical since it is the first time that Japan has ever 
agreed to conduct an FTA with other countries. The proposed scheme covers some 3,400 
items and eradicates tariffs on about 94 percent of Singapore's exports into Japan. 
Singapore, on the other hand, has eliminated the remaining tariffs on imports from Japan, 
mainly on alcoholic drinlýs. 17 
In response to China's effort to form an FTA with ASEAN, Japan also attempted 
to push its Comprehensive Economic Partnership Programme (CEPP) with ASEAN, with 
elements of an FTA to be completed within ten years (ASEAN Secretariat 2003). The 
agreement was made at the ASEAN-Japan Summit, following the Eighth ASEAN 
Summit in Cambodia. The decision to implement the CEPP was based on the report of 
the ASEAN-Japan Closer Economic Partnership Experts Group, which was earlier 
commissioned by the AEM and Japan in September 2001. It is expected that the 
agreement will increase economic interactions between ASEAN and Japan-18 Whilst 
16 For further analysis of the ASEAN-China Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co- 
operation, visit the ASEAN Secretariat (2002) official website at: lit! P'I/ýw. atseansec. org/8thhsunimiit/8thsumrnit china. h in 17 
C_. q_jt 
- This scheme, however, does not apply to some sensitive agricultural and fisheries products, nor to 
petrochemical and petroleum goods. 8 For details concerning Japan's major trading partners as of 2001 see Appendix 7. The data in Appendix 
7 shows that, recently, Singapore and Thailand were ranked seventh and ninth respectively amongst the top 
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ASEAN aims to boost its exports to Japan by US$ 20 billion, Japan is expected to 
increase its exports to ASEAN countries by US$ 20 billion (ASEAN Secretariat 2003: 3). 
Some areas of co-operation included in the agreement are financial services, information 
and communication technologies, sciences, the development of small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs), tourism, energy, human resources development, and transportation. 
Leaders from both sides share the view that the programme will facilitate greater 
economic ties between the two parties. Along with the already agreed Japan- Singapore's 
FTA, the Japanese government also intends to implement an FTA with the Philippines. 
To date, the free trade pact is still under negotiation between the two parties, and is 
expected to be concluded by 2004. In addition, in II- 12 December 2003, the Japanese 
government held the Japan - ASEAN Commemorative Surnmit in Tokyo, which made it 
the first ASEAN Summit ever to be held in a non-ASEAN country. 
Meanwhile, as bilateral economic co-operation between ASEAN and China, and 
ASEAN and Japan increases, the South Korean government also announced its intention 
to conduct an FTA with ASEAN in September 2002. Earlier that year, the former South 
Korean Foreign Minister, Han Sung Joo, is reported to have claimed that the creation of 
an FTA pact between ASEAN and South Korea is more than likely as the agreement 
would boost additional foreign investments and competitiveness in the region (Fore 
2002). The current South Korean Trade Minister, Hwang Doo-Yun, also added that his 
government was can-ying out a feasibility study about implementing an FTA with all 
Southeast Asian countries (Maneerungsee 2002). Unlike its Northeast Asian neighbours, 
ten major destinations for Japanese exports, whilst Indonesian and Malaysia were ranked fourth and eighth 
respectively. 
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China and Japan, the South Korean government is rather cautious in taking major steps to 
conduct an FTA with ASEAN countries. However, the South Korean government is 
alarmed by the current development of other free trade pacts that have been implemented 
between ASEAN, Japan, and China. As a result, it is very likely that an FTA between 
ASEAN and South Korea will be implemented soon. 
Moreover, ASEAN countries are increasingly interested in conducting FTAs with 
non-ASEAN member countries, which has been evident in a number of initiatives 
towards closer economic co-operation between ASEAN and the US, India, and the 
Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations (CER) (ASEAN Secretariat 2003). 
To start with, closer economic co-operation between ASEAN and the US began at the 
APEC Summit in Los Cobos, Mexico, on 26th October 2002. At the time, the US 
proposed the establishment of the Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative (EAI), 'which aims to 
build a network of FTAs between the US and individual ASEAN countries' (ASEAN 
Secretariat 2003: 6). The deal was made possible due to the close economic relations 
between the two parties. The US has been ASEAN's major trading partner, accounting 
for about 15.8 percent of ASEAN's total trade with the world in 2001 or about US$ 108.4 
billion. 19 Meanwhile, US imports from ASEAN accounted for about 17 percent in 2001, 
although ASEAN accounts for only 5-7 percent of total US trade with the rest of the 
world. Moreover, the institutionalisation of the free trade agreement between the two 
parties was significant because it was the first time the US had ever conducted a bilateral 
FTA pact with any Asian country. The first stage of the agreement will involve a free 
trade arrangement between the US and Singapore, which will not be implemented until 
19 For details concerning the US' major trading partners as of 2001 refer to Appendix 7. 
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2004 since the U. S. government is still drafting the agreement and has to present it to 
Congress. To date, according to the US Trade Representative, Robert Zoellick, there is 
only one major problem that has to be resolved, namely the free transfer of capital . 
20 The 
deal to implement an FTA with Singapore is hoped to be a blueprint for similar bilateral 
economic co-operations with other Southeast Asian countries. 
An important discussion between ASEAN and India also took place at the Eighth 
ASEAN Summit in Cambodia. This was the first ASEAN-India Summit to be held 
where both parties agreed to broaden and deepen the econornic linkages between each 
other (ASEAN Secretariat 2003: 4). However, the first consultation between the 
Economic Ministers of ASEAN and India actually took place a month earlier in Bandar 
Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam, on 15"' September 2002. Previously, the Indian 
government had initially announced its desire to reduce its peak tanff rates to the East 
Asia tariff levels within a three year period. Subsequently, a Joint Study on AFTA - 
India Linkages for the Enhancement of Trade and Investment was conducted, which 
recommended that the fonnation of an India-AFTA Regional Trade and Investment Area 
(RTIA) was feasible . 
21 One of the reasons for the creation of an India-AFTA RTIA was 
the increase of trade linkages between the two parties. Between 1993 until 2001, for 
example, two-way trade between the two parties doubled from US$ 2.9 billion to US$ 9.9 
billion. At the moment, both parties have an ASEAN - India Economic Linkages Task 
Force (AIELTF), which is preparing a Framework Agreement to Enhance ASEAN - 
20 As reported by the Business Day official website (2002). For further details visit: 
www. bday. co. za/bdav/content/direct/1,3523,1228609-6078-0,00. html 
ZI A report concerning the ASEAN-India Econorriic Linkage can be found in the ASEAN Secretariat's 
(2002c) press release, or visit the ASEAN Secretariat official website at: 
http:,, 'NN,, ýý, w. aseansec. OrgJI2315. htm 
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India Economic Co-operation for future consideration during the ASEAN-Indian 
Economic Co-operation that will take place on October 2003. 
A month prior to the opening of the Eighth ASEAN Summit, a Joint Ministerial 
Declaration on the AFTA - CER Closer Economic Partnership (CEP) was also signed in 
Brunei Darussalam, on 14"' September 2002. This is expected to increase the two way 
trade between the involved countries by up to US$ 40 billion by 2010. Moreover, it is 
also hoped that the CEP framework will be incorporated into the AFTA framework so 
that greater economic co-operation will be made possible between ASEAN countries and 
the CER group. Initially, the AFTA - CER linkage was developed in 1995. However, it 
was only at the Fifth AEM - CER Consultation in Chiang Mai, Thailand, in October 
2000 that Economic Ministers from both regions agreed to the formation of the High 
Level Task Force to conduct a feasibility study on the formation of the AFTA - CER 
Free Trade Area and other relevant issues surrounding closer integration between 
ASEAN and CER counthes. 22 Subsequently, the AFTA - CER CEP Implementation and 
Co-ordination Group (ACCICG) identified seven areas of economic co-operation, 
including (1) the protection for intellectual property; (2) standards and quality 
assessment; (3) trade in services; (4) the implementation of the CEPT scheme; (5) the 
development of small and medium enterprises; (6) industrial co-operation; and (7) E- 
ASEAN 23 (ASEAN Secretariat 2003: 4-5). 
22 As reported in the ASEAN Secretariat (2000b) official website at: 
http: //www. aseansec org/14005 htm 
" E-ASEAN is an attempt 'link up ASEAN members by internet and electronic means so ASEAN becomes 
one cyberspace' (Tay and Estanislao 2000: 19) 
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11, -art from those developments, ASEAN countries are also attempting to 'IF 
strengthen their own regional integration. On 8th October 2003, in Bali, for example, 
ASEAN member countries agreed to expand ASEAN co-operation by establishing an 
ASEAN Community (AC) by 2020. The Declaration of ASEAN Concord 11 will 
reinforce three elements of co-operation, namely political and security co-operation, 
economic co-operation, and socio-cultural co-operation, which were all included in the 
1976 Declaration of ASEAN Concord 1.24 ASEAN's main objective in forming an AC 
was to ensure lasting peace, stability, and prosperity in the Southeast Asian region. 
Moreover, ASEAN leaders also agreed to form the ASEAN Security Community (ASC), 
the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), and the ASEAN Soclo-Cultural Community 
(ASCC) as frameworks to help achieve the objective of a dynamic, cohesive, resilient, 
and integrated ASEAN Community. A spokesman from the ASEAN Secretariat declared 
that ASEAN has subscribed to the notion of democratic peace whereby member countries 
rely on democratic peace to promote regional peace and stability. 25 Despite this, ASEAN 
Secretariat officials and regional leaders refused to admit that the AC would lead to the 
creation of a military bloc or a political union. The Head of External Relations of the 
ASEAN Secretariat, Sundram Pushpanathan, for example, assured that an AC would not 
26 Mahathir, become a Fortress ofASEAN. Similarly, the Prime Minister of Malaysia, Dr 
also confirmed that the AC would never become an ASEAN Union. 27 However, given 
the slow progress of ASEAN in the past, the Indonesian President, Megawati, stated that 
24 Details of the Declaration of ASEAN Concord 11 are available at the ASEAN Secretariat official website 
(accessed 2004) at: 
- ttP: 
//www. aseansec. oi-g/1 5159. htm Z3 As quoted in Luard (2003). 26 As quoted in Parameswaran (2003). 27 As quoted by the Jakarta Post (2003) or visit the Jakarta Post official website at: http: //www theiakartapost. com/detailweeldy. asp? fileid=20031008. @)O-l 
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the signing of the Declaration of ASEAN Concord 11 was 'a watershed in the history of 
ASEAN'. 
28 
All these developments suggest that 'international policy is changing rapidly[, ] 
and it will continue to develop as negotiations proceed on various bilateral, regional and 
multilateral fronts' (Lloyd 2002: 12). However, it remains to be seen whether states 
involved in these schemes will be able to implement the agreements fully. Before 
retiring, the fonner ASEAN Secretary General, Rudolfo Severino, expressed his 
frustration over some ASEAN countries' reluctance to make significant changes to their 
nationalistic FEP, which consequently stalled many ASEAN's economic integration 
initiatives. 29 The challenges that ASEAN has to confront today are not merely to 
maintain the current regional integration initiatives amongst member countries, but also 
to conduct greater co-operation with its Northeast Asian, West Asian, and other non- 
Asian counterparts. Despite greater complementarity within the economic relationships 
between these regions, Southeast Asian countries are faced with the challenge of setting 
aside their national economic interests for the sake of regional economic integration. The 
bilateral FTA between China and ASEAN, for example, will be overshadowed by the 
strained relationship that has existed between some ASEAN member countries and China 
in the past. It is by no means clear that this agreement will signal an end to ASEAN 
member countries' suspicion of China. Nevertheless, greater integration between 
Southeast Asian countries and their Northeast Asian counterparts is inevitable because of 
28 As quoted by the BBC News (2003b), or visit the BBC News official website at: 
-tttP-*,, 
', 
-news. 
bbbc. co. Aukj /hiL/world/as ýa-acific/3 LI67120L. stm 29 As quoted by the ABC News International (2002), or visit the ABC News International official website 
at: 
\N'\\, w. abcnews. go. con-t/wire/World/reuters2002llO4 128. htm] 
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the greater benefits to be accrued from such arrangements. In fact, the scope of many 
RIA initiatives between the two regions will most likely expand in the future. 
6.5. Indonesian state and non-state actors' perceptions of the creation of AFTA 
Since the inception of the ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangement (ASEAN- 
PTA) in 1977, Indonesia has always demonstrated a rather ambiguous attitude towards 
ASEAN regional economic integration initiatives. As mentioned in Chapter 5, Indonesia 
always wanted better control over its own economy before agreeing to greater levels of 
economic co-operation with its neighbounng states (Kartadjoemena 1977: 71). This 
attitude persisted even when Indonesia undertook trade liberalisation measures during the 
early 1990s. In a subsequent analysis of Indonesian FEP, Anwar (1994) confirtned the 
ambiguity in Indonesian attitudes towards ASEAN regional economic integration 
initiatives. Specifically, in the area of economic co-operation, Indonesia has been rather 
pessimistic about relying on ASEAN for several reasons, all of which are still valid when 
examining the perceptions of Indonesian state and non-state actors of the creation of 
AFTA. Firstly, in the early period of economic co-operation, Indonesia was a relatiVely 
poor country in comparison to its neighbouring partners. Indonesian economists at the 
time were convinced that it was necessary for Indonesia to conduct a protectionist 
economic policy in order to achieve an appropriate level of economic development. 
Secondly, Indonesia preferred to protect its infant industries and conducted trade mostly 
with non-ASEAN member countries, mainly Japan and the US. Thirdly, the majority of 
Indonesian entrepreneurs were reluctant to enter the ASEAN regional market since 
Indonesia itself was already a large nation composed of over 100 million people during 
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the 1980s. Fourthly, Indonesia had always regarded regional economic co-operation 
projects as a way for richer ASEAN countries, particularly Singapore, to exploit the large 
Indonesian market. Finally, Indonesians also recognised the highly competitive nature of 
the ASEAN market. As a result, many Indonesians were pessimistic about the 
Association's proposed regional economic integration mechanisms. Therefore, many 
state and non-state actors during the New Order period thought that the country should 
not focus on ASEAN economic co-operation. 
On the whole, however, the majority of the Indonesian population has been 
unaware of the development of ASEAN economic integration initiatives. This is both 
because of the minimal attempt made to disseminate information on ASEAN's 
development to the public, and the public's lack of interest towards the issue of foreign 
affairs in general. At the same time, only a few members of the governmental elite, 
particularly during the New Order period, were aware of the development of ASEAN. 
Decisions on ASEAN were largely the concern of President Suharto, the anny, staff at 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and a small academic circle, especially the Centre 
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). The overall perception of the political 
elite towards their country's involvement in ASEAN was relatively positive. However, it 
is also important to note that, as Leifer (1983: 153) observes, 'Indonesia was caught 
between aspiration and achievement' in ASEAN and its regional economic integration 
initiatives. On the one hand, Indonesia's involvement in the Association was regarded as 
important owing to ASEAN's potential to establish an extensive economic relationship 
between Southeast Asian countries. On the other hand, many Indonesians have also been 
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fnistrated over their country's inability to influence other ASEAN member states' foreign 
economic policy (FEP). It has been widely acknowledged that the Indonesian political 
elite can be nationalistic, particularly in discussions over Indonesia's position in ASEAN. 
National aspirations concerning regional entitlements exist owing to the sheer size of the 
country in terms of land mass and population. The military has also continued to express 
nationalistic pride over Indonesia's past heroic struggle against the imperialist powers. 
However, Indonesia still cannot exert much influence over other member states' 
behaviour, including within the economic field. 
The perceptions held by Indonesian domestic constituents towards AFTA in the 
past have been largely centred around the policy-makers. There has been limited analysis 
of the perceptions of the wider Indonesians public, such as domestic non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and civil society organisations (CSOs), of the creation of AFTA. 
Generally, during the New Order administration, non-state actors did not participate in 
the FEP decision-making process. The only interest groups capable of influencing the 
policies of the Indonesian government were members of the academic community and the 
business community. During the process of the creation of AFTA, for example, the 
Indonesian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (KADIN - Kamar Dagang dan Industri 
Indonesia) was the only interest group large enough to present the views of the 
Indonesian business community on the formation of AFTA. However, in general, the 
attitude of KADIN towards the formation of AFTA remained passive due to the heavy 
centralisation of the FEP-making process. At the same time, the views of other interest 
groups in the country were largely ignored. The New Order's heavy centralisation. of 
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power and the ability of the state apparatus to repress or to neutralise dissident opinions 
has raised some doubts over the ability of Indonesian NGOs or CSOs to influence the 
country's overall direction (Eldridge 1995: 5). There are also many Indonesian NGOs or 
CSOs that serve the govemment by acting as a channel for social and political 
participation (Budiman 1988). As a result, the support shown towards the creation of 
AFTA at the time primarily represented the economic interests of those in power. 
Therefore, in general, the majority of Indonesians remained somewhat indifferent 
towards ASEAN (Anwar 1994: 200) and AFTA. One of the major reasons for this 
indifference was because the Association was still largely considered an 
intergovernmental organisation. Many actions conducted within the ASEAN framework 
were perceived to come largely from the wishes or perceptions of the government elite 
concerning the direction that should be pursued by the Association. Indonesian leaders 
were also concerned about enhancing Indonesia's influence over other ASEAN member 
countries. It was clear that Indonesia's leadership in the region was somewhat imaginary. 
Indonesia, despite its vast geographical size and large population, has kept a rather low 
profile with regard to foreign policy in ASEAN and has not been able to provide a sense 
of direction to the Association. Apart fTom heavy bureaucratisation in the initial 
implementation of AFTA, Indonesian support towards this scheme was also limited 
because of a lack in appropriate infonnation being disseminated to the public. 
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6.6. Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a detailed analysis on the development of AFTA, 
ASEAN's regional economic integration initiatives beyond the Southeast Asian region, 
and Indonesian state and non-state actors' perceptions towards the creation of the AFTA 
scheme. Despite the indifferent attitude amongst Indonesians towards ASEAN regional 
economic integration in the past, the introduction of AFTA in 1992 signalled a significant 
improvement within ASEAN regional economic integration. AFTA was considered a 
milestone in ASEAN co-operation due to its capacity to act as a catalyst for a greater co- 
operation or, perhaps, integration in the region. It is one of the most ambitious regional 
projects that ASEAN has proposed to date. However, just as previous ASEAN regional 
economic integration initiatives (i. e. ASEAN-PTA, AIP, AIC, and AIJV) failed owing to 
the divergent national economic interests amongst ASEAN member countries, it remains 
questionable whether AFTA will survive. The economic crisis of 1997, in particular, was 
a major setback to the progress of AFTA. The economic crisis did not only paralyse 
some ASEAN countries' economics, but also fragmented the political and social 
structures of these countries. At the onset of the economic crisis, some Southeast Asian 
countries wanted to postpone the implementation of AFTA. In contrast, however, 
ASEAN decided that the schedule of AFTA should instead be accelerated to I" January 
2002, from the initially agreed date of I" January 2003.30 
30 As reported in the ASEAN Secretariat (1998a) official website at: 
NIP: 1/kN/ww. aseansec. orjz/1 619. htm 
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The acceleration of the AFTA schedule was the only logical and rational thing to 
do for ASEAN, although this move was against popular opinion (Severino 1999). The 
acceleration of AFTA was hoped, inter alia, to bring back a supportive investment 
climate in member countries as well as to provide a positive sign to the world economy of 
ASEAN's intention to remain open economically. Further initiatives were also 
conducted to improve economic relations with non-ASEAN countries, which were 
evident in the discussions over the future possibility of the APT as well as other bilateral 
negotiations with the US, India, and the CER countries. All these developments suggest 
that policy-makers in the Southeast Asian region are increasingly interested in expanding 
current ASEAN economic co-operation beyond AFTA. However, it is too early to 
suggest that the scope of ASEAN's activities will be expanded into the APT framework 
in the near future. The Indonesia government, for example, supported the development 
of APT, but refused to elaborate further on the way in which co-operation within the APT 
framework can be expanded. Co-operation with non-ASEAN countries, in Jakarta's 
point of view, should always be treated cautiously. 
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Chapter 7: 
Contemporary Indonesian Perceptions of AFTA: 
An Empirical Analysis 
Introduction 
One of the main issues highlighted in New Regionalism Theory (NRT) is the 
spontaneous nature of regionalisation, which emphasises the role of domestic actors in 
the regionalism process (Hettne 1999; Schulz et aL 2001 a). The present chapter deals 
with this issue, and provides a detailed analysis of empirical data findings which 
demonstrates the symbiotic nature of the relationship between Indonesian nationalism 
and ASEAN regional economic integration. In a more specific manner, this chapter 
provides an analysis of the perceptions held by Indonesian state and non-state actors 
towards their country's involvement in AFTA. Apart from being the result of 
intergovernmental agreement, regionalism may also be perceived as the outcome of 
the demands made by various domestic interest groups whose participation in the 
policy-making process has been increasing throughout the world (Grossman and 
Helpman 2002: 1). Therefore, this analysis of the contemporary perceptions of 
Indonesian state and non-state actors of AFTA will include the views held by 
governinental officials, non-govenunental agencies (i. e. business associations and 
various non-governmental. organisations (NGOs)), and selected foreign embassies in 
Jakarta. 
In order to facilitate the analysis, this chapter is divided into seven sections. 
Section 7.2. attempts to identify some background factors that influence the 
contemporary perceptions of Indonesian state and non-state actors of ASEAN's 
regional economic integration initiatives. More specifically, this section analyses 
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their perceptions of ASEAN's regional economic integration schemes prior to the 
economic cnsis of 1997. Meanwhile, the main analysis, from section 7.3. to 7.6., is 
based on the conceptual framework laid out in Chapter 3, which include: first, 
ASEAN regionalism and Indonesia's economic development; second, ASEAN 
regionalism and Indonesian nationalism; third, ASEAN regionalism and Indonesia's 
international autonomy, bargaining power, and the ability to contain the negative 
forces of globalisation; and, fourth, the process of dissemination regarding ASEAN 
and AFTA. Finally, the chapter concludes with an overall analysis of the perceptions 
of Indonesian state and non-state actors of the current implementation of AFTA. 
7.2. The contemporary attitude of Indonesians towards AFTA 
The perceptions of Indonesian state and non-state actors of AFTA in recent 
years have been changing. The emergence of the regional economic crisis in 1997, in 
particular, has played a major role in changing their attitudes towards ASEAN 
regional economic integration schemes. This change of attitude was actually 
stimulated by the economic crisis in that there was a consensus amongst Indonesian 
policy-makers that enhanced regional economic integration in the Southeast Asian 
region would provide a fundamental mechanism to alleviate the economic crisis. As a 
result, the Indonesian government welcomed ASEAN's initiative to accelerate the 
AFTA schedule as envisioned in the Statement on Bold Measures. ' This statement 
reflected the realisation of ASEAN leaders that the economic crisis would have 
disastrous effects on the business dynamics and the economies of ASEAN member 
I Specific details concerning the Statement on Bold Measures can be obtained from the ASEAN 
Secretariat (1998b) official website at: 
http: //www aqeansec. org, /8756. htin 
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countries. It is for this reason that the member countries of ASEAN agreed to initiate 
some concrete measures to minimise the negative effects of the economic crisis. 2 
Although AFTA in itself was not able 'to address the regional upheaval and was 
certainly not designed to deal with such events' (Narine 2002: 186), ASEAN leaders 
were convinced that the acceleration of AFTA would stimulate economic growth and 
renewed business confidence, which, in turn, would speed up the process of economic 
recovery in the region. As it stood, Indonesia managed to place as many as 6,346 
items (88.43 percent) on to AFTA's inclusion list (IL) in 2000, and 6,461 items 
(90.04 percent) in 2001 (Depperindag 2000: 27), which reflected Indonesia's genuine 
commitment towards AFTA. 
Apart from a need to alleviate the economic crisis, Indonesian state and non- 
state actors were also inclined to strengthen ASEAN economic regionalism through 
AFTA for the overall benefits accrued from regional integration strategy (RIS), which 
have already been analysed in Chapter 3. The field research also reveals that, because 
of their nation's commitment to AFTA, Indonesian state and noon-state actors were 
convinced that the country could move closer to achieving its objectives of sustained 
economic development and the maintenance of national unity. With its capacity to 
promote economic growth and competitiveness, AFTA will have positive knock-on 
effects on the overall economic development of Indonesia, leading to prosperity. This 
nationwide prosperity will help the Indonesian govenunent to minimise the threat of 
national disintegration presently posed by several ethno-nations (i. e. Aceh, Papua, 
' Apart from the acceleration of the AFTA schedule, the 1998 Statement on Bold Measures also 
Postulates other mechanisms that are useful to economic recovery, which include short-term measures 
to enhance the investment climate (i. e. an agreement between each ASEAN country to extend 
additional special privileges to qualified ASEAN and non-ASEAN investors, which was to be effective 
for applications made between I st January 1999 and 31 st December 2000) and the establishment of the 
ASEAN Industrial Co-operation (AICO) scheme. 
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etc), which has become a serious post-crisis phenomenon in Indonesia. Moreover, the 
Indonesian goveniment will also be able to increase its autonomy and bargaining 
power in the international arena through its full commitment in the ASEAN regional 
economic integration schemes. In the age of an increasing drive towards 
multilateralism, pressure groups (i. e. the business community, the academic 
community, NGOs and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs)) in Indonesia are 
demanding that their government should play an active role in the international arena. 
Greater prosperity throughout the Southeast Asian region will also increase the 
prestige and power of other ASEAN member countries. Such conditions, in turn, will 
give ASEAN member countries greater autonomy and bargaining power when dealing 
with major powers (i. e. the US and the EU) in many multilateral negotiations. In the 
long-term, this RIS is also hoped to contribute to the promotion of Indonesian culture 
and identity at both regional and international levels. Therefore, the need to minimise 
the negative impacts of the economic crisis and the other important incentives 
outlined above have acted as stimulants to promote the speeding up of the AFTA 
schedule. 
However, the Indonesian government's commitment towards the 
implementation and the schedule acceleration of AFTA drew some criticisms from 
various sources in Indonesia. Indonesian domestic pressure groups (i. e. business 
associations, NGOs, CSOs), for example, were very sceptical of Indonesia's entrance 
into the AFTA scheme. A year prior to the implementation of the AFTA scheme in 
January 2002, for example, the Indonesian Chambers of Commerce and Industry 
(KADIN - Kamar Dagang dan Industri Indonesia) expressed its concem about 
AFTA and made an official demand that the Indonesian government should delay 
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Indonesia's entry into the scheme until 2005.3 Almost a year after its implementation, 
the Indonesian government was still receiving stiff criticism over its commitment to 
AFTA. In the face of possible increases in fuel, power, and telephone prices in early 
2003, for example, various Indonesian labour organisations and members of the 
Indonesian Business Association (APINDO - Asosiasi Pengusaha Indonesia) 
maintained that the Indonesian government's commitment to AFTA was proof that 
the government was more concerned about the country's global position than the 
welfare of its people (Guerin 2003). The anti-AFTA elements in Indonesia contended 
that the government should be more concerned about domestic problems rather than 
giving priority to regional trade liberalisation issues. 
Equally important in analysing contemporary Indonesian attitudes towards 
AFTA was the introduction of the Regional Autonomy Laws (RAL), which 
challenged the AFTA scheme. In 1999, the Habibie administration issued Act No. 22 
/ 1999, which is a regional governinent law, 4 and Act No. 25/1 999,5 which is 
concerned with the fiscal balance between central and regional governments. Both 
regulations were officially implemented in January 2001. As analysed in Chapter 3, 
these two Acts were aimed at decentralising the heavily centralised system employed 
by the New Order regime. 6 More comprehensively, Act No. 22 was used to make a 
fundamental shift in government functions from the central to the regional level, 
whilst Act No. 25 was employed in conjunction with the former Act to focus upon the 
3 As reported in Kompas (2001 a). 4 Also known as the Provincial Government Act (UUPD - Undang-Undang Peraturan Daerah). 5 Also known as the Financial Balance between Central and Provincial Governments Act (UUPKPD - Undang- Undang Perimbangan Keuangan Pusat dan Daerah). 
6 The New Order regime's policy of centralisation has often been criticised on the grounds that it 
increased socio-economic inequalities between regions by transferring wealth Erom resource-rich 
provinces to Jakarta (Tadjoeddin et al. 2001: 283). One of the New Order's main reasons for pursuing 
such a policy was that the existence of the Indonesian state has been challenged throughout history by 
various ethnonationalist movements. During the Old Order and the New Order periods, both 
governments used centralisation to limit and control such separatist movements. 
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fiscal relations between the central and regional govermuents (Silver et al. 2001: 346). 
These two acts have generated great concern, particularly over the issue of 
ethnonationalism. In KADIN's view, for example, the RAL will complicate the 
investment climate in Indonesia as a result of several new provincial tax collection 
laws that could hinder business transactions. 7 Following the implementation of these 
regulations, many provincial govenu-nents have issued numerous provincial laws 
which have greatly bureaucratised the relationship between officials and the business 
sector. The Indonesian goverranent, on the other hand, argues that such changes are a 
natural result of political transition in Indonesia, and should be considered reform 
euphoria. 8 Nevertheless, in the short run, diverging investment laws across the 
country do create a substantial challenge to the central government's commitment to 
AFTA. 
7.3. ASEAN regionalism and Indonesia's economic development 
One main motive behind the Indonesian government's support for a regional 
integration strategy (RIS) is the achievement of sustained economic development. 
Although attitudes towards ASEAN have been generally positive, the majority of 
respondents interviewed remained cautious about ASEAN's current project, AFTA, 
and Indonesia's involvement in the scheme. The majority of respondents were 
convinced that Indonesia was not ready to get involved in the AFTA scheme due to 
7 As reported in Kompas (2001b), or visit the Kompas official website at: 
ýý. kornpas. com/business/news/0 102/1 O. htm 
a As postulated by Mr. Kadjatmiko, who at the time held the position of the Director of Balancing Fund 
of the Directorate General of the Fiscal Balance Committee of Provincial Autonomy (DPOD - Dewan Perimbangan Otonomi Daerah), during an interview conducted on the IOh August 2001. The DPOD 
is a branch of the Ministry of Finance (MoF) that deals solely with the financial aspects of provincial 
autonomy. Reform euphoria refers to the condition in which the majority of the population demand 
greater democratisation in all aspects of domestic politics. In contemporary Indonesia, such euphoria 
resulted from the economic crisis and the resignation of Suharto as President, which led to demands for 
further democratisation and greater autonomy amongst Indonesian provinces. 
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the economic crisis of 1997. This was the prevalent view amongst the majority of 
respondents who took a convergence standpoint. However, those in the maximalist 
camp argued that Indonesia was ready to enter the AFTA scheme, and felt that this 
scheme would help Indonesia to escape from the current economic crisis, apart from 
other benefits that will be analysed in the following sections (i. e. strengthening 
Indonesian nationalism, increasing bargaining power, international autonomy, and the 
ý11 ability to resist the negative forces of globalisation). Minimalists, on the other hand, 
rejected this idea and argued that Indonesia should focus on its domestic economic 
problems before any further commitment to ASEAN and its AFTA scheme. Some 
representatives from Indonesian NGOs and CSOs, for example, believed that certain 
trade liberalisation measures, such as AFTA, may be detrimental to the well-being of 
many Indonesians. Accordingly, rather than as a means to promote sustained 
economic development, regionalism was viewed as detrimental to Indonesia's 
domestic economy. Nevertheless, the symbiotic nature of the relationship between 
regionalism and nationalism in the context of ASEAN and Indonesia was 
I 
demonstrated by the fact that the majority of respondents fell within the maximalist 
and convergence categories. 
7.3.1. Maximalist 
Those within the maximalist camp viewed ASEAN and Indonesia's 
commitment to ASEAN and its AFTA scheme as positive. Maximalist respondents 
believed that ASEAN regionalism should be strengthened because, amongst other 
things, it contributes to the achievement of sustained economic development in 
member countries. On the whole, the majority of government officials and 
representatives from the ASEAN Secretariat and foreign embassies were convinced 
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that ASEAN and its AFTA scheme are crucial to sustaining Indonesia's sustained 
economic development. To start with, all the govenunental officials from the eleven 
central govermuental institutions and two prov'ncial government institutions 
interviewed had no hesitation in expressing their support of strengthening regionalism 
in Southeast Asia. 9 ASEAN, in the eyes of most governmental officials, is still 
regarded as the main pillar of Indonesian foreign policy. Indonesia is expected to 
continue to enhance its activities at the regional level. One official from the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs (MFA)lO affirmed how important it was for Indonesia to conduct a 
good neighbouring policy towards other ASEAN member countries. By prioritising 
ASEAN, the objectives of regional stability, harmony, and prosperity can be 
achieved. This, in turn, creates the necessary space for Indonesia to focus on its 
progression beyond its current status as a developing country. Therefore, it is seen to 
be in the national interests of Indonesia to co-operate, closely with other ASEAN 
member countries. This line of argument was shared by officials at various different 
governmental institutions. Some officials, such as those from the Ministry of Industry 
and Trade (Depperindag - Departemen Perindustrian dan Perdagangan)" and the 
9 Each governmental institution has one ASEAN Unit that functions as a tool to synchronise the 
policies issued both at the regional and domestic levels. The ASEAN Unit at the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MFA), for example, deals with the general issue of ASEAN co-operation, whilst similar units 
at the Ministry of Trade and Industry (Depperindag) and the Ministry of Finance (MoF) deal with, 
respectively, trade and finance related matters within ASEAN co-operation. There is also an AFTA 
Unit in the MFA, which deals specifically with AFTA-related matters. The only governmental 
institutions interviewed that do not have an ASEAN Unit are the State Logistic Agency (Bulog) and the 
Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA). This is because such governmental institutions focus 
solely on domestic issues. Despite this, officials at both BULOG and IBRA were able to participate in 
the research interview as a result of the recently expanded scope of their activities. BULOG, for 
instance, has consistently expressed its concerns over the possibility of trade liberalisation measures in 
the agricultural sector, both at the regional or the international level. Similarly, the scope of IBRA's 
activities has indirectly gone beyond the national level. The sale of troubled Indonesian banks and 
their assets has recently attracted the interest of many conglomerates from neighbouring countries, 
particularly from Malaysia. 
10 An interview was conducted on the 13th December 2000 in Jakarta. The interview was conducted 
xk'ith a representative of the Sub-Directorate of Commodity and Natural Resources who wished to 
remain anonymous. II An interview was conducted on the 19th February 2001 with Ketut Suwarko, Head of the Sub- 
Division of ASEAN Regional Co-operation, in Jakarta. 
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Ministry of Finance (MoF), 12 even expressed personal support for Indonesia's 
involvement in ASEAN regional co-operation. 
The majority of government officials interviewed also expressed a maximalist 
attitude towards the development of AFTA and Indonesia's participation in this 
scheme. Officials at the MFA and the Depperindag, for example, have been leading 
supporters of AFTA, and regard this scheme as representative of Indonesia's national 
interests at the regional level. The same officials also believed that there is a general 
consensus amongst policy makers that Indonesia would be left behind if participation 
in AFTA was discarded. Moreover, it was also hoped that AFTA would help alleviate 
Indonesia's internal economic problems, particularly those associated with good 
corporate governance, lack of skilled workers, and so on. AFTA has essentially 
aimed to increase the level of efficiency and competitiveness in the region, which 
means that Indonesia is obliged to solve its own internal problems immediately. 
Criticism concerning AFTA to date mostly came from local entrepreneurs. The 
official respondents, however, thought that it was very unlikely that the governinent 
would ever get a positive response about trade liberalisation from local entrepreneurs. 
A recent report issued by the Depperindag reveals that 46 percent of commodities 
exported to the ASEAN market are ready to compete within AFTA. 13 As far as the 
Depperindag officials were concerned, many Indonesian industries are ready to 
compete in AFTA. In fact, by 2001 Indonesia was able to comply with AFTA's 
requirements by putting nearly 90 percent of the items included in the inclusion list. 
12 An interview was conducted on the P March 2001 with Dr. Bambang Marsoem, Head of 
International and Regional Economic Co-operation, and his assistant, Solehudin Masyar, in Jakarta. 13 As reported in Kompas (2001d: 13). The article also reveals that the high rate competitive sectors 
include the metal, machine, and electronic industries. Meanwhile, the low rate competitive sectors are 
the chemical, agricultural, and forestry industries. 
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Other governmental officials at other institutions, such as the Central Bank of 
Indonesia (BI) 14 and MoF, were also enthusiastic about AFTA. These institutions 
were acting in compliance with AFTA. The BI, alongside the MFA and the 
Depperindag, is regarded as one of the main pillars of AFTA. This is in spite of the 
fact that the AFTA scheme is solely concerned with the eradication of tariffs amongst 
member countries, which is irrelevant to the Bl's main activities. Nevertheless, 
according to the respondents at the BI, AFTA was a stepping stone for Indonesia 
towards competing in the international market. The BI itself had been active in 
preparing Indonesia to enter AFTA in monetary terms. Past arrangements with other 
Southeast Asian Central Banks have been sustained to support the realisation of 
AFTA, such as the ASEAN Swap Arrangement (ASA) and the Bilateral Swap 
Arrangement (BSA). 15 The Southeast Asian Central Banks (SEACEN) 16 has also 
extended its monetary co-operation in the form of the ASEAN Surveillance Co- 
ordinating Unit (ASCU), which has had the objectives of strengthening the 
implementation of AFTA and acting as a buffer to prevent future crises. However, 
officials at the MoF were more optimistic about the progress of AFTA and criticised 
14 An interview was conducted with two officials from the International Trade Co-operation Division 
and two officials from the international Economic and Institution Studies of BI on the 201h February 
200 1, in Jakarta. All respondents wished to remain anonymous. 15 The ASA scheme actually began in 1978 following the signing of the Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) amongst Southeast Asian countries' Central Banks. The scheme aims to provide 
short-term liquidity reserves for ASEAN members who have difficulties with their balance of payment, 
as well as to increase the level of monetary co-operation amongst member countries. Following the 
economic crisis of 1997, the ASA facility was increased from an initial US$ 200 million to US$ I 
billion. Whilst the founding fathers of ASEAN and Brunei contributed a total of US$ 900 million, or 
US$ 150 million each, the new members of ASEAN contributed US$ 50 million, US$ 28 million, U`S$ 
17 million, and US$ 5 million respectively. The ASA scheme was later extended into the BSA 
scheme, which was initiated following the ASEAN Finance Deputy Ministers Meeting (AFDM) with 
their three Northeast Asian counterparts, Japan, South Korea, and China (a follow-up meeting of the 
Chiang Mai Initiative of 2000). The BSA aims to provide short-term support in the form of swap 
arrangements between ASEAN countries and their three Northeast Asian partners. 16 SEACEN was formed into a legal entity in 1982, and is composed of eight central banks from both 
ASEAN and non-ASEAN member countries (Bank Indonesia, Bank Negara Malaysia, Central Bank of 
Myanmar, Nepal Rastra Bank, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, Monetary Authority of Singapore, Central 
Bank of Sri Lanka, and Bank of Thailand). In recent years membership was expanded to include the 
Central Bank of China, Taipei, and the Bank of Mongolia. The headquarter of the SEACEN Research 
and Training Centre is located in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. 
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the Depperindag for its rather conservative measures to liberalise the Indonesian 
market. The respondents argued that the Depperindag had often implemented policies 
to protect various Indonesian industries, such as those evident in the steel, clove, and 
sugar industries. Officials from the MoF felt that AFTA should be taken very 
seriously, and the ministry regarded the scheme as a positive contribution to the 
economic development of the country. On the whole, therefore, respondents from 
both institutions believed Indonesia was ready to enter AFTA. 
Other respondents who held a maximalist standpoint were representatives 
from the ASEAN Secretariat' 7 and from various foreign embassies. To start with, as 
the best informed and most closely involved in the Association's activities, the 
representatives of the ASEAN Secretariat were by far the biggest supporters of 
ASEAN's regionalism attempts. The most prevalent concern expressed by the 
representatives of the Secretariat concerned the limitations imposed on the 
Secretariat's operations. Since its conception, the Secretariat has been criticised by 
the academic circle and the general public about its ineffectiveness in realising the 
aspirations of Southeast Asian people. In their defence, however, the respondents 
argued that the public was unaware that the main functions of the Secretariat were 
limited to initiating, monitoring, and implementing the policies decided on by the 
member governments. The Secretariat, therefore, only works for ASEAN member 
governments and is incapable of setting up its own policies without prior consultation 
with all ASEAN member governments. These limitations persist despite attempts to 
upgrade the position of Secretary General to a Ministerial level in 1992. Although 
most integration schemes are normally tied into member countries' political interests, 
17 An interview was conducted on the 7th December 2000 with the officials at the Bureau of Trade, 
Industry and Services, in Jakarta who wished to remain anonymous. 
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the Secretariat has arguably been successful in maintaining the progress of regional 
integration in Southeast Asia. 
Meanwhile, the representatives of ASEAN and non-ASEAN foreign 
embassies also gave their views about Indonesia's participation in ASEAN and AFTA 
and their country's experiences in dealing with regionalism. To start with, the 
representatives of both the Royal Embassy of Thailand 18 and the Embassy of Brunei 
Darussalam'9 also expressed their government's enthusiasm towards the strengthening 
of regionalism in Southeast Asia. 20 The Ambassador of Thailand, in particular, 
stressed that support for regionalism is prevalent amongst both state and non-state 
actors in Thailand. His country's contributions to ASEAN have been significant since 
the Association's conception. Aside from being one of the founding fathers and the 
birthplace of ASEAN, Thailand has been active in proposing a number of schemes to 
enhance regional integration measures. The former Thai Prime Minister, Anand 
Panyarachun, for example, initiated AFTA in the early 1990s. ASEAN has also 
influenced the majority of foreign policies in Thailand since the Association's 
creation in 1967. Although relationships with neighbouring countries have generally 
been good, Thailand's Prime Minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, endorsed a foreign policy 
21 that will allow Thailand to take a more proactive role at the regional level . 
18 An interview was conducted on the 17'h October 2000 with Somphand Kokilanon, the Ambassador 
of Thailand for the Republic of Indonesia, in Jakarta. 19 An interview was conducted on the 21" August 2001, in Jakarta, with a respondent who wished to 
remain anonymous. 20 Attempts to conduct interviews with the representatives from other ASEAN countries' embassies 
were made but were rejected on the grounds of the sensitivity of the issues discussed. Meanwhile, 
other non-ASEAN countries' embassies were also approached, including the Embassy of Japan and the 
Delegation of the European Commission in Jakarta, but both declined to give interviews. 21 As reported by the Thailand Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2001), or visit the Thailand Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs official website at: 
http: /'Nk'xk, w. mfa., -, o. th,, 'xN, eb/32.1)hp 
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Although trade relationships have been positive between Thailand and Indonesia, 22 
the respondent expressed his concern regarding a number of issues that may create 
problems in the immediate future if not properly handled by the Indonesian 
authorities. Amongst some of the most pressing issues are the complex bureaucracy 
of local authorities, security issues, and the question of Indonesia's leadership, which 
has been waning in ASEAN since the economic crisis began. 
As with Thailand and Indonesia, Brunei Darussalam also place ASEAN at the 
cornerstone of its foreign policy. Brunei's contribution to regionalism in Southeast 
Asia is large. Apart from hosting a number of important ASEAN meetings and other 
activities, Brunei is also one of the major co-ordinators for ASEAN's dialogue 
partners, such as ASEAN - New Zealand (1985-88), ASEAN - Canada (1988-91), 
and so on, all of which reflect Brunei's commitment towards regional co-operation in 
Southeast Asia. 23 The representative of the Brunei Embassy in Jakarta felt that both 
his government and the Indonesian government saw the increasing regionalism in 
Southeast Asia as positive. The respondent also seemed to suggest that both his 
government and the Indonesian government have been very committed to ASEAN 
and its AFTA scheme. Since the economic crisis in 1997, for example, there has been 
an acceleration in economic integration, apparent in the context of AFTA and in the 
increased number of joint investments amongst ASEAN entrepreneurs. In 2001 
22 The level of FDI that comes from Thailand to Indonesia has been relatively high. In 2000 alone, for 
instance, thirty-eight Thai projects were approved by the Indonesian government with a total 
investment value of US$ 2.3. billion, which ranked Thailand as the 15th largest investor in Indonesia 
(BKPM 2000). In the following year, or 2001, the total value of Thailand's investment in Indonesia 
increased to US$ 3 billion, which came from only three projects (BKPM 2002). On the other hand, however, the Board of Investment of Thailand (BOIT) reported that there was only one Indonesian 
project approved by the Thai government, amounting to US$ 28.6 million. For detailed data regarding 
foreign investment in Thailand, visit the BOIT official website (accessed 2003) at: 
lift : //Www. boi Ro. th/enRlish/tid/dataiBOI statistics fi. html 
' The representative of the Embassy of Brunei, however, refused to comment on the question of Indonesia's involvement in ASEAN due to the sensitivity of the subject. 
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alone, many entrepreneurs from both Indonesia and Brunei expressed their interest in 
conducting joint investments in agribusiness. Despite this, the representative of the 
Brunei Embassy also noted that some problems still existed between Brunei and its 
ASEAN counterparts. Brunei is a relatively small country that relies on oil as its main 
source of income. As a result, there was a limited amount of space and few natural 
resources available for foreign investment to take place in Brunei. Meanwhile, the 
majority of Brunei's economy was comprised of small and medium size enterprises 
(SMEs), which cannot compete with the many multinationals that operate in other 
ASEAN countries. Consequently, economic initiatives between Brunei and its 
ASEAN counterparts remain modest. 
As with other respondents in this category, the representatives of the US 
Embassy, 24 the German Embassy, 25 and the British EmbasSY26 also regarded the 
Southeast Asian regionalism process as positive. The US, in particular, saw the 
growing Southeast Asian market as having potential for foreign investments. The US 
automotive industry, for example, is deeply interested in the Southeast Asian region. 
According to the representative from the US Embassy, the three largest US 
automotive companies, Chrysler, Ford, and General Motors, have recently been in the 
region to conduct feasibility studies for investment, acknowledging that the Southeast 
Asian region is important to US economic interests. In a speech made by the former 
US Trade Representative, Charlene Bershefsky, at the US Ambassadors Tour Annual 
Dinner in Washington D. C. in 2000, it was clear that the US regarded the US-ASEAN 
24 An interview was conducted on the II th October 2000 with David C. DiGiovanna, the Economic 
Officer of the US Embassy, in Jakarta. 25 An interview was conducted on the 30th November 2000 with Alex Stedtfelt, the First Economic 
Officer of the German Embassy, in Jakarta 26 An interview was conducted on the 23d March 2000, in Jakarta, with a representative of the British 
Embassy who wished to remain anonymous 
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relationship as mutually beneficial. The Southeast Asian region has recently been the 
recipient of nearly US$ 42 billion of American investment, whilst the US is the 
central market for exports from the region with a value exceeding US$ 80 billion in 
goods and services in 1999 alone. It is, therefore, only logical for the US to continue 
to support strengthening regionalism in the Southeast Asian region. 
At the same time, both Great Britain and Gennany also agreed with their 
American counterpart, but provided a rather more idealistic explanation for the logic 
of regionalism in Southeast Asia. They felt that regionalism clearly reflects the needs 
of member countries to forge a relationship. In this context, ASEAN has been 
successful and has been able to play a major role in enhancing the interest of its 
member countries in the international fora. The Gennan govermnent encouraged the 
strengthening of the regionalism process in Southeast Asia, and argued that the 
benefits of an integrated region will exceed the benefits that individual states might 
have in managing alone. The British Embassy official, on the other hand, argued 
more from the point of view of economics to explain his government support towards 
regionalism in Southeast Asia. As with the US, Britain has substantial investments in 
the region. In Indonesia alone, the UK is the second largest foreign investor after 
Japan, with total investments amounting to US$ 50 billion in 2000. The British 
government was, therefore, very committed to the agreement made within ASEM. 
There has been recent concern about the growing economic uncertainty in the region, 
particularly in Indonesia. It was felt that the move towards regionalism has somehow 
been halted since the economic crisis began, and most countries in the region have 
been more concerned with domestic rather than regional issues. Despite this, the 
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respondent remained optimistic about the future of regionalism in Southeast Asia, 
although could not guarantee any deepening regional integration in the region. 
In terms of AFTA, officials from the ASEAN Secretariat and ASEAN foreign 
embassies believed that the implementation of AFTA and Indonesia would benefit 
substantially from its committment in the AFTA scheme. Although since the 
economic crisis began member governinents have been engrossed with domestic 
problems, relationship amongst them remain relatively stable. Commitment to the 
AFTA's schedule shows that the economic crisis has not damaged the relationships 
between member countries. In addition, it was felt that there was little to suggest that 
the progress of CEPT had been disrupted by the recent economic crisis. The only 
disruption caused to CEPT came from certain members' insistence on protecting 
some of their industries, such as the Malaysian automotive industry. Despite this, it 
was felt that AFTA, as of 2001, was still on track, which proved that the economic 
crisis had been the major catalyst in the ASEAN regionalisation process. Similar 
views were also expressed by the representatives of non-ASEAN foreign embassies. 27 
The US representative, in particular, appalauded the progress of regionalism in 
Southeast Asia and the Indonesian government's efforts to maintain its position in 
AFTA despite the economic crisis. The only concern expressed by the majority of 
non-ASEAN foreign embassy representatives was about Indonesia's passivity in the 
Association in recent years. This was seen to have affected the regionalisation 
ries. process in Southeast Asia and also the relationships between member count i 
Indonesia did not seem to have either the financial capacity or the time to assume 
leadership in the region in the short-term, as most resources were allocated to manage 
27 The representative of the British Embassy, however, claimed that his government did not have any 
ic po 8peclfi mts of view regarding Indonesia's involvement in AFTA, although his government had been 
very keen about the development of AFTA to date. 
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domestic problems, such as eradicating poverty, corruption, threat of national 
disintegration. 
7.3.2. Minimalist 
Minimalist respondents did not feel that ASEAN regionalism contributes 
much to Indonesian economic development. As a result, they opposed regionalism, or 
at least the concept of open regionalism to which ASEAN subscribes, and argued that 
the Indonesian government should focus more on domestic problems. Those who 
opposed the concept of regionalism were generally the representatives of Indonesian 
NGOs and CSOs. Pressure groups, such as the Urban Poor Consortium (UpC)'28 the 
National Front for Indonesian Labour Struggle (FNPBI - Front Nasional Perjuangan 
Buruh Indonesia) '29 the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI - 
Ikatan Cendikiawan Muslim Indonesia) '30 and the International Financial 
Development (INFID) 31 believed that regionalism had never contributed significantly 
to Indonesia's economic development. For the representatives from both UPC and 
FNPBI, for example, Indonesia needed to concentrate on its internal problems before 
embarking upon regional or international adventures. They felt that Indonesia's 
current problems extend beyond that of the economic crisis. One of Indonesia's 
persistent problems has been the poor quality of its human resources, which has been 
exacerbated since the economic crisis began in 1997. Indonesia's ability to compete 
with its ASEAN counterparts has been undermined partly because the human resource 
29 An interview was conducted on the 9"' October 2000 with Wardah Hafidz, the Head of UPC, in 
Jakarta. 
29 An interview was conducted on the 23rd November 2000 with Dita Indah Sari, the Head of the 
FNPBl, in Jakarta 
30 An interview was conducted on the 2 nd February 2001 with Adi Sasono, the Head of ICML 
Previously, Adi Sasono held the position of Minister of Co-operative, Small and Medium Enterprises 
during the Habibie administration. 31 An interview was conducted on 18 January 2001 with Boni Setiawan, an INFID activist, in Jakarta. 
247 
problem has not been adequately addressed. The world economy non-nally regards 
developing countries, such as Indonesia, as a good place for foreign investments 
owing to its abundance of cheap labour. The minimalist respondents, however, 
strongly criticised the government's decision to use cheap labour as a tool in 
marketing campaigns to attract foreign investment. Southeast Asian countries such as 
Malaysia and the Philippines are still able to attract foreign investment despite higher 
labour costs in total production costs (roughly around 20 percent in comparison to 
Indonesia's 5-8 percent). Moreover, the minimalist respondents also believed that 
Indonesia should reconsider its position in ASEAN, to prevent the country becoming 
a consumer market (major importer) in the Association's economic co-operation 
schemes. However, others in the minimalist group paid more attention to trade 
liberalisation at the global level. For ICMI, ASEAN was not particularly significant 
for Indonesia, aside from creating regional stability and security. It was felt that 
ASEAN countries have traditionally conducted trade with other non-ASEAN 
countries. Therefore, regionalism was not excessively important at the present time. 
The idea of regionalism had somehow changed in recent years as countries have 
become more open to the world market. A closed form of regionalism, such as trade 
bloc, was seen by the ICMI to be preferable since Indonesia was not yet capable of 
competing in the world market. 
The same representatives of Indonesian NGOs and CSOs also held a 
minimalist standpoint towards the development of AFTA. Reasons for opposition 
varied according to the different concerns of each individual pressure group. On the 
whole, however, there were four major reasons why they resisted AFTA. Firstly, the 
majority of Indonesian NGOs and CSOs were pessimistic about AFTA since ASEAN 
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economies are still highly competitive amongst one another. Apart from that, it was 
felt that many ASEAN countries were overly preoccupied with their national interests, 
such as in the agricultural sector, which is still considered a sensitive area in need of 
protection by most member countries. As a result, it was felt that ASEAN still lacked 
economic openness in comparison to other regional organisations. It was thought, 
therefore, highly unlikely that the Indonesian economy would be positively impacted 
by the implementation of AFTA. Secondly, even if AFTA did influence the 
economic activities of member countries, the impact of the scheme would be limited 
in comparison to policies pursued by other multilateral bodies, such as the WTO. A 
third problem was seen to lie in the Association's reluctance to allow the active 
participation of civil society groups in the decision-making process. To date, as 
pointed out earlier by respondents in the maximalist camp, issues such as labour, the 
environment, human rights, and democracy have hardly been discussed by the 
Association. ASEAN is criticised by most representatives of Indonesian NGOs and 
CSOs for having placed too much emphasis on trade-related issues in AFTA. They 
also argued that concentration on trade alone would only benefit a small proportion of 
the ASEAN community. The Association should widen the focus of its co-operation 
schemes, particularly those related to issues such as development, the environment, 
and so on. Finally, although some information regarding ASEAN-related activities 
was indeed available, it was felt that the amount of infon-nation passed on to the 
general public was limited, highly technical and expensive to obtain. 
As regards Indonesia's participation in AFTA, the majority of respondents in 
the minimalist camp also noted that the economic situation in Indonesia during the 
Post - 1997 economic crisis was not conducive to the country's involvement in AFTA. 
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Apart from being a consumer market (major importer) for other ASEAN countries, 
there was also a shortage of skilled human resources in Indonesia, which would make 
the country less competitive to other ASEAN countries. If the government insisted on 
pursuing its position in the scheme, the majority of respondents predicted that 
Indonesia would become a consumer market (i. e. major importers) for other ASEAN 
countries. Another problem was seen to be the shortage of Indonesian skilled human 
resources, which could not compete with other ASEAN countries. It was reported in 
2001 that 76 percent of the Indonesian workforce had attended only primary 
education (through to sixth grade) and did not possess the technological training or 
knowledge for the numerous positions open (Gross 2001: 1). As an agrarian country, 
ý11 about 50 percent of the Indonesian labour force consists mainly of farmers. 
Despite this, the Indonesian agricultural industry, such as rice production, has 
not prospered as well as those in neighbouring countries, such as Thailand. Food 
shortages are very common these days whilst the prices of agricultural products have 
been very expensive. Moreover, ASEAN was also criticised for its inability to cope 
with the concems of the Indonesian people. The Indonesian government has been 
concentrating on national economic recovery and, at the same time, neglecting its 
commitment to AFTA. The government was criticised for not being more aggressive 
at the regional level. Some minimalists were also concerned about the Indonesian 
political elite and their influence on goverranent decisions in ASEAN and AFTA. 
The economic interests of the political elite were thought to influence the Indonesian 
government's pursuit of protectionist measures, such as that being imposed on 
agriculture industry, in AFTA. If this is indeed the case, the scheme may turn out to 
be useless. 
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7.3.3. Convergence 
A Convergence standpoint was generally held amongst a handful of 
government officials, members of Indonesian business associations, the academic 
community, and representatives of some Indonesian NGOs and CSOs. All 
respondents within the convergence category held a generally pragmatic attitude 
towards Indonesia's commitment to ASEAN and its AFTA scheme. Support for 
ASEAN regionalism would prevail as long as ASEAN and its AFTA scheme 
contributed towards the achievement of sustained economic development in 
Indonesia. In general, however, the majority of respondents within the convergence 
category believed that Indonesia's commitment to ASEAN and AFTA would improve 
the country's economic development. 
To start with, government officials from the Ministry of Co-operative, Small 
and Medium Enterprises (MoC-SMES), 32 the Investment Co-ordinating Board 
33 34 (BKPM - Badan Koordinasi Penanaman Modao, the Custom and Excise Office , 
the National Logistic Agency (BULOG - Badan Usaha Logistik) 
3' expressed their 
enthusiasm about ASEAN regionalism. They were convinced that the strengthening 
of ASEAN regionalism would have a tremendous effect on Indonesia's sustained 
economic development. Despite this, the same govenunent officials were qulte 
cautious about commenting about AFTA and their country's involvement in the 
32 An interview was conducted on the 16th November 2000 with Dr. Noer Soetrisno, Special Staff for 
Production Division, in Jakarta. 
33 An interview was conducted on the 18th December 2000 with Darmawan Jayusman, Director of 
International Promotion Division, in Jakarta. 
34 An interview was conducted on the 9h August 2001 with Dr. Permana Agung, the Directorate 
General of Custom and Excise, in Jakarta. 3S An interview was conducted on the 14th August 2001with Widjanarko Puspoyo, the Head of BULOG, in Jakarta. 
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scheme. With regard to AFTA, respondents from these four institutions were 
concerned about the competitive nature of ASEAN economies, the speedy 
implementation of AFTA, and the potentially exploitative nature of trade 
liberalisation in general. Moreover, the same officials were also concerned about the 
lack of information regarding AFTA and Indonesia's readiness to join in the scheme. 
At the same tiMe, Indonesia's readiness to join AFTA was generally felt to depend on 
the country's immediate, internal problems. With regard to the development of 
AFTA, respondents disagreed about competitiveness amongst ASEAN economies. 
The BULOG representative was also concerned about the impact of AFTA and 
AFTA's timeframe on the agricultural sector. The respondent believed that both the 
content and the schedule of the AFTA agreement should be re-studied. At present, it 
appears that most countries are being forced to speedily expand their inclusion list. If 
this approach continues, it was felt that it would benefit only the countries in the 
region that were fully equipped to face trade liberalisation measures, such as 
Singapore. Despite this, officials from the four government institutions above felt that 
AFTA has the potential to promote economic development in the country due to its 
capacity to create efficiency and to attract foreign investment. 
Meanwhile, out of the four representatives of business associations 
interviewed, only the representative from the Association for the Advancement of 
Small Business (PUPUK - Perkumpulan Untuk Peningkatan Usaha Kecio showed 
reservation towards ASEAN. 36 For the majority of these representatives, such as 
those from the Indonesian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (KADIN - Kamar 
36 The interview with the representative of PUPUK was conducted on the 3rd September 2001 with the JýXeCLltive Director, Alam Putra, in Surabaya, East Java. 
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Dagang dan Industri Indonesia), 37 the Association of Indonesian Entrepreneurs 
(APINDO - Asosiasi Pengusaha Indonesia), 38 and the Indonesian Society of Small 
and Medium Scale Entrepreneurs (KUKMI - Kerukunan Usahawan Kecil dan 
Menengah Indonesia) '39 ASEAN remains the main focus in the Indonesian economy. 
The Head of KADIN, for example, continuously reiterated how important it was to be 
ASEAN and to think ASEAN . 
40 According to the respondent, globalisation has been 
the rhetoric of most major Western powers which have been implementing 
protectionist measures to serve their own national interests. In response, it was felt 
that the Indonesian government should take a more active role in pushing other 
ASEAN countries to counter unbalances created by the West. For the majority of the 
representatives from Indonesian business associations, the Southeast Asian region was 
still better off with than without ASEAN. 
Enthusiasm towards ASEAN was equally reflected towards AFTA. Such 
support was even present amongst members of KADIN who had previously been 
major critics of AFTA. KADIN had persistently asked the government to delay 
37 KADIN was formed on the 24h September 1968, to work in partnership with the Indonesian 
government and other national development institutions. It was also intended to function as a forum 
for Indonesian state-owned enterprises, co-operatives, and private businesses. KADIN was officially 
acknowledged by the government under Presidential Decree No. I/ 1987, and was legalised under Law 
No. I/ 1987 (Kompas 2004: 44). It is important to note that most Indonesian business associations are 
also members of KADIN, which is the largest and the most influential business association in 
Indonesia. Therefore, the views of KADIN, to some extent, represent the general view of the majority 
of Indonesian business associationsTwo research interviews were carried out with the representatives 
Of KADIN, one with the Head of the ASEAN Committee Section, Iman TAufik, on the 26 th November 
2000, and the other with the Head of KADIN, Aburizal Bakrie, on the 23d August 2001. Both 
mterviews took place in Jakarta. 38 An interview was conducted on the 19th October 2000 with Djimanto, the Vice-President of 
APINDO, in Jakarta. 
An interview was conducted on the 25h August 2001 with Dr. Mohammad Syargawi, the Vice- 
President of KUKMI, in Jakarta 40 KADIN is a member of the ASEAN Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ASEAN-CCI). It was 
decided during a meeting attended by forty-nine members of the ASEAN-CCI Committee in Bangkok, 
on December 1995, that the permanent ASEAN-CCI Secretariat should be established in Jakarta. 
Subsequently, the Indonesian Head of KADIN, Aburizal Bakrie, took over the ASEAN-CCI presidency 
frOn' 1996-1997 (Kompas 2004: 44). 
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Indonesia's entry into the scheme for several reasons. 41 Firstly, KADIN argued that 
most Indonesian entrepreneurs were not prepared to join AFTA. Secondly, KADIN 
also insisted that the weak security and poor economic situation in the country would 
compromise the implementation of AFTA. Thirdly, there was also a growing 
consensus amongst members of KADIN that Indonesia, as the largest ASEAN 
market, would be a competing ground for both domestic and foreign entrepreneurs. It 
would not be in the interests of many domestic interest groups to allow the demise of 
local SMEs. The representatives of KADIN also felt that there was 
miscommunication between the Indonesian media and KADIN. KADIN had asked 
the government to delay the AFTA schedule only in certain sectors, such as the retail 
sector, from the originally agreed 2002 to 2005. In regard to the retail sector, 
members of KADIN disagreed with govenunent officials who insisted that the 
binding nature of the AFTA agreement should be respected. In contrast, KADIN 
argued that it has never asked the government to pull back fully from AFTA as such 
an action would have a detrimental effect on Indonesia's position at the global level. 
A binding agreement or commitment cannot be broken, but it can be delayed. Within 
many international agreements there is the recognition of a nation's right to defend its 
own national interests first, and this also applies to AFTA. In the view of the 
respondent, the US has often been reluctant to open up its agricultural sector in the 
WTO since such this would undennine its own national interest. The Indonesian 
economy is far smaller than the American economy, but still has its own national 
interests and should be able to defend them. The recent wave of large retail TNCs 
entering the country has not created favourable conditions for local retailers. 
41 As reported in Kompas (200 1 a). 
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As for the remaining industrial sectors, KADIN believed that Indonesia would 
be ready for AFTA. This also applies to other ASEAN member countries, even to 
those that have been severely hit by the economic crisis. Thailand, for instance, has 
been very supportive towards AFTA by opening its agricultural sector, which has 
been liberalised since 1995. In recent years, Thailand has become one of the major 
exporters of rice and sugar to other ASEAN countries. IMF prescriptions have meant 
that many Southeast Asian economies have remained open. Indonesia will also adopt 
such an approach despite domestic concerns over the country's involvement in AFTA. 
Since the signing of the first Letter of Intent (Lol) with the IMF on 31" October 1997, 
Indonesia has been forced to open up even its traditionally protected agricultural 
sector. Although this has a detrimental effect on domestic prices, the Indonesian 
government and major interest groups will remain committed to the IMF's 
prescriptions. This, in turn, should have a positive result on the country's 
commitment to AFTA. 
However, other Indonesian business associations did not share KADfN's 
views. For example, the representative from APINDO was convinced that Indonesia 
would be negatively affected if it continued with its commitment to AFTA. The 
respondent also argued that Indonesia, even long before the economic crisis, could not 
compete with other ASEAN countries or at the global level. Indonesia's export 
growth in wood products and apparels, for example, had decreased by about 21 
percent and II percent respectively between 1989 and 1996.42 It was thus deemed 
unrealistic for Indonesia to become involved in any regional trade liberalisation 
measures. The respondent felt that Indonesia was behind in tenns of good corporate 
42 This data was also confirmed by Aswicahyono and Pangestu (2000: 471-2) in their analysis of 
Indonesia's exports and levels of competitiveness. 
255 
governance, competitive technical skills, and the flexibility needed to achieve 
efficiency. Moreover, PUPUK was also concerned about the increasing tendency for 
large TNCs to decentralise their production and distribution activities which, in turn, 
might have a very damaging effect on local Indonesian entrepreneurs. The remaining 
respondents in the business community generally regarded the development of AFTA 
as positive, although they thought that the govemment should take a very cautious 
approach towards further economic liberalisation in the country. They also stressed 
that the government would face difficulties in gaining support from the Indonesian 
business community if planning was not in their interests. 
As with the representatives of Indonesian business associations, members of 
the academic community in Indonesia also expressed their support for ASEAN 
regionalism. In the view of Dr. Hadi Soesastro from the CSIS, the existence of 
ASEAN remained important for Indonesia. 43 In the last thirty-five years, ASEAN's 
contribution to the region's development has been significant, particularly as a major 
stabilising force in Southeast Asia. Because Southeast Asia was more stable, 
countries in the region were able to focus on their own development. His associate at 
the CSIS, Dr. Cornelis Luhulima, also felt that Indonesia had always supported 
regionalism in Southeast Asia. 44 The former President Suharto was possibly one of 
the first people to coin the term an integrated Southeast Asia. The New Order 
government's pragmatic approach towards ASEAN was primarily due to senior 
military officers' preoccupation with preserving sovereignty and nationalism. 
Furthermore, Dr. Dewi Anwar was even more optimistic about Southeast Asian 
43 An interview was conducted on the 6h December 2000 in Jakarta. Dr. Hadi Soesastro the Executive Director of the CSIS at the time of the interview. 44 An interview was conducted on the 2 I't August 2001 in Jakarta. Dr. Cornelis Luhulima was a Senior Researcher at the CSIS at the time of the interview 
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regionalism, and implied that her ideal would be to have an ASEAN Community in 
the near future, although she admitted that such an ideal may be somewhat 
unreal, StiC. 
45 
Despite the prevalence of positive views about ASEAN, some members of the 
academic community also retained certain scepticisms, particularly on the issue of 
ASEAN's capacity to find economic complementarity amongst its members. As a 
supporter of a macro-regionalism at the Asia-Pacific level, Prof. Lepi Tarmidi argued 
that the search for economic complementarity was more feasible at the APEC level 
than at the ASEAN level. 46 Most ASEAN member countries have traditionally been 
trade partners with APEC's non-ASEAN members and he felt that it was logical for 
Indonesia to focus more upon the development of APEC than on ASEAN. The 
original six ASEAN members were initially sceptical about entering the APEC forum, 
but later changed their minds owing to the non-binding nature of the agreement, 
which offered ASEAN countries the chance to pull back from APEC. For Dr. 
Bustanul Arifin, on the other hand, it was not a question of which regional grouping 
Indonesia should belong to. 47 He felt that specific attention should be given to 
enhanced co-operation outside the economic field, since economic co-operation had 
largely failed to generate any substantial improvements for member countries. 
45 An interview was conducted on 24h January 2001 in Jakarta. Dr. Dewi Fortuna Anwar was the 
former Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs during the Habibie Administration. At the time of the 
interview, she held the position of the Executive Director for Research at the Habibie Centre, Research 
Associate at the Indonesian Institute for Sciences (LIPI - Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia), and 
a Senior Researcher at the Centre for Information and Development Studies (CIDES). 46 An interview was conducted on the 5h March 2001 in Jakarta. Prof Lepi Tarmidi was a Senior 
Lecturer of Economics and the Director of APEC Study Centre at the University of Indonesia at the 
time Of the interview. 47 An interview was conducted on the 7h September 2001 in Jakarta. Dr. Bustanul Arifin was the Director of the Institute for the Development of Economics and Finance (INDEF) at the time of the 
interview. 
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Members of the academic community also gave varying responses regarding 
the development of AFTA and Indonesia's participation in the scheme. With regard 
to the development of AFTA, nearly all respondents agreed that it had been very 
positive, although some held a convergent standpoint on the issue. The majority of 
members of the academic community believed that AFTA had made a positive 
contribution towards the development of ASEAN member countries. One of the most 
important contributions highlighted was AFTA's capacity to provide a much needed 
stepping stone for member countries to compete in the world market. AFTA was, 
after all, intended to transform the conservative, protectionist, and inward-looking 
economic policies of member countries. The majority of respondents from the 
academic community also agreed that it was not the intention of ASEAN member 
countries to conduct trade liberalisation at the regional level per se. AFTA would 
make ASEAN member countries more confident that they will eventually become one 
of the major economic powers in Asia, if not in the world. Despite this, the majority 
of respondents also agreed that the issues of nationalism and sovereignty still limit the 
development of AFTA. Dr. Soesastro, in particular, criticised member countries' 
excessive persistence in protecting their own national interests. He felt that Malaysia, 
for instance, had continued to take protectionist measures to defend the national 
interests of its automotive industry. For the benefit of its two national cars, Proton 
and Perodua, the Malaysian government has postponed the liberalisation of its 
automotive industry until I" January 2005. As of February 2004, tariffs imposed on 
the Malaysian automotive industry were between 42 and 300 percent. The Malaysian 
government planned to cut these tariff rates to 20 percent only, instead of the 5 
percent imposed in other ASEAN countries (Shari 2003). Generally, therefore, it was 
felt that ASEAN countries remained closed. 
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Although the majority of members of the academic community viewed the 
existence of ASEAN as positive, many of them also showed reservation about the 
development of AFTA and Indonesia's participation in the scheme. In the view of Dr. 
Anwar, for example, many people were unhappy with the government's decision to 
implement AFTA. Indonesia was simply not ready to enter the AFTA scheme as a 
result of the economic crisis. It was, therefore, rather unrealistic to ask many 
Indonesian domestic industries to participate in AFTA since they needed time to 
recover. In the worst case scenario, Indonesia would be flooded with foreign goods if 
the government maintained its policy on AFTA. On the whole, Dr. Anwar believed 
that AFTA would be difficult to implement in Indonesia. Even if the country had not 
been hit by the economic crisis, Indonesia had a long tradition of protectionism in the 
region. It could even be argued that there is no reason for Indonesia to participate in 
AFTA when the country itself already constitutes a large market. The amount of 
investment conducted by Indonesian entrepreneurs in other ASEAN countries was 
limited. In 2003 alone, for example, the Board of Investment of Thailand (BOIT) 
only noted one foreign investment from Indonesia. 48 It was felt to be difficult to 
persuade Indonesians that AFTA would be beneficial to the national economy. 
Moreover, it would also be difficult to convince Indonesians that trade liberalisation 
at the ASEAN level would provide a training ground for competition in the world 
market. Moreover, Prof Tarmidi also added that the economic crisis will create 
problems for member countries which fail to reach the agreed targets. As of February 
2000, for example, there were about 53,229 items listed into the inclusion list. 
48 As reported in the BOIT official website at: tlt! P: //wýý, w. bni.. izo. th/enp, lish/tid/data/BOI statistics fi. html 
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However, the crisis will undermine AFTA targets since developing member countries 
will find it difficult to follow the developed countries in liberating their economies. 
On the whole, however, the majority members of the academic community 
believed that Indonesia was definitely ready to join AFTA, although the scheme 
should be treated cautiously. For Dr. Soesastro, Dr. Luhulima, and Prof Tarimidi, 
Indonesia was far more ready than its ASEAN counterparts, such as Malaysia and 
Thailand, to join the AFTA scheme. The Indonesian market was liberalised in 1995, 
when the AFTA arrangement was still in its infancy. Dr. Soesastro also added that, 
prior to 2002, nearly 60 percent of Indonesian traded items had already reached a 0-5 
percent tariff level. The respondent felt optimist that the remaining 30 percent of 
traded items would reach a tariff level of below 10 percent by the time AFTA was 
implemented. Generally, therefore, Indonesia's tariff levels are relatively low, 
although there are some exceptions, such as those in the automotive, chemical, iron, 
and steel industries, where tariff rates are still above 50 percent. 49 1n addition, Dr. 
Luhulima also postulated that lowering the Indonesian tariff rates to 0-5 percent 
would have little impact on the overall domestic economy as the average tanff rate of 
Indonesia at the time of the interview (2001) was 8 percent. He even criticised some 
Indonesian business associations, particularly KADIN, for insisting that the 
government should postpone the AFTA schedule to 2005. Instead of pulling back 
ftom AFTA, he felt it would be better to differentiate between the industrial sectors 
that were ready, such as gannent and electronics, and those that were not ready, such 
49 Indonesia's automotive industry has the highest tariff rates to date. Reports by the Asian Automotive 
Business Review (2000), for instance, indicated that import tariffs for passenger cars could reach as 
Much as 65 percent plus 30 percent luxury tax. Prior to 1999, the tariff rate for the same item was 200 
percent, plus 35 percent luxury tax. 
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as agriculture sector, to join AFTA. 
50 Meanwhile, although Prof Tarmidi remained 
sceptical that AFTA would be implemented fully by 2002, he was convinced that the 
Indonesian market was by far one of the most liberated markets in the region. Many 
of the liberalisation measures in the country have been in line with the country's 
commitment to the WTO and other multilateral agreements. Moreover, owing to the 
recent chaotic domestic economic conditions, he felt that Indonesia was bound to 
liberalise further, and the level of trade would increase following trade liberalisation, 
thus increasing the growth potential of the country. 
Apart from members of various Indonesian business associations and 
members of the academic community, there were also some representatives of 
Indonesian NGOs and CSOs who held a convergence standpoint on the issue. 
Indonesian NGOs and CSOs, such as the Pesticide Action Network Indonesia 
(PANI) '51 the Federation of the Indonesian Workers Union (FSPSI - Federasi Serikat 
Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia) '52 Indonesian Consumer Organisation 
(YLKI)53, the 
Leadership for Environment and Development (LEAD)54, the Uni-Social Democrat 
50 According to the respondents from the BKPM, the Indonesian government, until now, classified 
foreign investment into three categories, which were open, semi-open, and closed. The classification 
depends upon the capacity of the industry to compete with foreign competitors. Industries categorised 
as closed, such as agriculture and communication industries, are normally in their infancy level, whilst 
those categorised as open, such as textile and garment, are capable of competing with foreign 
Competitors. 
51 PANI was originally formed following a meeting of various civil society groups in Penang, 
Malaysia, in 1982, under the auspices of the International Organisation of Consumers Union (IOCU). 
The meeting was held to discuss concern over the irrational use of pesticides. To date, the group is 
committed to protect the health and safety of the people and the environment from pesticides and 
genetic engineering. The interview with the Director of PANI, Reza Tjahyadi, was conducted through 
electronic mail. The information sent to the author was received on the 8h February 2001. 52 FSPSI has been traditionally known as the government's supported trade union. Despite the recent 
rise in the number of trade unions, FSPSI claims to have the largest membership in Indonesia. Yacob Nuwa Wea, who at the time held the position of the Head of FSPSI, was interviewed on the 20th January 2001 in Jakarta. He is currently the State Minister of Manpower and Transmigration under the Megawati administration. 53 An interview was conducted on the 9h September 2001 with Indah Sukmaningsih, the Director of YLKI, in Jakarta. 
54 An interview was conducted on 256 August 2001 with M. Kismadi, the National Programme Director of LEAD, in Jakarta 
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(UNISOSDEM) '55 and Information and Civic Studies (KLIK - Kajian Layanan 
Informasi untuk Kedaulatan Rakyat), 56 generally support the concept of regionalism 
in Southeast Asia as long as it serves Indonesia's national interests. At the same time, 
however, the representatives fTom these NGOs and CSOs also felt rather indifferent 
about ASEAN. Regional issues, after all, have not been on the agenda of many 
Indonesian NGOs and CSOs. Amongst these NGOs and CSOs, only PANI that 
showed genuine interest about both national and regional issues. 57 For the remaining 
NGO and CSO workers, the main reason for overlooking regional issues was the 
limited amount of information disseminated on Southeast Asian regionalism issues by 
both the ASEAN Secretariat and the government. Another reason has been that 
NGOs and CSOs did not see ASEAN as a potential threat to the national development 
of the country. The majority of NGOs and CSOs interviewed were convinced that 
larger international institutions, such as the WTO and the IMF, pose a greater threat to 
the preservation of national sovereignty and the national interests of the country. 
Unlike PANI, other NGOs and CSOs that fall within convergence category 
were largely uninformed about the development of ASEAN, in spite of their 
knowledge of the history of ASEAN. As the Head of the Federation of the Indonesian 
Workers Union (FSPSI) postulated, Indonesia is presently experiencing acute internal 
problems, which makes it impossible for local NGOs and CSOs, including FSPSI, to 
focus on Indonesia's foreign policy or ASEAN. Despite this, they were still 
55 An interview was conducted on the 25" September 2001 in Jakarta with Bambang Warih Koesoema, 
the Executive Director of UNISOSDEM. 56 An interview was conducted on the 20'h July 200 1 with the Head of KLIK, Yasir Alimi, in Hull, UK. 57 The activities of PAN Indonesia cover the whole Asia-Pacific region. In 1988, for example, PAN 
Indonesia, along with similar organisations in other Southeast Asian countries, formed the Southeast 
Asian Sustainable Network (SEASAN). Subsequently, in 1996, the group also became a board 
member of the Southeast Asian Council on Food Security and Fair Trade (SEACFSFT), which was 
formed in Quezon City, Philippines. In general PAN Indonesia has traditionally supported the notion 
of regionalism in Southeast Asia. 
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interested in the development of ASEAN, although most information concerning this 
issue had come mainly from the media. FSPSI was mainly concemed with possible 
trade liberalisation measures both at regional and international levels, which would 
have significant impacts on the well-being of domestic workers. Meanwhile, the 
representatives from YLKI, LEAD, UNISOSDEM, and KLIK maintained that 
negotiations between governments and pressure groups were easier to conduct at the 
ASEAN level than at the macro-regional level, such as APEC. Experts at the macro- 
regional level mainly consist of those trained in developed countnes whose opinions 
often neglect the main concerns of local consumer protection groups. Negotiations 
with other consumer protection groups at the ASEAN level are more effective since 
problems encountered amongst groups in the region would have more similarities 
than those encountered at the broader Asia-Pacific level. Despite this, all the 
maximalist respondents interviewed criticised the government for its lack of interest 
in involving local NGOs and CSOs in dealing with regional problems. This has been 
evident, inter alia, in the lack of attempts made by the government to properly 
disseminate information regarding ASEAN-related matters to local NGOs and CSOs. 
The representatives from PAN, FSPSI, YLKI, LEAD, LTNISOSDEM, and 
KLIK, also supported the development of AFTA and Indonesia's participation in the 
scheme. In the view of representative of PANI, for example, AFTA was preferable to 
other multilateral trade liberalisation measures, such as those of the WTO. In 1996, 
PANI and other similar pressure groups in Southeast Asia conducted a preliminary 
study on the feasibility of AFTA. Although the study showed positive results, PAN 
has recently raised concern over the proposed decrease in Indonesia's tanff levels on 
agricultural products when AFTA is implemented. At the same time, the country is 
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also expected to reduce its import tariffs on rice to zero percent. Despite this, AFTA 
was seen to be inevitable, and, as a result, PANI has made significant efforts to study 
the scheme further. Despite their support towards AFTA, some NGOs and CSOs that 
fall within the convergence category also expressed concerns over the items in 
AFTA's inclusion list and over the public reaction towards the goverranent's decision 
to accelerate the schedule of the scheme. The representatives from UNISOSDEM, 
FSPSI, and the Indonesian Human Rights Group (Komnas-HAM - Komisi Nasional 
untuk Hak-Hak Asasi Manusia), 58 for example, believed items included in the 
scheme's list should be added on step-by-step. It was felt, therefore, that there should 
be more meetings amongst ASEAN member governments' officials in order to 
increase the efficiency of AFTA. In addition, they also criticised decisions made 
within the AFTA framework as highly illogical. Southeast Asian leaders, for 
example, had been very reluctant to discuss any important issues apart from trade, 
such as labour and the environment. By neglecting these important issues, it was 
expected that the implementation of AFTA would likely face stiff opposition fTom 
many domestic forces. 
7.4. ASEAN regionalism and Indonesian nationalism 
The question of Indonesian nationalism versus ASEAN regionalism has been 
the central analysis of this thesis. The importance of this question lies in whether 
Indonesian nationalism acts as an impediment to the development of ASEAN 
regionalism. Those respondents categorised as maximalists contended that 
Indonesian nationalism can be strengthened through the country's commitment in 
58 An interview was conducted on the 10" August 2002 with Dr. Charles Himawan, a member of the Board of Directors of the KOMNAS-HAM. He is also a faculty member of the Department of Economics at the University of Indonesia. 
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ASEAN. On the other hand, Indonesian minimalists maintained the opposite, and 
argued that Indonesian nationalism is gradually weakening today as a result of 
increased trade liberalisation. All respondents within the convergence category held a 
rather pragmatic view on the subject, and insisted that emphasis should be placed on 
the concept of logical nationalism, in which regionalism is perceived as an 
enhancement of Indonesian national interests, rather than romantic nationalism. On 
the whole, however, the relationship between nationalism and regionalism was once 
again proven to be symbiotic since the majority of respondents could be placed within 
the maximalist and convergence camps. 
24.1. Maximalist 
The respondents within the maximalist camp believed mainly that ASEAN 
regionalism is crucial to the well-being of Indonesian nationalism. In addition, 
ASEAN regionalism was thought to be useful in helping the Indonesian government 
eradicate its many domestic problems, particularly the threat of national 
disintegration. The maximalist camp consisted mainly of two representatives from 
Indonesian government institutions, officials from the ASEAN Secretariat and 
representatives from various foreign embassies. The majority of these respondents 
supported the argument that Indonesian nationalism would be strengthened through 
further commitment to the ASEAN regionalisation process. Amongst governinental. 
officials, only officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Ministry of 
Finance (MoF) expressed a maximalist attitude on the issue of the relationship 
between Indonesian nationalism and ASEAN regionalism. The official respondent 
frOrn the MoF argued that Indonesia has so far been committed to the process of 
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regionalisation in Southeast Asia and the Indonesian goveniment has given no 
indication that it might take any drastic moves that may j eopardise its commitment in 
AFTA. Many Indonesians have begun to realise that ASEAN and its AFTA scheme 
will serve Indonesia's overall national interests at the domestic and global levels. At 
the domestic level, Indonesia's participation in AFTA will help Indonesia achieve 
sustained economic development, which is a necessary ingredient of national stability 
and unity. At the international level, Indonesia's participation in AFTA will give the 
country a much needed stepping stone towards wider multilateral trade agreements, 
such as those within WTO frameworks. 
An official from the MFA. also believed that, to a large extent, the majority of 
Indonesians still perceive the tariff elimination measures within the AFTA agreement 
as positive. The official respondent interviewed, for example, convinced that AFTA 
would contribute significantly to the economic development of Indonesia. The more 
prosperous Indonesia, the more likely that the Indonesian government would be able 
to eradicate many domestic problems, particularly those associated with the threat of 
national disintegration. The rise of ethrionationalism in Indonesia has been associated 
with unequal economic distribution throughout the country. Therefore, AFTA has 
become part of Indonesia's national interests. Another encouraging aspect of AFTA 
has been ASEAN countries' attempts to overcome the problem of economic 
or example, are becoming competition. The small markets of Singapore and Brunei, f 
increasingly dependent on their neighbours as sources of natural resources. Even a 
large country such as Indonesia has become increasingly dependent on Thailand for 
rice imports. This is a starting point from which ASEAN's initiatives for further 
I-egionalism can be taken up. Another way to increase the levels of intra-trade is to 
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focus upon the development of finished goods production rather than on raw 
materials. A number of Southeast Asian countries have initiated such projects in the 
past but failed to sustain them as a result of their incapacity to produce and to sell 
high quality products. This issue remains a challenge for the participants of AFTA. 
Indonesians are now increasingly aware of the positive outcomes that regional trade 
liberalisation will bring to the country. It is, therefore, unlikely that nationalism will 
present a major stumbling block to the progress of regionalism. 
Meanwhile, the representatives of the ASEAN Secretariat and foreign 
embassies also gave their perceptions about Indonesian nationalism and ASEAN 
regionalism. Most representatives of the ASEAN Secretariat and foreign embassies 
convinced that Indonesia has still followed through on its commitment at the regional 
level. There is no significant evidence to suggest that Indonesia will be withdrawing 
from any arrangements made at the ASEAN level. The representatives of the ASEAN 
Secretariat in particular noted that even in the past Indonesia has never actually 
withdrawn from ASEAN's regionalism initiatives. The failure of past projects has led 
to an agenda of compromise that will accommodate the interests of all member 
countries. It is important to point out that ASEAN is still relatively young and is 
leaming to accommodate the differences between its members. The respondents 
expected that the Association would come up with new and fresh ideas to promote 
further integration. As regards the AFTA agenda, Indonesia is still one of the most 
Open countries in the region. By the end of 2000, for example, Indonesia was ranked 
third amongst AFTA participants, behind only Thailand and Malaysia for the number 
of items listed for inclusion under the CEPT scheme. 59 In addition, the respondents 
59 Data for the CEPT Product List for the year 2000 Is provided in Chapter 6, Table 6.2. 
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also thought that the Indonesian public is becoming increasingly aware that their 
country's commitment to ASEAN and AFTA will help the Indonesian government 
manage the many domestic problems that have emerged since the economic crisis in 
1997. The threat of national disintegration, for example, has been mounting since 
Suharto stepped down from presidency in 1998. Uneven economic prosperity 
throughout Indonesia could be better dealt with if Indonesia remained focused on its 
foreign economic policy (FEP), particularly on AFTA. 
Moreover, the representatives of the US embassy also added that the 
Indonesian government is still able to balance its interests at the regional level. It was 
felt, therefore, inappropriate to refer to nationalistic sentiments amongst Indonesian 
citizens against ASEAN. The respondent also added that the most negative reactions 
were directed towards international institutions, such as the IMF, the World Bank, and 
developed countries, such as Australia, Britain and the US. The respondent referred 
to the number of demonstrations held in front of the US and the British embassies 
since the start of the economic crisis. The representatives of the Thai and the Brunei 
Embassy also held a maximalist standpoint on the issue. It was argued by both 
respondents that most people in the Southeast Asian region have probably realised 
that they no longer live in isolation. Collective attempts to cope with the challenges 
of globalisation are therefore inevitable. To that end, the Thai govenunent proposed a 
flexible engagement system in 1998, which will enable each member state to deal 
sOlely with its own problems. Consultation at the regional level will only be 
conducted if the troubled member government is unable to cope with the problems on 
hand. The notion of nationalism and regionalism should, therefore, be balanced out, 
depending on each individual country's need at that time. Despite this, both 
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respondents convinced that ASEAN has been able to maintain member countries' 
sovereignty and national unity. In light of possible threat of disintegration Indonesia, 
for example, the Thai government, as noted in Chapter 3, was committed to support 
Indonesia's national unity. The representative of the Brunei Embassy similarly 
insisted that nationalism has not caused problems in the development of ASEAN. On 
the contrary, most ASEAN countries realise the necessity of regionalism initiatives to 
handle regional problems. 
24.2 Minimalist 
Those in the minimalist camp did not believe that ASEAN regionalism has 
contributed much to the preservation of Indonesian nationalism. Many respondents in 
the convergence category felt that ASEAN's continued pursuit of open regionalism 
has threatened Indonesian culture and identity. The majority of respondents within 
the minimalist camp consisted mainly of representatives from Indonesian NGOs and 
CSOs. One prominent nationalist figure during the research interview was Adi 
Sasono, the Head of ICMI. Sasono convinced that nationalism has been a quite 
significant force in Indonesia in recent years. As mentioned in Chapter 5, Sasono was 
once regarded as the nationalistic figure who introduced the People's Economy 
(Ekonomi Kerakyatan) system when he held the post of Minister of Co-operatives and 
SMEs during the Habibie administration. The people's economy system was 
regarded as highly nationalistic as it did not favour the development of large 
conglomerates, which were mainly composed of ethnic Chinese Indonesians and 
foreigners. At the time it was feared that such a policy would hinder the development 
of foreign investment in the country. On the contrary, the Indonesian economy in fact 
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irnproved when the policy was implemented. The Indonesian economy is mainly 
Cornposed of many SMEs, although their contribution was only about 14 percent of 
the total national GDP in 2001.60 Unemployment was at a high of 20 percent at the 
time, and the poverty level reached 39 percent in 1999. The People's Economy 
system was introduced at that time to balance the economy by making it more 
efficient and preventing monopolisation of the distribution and production processes. 
Sasono, therefore, rejected the nationalist tag attached to his policy. The policy 
worked reasonably well and created a significant change in the economy. By the time 
Habible was removed from office in September 1999, the inflation level was down to 
hout 10 percent, from an initial 77 percent, whilst the poverty level was slashed to 
about 14 percent. 
Despite this, Sasono still regarded nationalism as a significant force in 
Indonesia and Indonesia does not necessarily benefit from ASEAN's attempt to 
promote open regionalism. Open regionalism in Southeast Asia has prompted the 
Indonesian government to open up its market, which has allowed transnational. 
corporations (TNCs) to take charge of the Indonesian economy. Not only is Indonesia 
now flooded with foreign goods, Indonesians are increasingly influenced by foreign 
cultures. Therefore, it was hardly surprising to find nationalist sentiments in 
Indonesia, particularly since TNCs have begun to threaten Indonesian national 
identity. The respondent also mentioned the conflict between IBRA, Guthrie Ltd., 
and Indonesian local farmers as another example of the negative relationship between 
nationalism and regionalism. Nationalist sentiments against multinational companies 
60 In 2001 alone, there were 40,195,516 SMEs, which accounted for about 99.9 percent of total 
enterprises in Indonesia. Detail statistics of Indonesian SMEs can be obtained from the official website 
of the Ministry of Co-operative - Small and Medium Enterprises (MoC-SMEs) (200 1) at: http:, ' \k'xk, w. depkop. po. id/situs/dt/dtukni/index data ukm 2000. asp 
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non-nally occur when companies threaten the livelihood of local people. Although 
IBRA insisted that such nationalist sentiments were provoked by members of the local 
company involved, the respondent was convinced that nationalism amongst local 
people still exists although it may not be virulently expressed. On the whole, 
Indonesia is experiencing problems of governmental mismanagement, which are 
caused mainly by the lack of strong leadership. The current government's foreign 
policy has been very vague in comparison to those of the Old Order and the New 
Order governments. It is very unfortunate that Indonesia lacked a foreign policy 
focus at the start of the economic crisis. 
Other respondent categorised within the minimalist camp was the 
representative of the National Student League for Democracy (LMND - Liga 
Mahasiswa Nasional untuk Demokrasi). 61 The respondent believed that Indonesian 
nationalism and ASEAN regionalism have been used rhetorically by certain group of 
people to protect their economic interests. As with the Head of ICMI, the 
representative of LMND also argued that ASEAN regionalism is nothing more than a 
trade block that makes up the current capitalist system. Indonesian nationalism and 
the creation of ASEAN and its AFTA scheme have not only represented the economic 
interests of certain groups, 62 but they have also been transformed in order to 
accommodate the interests of developed countries and large TNcs. The economic 
crisis has played a major role in eroding Indonesian nationalism and sovereignty as 
61 An interview was conducted on the 20th December 2000 with Reindhardt Sirait, an activist of LMND, in Jakarta. 
62 The military, s involvement in Indonesian daily economic life was often cited as a case in point. The Indonesian military has often used nationalistic themes for the purpose of securing their economic interests in the country. The involvement of the Indonesian military in business has been prevalent 
since the early 1970s, through the formation of the Kartika Eka Paksi Foundation. To date, the foundation owns a total of 26 firms and seven joint ventures (Langit 2002), most of which support the 
welfare Of military personnel and their families. 
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Indonesia was forced by international actors and institutions to remain economically 
open. During the early stage of the economic crisis, the govermnent itself was unable 
to tum to its closest allies in ASEAN, as they too were facing domestic problems. It 
is, therefore, reasonable to suggest that Indonesian nationalist sentiments have abated 
and do not pose any immediate impediment to the progress of ASEAN's 
regionalisation process. The representative of LMND also pointed out that the work 
of ASEAN has been limited to talks and discussions only. Therefore, even if 
Indonesia has insisted on conducting a strong protectionist policy, it remains very 
unlikely that the progress of AFTA will be halted. As with the concept of nationalism 
itself, the concept of regionalism is regarded by many in the pressure groups as 
having an urban bias and being full of rhetoric. 
7.4.3. Convergence 
The majority of respondents interviewed held a convergence standpoint, 
arguing that the ASEAN regionalisation process can be perceived as an extension of 
Indonesian national interests at the regional level. Many respondents in this category 
believed that most Indonesians subscribed to a more logical concept of nationalism. 
In this context, Indonesians today were not necessarily inward-looking, but more 
aware of regional and international issues. This has been a common view amongst 
the representatives from most governmental institutions, business associations, 
members of the academic community, and Indonesian NGOs and CSOs. For 
Indonesian government officials, ASEAN is considered important to the Indonesian 
90vernment owing to the Association's ability to, amongst other things, maintain 
regional han-nony and security. In addition, a large proportion of govemment officials 
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also believed that regionalism is necessary to oppose the challenge of the 
globalisation. Some respondents also held a very pragmatic approach towards the 
issue, claiming that Indonesia should reassess the benefits of entering into multilateral 
arrangements, including ASEAN. However, the same pragmatists also argued that 
ASEAN is the only multilateral organisation that Indonesia should belong to, at least 
at the present time. It was further argued that through its presence in ASEAN, 
Indonesia is better able to preserve its national sovereignty. The representative of the 
Investment Co-ordinating Board (BKPM), for example, stressed that it is impossible 
for each ASEAN country to struggle on its own in an era of globalisation. Similarly, 
the representatives from the Ministry of Co-operative, Small and Medium Enterprises 
(MoC-SMEs) also added how important it was to control nationalism because it might 
hinder Indonesia's own development. 
During the post-crisis period, two issues were controversial in relation to the 
debate over the rise of nationalistic sentiment in Indonesia. The first issue was the 
Indonesian Banking Restructuring Agency's (IBRA)63 dealings in the sale of 
64 Indonesian assets to a Malaysian palm oil company, Kumpulan Guthrie Ltd . The 
deal struck between the two parties involved a palm oil plantation, which covered 
about 265,777 hectares of land across several Indonesian provinces 65 and was 
previously owned by one of the largest Indonesian conglomerate groups, Salim 
63 Two interviews were conducted with the representatives from the IBRA, the first was with Noegroho 
Soetardjo, Head of Agency Planning and Secretariat Division, on the 7h March 2001, and the second 
was with Swasti Sawitri, an Economic officer of the IBRA Jakarta Branch, on the 3 I't July 2001. Both interviews took place in Jakarta. 64 The IBRA is a special govermnent agency that was established in 1998 and is responsible for the 
rehabilitation of the Indonesian banking sector after the economic crisis. The main activities of IBRA 
are to control assets previously owned by the troubled private sector and to sell those assets within the 
mandated timeframe of 2004. Although the IBRA preferred to sell these assets to other Indonesian 
entrepreneurs, the economic crisis made it impossible for other Indonesian conglomerate groups to 
Purchase these assets. As a result, many of the troubled assets were subsequently offered to foreign investors. 
65 The largest palm oil plantation was in Riau, North Sumatra. 
273 
Group. Initially, the Salim Group promised local farmers that they would acquire 
control of over 70 percent of the land in the near future. However, the agreement 
between the local farmers and the Salim Group soon became invalid when IBRA took 
over the plantations and the Salim Group was forced to deal directly with the new 
owner. The sale of this asset provoked major debates amongst Indonesian politicians. 
Key nationalist figures argued that the sale ignored the interests of local farmers. 
More importantly, they were also concerned that Malaysia would become the major 
palm oil producer if the asset was handed over to the Malaysians. 66 Apart from that, 
the agreement also violated a 1999 forestry law, which restricts a company's control 
to only 20,000 hectares of land in one province, or a total of 100,000 hectares 
throughout the country. Nationalist sentiments were not only prevalent in the capital, 
but also amongst provincial government officials and local farmers. In Riau, for 
example, members of the provincial parliament played the nationalist card by 
threatening the security of potential foreign investors. However, some supporters of 
Kumpulan Guthrie in the Indonesian government argued that the cancellation of the 
sale agreement would be a major blow to Indonesia's efforts to regain the confidence 
of foreign investors, which had been fading since the economic crisis began. 
The IBRA was indeed facing a dilemma, torn between the concerns of the 
provincial govemments and local fanners and the importance of protecting 
Indonesia's intemational. credibility. By March 2001, however, the IBRA decided to 
go ahead with the agreement and sold the disputed asset to Kumpulan Guthrie for a 
total of US$ 368 million. Kurnpulan Guthrie has made a token gesture to local 
interests by allowing local farmers to control 10 percent of its land within a three to 
66 Malaysia and Indonesia are the world's two largest palm oil producers, with Malaysia accounting for 
about half of the global output and Indonesia about 30 percent. 
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five year timeframe, along with a further 20 percent of public shareholding. Although 
the deal raised anger amongst some Indonesian domestic constituents, an IBRA 
official interviewed argued that nationalistic sentiments had been stirred up by certain 
individuals who were interested in acquiring shares in the disputed asset. Moreover, 
he also argued that there was a possibility that members of the Salim Group were also 
involved in stirring up public anger in an attempt to repossess their old assets. 
Although the Indonesian government prohibits such actions, members of the Salim 
Group were potentially able to repossess their old assets by setting up a shadow 
company 67 that claimed to have no affiliation to the Group. Moreover, the respondent 
also believed that the Salim Group had paid the local farmers to protest against 
foreign control of the disputed land, which created an impression that nationalistic 
sentiments were rising. 68 The IBRA official was not convinced that there had been 
any strong nationalistic upsurge against foreign investment in the country. According 
to him, concern over the issue of nationalism was exaggerated and was not necessarily 
a factor that would halt the progress of AFTA. 
A more recent rise in nationalistic sentiment in the country is evident in the 
case of the implementation of the Regional Autonomy Laws (RALs). Although the 
Majority of government officials held a convergent standpoint on the relationship 
between nationalism and regionalism, some respondents also contended that the 
implementation of the RALs brought new challenges to the concept of Indonesian 
nationalism. Although the Indonesian government has recently been putting efforts 
67 According to the IBRA official interviewed, the term 'shadow company' here means a new company 
established by the owners of troubled assets in order to repossess their old assets. They have conducted 
such an action through their associates or affiliates who claim to have no connection with the owner of 
the troubled asset. 68 
1 
Despite such claims, the respondent failed to produce any hard evidence to indicate malpractice in 
either the bidding process or the supposed bribery conducted by the Salim Group. 
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into revising the content of the RALs, many sections of Indonesian society maintain 
that the Indonesian government is not yet ready to handle the possibly chaotic 
implementation of the RALs. One main problem highlighted is that the RALs would 
trigger conflict between the central and the provincial governments. Furthermore, 
there are only a handful of provinces that would be able to prosper economically once 
the law is implemented. A study by the Depperindag (2000: 40) has revealed that 
there are only five provinces that will benefit from the implementation of the RALs, 
which include Riau, Papua, East Kalimantan, Aceh, and South Sumatra, all of which 
are resource rich provinces. Others, including Jakarta, could face bankruptcy once the 
RAL is implemented. Moreover, the Indonesian business cornmunity was concerned 
about the 1,006 different bureaucratic provincial regulations (PERDA - Peraturan 
Daerah) that will cause problems to Indonesian domestic trade and international 
competitiveness. 69 Provincial governments have clearly become accustomed to the 
centralised system employed by the New Order government. The sudden 
implementation of RALs has given them greater authority over their own region. 
However, perceptions amongst officials at the provincial governments have been 
varied since the RAL was implemented. 
Amongst governmental institutions, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) and 
the Directorate General of Central and Local and Fiscal Balance (DPOD - Dewan 
Perimbangan Otonomi Daerah)70 have been two of the most active govenunent 
Institutions in overseeing the implementation of the Regional Autonomy Laws 
(R-ALs). The author, however, was only able to conduct intervIew wIth a 
69 As reported m Kompas (200 1 c), or visit the Kompas official website at: I 
"' An interview was conducted on the 10th August 2001 with Kadjatmiko, the Secretary of the Directorate General of DPOD, in Jakarta. 
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representative from the DPOD since it proved difficult to meet with officials from the 
MHA. The questions set for the respondent were largely designed to stimulate 
discussion on the implementation of the RALs and their impact on AFTA. Although 
the respondent held a convergent stance on the issue of nationalism vis-ei-vis 
regionalism, he believed that the immediate public interpretation of the RALs has 
been highly ethnonationalistic. However, in the eyes of the Indonesian govenunent, 
this public response is to be expected and is part of the process of further 
democratisation in the country. The central government has conducted many 
dialogues with its provincial counterparts to reach an understanding between the 
involved parties. The respondent also added that, to date, most provincial constituents 
mainly support the general concept of RALs. Despite this, the respondent argued that 
the implementation of the RALs will have a major impact on the ASEAN regionalism 
process, particularly in the short-term. One main problem that was highlighted was 
the lack of human resources to cope with the demand generated by the RALs. With 
the implementation of these laws, individual provincial laws will create inefficiency 
within AFTA, particularly those laws related to provincial investment. Attempts to 
anticipate such problems, however, have been made by the central government. For 
example, revisions have been made regarding the 68 problematic provincial 
regulations that might produce a negative impact on the investment climate 
throughout Indonesian provinces. The former Minister of Home Affairs, Hari 
Sabarno, announced that many of these laws should be pulled back from operation. 71 
Officials at other governmental institutions also held a similar position 
regarding the implementation of the RALs and the progress of AFTA. Officials at 
71 As reported by the Support for Decentralization Measures (sf[)m) (2002: 3) 
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both National Development Planning Board (BAPPENAS - Badan Perencanaan 
Pembangunan Nasionaý72 and the Custom and Excise Office, for example, believed 
that Indonesia has extensive immediate problems with the implementation of the 
Regional Autonomy Laws (PALs), particularly regarding the rise of 
ethnonationalism, which will have substantial effects on the progress of AFTA. The 
officials from BAPPENAS pinpointed the central government's inability to provide a 
concrete plan to handle both the RALs and AFTA. The problem does not exist only 
between the central and the provincial govemments, but also amongst officials in the 
capital. The Directorate General of the Custom and Excise Office asserted that the 
implementation of the RALs is chaotic at the moment and its impact on regionalism 
would be significant. Indonesian provinces will not be allowed to develop equally 
after the implementation of the RALs. Another problem with the implementation of 
the RALs is the lack of appropriate facilities in some of the provinces, which will 
produce diverse outcomes amongst provinces when AFTA is implemented. The 
failure to address these issues properly will greatly impact on Indonesia's 
involvement in many regional co-operation schernes. 
One provincial government institution interviewed, the Depperindag of East 
Java, however, provided a contrasting point of view. 73 The officials there argued that 
the introduction of the RALs would be a positive contribution towards the progress of 
AFTA. Many local districts were disinterested in dealing with foreign investments 
prior to the implementation of the RALs. The introduction of this law has promoted a 
sense of openness by allowing provincial entrepreneurs to deal directly with foreign 
72 An interview was conducted on the 20'h August 2001 with an official at the Bureau of Balance of Payrnent and International Relations who wished to remain anonymous. 73 An interview was conducted with officials of the Government of East Java Province, Industry and Trade Office on 2 nd September 2001 in Surabaya, East Java. All respondents In this govenu-nent 
institution wished to remain anonymous. 
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investors. 74 Recently, the Depperindag office in East Java has also taken the initiative 
to promote openness within its region by allowing one of its district areas, Malang. to 
conduct a trade relationship with Johor of Malaysia. Such initiatives, however, pose 
another problem for the provincial government. Various districts throughout East 
Java have been competing against each other to attract foreign investments. It was 
suggested by the officials interviewed that there is a need to synergise the policies 
pursued in these districts. Generally, therefore, according to the officials interviewed, 
the implementation and the acceleration of AFTA will not be beneficial for individual 
Indonesian provinces for the time being. The various districts need to synergise, all 
their policies prior to concentrating on foreign investments. 
As with officials from various Indonesian governmental institutions, members 
of KADIN interviewed took an equally pragmatic approach on the relationship 
between nationalism and regionalism. Within KADIN, for example, members 
expressed different opinions about the subject. For KADIN's Head of ASEAN 
Committee, for instance, the government has acted in an excessive manner to promote 
Indonesian nationalism. The result of such conduct has been detrimental to the 
Indonesian economy. The respondent cited one example of such conduct, which was 
the government's indecision in solving the conflict between entrepreneurs and 
workers. The absence of adequate labour laws has intensified labour movements 
since the economic crisis. Indonesian workers often express their dissatisfaction 
through demonstrations that disrupt productivity and efficiency in the workplace. 
Subsequently, the representative from KADIN suggested that the govermnent should 
have been more consistent and decisive in handling the widespread labour movements 
74 HoweNer, it is important to note that under Governmental Decree No. 25/05/2000 all forms of co- 
operation conducted between provincial governments and foreign institutions shall not contradict 
,, imilar agreements made by the central government. 
279 
that may have slowed down the progress of the Indonesian economy. The 
government, moreover, has taken protectionist measures regarding international trade, 
which has hampered the national economy. Some sectors, such as industry and 
trading, communications, and energy, are still closed to foreign investments. 
Inefficiency in these industries has emerged as a result of the lack of competition. On 
the whole, therefore, Indonesia has not prospered well under its protectionist PoliCY. 75 
On the whole, therefore, Indonesia has not prospered well under a protectionist 
policy. The concept of Indonesian nationalism, therefore, must be changed, and 
should not be based on romantic notions, but on rationality. Moreover, the Head of 
KADIN also stated his concem over the impact of the rise of ethnonationalism, which 
was resulted from the introduction of RALs, towards AFTA. KADIN's early 
hypothesis suggests that AFTA would be affected substantially by the introduction of 
RALs because various provincial governments might impose divergent investment 
and trade laws towards foreign products and entities. To that end, KADIN has forined 
a monitoring team, Regional Autonomy Watch (KPPOD - Komite Pemantauan 
Pelaksanaan Otonomi Daerah), that will oversee the implementation of the RALs and 
their impacts on AFTA. 76 
As with most government officials, the majority of respondents in the 
academic community can also be placed within the convergence camp with regard to 
their attitudes towards the relationship between Indonesian nationalism and ASEAN 
75 The Indonesian daily newspaper, Kompas (2004: 40), for example, reported that, due to the absence 
Of competition, communication costs in Indonesia have remained one of the highest in Southeast Asia. The International telephone rate in Indonesia reached as much as US$ 2.5 per minute in comparison to Singapore and Malaysia, both of which had international telephone rates below US$ I per minute. 76 The formation of the KPPOD was initiated during the national discussion on Saving the Regional Autonomy, which was conducted on 7 December 2000. Various civil society groups and academic 
think-lanks agreed to form an independent institution that is responsible for monitoring the 
Implementation of the regional autonomy law. Further information regarding the KPPOD can be found 
at the Committee's official website at: http7' \N'\\, N\-, kl)nod. org/ 
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reýonalism. For both Dr. Dewi Anwar and Dr. Cornelis Luhulirnaý Indonesians are 
arnbivalent about nationalism. On one hand, Indonesia has been fully integrated into 
the capitalist system, despite the rhetoric that Indonesian society is based on socialist 
pnnciples. 77 Up until the present day, it has been common for leaders to preach about 
the importance of Indonesian nationalism. However, Indonesians are also influenced 
by consumerism and by external conditions. More importantly, Suharto's role in 
making AFTA possible should be noted. Although most of his advisers and other 
ASEAN countries were sceptical about it, the Indonesian leader was convinced that 
regional trade liberalisation was the way to face globalisation. On the other hand, 
national pride is still important to most Indonesians. Some Indonesian policy-makers, 
for example, still believed that Indonesia could stand on its own feet, without 
assistance from other countries. In recent years, however, there have been some 
changes to the context of Indonesian nationalism as a result of the recent wave of 
democratisation in the country. The majority of Indonesians are no longer inward 
looking in their attitude towards regionalism, although they may continue to resist 
pressure from the West. This is not to suggest that Indonesia is xenophobic towards 
the West, and Indonesians are becoming more aware of their regional consciousness. 
Nowadays most Indonesians base their nationalism on rational ideas (or pragmatic 
self interest) rather than on romantic notions. 
Others in the academic community, such as Dr. Hadi Soesastro and Dr. 
Bustanul Arifin, asserted that regionalism is one possible way to maintain Indonesian 
77 Indonesian society has been regarded as socialist owing to the emphasis on co-operation and 
collective behaviour. The concept of gotong royong (mutual assistance), which refers to a collectivist 
Organisation of the economy that is based on the principle of family, was apparent even before the 
independence period. 
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sovereignty vis-6-vis globalisation. Despite this, members of the academic 
community also criticised ASEAN member governments' inability to utilise the 
Association fully. Most countries in the region are still overly concerned with 
preserving their national sovereignties. Protectionist policies, such as those in the 
Indonesian agricultural sector and the Malaysian automotive sector already 
mentioned, remain major stumbling blocks towards further trade liberalisation in the 
region. In many ways, therefore, ASEAN still remains ineffectual. Member countries 
have always aspired to participate in international events, but are incapable owing to 
the lack of proper organisation in the Association. However, it is also important to 
note that the majority of ASEAN countries are more concerned about the threat of 
globalisation than regionalism. To that end, the majority of the people in the region 
have acknowledged the importance of an efficient regional organisation that is able to 
represent their interests at the intemational level. Northeast Asian countries have 
been asked to join ASEAN member countries to fon-n a greater East Asian grouping. 
However, most members of the academic community were rather pessimistic about 
the progress of APT since ASEAN is still trying to adapt to the inclusion of its other 
new members. 
There are divergent perspectives on the emergence of ethnonationalism as a 
result of the implementation of the RALs. On the one hand, the implementation of 
the RALs will create more bureaucracy at the provincial level, which will affect the 
investment climate in the country. However, respondents in the academic community 
NN,, ho held such opinions regarded the emergence of ethnonationalism as a short-term 
euphoria resulting from the democratisation process. Moreover, the misinterpretation 
of the R-ALs might also result in the issuance of many bureaucratic laws which are not 
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conducive to the national investment climate. Therefore, the implementation of the 
RALs and the emergence of ethnonationalism will remain a major challenge for the 
central government. On the positive side, however, the implementation of the RALs 
will enable all provinces to handle their own affairs, although most provincial 
regulations should be in line with central government ones. For Prof Lepi Tannidi, 
however, it was an exaggeration to suggest that the RALs would have any substantial 
impacts on the implementation of AFTA. Even long before the RAL was introduced, 
many areas in Indonesia, such as Riau and Batam, were already involved in various 
Growth Triangle (GT) initiatives. This indicates that some of these provinces already 
have the necessary experience to deal with regional trade liberalisation. However, it 
is also important to note that only a limited number of Indonesian provinces have 
been involved in the GT initiatives. 
7.5. ASEAN regionalism and Indonesia's autonomy, bargaining power, and 
ability to contain the negative forces of globalisation 
Three related factors that encourage state and non-state actors to support an 
RIS are the likelihood that an RIS will increase a country's international autonomy, 
thereby boosting its bargaining power and helping to eontain the negative forees of 
globalisation. Respondents from the maximalist camp argued that ASEAN has helped 
to increase Indonesia's international autonomy and bargaining power in the 
intemational arena. More importantly, ASEAN was perceived as a tool to contain the 
negative forces of globalisation. Minimalist respondents, on the other hand, 
maintained that ASEAN has had little impact on Indonesia's international autonomy, 
bargaining power, and has not acted as a buffer against globalisatlon. Most 
millimalist respondents argued that events in Indonesia are still largely influenced by 
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international conditions. Consequently, minimalist respondents remained sceptical 
about whether ASEAN could bring about the aforementioned benefits of regionalism. 
Finally, those within the convergence category maintained that ASEAN's influence 
on Indonesia's international autonomy, bargaining power, and its ability to contaln the 
negative forces of globalisation has only been obvious since the economic crisis of 
1997. The significant number of respondents within the maximalist category affirmed 
the syrnbiotic nature of ASEAN regionalism and Indonesian nationalism. 
7.5.1. Maximalist 
Those within the maximalist camp believed that ASEAN has greatly 
contributed to Indonesia's autonomy and bargaining power in the international arena. 
Apart from that, maximalist respondents also felt that Indonesia would be better able 
to resist the negative forces of globalisation through ASEAN. The most respondents 
within the maximalist category were officials from governmental institutions, 
representatives from Indonesian business associations, members of the academic 
community, and representatives from the ASEAN Secretariat and foreign embassies. 
Officials from Indonesian government institutions, such as those from the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MFA), Ministry of Industry and Trade (Depperindag), the 
Investment Co-ordinating Board (BKPM), and the National Logistic Agency 
(BULOG), and all representatives from Indonesian business associations, particularly 
the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KAMN), thought that ASEAN 
was as a useful platform from which to promote Indonesia's international autonomy 
and bargaining power. They felt that ASEAN's contribution to Indonesia's 
Iritemational autonomy and bargaining power was clearly demonstrated in Indonesia's 
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involvement in the WTO and in trade disputes with other regional groupings, such as 
the EU and NAFTA. The dispute between ASEAN, the EU, and NAFTA over the 
agricultural sector is a case in point. Subsequently, member countries of the EU and 
NAFTA imposed as much as 24 percent tariffs for agricultural products originating 
from ASEAN countries, whilst imposing lower tariff rates at around I percent for 
agricultural products from Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific (ACP) group. 
ASEAN, according to an MFA. official, greatly benefits Indonesia because it can 
increase the country's bargaining power with the EU and NAFTA member counthes. 
The Head of BULOG 78 shared a similar point of view and pointed out that Indonesia 
would find it easier to cope with the high agricultural tariffs imposed by most member 
countries of OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) 
through collective action taken at the regional level. 
All Indonesian government officials interviewed also believed that multilateral 
trade bodies, such as the WTO, only represent the national interests of developed 
countries. All government officials and the representatives of the business 
associations also argued that although there may be differences in the interests of 
ASEAN member countries, on the whole, ASEAN countries usually raised similar 
concerns during multilateral trade negotiations. The significance of ASEAN had 
become more apparent since joining of three new member countries, Lao, Cambodia, 
and Burma, and with the possible expansion of ASEAN into ASEAN plus Three 
(APT). Many Indonesian government officials thought that any further enlargement 
of the Association was positive as it would increase Indonesia's international 
autonomy, bargaining power, and act as a buffer against globalisation. 
78 The interview was conducted on the 14th August 2001 with Widjanarko, Puspoyo, the Head of BULOG, in Jakarta. 
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Some members of the academic community shared similar views to those 
expressed by government officials and representatives of Indonesian business 
associations. In AFTA-related matters, in particular, members of academics, such as 
Dr. Hadi Soesastro, Dr. Cornelis Luhulima, and Dr. Bustanul Arifin, believed that the 
scheme had made a positive contribution towards the development of ASEAN 
member countries. One of the most important contributions highlighted was AFTA's 
capacity to provide a much needed stepping stone for member countries to compete in 
the world market. AFTA was, after all, intended to transform. the conservative, 
protectionist, and inward-looking economic policies of member countries. The 
majority of respondents also agreed that it was not the intention of ASEAN member 
countries to conduct trade liberalisation at the regional level per se. AFTA makes 
ASEAN member countries more confident that they will eventually become one of 
the major economic powers in Asia, if not in the world. Consequently, ASEAN 
member countries, through their commitment to AFTA, will be able to increase their 
intemational autonomy, bargaining power, and their ability to contain the negative 
forces of globalisation. 
Meanwhile, representatives from the ASEAN Secretariat and foreign 
embassies believed that ASEAN has helped to increase the international autonomy 
and bargaining power of its member countries. In the absence of ASEAN, member 
countries would find it even more difficult to cope with the great challenges posed by 
the process of globalisation. It was for this very reason that the representatives from 
the ASEAN Secretariat, Thai Embassy and Brunei Embassy were positive about 
ASEAN enlargement and the strengthening of APT. Meanwhile, representatives from 
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non-ASEAN foreign embassies believed that ASEAN member countries' bargaining 
power and international autonomy have been weakened since the economic cnsis in 
1997. However, representatives of the ASEAN Secretariat and all foreign embassies 
interviewed felt that ASEAN member countries also realised that deeper regionalism 
in Southeast Asia was important as a mechanism not only to escape from the current 
economic crisis, but also to maintain or increase their bargaining power and 
intemational autonomy. The US, in particular, hoped that ASEAN would proceed 
with deeper economic integration, not only amongst ASEAN member countries, but 
also with Australia and New Zealand. The representative of the US Embassy thought 
that such integration would not only increase solidarity amongst these economies, but 
would also boost economy and trade, thus enabling member countries to achieve their 
respective objectives. 
7.5.2. Minimalist 
Unlike those in the maximalist camp, respondents in the minimalist camp 
argued that ASEAN's contributions to Indonesian international autonomy and 
bargaining power have been minimal. Apart from that, ASEAN's insistent pursuit of 
open regionalism has limited Indonesia's ability to resist the negative forces of 
globalisation. The majority of minimalist respondents were representatives from 
Indonesian NGOs and CSOs- Most of them were convinced that the contnbution of 
ASEAN towards increasing Indonesia's international autonomy and bargaining power 
has been minimal. Moreover, they also added that ASEAN has been ineffective in 
resisting the negative forces of globalisation. According to a representative from the 
Indonesian Consumer Group (YLKI), although globalisation is an importance force 
287 
that rnust be discussed and dealt with, the Indonesian govemment and most 
Indonesian citizens remained unaware of the issue and the negative impacts that might 
ensue. To date, neither the ASEAN Secretariat nor the Indonesian government had 
provided enough infonnation on the way in which positive globall ism and regional 
govemance could be implemented whilst resisting all the negative forces of 
globalisation. 
Moreover, a representative of the National Student League for Democracy 
(LMND) also felt that regionalism in Southeast Asia represented regional capitalism 
that supported, instead of opposing, global capitalism. In reality, as with international 
trade in general, regionalism was only a trade agreement between the rich and the 
poor. As a result, ASEAN regionalism has not improved the fate of many Indonesian 
poor people. Indonesian labours, for example, have been fully exploited by 
transnational corporations (TNCs). When Indonesian labours rose to challenge these 
international entities, they simply moved to other locations in other ASEAN 
countries. ASEAN, as a regional grouping, has been unable to regulate this 
irresponsible behaviour from TNCs. Therefore, this was felt to indicate that 
ASEAN's contributions to increasing Indonesia's international autonomy, bargaining 
power, and in resisting the negative forces of globalisation have been minimal. Many 
representatives from Indonesian NGOs and CSOs felt that ASEAN should be more 
vocal in negotiations at a multilateral level so that its contributions can be felt 
amongst the poor. 
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7.5.3. Convergence 
There were only two respondents that could be placed within the convergence 
category, both of whom were members of the academic community. Both 
respondents believed that ASEAN had helped to increase Indonesia's intemational 
autonomy, bargaining power, and ability to resist the negative forces of globalism 
only since the economic crisis in 1997. In the view of Dr. Anwar and Prof. Tarmidi, 
the impact of the economic crisis towards the development of ASEAN regionalism 
has been significant. On the one hand, the economic crisis had weakened the 
relationship amongst ASEAN member countries. There were several reasons for this. 
Firstly, ASEAN was never equipped to deal or to cope with the economic crisis. It 
would have been somewhat illogical for member countries to seek assistance from the 
Association when the economic crisis hit the region. Instead, all countries hit by the 
economic crisis automatically sought assistance from institutions outside ASEAN. 
Thailand and Indonesia, for example, agreed to loan packages from the IMF in 
August and October 1997. It was for this reason that ASEAN became irrelevant 
during the crisis. Secondly, member countries, particularly Indonesia, became 
engrossed with domestic problems, such as social unrest and the increasing threat of 
national disintegration, which meant that time and energy spent on regional economic 
co-operation was limited. Thirdly, there were complications in the relationship 
between member countries during the economic crisis. Countries that were not hit by 
the economic crisis were under an obligation to help the troubled ones. If assistance 
did not come from richer countries, relationships became strained. This has been 
evident in the relationship between Indonesia and Singapore in recent years. 
Nonetheless, precisely because of the crisis, and precisely because ASEAN was 
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helpless during the crisis, there has been a realisation that something has to be done to 
Improve the situation. The crisis has thus become a catalyst in promoting greater 
regional co-operation amongst member countries, which, subsequently, helped to 
increase member country's international autonomy and bargaining power in the 
future. 
Despite this, Dr. Anwar also added that ASEAN's enlargement process has 
actually weakened the grouping's international autonomy and bargaining position. 
Dr. Anwar did not agree with the admittance to the Association of new member 
countries, particularly Myanmar. Initially, ASEAN member countries expected 
Myamar to be an observer before getting full membership into the Association, but 
for strategic and economic reasons, Myanmar was accepted as a full member. 
ASEAN leaders feared that an economic gap between ASEAN and Myamnar would 
exist if the latter was not accepted as a member of the Association. However, Dr. 
Anwar argued that Myanmar should have learnt how the Association works and, most 
importantly, should have dealt with their own domestic problems before joining. He 
felt, therefore, that the admittance of Myanmar into the Association had led to a 
deterioration in the level of Indonesia's international autonomy and its bargaining 
pOsition in the international arena. 
7.6. Other relevant issues: dissemination of information regarding ASEAN and 
AFTA 
Another issue analysed in this thesis is the dissemination of information 
regarding ASEAN and AFTA-related issues to the general public by both the 
Indonesian government and the ASEAN Secretariat. Resistance to ASEAN and its 
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AFTA scheme often resulted from the lack of information, rather than nationalism, 
provided to the general public. Most knowledge regarding ASEAN and its 
development has been generated from either educational institutions or from 
publications provided for the general public. The field research reveals, however, that 
only a minority of the Indonesians interviewed have been able to access a significant 
amount of infortnation regarding ASEAN and AFTA. It has been suggested that 
documents and newsletters regarding the development of ASEAN have not been 
widely available to the public, with the exception of ASEAN's annual report (Anwar 
1994: 249). The majority of recipients have been members of the academic 
community and important economic actors. More importantly, the field research also 
reveals that the infonnation passed on to govenunental officials has not been equally 
distributed. This is the result of a lack of synergy between top and low level 
govemment officials on how to implement some of ASEAN's policies. Since the 
economic crisis emerged in 1997, however, the media has been taking a more active 
role in disseminating infort-nation. regarding ASEAN, particularly since the 
implementation of AFTA. The dissemination of information is indeed crucial for the 
future of ASEAN regionalism as it promotes greater consciousness about regional 
issues and problems amongst Southeast Asians. If inadequate dissemination persists, 
especially from the top level, it is likely that ASEAN will continue to be an exclusive 
club for government officials at the ministerial level. 
76-1. Maximalist 
Those in the maximalist category generally believed that both the Indonesian 
gOvernment and the ASEAN Secretariat have provided sufficient infonnation to the 
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general public. The majority of respondents placed within the maximalist camp were 
rnade up of some officials from governmental institutions and the representatives 
from the ASEAN Secretariat and foreign embassies in Jakarta. Responses regarding 
the aforementioned issue varied amongst govemirnent officials, depending on the 
institution in which the respondents worked. Officials who worked at the governinent 
institutions that deal directly with ASEAN-related issues, such as the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Department of Industry and Trade (Depperindag), the 
Custom and Excise Office, and the Ministty of Co-operative, Small and Medium 
Enterprises (MoC-SMEs), stated that they had been making substantial efforts to 
disseminate inforination to the public. Inforination was generally available through 
newsletters or publications, or the official website of all the ministries that dealt with 
ASEAN-related activities. Normally, all top-level officials at the ministerial level 
were required to obtain information on ASEAN-related issues. Subsequently, the 
information had to be disseminated to their subordinates. In some governmental 
institutions, particularly the MFA, there is a Sub-Directorate of ASEAN Socialisation 
and an AFTA unit that have the responsibility of disseminating ASEAN-related 
infort'nation to the general public, including the academic community and the private 
sector. In addition, the representatives of these government institutions also claimed 
to have conducted various workshops providing substantial amounts of information to 
the public, which were non-nally co-ordinated with the co-operation of the ASEAN 
Secretariat. On the 21 s' March 200 1, for example, the Indonesian government and the 
ASEAN Secretariat launched the CEPT Outreach Programme to publicise the CEPT 
Programme to the business community. 79 It was hoped that this programme would 
enable the business community to reap the full benefits from AFTA. Moreover, 
79 The first round of the CEPT Outreach Programme was held in Manila, Ho Chi Minh City, Kuala Lumpur, and Singapore on 26 March, 30 March, 4 April, and 6 April 2001 respectively. 
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government institutions such as the Depperindag also granted local companies 
consultations outside formal conferences and seminars. 
The respondents who believed that both the Indonesian government and the 
ASEAN Secretariat had provided enough infonnation to the public also pinpointed 
several problems in the information dissemination process. Government officials 
reported that the majority of Indonesian entrepreneurs had not been interested in 
becoming involved in many ASEAN activities. The CEPT Outreach Programme held 
in Jakarta, for example, attracted only 4 local companies, in comparison with the 100 
Japanese companies, and a substantial number of government officials and 
representatives from various foreign embassies and the ASEAN Secretariat. The 
majority of entrepreneurs were reluctant to attend many ASEAN activities, and 
preferred to send their representatives instead. This caused problems of 
miscommunication between govenunent officials and leaders of local companies. 
Even when a meeting was attended by leaders of local companies, any information 
then disseminated to their employees had been very limited. The underlying problem 
is that the majority of Indonesian entrepreneurs have failed to comprehend the 
benefits that they may reap from AFTA. Aside from the fact that Indonesia itself is 
already a large market, the majority of Indonesian enterprises also tend to conduct 
business with companies from non-ASEAN countries. 
Meanwhile, officials of the ASEAN Secretariat and foreign embassies in 
Indonesia were optimistic about the dissemination process of the Secretariat and the 
Indonesian goverment. The only exception was the representative of the Brunei 
Embassy, who felt that both ASEAN and its member governments had been reluctant 
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to provide comprehensive information on ASEAN to the public. However, the 
respondent thought that both sides, the authority and the public, were equally 
responsible for the failure of the dissemination progarnme. The majority of the 
public had not paid much attention to the development of ASEAN, which could either 
be due to the Association's lack of progress or the fact it has done little for Southeast 
Asians in recent years. One important tool in the dissemination process is the media. 
Up until recently, however, the media has failed to deliver much information, which is 
partly due to censorship and the public's lack of interest in the subject. 
For the ASEAN Secretariat, however, problems with regard to dissemination 
were mainly the fault of the govenunent. The Secretariat claimed to have consistently 
communicated its policies to the public. This process norinally stopped at the 
govermnental level. ASEAN is an inter-governmental organisation that has adopted a 
non-interference system. Individual governments, therefore, have the right to either 
publicise or not to publicise ASEAN's policies to the public. The Secretariat 
normally passes information on to each member country's AFTA Unit. The 
Secretariat has refused to take responsibility for the way in which these Units might 
then disseminate such infort-nation at the national level. Moreover, the Secretanat 
also claimed that it had attempted to encourage the involvement of NGOs and CSOs 
in the past; particularly amongst ASEAN affiliated NGOs. In many cases, however, 
NGOs and CSOs were often reluctant to make any substantial contribution to issues 
proposed by the Secretariat. Therefore, it is perhaps unfair to point the finger of 
blame at the Secretariat alone. 
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The remaining foreign embassies in Indonesia, on the other hand, maintained 
that the information provided by the Secretariat had been well disseminated to the 
general public. AFTA-related issues, for example, were said to have been aired 
frequently by the local media in recent years. The representative of the US Embassy, 
in particular, was convinced that Indonesians were fully aware that their country is a 
major player in the region and were thus interested in hearing about ASEAN and 
AFTA. It was also claimed that the media was active in passing information to the 
public. In fact, ASEAN and AFTA-related issues appeared more frequently in the 
local media than, for example, multilateral trade issues. Other respondents in this 
category also felt that although the information provided had been sufficient, it was 
also important to inform non-ASEAN embassies on the most recent activities of the 
Association. To that end, the relationship between foreign embassies and the 
Secretariat should be expanded. During the field research, for example, the 
representative of the Bntish Embassy was unsure of his government's view on many 
questions posed by the author, which suggests that there is limited interaction between 
the Secretariat and non-ASEAN foreign embassies. 
6 2. Minimalist 
Unlike respondents in the maximalist camp, those in the minimalist camp 
believed that both the Indonesian govenunent and the ASEAN Secretariat have 
provided limited infon-nation to the general public. The majority of government 
officials interviewed held a minimalist standpoint on the issue. One of the most 
profound problems was that ASEAN-related information has also not been well 
disseminated amongst government officials. At the time when the interviews were 
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conducted, the majority of govemment officials stated that both ASEAN and AFTA 
issues were still very abstract to them. Decision- making processes on both issues 
have been mainly the concern of policy makers at the MFA, and perhaps the 
Depperindag for AFTA-related matters. Another problem was the lack of synergy 
amongst governmental institutions regarding ASEAN's various initiatives on regional 
integration. Some governmental officials also noted that even officials at the top 
ministerial level had been indifferent about ASEAN and AFTA, since many of the 
intergovenunental forums conducted at the regional level had been a place for 
informal talks and discussions only as opposed to an opportunity to concentrate on the 
real issues and problems that had to be tackled. Govemment representatives sent to 
these meetings have been forced by their superiors to attend. Some respondents also 
pointed out that the dissemination process in ASEAN and AFTA had only touched 
those who were directly involved, such as the private sector and a small number of 
interest groups. The same respondents, however, also questioned the usefulness of 
disseminating ASEAN and AFTA information to all layers of Indonesian society 
since most people were still only concerned about issues that directly affected them. 
Concern regarding the dissemination of ASEAN-related information was also 
prevalent amongst members of the business community. Although some Indonesian 
business associations realised that both the ASEAN Secretariat and Indonesian 
govemment had tried to disseminate information on ASEAN and AFTA-related 
issues, they felt that such activities should be expanded. Aside from regular 
ývOrkshops and seminars on AFTA, there had been little in the way of public relations 
work to promote AFTA to the general public. This is important because it would not 
OnlY increase people's awareness of AFTA, but it would also increase their level of 
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consciousness about regionalism and Indonesian foreign policy in general. The usual 
claim has been that problems of dissemination arise not only from the authority 
responsible, but also from the lack of interest shown by the general public. The 
business community opposed such a statement, stating that public interest could be 
generated if the subject was intensely promoted. To date, both the ASEAN 
Secretariat and the government had only disseminated general facts about ASEAN- 
related activities, but had not elaborated on the importance of involvement in their 
activities. Most business associations also complained that the information provided 
by the government was extremely technical. Finally, the business community also 
thought that the govennnent should make fundamental changes to minimise 
bureaucracy so that information regarding ASEAN and AFTA could be more 
appropriately disseminated. Moreover, the majority of respondents interviewed in the 
business community category also agreed that SMEs were major constituents that had 
been left behind by ASEAN and AFTA. 80 Most SMEs claimed that neither 
govemment officials nor the ASEAN Secretariat had ever contacted them or invited 
them to participate in any regional activities. Some companies categonsed as 
medium-sized enterprises acknowledged the existence of ASEAN and AFTA, and 
some even expressed interest in becoming more fully involved in the scheme. 
However, most of them stated that information from governmental institutions had not 
only been very technical, but also expensive to obtain. Therefore, for the private 
sector, the problem lay not only in the lack of interest expressed by the general public, 
but also the willingness of the government and the ASEAN Secretariat to promote 
their activities. 
so The degree of evidence was demonstrated when the representative from the Indonesian Society of Srnall and Medium Scale Enterprises (KUKMI) even asked the interviewer to explain details 
concerning the implementation of AFTA. More interestingly, however, was the fact that even KUKMI, which shares office space with the Depperindag, claimed to have obtained little information 
regarding AFTA from the government. 
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As the major recipients of ASEAN information, the perspectives of pressure 
groups were the most important ones. As with respondents in other categories, the 
majority of people interviewed in the NGO and CSO category also held a minimalist 
standpoint on the subject. The problem in the relationship between ASEAN and local 
NGOs and CSOs was twofold. On the one hand, it is true that many local NGOs and 
CSOs have not been provided with appropriate infonnation regarding ASEAN and its 
activities. As a result, the majority of local NGOs and CSOs were uninfon-ned about 
the development of the Association. Although some NGOs and CSOs also admitted 
that both the ASEAN Secretariat and the Indonesian governinent had provided 
significant information regarding ASEAN and AFTA, both institutions had focused 
the dissemination on certain actors, mainly economic actors and members of the 
academic community. Most of the representatives of pressure groups also realised 
that ASEAN had been quite active in promoting regionalism in Southeast Asia, but 
thought that the Association should expand its activities to encourage greater 
participation from NGOs and CSOs- Most representatives claimed that they had 
never been contacted by the ASEAN Secretariat or been invited to any of the 
Association's activities. Even those who had dealt with the Association in the past 
stated that the Association had been slow to respond to their enquiries. Yet societies 
in the region are changing and are demanding a more democratic form of practice. To 
date, ASEAN and its member governments have been ignoring such demands. 
On the other hand, some NGOs and CSOs, such as the Urban Poor 
Consortium (UPC), the Front National for the Indonesian Labour Struggle (FNPBI), 
t1le National Student League for Democracy (LNIND), the tridonesian Friends of the 
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Earth (WALHI - Wahana Lingkungan Hidup), 
81 and Indonesian Consumer Group 
(YLKI), also admitted that the majority of people had not paid any attention to the 
development of ASEAN, including the AFTA scheme. Most NGOs and CSOs 
thought that AFTA did not pose an immediate threat to the Indonesian people. There 
was greater concern about other multilateral governing bodies, such as the IMF, 
WTO, and the World Bank. The same NGOs and CSOs also argued that since the 
creation of ASEAN, the Association has brought only poverty, not prospenty, to 
Southeast Asians. For most people, ASEAN and AFTA are tools used by a group of 
dch people to serve their economic interests. However, ASEAN and AFTA should 
also be seen as agents of public decision. Therefore, a regional network that provides 
sufficient information to the public regarding the development of ASEAN and AFTA 
should be established. The field research also revealed that there is an interest in 
building an ASEAN-wide network to accommodate the interests of people at the 
grass-roots level in the region. Unfortunately, bureaucracy at both the govemmental 
and the regional level has limited the opportunity for such networks. 
7 6.3. Convergence 
Those within the convergence category felt that the Indonesian government 
and the ASEAN Secretariat have provided sufficient information to the public. 
HOwever, they also believed that ASEAN's process of information dissemination 
should be expanded to include a wider range of domestic constituents, particularly 
small and medium size enterprises (SMES), NGOs, and CSOs. Respondents within 
the convergence camp were mainly composed of members of the academic 
91 Interview was conducted with Longgena Ginting, an activist of WALK on 4h March 2001, in Jakarta. 
299 
Cominunity. Members of the academic community realised that, in the past, ASEAN 
has provided limited information to the public. Recently, however, there have been 
substantial changes in the way in which the Association disseminates infon-nation 
regarding its activities to the public. One major drawback of ASEAN has been that 
the Association is an exclusive forum for member countries' foreign ministers. Some 
members of the academic community also pointed out that many things within the 
Association have been kept secret and confidential, alongside a strong tradition of 
bureaucracy. This has been part of the non-interference system practiced by ASEAN. 
Many people have acknowledged that ASEAN was formed this way to accommodate 
the interests of member countries' foreign ministers (Wanandi 2000: 3 1; Soesastro 
2000: 189). In the last few years, there have been suggestions that the Association's 
existing organisational structure should be replaced. One suggestion has been to 
create a Council of Ministers, which would invite the Economic Ministers of all 
member countries to work together with Foreign Ministers, thus limiting the 
monopoly of ASEAN Foreign Ministers over activities within the Association. 
Another suggestion has been to elevate the position of national leaders in the decision 
making process. To date, these suggestions have either been ignored or rejected. 
At the same time, however, members of the academic community also stated 
that most of the dissemination process would have to come from the top level. It is, 
therefore, important for policy makers to prioritise the involvement of the general 
public. From the field research, the author found that there were mixed ideas on 
\N'hether the present structure of ASEAN allows for the involvement of people at the 
grass-roots level. A member of the academic community, Dr. Comelis Luhulima, 
asserted that Indonesian foreIgn Policy was better implemented during the New Order 
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period. The strongly autocratic methods of the regime enabled the government to 
create a more effective foreign policy than the present government, and also forced a 
consensus of view amongst various government institutions. Most members of the 
academic community, however, thought otherwise, arguing that such an autocratic 
method limits the involvement of people at the grass-roots level. ASEAN has tried to 
boost the involvement of Southeast Asian CSOs and NGOs by conducting various 
meetings between the Secretariat and people's representatives at the grass-roots level. 
The recent ASEAN People's Summit, which was held in Batam in 2000, was an 
example of community building at the regional level. There has been some 
recognition amongst top level governmental officials of the importance of involving 
non-state actors in regional activities. As a result, members of the academic 
community perceived ASEAN's process of dissemination of information should be 
expanded to include these pressure groups. 
7.7. ConcInsion 
The field research analysis has provided an illustration in the way in which the 
contemporary relationship between nationalism and regionalism can be regarded as 
symbiotic. More specifically, it has shed a light on the contemporary perceptions of 
the recent development of ASEAN and its main economic integration mechanism, 
AFTA. Although to a large extent there have been few changes in the way Indonesian 
state and non-state actors perceive ASEAN and AFTA since the initiation of AFTA in 
1992, it is clear that the majority of Indonesians are increasingly more aware of 
re0onal issues. The emergence of the regional economic crisis in 1997, in particular. 
acted as a catalyst to bring about greater awareness amongst Indonesians about 
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re0onalisrn. There 
is no doubt that both the media and the emergence of new 
jnformation technologies are also responsible 
for increasing public awareness of 
regional issue. This new development signals greater challenges for ASEAN the 
immediate future. The Association, amongst other things, will be expected to interact 
better with its people. This is particularly applicable to recent ASEAN attempts to 
promote AFTA. Although there were quite divergent views on the development of 
AFTA, the majority of Indonesian state and non-state actors interviewed believed that 
this scheme would bring improve economic condition in the country. 
Nevertheless, there was still doubt regarding Indonesia's readiness to 
implement the AFTA scheme. The regional economic crisis was most often cited by 
the majority of the respondents as the major problem for Indonesia in implementing 
the AFTA scheme. However, the most pressing problem that caused resistance 
towards AFTA was the lack of proper inforination disseminated to the public. It is for 
this reason that the new challenge for ASEAN is not only to become more interactive 
with its people, but also to become more transparent and accountable. Thus, the 
11 of activities of ASEAN must be expanded to accommodate the increasing numbers 
CSOs and NGOs throughout the region. This should be seen as a new mechanism to 
minimise anY Possible public misunderstanding of the scheme. ASEAN must take 
into account that Indonesians, as with the citizens of other ASEAN countries, no 
longer perceive regionalism as a threat to their daily lives, but as means to serve their 
country's national interests. To sum up, therefore, the success of ASEAN's current 
and future projects will be determined by the Association's capacity to become 
less 
bureaucratic, and more transparent and accountable to its people. 
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Chapter 8: 
Conclusion 
8.1. Introduction 
The main objective of this thesis has been to analyse the dynamic relationship 
between nationalism and regionalism. As demonstrated throughout the thesis, 
nationalism and regionalism stand in a symbiotic relationship to one another. 
Therefore, the relationship between the two variables is not necessarily contentious, 
and it can be mutually reinforcing. This analysis hopes to contribute to the ongoing 
debate within the New Regionalism Theory (NRT), most of which has focused on an 
analysis of the regional-global nexus. In contrast, this thesis has provided a domestic 
focus on the pursuance of a regional integration strategy (RIS). Thus, as with some of 
the current analyses of the relationship between nationalism and trade liberalisation 
(Crane 1999; Shulman 2000; Helleiner 2002; Pickel 2003), this thesis also argues that, 
in light of the increasing trend towards globallsation and regionalism, nationalists 
today must change or adjust their strategy in order to achieve their objectives of* 
sustained economic development; (2) national unity; (3) the state's autonomy in 
intemational fora; (4) the promotion of national identity; (5) the fonnation of regional 
collective action to contain the negative forces of globalism and to achieve regional 
90vemance through positive globalism and regionalism; and (6) the elevation of the 
nation-state's bargaining power at the international level. 
Therefore, in this concluding chapter, the author aims to recapitulate on the 
aiialysis of the relationship between Indonesian nationalism and ASEAN regionalism. 
The results of the case study analysis suggest a shifting paradigm in the attitude of 
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Indonesian state and non-state actors towards ASEAN and its activities in recent 
years, albeit not a drastic one. The shift is from a traditional nationalistic approach, 
which reflects an inward-looking attitude, to a more liberal approach towards the 
concept of ASEAN regionalism. In this context, regionalism is no longer perceived 
as a threat that undennines the sovereignty of a nation, but is perceived as an 
enhancement of Indonesian national interests. Essentially, the new form of 
Indonesian nationalism today is not necessarily dogmatic, or based on a romanticised 
notion of nationhood. This shift suggests that Indonesians are increasingly aware of 
regional issues and want ASEAN to expand its activities and to include a wider range 
of participants within society. The primary analysis of this chapter, therefore, will 
examine NRT and the findings of this study to explain the relationship between 
Indonesian nationalism and ASEAN regionalism. 
8.2. NRT and the research findings: explaining the relationship between 
Indonesian nationalism and ASEAN regionalism 
NRT analysis has traditionally placed regionalism in the framework of a 
reoonal-global nexus. As mentioned in Chapter 3, however, NRT's emphasis on the 
multidimensionality, heterogeneity, flexibility, and the fluidity of regionalism implies 
that the domestic domain is as important as regional and global aspects to explain the 
emergence and the development of regionalism. Unlike previous theoretical 
approaches, such as neo-realism, that used state interest as the single criterion to 
explain regionalism (Gilpin 2001), NRT stresses that 'geographical, historical, 
cultural and economic variables - as well as patterns of conflict / sectinty and other 
critefia - all create patterns of interaction and produce conceptions of 'regionness" 
(Schulz et al. 2001b: 252). As a result, NRT analysis does not consider the state to 
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be the main determinant of regionalism, but also other actors, including market actors 
and civil society. However, up until now, NRT analysis has paid too much attention 
to regional non-state actors, whilst neglecting domestic actors that contribute as much 
as those regional actors in promoting regionalism. In contrast, this thesis has analysed 
the contribution of the domestic state, market and civil-society actors to explain the 
ýse of regionalism. More specifically, it has provided an analysis of thepereeption of 
domestic actors towards the pattern of regionalism that exists in their region. This 
issue is crucial because domestic actors are the people who are directly affected by 
policies issued by the states involved in a regional grouping. 
One main aspect that has to be addressed in analysing the local-regional nexus 
is the concept of nationalism, which is one of the most potent ideologies in modem 
history, and as such is capable of undermining the process of regionalism. 
Traditionally, nationalists' major concern about their country's involvement in a 
re0onal grouping is the loss of sovereignty that may ensue. The prevalent 
assumption amongst nationalists in the past was that regionalism involves a series of 
compromises made amongst different states and, thus, does not fully represent the 
national interests of the country. Moreover, nationalists in the past have also 
criticised the supposed benefits derived from the formation of a regional grouping 
(Hatsuse 1999: 105), much of which have gone to the powerful and wealthy, and not 
to the weak and the poor. As a result, therefore, a strained relationship between 
nationalists and the advocates of regionalism grew. 
It is, however, too nalve to suggest that the same relationship exists between 
nationalism and regionalism today. The proliferation of regionalism in the late 
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twentieth century and early twenty-first century is different from the regionalism that 
grew during the first wave in the 1950s and 1960s, the purpose of which was to 
achieve harmony, prosperity, and peace. In recent years, however, some scholars, 
particularly Shulman (2000), have demonstrated how a modem RIS is underpinned by 
several rationales that might also appeal to nationalists. As highlighted in Chapter 3, 
the primary rationales behind an RIS are sustained domestic economic development, 
the promotion of national unity, the enhancement of a state's autonomy in 
intemational fora, the promotion of national identity, collateral action against global 
capitalist movements, and the improvement of members states' bargaining power at 
the international level. These motives are not only prevalent amongst members of the 
maj . onty nation within a nation-state, but also members of the minority nations that 
may or may not seek independence from the former. Thus, nationalists today are not 
necessarily hostile to the idea of RIS. 
It is, therefore, clear that the relationship between nationalism and regionalism 
does not always have to be in conflict, as has previously been suggested. Yet it is 
IMPortant to point out that this is still a tentative hypothetical assumption. There is 
great variation in the type and the shape of regional groupings throughout the world 
and such theorisation may only be applicable to certain regional groupings. This 
thesis has utilised the case study of the relationship between Indonesian nationalism 
and ASEAN regionalism. The aforementioned theory appears suitable for an analysis 
of the relationship between the two concepts in the geographical area concerned. The 
case study of the contemporary relationship between Indonesian nationalism and 
ASEAN regionalism shows that the two variables are not mutually exclusive, even 
when nationalistic sentiments are continuously stimulated by internal (i. e. threat of 
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national disintegration) and external (i. e. regional economic crisis) forces. In the past, 
particularly during the New Order period, Indonesia's aspirations within ASEAN 
were not fulfilled (Leifer 1983: 153), which led to a sense of frustration on the part of 
the political elites who sought to influence the course of action taken by other 
ASEAN member states. In reality, therefore, Indonesia was incapable of extending its 
influence in ASEAN and on its member countries' foreign policy. Although today 
nationalism is still an important element in an analysis of Indonesians attitudes 
towards ASEAN, contemporary Indonesian perspectives on the Association are 
somewhat different to those in the past. There is no doubt that the majority of 
Indonesian state and non-state actors still feel indifferent about ASEAN and AFTA. 
However, the Association is still expected to continue to exist and to improve its 
current co-operation initiatives. 
On the whole, most respondents interviewed during the field research can be 
placed within the convergence category. The majority of Indonesians, therefore, can 
be referred to as new nationalists, which is based on the notion of logical nationalism 
rather than romantic nationalism. Indonesian nationalism at the end of the twentieth 
and the beginning of the twenty-first centuries is no longer protectionist and Inward- 
looking. In foreign economic policy (FEP), for example, new nationalism (logical 
nationalism) in Indonesia is demonstrated through the country's continued support for 
ASEAN and its activities. However, it is important to note that Indonesian state and 
non-state actors' support of the Association will remain only as long as it serves 
member countries' national interests. The majority of respondents were also positive 
abOut ASEAN's continued existence and its contribution towards increasing 
Indonesia's bargaining power, international autonomy, and ability to resist the 
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negative forces of globalisation. Many Indonesian state and non-state actors still 
perceived ASEAN as an effective bargaining tool in many multilateral trade 
negotiations. Therefore, the majority of Indonesian state and non-state actors did not 
perceive Indonesian nationalism as an impediment to the ASEAN regionalisation 
process. 
To start with, the case study analysis reveals that one of the most important 
motives for Indonesian domestic constituents to support ASEAN is the Association's 
perceived ability to generate sustained economic development. Indonesian state and 
non-state actors generally support the idea of ASEAN regionalism. Indonesian 
domestic constituents, both state and non-state actors, continuously maintain the 
importance of ASEAN as the main pillar of Indonesian foreign policy. Support for 
ASEAN prevails generally as a result of the Association's capacity to generate stable 
and hannonious relationships amongst member countries. A more stable and 
harmonious ASEAN region provides member countries more space to focus on their 
economic development. However, there are also those who believe that ASEAN has 
contributed little towards Indonesia's economic development, a view commonly held 
by a small number of Indonesian NGOS and CSOS. In their view, ASEAN provided 
little assistance to Indonesia during the economic crisis. Moreover, many 
representatives of Indonesian NGOs and CSOs thought that the Indonesian 
govemment should put more priority on the solving of domestic problems before 
embarking upon regional or international adventures, precisely because of the need to 
recover from the economic crisis. 
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Although the existence of ASEAN has generally been perceived as positive by 
the MaJOritY of Indonesian state and non-state actors, the Association's main project 
to date, AFTA, has failed to establish similar support. From the case study analysis, 
there are five main criticisms commonly levelled at AFTA. Firstly, unlike ASEAN, 
which has been useful in promoting Indonesia's good name, regional harmony, acting 
as a buffer against external attacks and subversion, as a vehicle for autonomous 
re0onal order, as an international bargaining tool, and a means of enhancing 
Indonesia's international stature, AFTA has been perceived as a threat that will 
undermine the development of the Indonesian economy, particularly small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs). Secondly, a large number of Indonesian non-state 
actors, particularly members of the academic community and larger economic actors, 
remain convinced that the current state of the Indonesian domestic economy is not 
conducive to the implementation of AFTA. Apart from an acute internal economic 
problem, the implementation of the regional autonomy law (RAL) is perceived as 
having a significant impact on the way in which AFTA is implemented in Indonesia. 
Thirdly, many Indonesians also believe that AFTA will become like other ASEAN 
economic co-operation initiatives in the past. For many Indonesians, AFTA is viewed 
mainly as a platform for talks and discussions amongst ASEAN foreign policy 
makers. One reason for this is that ASEAN countries have continued to pursue 
protectionist policies, as a result of their relative resource wealth. Moreover, the 
MajOritY of Indonesian policy-makers are concerned about the competitive nature of 
ASEAN member economies, which makes the objective of regional economic 
integration difficult to achieve. In the immediate future, at least, Indonesia, like the 
nlai0rity of ASEAN economies, will remain dependent on trade with non-ASEAN 
Wuntries. Fourthly, the majority of Indonesians remain convinced that the 
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Irf, plernentation of 
AFTA will only benefit large economic actors. Despite being 
adversely affected by the economic crisis, Indonesian large economic actors have 
been able to re-accumulate sufficient capital and resources to compete in the AFTA 
scheme. Fifthly, however, in comparison to the multilateral economic arrangements 
(i. e. under the auspices of the WTO), there is a widespread conviction amongst 
Indonesians state and non-state actors that AFTA does not pose an immediate threat to 
the national economic development of Indonesia. 
In general, therefore, AFTA has not generated much support because it has 
been perceived as a mechanism that will undermine Indonesia's economic 
development and as a tool to lessen the country's sovereignty. Although it is true that 
the signing of AFTA in 1992 was an indication of a shift from the traditional 
approach of economic nationalism to liberal reform in Southeast Asia (Stubbs 2000c: 
298), it would be inaccurate to suggest that Indonesia lost control over foreign goods 
that came into the country when the scheme was first implemented in 2002. Many 
Indonesians, as mentioned above, are more cautious about multilateral trade 
agreements made at the global level rather than regional level. Indonesian 
govemment officials also affirmed that Indonesia would remain committed to AFTA 
trade liberalisation measures. Even those representing domestic businesses and 
industries, such as the Indonesian Charnbers of Commerce and Industry (KADIN) and 
other smaller business associations, were convinced that the majority of Indonesia's 
domestic industries are ready for AFTA. Moreover, the case study analysis also 
reý'eals that members of the academic community remain convinced that the degree of 
openness amongst ASEAN countries today is still varied. The impact that AFTA may 
have on ASEAN economies are still uncertain. it is difficult to analyse the 
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development of AFTA as it is still in its early stages. Another serious issue to be 
addressed is whether or not ASEAN member governments will actually be able to 
implement full trade liberalisation in the region. 
Apart from the achievement of sustained economic development, ASEAN also 
serves Indonesian nationalism and autonomy in the international arena. Although 
national pride is still important to most Indonesians, they are also influenced by 
consumerism and by external conditions. As a result, the context of Indonesian 
nationalism has changed somewhat, especially as a result of the recent wave of 
democratisation in the country. The majority of Indonesians subscribe increasingly to 
the notion of logical nationalism, rather than romantic nationalism, the emphasis of 
which is on a more outward approach to international affairs and a more pragmatic 
approach to Indonesian foreign policy. As a result, many Indonesians, including the 
majority of Indonesian government officials, representatives of Indonesian business 
associations, members of the academic community, and representatives of Indonesian 
NGOs and CSOs, are no longer inward-looking in their attitude towards regionalism. 
Indeed, the ma ority of Indonesians now feel that Indonesia's participation in ASEAN i 
and its AFTA scheme is important because it will help Indonesla achieve sustained 
economic development and thus ensure domestic stability and unity. Moreover, the 
increasing threat of national disintegration in Indonesia is also thought to be better 
handled with the collective support from other ASEAN member countries. Support 
expressed by some ASEAN member governments, such as Singapore and Thailand, 
assures Indonesia of its neighbours' commitment in supporting Indonesia's temtorial 
integrity. 
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ASEAN is also useful to Indonesia because it can help increase Indonesia's 
bargaining power in the intemational arena and resist the negative forces of 
globalisation. Many Indonesian domestic constituents are aware that they cannot 
resist the negative forces of globalisation alone. Not only is Indonesia now flooded 
with foreign goods, many Indonesian domestic constituents also feel that the 
Indonesian government is fighting a losing battle in its international trade 
negotiations. ASEAN's contributions to Indonesia's international autonomy and 
bargaining power have been clearly demonstrated during the many trade disputes 
between the WTO and other regional groupings, particularly the EU and NAFTA. 
Although ASEAN member countries may have different interests, they have, on the 
whole, raised similar concerns during many multilateral negotiations. Moreover, the 
significance of ASEAN as a bargaining tool has grown since the joining of three new 
member countries, Lao, Cambodia, and Burma, and with the possible expansion of 
ASEAN into ASEAN plus Three (APT). The majority of Indonesian government 
officials, representatives of business associations, and members of the academic 
community are convinced that the expansion of the ASEAN membership and the 
possible creation of APT will increase Indonesia's bargaining power. This, in turn, 
will provide greater power for Indonesia to help it resist the negative forces of 
globalisation. 
The case study analysis has also shed a light on the problem of information 
dissemination, and the way in which the lack of adequate dissemination has resulted 
In limited support for AFTA from Indonesian state and non-state actors. Whilst it is 
clear that the Association and its member governments have generally provided 
limited, highly technical and expensive information to the general public, it is also 
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true that the Indonesian public at any rate has shown a lack of interest about 
Indonesian FEP in ASEAN. This lack of interest was visible even throughout the 
post-crisis period, when the majority of Indonesians were more concerned about the 
escalating domestic problems. The ASEAN Secretariat has always insisted that the 
Association has placed importance on the dissemination process. The problem 
generally occurs at the govenunental level, where ministers tend to be cautious about 
disseminating information to the public. Positive attempts have been made to 
promote the Association's activities to the general public through various workshops 
and seminars, such as the ASEAN People's Assembly and the CEPT Outreach 
Programme. Nonetheless, public attendance at such events has been minimal, 
suggesting that the majority of Indonesians remain passive about ASEAN and its 
activities. 
Therefore, the majority of Indonesian state and non-state actors interviewed 
during the field research identified two major areas in ASEAN that need to be 
improved, including the organisational structure of the Association and the process of 
information dissemination. Firstly, the traditional image of ASEAN as an exclusive 
club for governmental officials, particularly Foreign Ministers, is resented by the 
majority of Indonesians, who also deplore the high levels of bureaucracy that exist 
Ný, ithin the Association. As a result, ASEAN and its member governments are accused 
of having neglected the demands made by smaller domestic non-state actors. New 
approaches to minimise the problem of exclusivity, such as the inclusion of either 
other state ministers or national leaders in the decision-making process, were simply 
rejected by member governments of ASEAN. In any case, such proposals would do 
little to promote a bottom-up approach within the Association. Therefore, new efforts 
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to niinirnise the problem of exclusivity should focus on the incorporation of non-state 
actors in the decision-making process. Secondly, ASEAN must intensify the process 
of disseminating information regarding its activities to the public. Whilst most of the 
Indonesian public are aware of the existence of ASEAN, the Association only 
provides limited, if not highly technical and expensive, information regarding its 
activities to the public. Another worrying aspect is the fact that information has been 
disseminated unevenly amongst different economic actors. For example, information 
on AFTA related matters has only been disseminated to large economic actors. This 
presents a major problem for the majority of Indonesian economic actors, most of 
whom are SMEs. Officials at various governmental institutions have also expressed 
their concern about the uneven nature of ASEAN's information dissemination 
process. Information on ASEAN related matters has so far been monopolised by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and to certain extent, the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry (Depperindag), particularly on issues surrounding the implementation of 
AFTA. 
Therefore, this research has made a number of important points to the ongoing 
debate within NRT analysis and other analyses of the relationship between 
nationalism and regionalism. Firstly, it is important to note that a regional grouping 
should be structured to accommodate the interests of a wider range of domestic 
partic'Pants. To this end, a regional organisation must encourage the involvement of 
non-state actors in many of Its projects or activities. Secondly, although the field 
research findings show some hostility towards an RIS from certain domestic actors, 
this does not suggest that nationalism and regionalism stand in conflict. The hostility 
Prevalent amongst some non-state actors in a country towards an RIS does not so 
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inuch result 
from an inward-looking nationalist attitude or the divergence in the 
interests of regional actors 
(i. e. government officials) and local actors (i. e. the 
business community and NGOs / CSOs), but results rather from a lack of information 
about and the inadequate promotion of regional activities, provided by the state to 
non-state actors. However, it is also important to note that the intensive promotion of 
re0onal activities is no a guarantee that support for an RIS will be generated within 
the public domain. However, the provision of adequate information would at least 
provide the public with a suitable basis upon which to form their opinions. 
8.3. Conclusion 
Regionalism and nationalism are two major concepts that influence 
international relations today. There is little doubt that the current wave of regionalism 
and the continued existence of nationalism imply that a complementary relationship 
has developed between the two. It is, therefore, important to re-emphasise in the 
concluding remarks of this thesis that nationalism and regionalism stand in a 
syrnbiotic relationship to one another. This thesis hopefully provides a significant 
contribution to new understandings of these concepts. More importantly, It is hoped 
that this thesis provides new directions within NRT with which to explain the rise and 
the development of regionalism today. The case study on the relationship between 
Indonesian nationalism and ASEAN regionalism has shed some light on the 
complementary relationship between the two concepts. Throughout its existence, 
ASEAN has experienced both major achievements and setbacks. The regionalism 
agenda has been expanded to cover a wide range of issues, such as politics, security, 
economics and social cooperation. Although the majority of Indonesian domestic 
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state and non-state actors still 
feel quite indifferent about the Association, its 
existence is still considered useful, particularly as a vehicle to promote their country's 
interests at the domestic (i. e. promotion of unity), regional (i. e. promotion and 
expansion of national culture and identity and the fonnation of regional collective 
action against the negative forces of globalisation), and international levels (i. e. 
promotion of the state's autonomy and the elevation of bargaining power). The 
Southeast Asian region is arguably better off with than without ASEAN. 
Despite this, it is inevitable that the future of regionalism in Southeast Asia 
will depend upon ASEAN's ability to promote greater transparency and openness in 
many of its activities. ASEAN has been strongly criticised for, amongst other things, 
its higbly complex organisational and bureaucratic structure, which limits the greater 
participation of a wider range of domestic actors. In recent years, the failure of 
ASEAN to address the economic crisis has also damaged the reputation of the 
Association. As a result, the relevance of ASEAN has been brought into question. 
Whilst the Association is still faced with the challenge of becoming more democratic 
in its activities, the pursuit of further regional economic integration is underway with 
the introduction of AFTA. However, perspectives on this particular scheme are 
varied amongst different domestic actors in each ASEAN country. In Indonesia, for 
example, both state and non-state actors expressed concern that regional trade 
11beralisation would further exacerbate the already acute national economic situation. 
Whilst scepticism prevails, it is, however, inappropriate to suggest that 
ASEAN is no longer relevant. It is hoped that in the immediate future the Association 
introduce significant changes to deal with the aforementioned problems. One 
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Irnportant step that would 
improve understanding of ASEAN and its activities would 
be the improved dissemination of proper information to all layers of society. It is also 
Iniportant to emphasise that the indifferent attitude prevalent amongst Indonesians 
towards ASEAN is not so much an offshoot of nationalistic sentiments, but more a 
result of the lack of adequate infonnation regarding the Association and its activities. 
The Association should, therefore, increase its public relations exercises to promote 
itself to the general public. This will be very important, not only to encourage public 
awareness of ASEAN and its activities, but also to increase Indonesians' knowledge 
and understanding of their immediate neighbours. In the more democratic country 
that Indonesia is today, domestic actors will continue to demand a more open and 
transparent ASEAN. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. 
List of ASEAN Affidiated NGOs, as of May 2001 
No Name of ASEAN Affiliated NGOs Headquarters 
T_ Indonesia 
2 ASEAN Port Authorities Association (APAA) Philippines 
3 ASEAN Bankers Association (ABA) Singapore 
4 ASEAN Paediatric Federation (APF) Singapore 
5 ASEAN Federation of Accountants (AFA) Philippines 
6 ASEAN Council of Japan Alumni Indonesia 
7 ASEAN Law Association (ALA) Singapore and 
Malaysia 
8 ASEAN Confederation of Employers (ACE) Philippines 
9 ASEAN University Sports Council (AUSC) Malaysia 
10 ASEAN Federation of Furniture Manufacturers (AFFMA) Indonesia 
11 ASEAN Association of Radiologist (AAR) Philippines 
12 ASEAN Handicraft Promotion and Development Association (AHHPADA) Thailand 
13 ASEAN Valuers Association (AVA) Malaysia 
14 ASEAN Insurance Council (AIC) Indonesia 
15 ASEAN Football Federation (AFF) Indonesia 
16 ASEAN Federation for Psychiatric Philippines 
17 ASEAN Federation of Electrical Engineering Contractors (AFEEC) Philippines 
18 ASEAN Confederation of Women's Organisation (ACWO) Singapore 
19 ASEAN Orthopaedic Association (AOA) Singapore 
20 ASEAN Neurosurgical Society (ANS) Indonesia 
21 ASEAN Constructors Federation (ACF) Singapore 
22 ASEAN Federation of Mining Association (AFMA) Indonesia 
23 ASEAN Council of Teachers (ACT) Philippines 
24 AASEAN Fisheries Federation (AFF) Indonesia 
25 ASEAN Federation of Forwarders Association (AFFA) Indonesia 
26 ASEAN Non-Governmental Organisation for the Prevention of Drugs and 
Substance Abuse Malaysia 
27 ASEAN Association of Medical Laboratory Technologists (AAMLT) Indonesia 
28 ASEAN Law Student Association (ALSA) Indonesia 
29 ASEAN Vegetable Oil Club (AVOC) Malaysia 
30 ASEAN Business Forum (ABF) Singapore 
31 ASEAN Federation of Land Surveying and Geomatics (ASEAN FLAG) Malaysia 
32 ASEAN Intellectual Property Association (AIPA) Singapore 
33 ASEAN Federation of Heart Foundation (AFHF) Indonesia 34 ASEAN Thalassaemia Society (ATS) Indonesia 
35 ASEAN NGO Coalition on Ageing Thailand 36 ASEAN Oleochemical Manufacturers Malaysia 
37 ASEAN Federation of Flying Club (AFFC) Malaysia 38 ASEAN Forestry Students Association (AFSA) Indonesia 
39 ASEAN Chess Confederation (ACC) Singapore 
40 ASEAN Cosmetic Association (ACA) Singapore 
41 ASEAN Academics of Science, Engineering and Technology (ASEAN 
CASE) Malaysia 
42 Confederation of ASEAN Journalist (CAJ) 43 Committee for ASEAN Youth Co-operation Malaysia 
44 Federation of ASEAN Consulting Engineers (FACE) Malaysia 45 Federation of ASEAN Shippers Council (FASC) 46 Federation of ASEAN Shipowners Association (FASA) Singapore 47 Federation of ASEAN Newspaper Publisher (FANP) 48 Federation of ASEAN Economic Association (FAEA) Indonesia 49 Federation of ASEAN Public Relation Organisations, (FAPRO) Singapore 50 ASEAN CO-ODerative Onzanisation (ACO) Indonesia 
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51 ASEAN Association for Planning and Housing (AAFH) Philippines 
52 ASEAN Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ASEAN CCI) Malaysia 
53 ASEAN Federation of Engineering Organisation 
54 ASEAN Standard Trade Industry 
55 Medical Association of Southeast Asian Nations (MASEAN) Singapore 
56 Music industry Association (MIA) Singapore 
57 Confederation of ASEAN Societies of Anaesthesiologists 
58 Rheumatism Association of ASEAN (RAA) Indonesia 
59 Southeast Asia Association of Seismology and Earthquake Engineering 
(SEASEE) Philippines 
60 Veterans Confederation of ASEAN Countries (VECONAQ Philippines 
61 Southeast Asia Regional Institute for Community and Education (SEARICE) Thailand 
62 ASEAN Tours and Travel Association (ATTA) 
63 ASEAN Motion Picture Producers Association (AMPPA) 
64 ASEAN Council of Museum (ACM) 
65 ASEAN Council of Petroleum Co-operation (ACPQ 
66 ASEAN College of Surgeons (ACS) 
67 ASEAN Cardiologists Federation (ACF) 
68 ASEAN Consumer Protection Agency (ACPA) 
69 ASEAN Federation of Jurists (AFJ) 
70 ASEAN Trade Union Council (ATUC) 
71 ASEAN Federation of Women (AFW) 
72 
, 
ASEAN Banking Council (ABC) 
Source: Nishikawa (1983: 48); ASEAN Secretariat official website (accessed 2002) 
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Appendix 2 
The level of tariff barriers since the collapse of 
bipolarity in late 1980s 
Year 
Simple 
mean tariff 
% (1) 
Standard 
deviation 
tariff rates 
% (2) 
Weighted 
mean 
tariff 
% (3) 
Share of lines 
with 
international 
peaks 
% (4) 
Share of 
lines with 
specific 
tariffs 
%(5) 
EU 1988 3.3 5.6 3.6 3.6 13.8 
1998 3.5 5.0 2.7 2.3 12.6 
Australia 1991 8.0 12.9 7.4 15.5 1.1 
1999 5.7 7.3 3.8 12.2 0.7 
North 
America 
Canada 1989 7.7 7.0 6.5 14.2 15 
U. S. 1989 5.7 6.7 4.1 8.0 13.0 
1999 4.3 11.4 2.8 6.3 8.3 
Mexico 1991 13.2 4.3 11.9 18.9 0.0 
1999 10.1 9.4 14.7 24.5 0.0 
Latin 
America 
Aruentina. 0 
1992 12.2 7.7 12.7 31.0 0.0 
1999 11.0 8.3 10.7 39.5 0.0 
Brazil 1989 42.4 17.2 32.0 92.4 0.2 
1999 13,6 7.8 12.6 54.0 0.0 
Chile 1992 11.0 0.5 11.0 0.0 0.0 
1999 10.0 0.5 9.9 0.0 0.0 
Colombia 1991 5.7 8.2 6.4 1.6 0.0 
1999 11.8 6.2 10.7 22.9 0.0 
East Asia 
China 1992 41.3 30.8 32.6 78.4 0.0 
1998 16.8 11.1 15.7 43.4 0.4 
Taiwan 1989 12.3 9.5 9.9 16.7 0.5 
1999 8.8 9.4 5.2 10.6 2.1 
Japan 1988 5.9 8.0 3.3 8.6 11.5 
1999 4.8 7.3 2.3 7.6 2.6 
Korea, Rep. 1988 18.8 8.1 13.8 72.8 10.2 
1999 8.7 5.9 5.9 4.8 0.8 
S. E. Asia 
Indonesia 1989 21.9 19.7 13ý2 50.5 0.3 
1999 10.9 14.1 6.2 26.9 0.1 
Malaysia 1988 20.6 19.9 13.8 54.0 6.2 
1997 7.1 31.0 4.9 15.9 0.4 
Philippines 1988 28.0 14.2 22.5 77.2 O'l 
1999 10.0 8.8 6.7 24.1 0,0 
Singapore 1989 0.5 2.2 0.5 0.1 1.1 
1995 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 M 
Thailand 1989 38.5 19.6 33.0 72.8 21.9 
1995 21.6 15.4 15.0 57.6 1.8 
Vietnam 1994 12.7 17.8 18.6 32.4 1.0 
1999V 115). 11 117.7 117.3 37.3 - 
0.6 
Note (1) 
7 
Simple mean tanff is the unweighted average of the eikctively appked 
rates for all 
products subject to tariffs. 
(2) Standard deviati on of tariff rat es measures the average disp ersion of tanff ra tes around 
the 
simple mean. 
(3) Weighted mean tariff is the av erage of effect lvely applied r ates weighted 
by the product 
import shares corresponding to each partner country. 
(4) International peaks are tariff rates that exceed 15 percent. 
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(5) Specific tariffs are tariffs that are set on a per unit basis or that combine ad valorem and per unit rates 
Source: World Bank (2001: 336-9) 
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Appendix 3 
The ASEAN Declaration 
(Bangkok Declaration) 
Bangkok, 8 august 1967 
The Presidium Minister for Political Affairs/ Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
Indonesia, the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of 
the Philippines, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Singapore and the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of Thailand: 
MINDFUL of the existence of mutual interests and common problems among 
countries of South-East Asia and convinced of the need to strengthen further the 
existing bonds of regional solidarity and co-operation; 
DESIRING to establish a firm foundation for common action to promote regional 
cooperation in South-East Asia in the spirit of equality and partnership and thereby 
contribute towards peace, progress and prosperity in the region; 
CONSCIOUS that in an increasingly interdependent world, the cherished ideals of 
peace, freedom, social justice and economic well-being are best attained by fostering 
good understanding, good neighbourliness and meaningful cooperation among the 
countries of the region already bound together by ties of history and culture; 
CONSIDERING that the countries of South East Asia share a primary responsibility 
for strengthening the economic and social stability of the region and ensuring their 
peacefull and progressive national development, and that they are determined to 
ensure their stability and security from external interference in any form or 
manifestation in order to preserve their national identities in accordance with the 
ideals and aspirations of their peoples; 
AFFIRMING that all foreign bases are temporary and remain only with the 
expressed concurrence of the countries concerned and are not intended to be used 
directly or indirectly to subvert the national independence and freedom of States in 
the area or prejudice the orderly processes of their national development; 
DO HEREBY DECLARE: 
FIRST, the establishment of an Association for Regional Cooperation among the 
countries of South-East Asia to be known as the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
SECOND, that the aims and purposes of the Association shall be: 
To accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural 
development in the region through joint endeavours in the spirit of equality 
and partnership in order to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and 
peaceful community of Southeast Asian nations; 
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2. To promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice 
and the rule of law in the relationship among countries of the region and 
adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter; 
3. To promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of 
common interest in the economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and 
administrative fields; 
4. To provide assistance toe ach other in the form of training and research 
facilities in the educational, professional, technical and administrative 
spheres; 
5. To collaborate more effectively for the greater utilization of their 
agriculture and industries, the expansion of their trade, including the study 
of the problems of international commodity trade, the improvement of 
their transportation and communications facilities and the raising of the 
living standards of their peoples; 
6. To promote South-East Asian studies; 
7. To maintain close and beneficial cooperation with existing international 
and regional organization with similar aims and purposes, and explore all 
avenues for even closer cooperation among themselves 
THIRD, that to carry out these aims and purposes, the following machinery shall be 
established: 
(a) Annual Meeting of Foreign Ministers, which shall be by rotation and 
referred to as ASEAN Ministerial Meeting. Special Meetings of Foreign 
Ministers may be convened as required. 
(b) A standing committee, under the chairmanship of the Foreign Minister of 
the host country or his representative and having as its members the 
accredited Ambassadors of the other member countries, to carry on the 
work of the Association in between Meetings of Foreign Ministers. 
(c) Ad-Hoc Committees and Permanent Committees of specialists and 
officials on specific subjects. 
(d) A national Secretariat in each member country to carry out the work of the 
Association on behalf of that country and to service the Annual or Specal 
Meetings of Foreign Ministers, the Standing Committee and such other 
committees as may hereafter be established. 
FOURTH, that the Association is open for participation to all States in the South-East Asian Region subscribing to the aforementioned aims, principles and purposes. 
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FIFTH, that the Association represents the collective will of the nations of South- 
East Asia to bind themselves together in friendship and cooperation and, through joint 
efforts and sacrifices, secure 
for their peoples and for posterity the blessings of peace, 
fteedom and prosperity. 
DONE in Bangkok on the Eighth Day of August in the Year One Thousand Nine 
Hundred and Sixty-Seven. 
rem the Republic of In4anesia - 
ADAM AtALIX 
Pewsidkm Hinistro W FaMical 
Ministet teir Feteigob Allaits 
Fog Malaysia -. 
TOW ABDUL RAZAK 
Depaty Prime Ministeo. 
Xin6tet ot Detenc* and 
Minivup, r of, Naltional Developmaint 
Fol Me Repqiblic of tb* Pbt-oippiwes : 
IMARCISO RAMOS 
S*otvtatr of Iroceil" Affaits: 
Fot the Republic at Singapo4 e: 
S. RAJARATIAM 
Hisnister of Tofeign Affaits 
Tat Cho Kihgd&m 611 Th"and - 
TRANATKNOMAN 
Minister of Foreign Aftaits 
SOurce: ASEAN Secretariat official website (accessed 2002) at: 
http: //www. aseansec. oriz/1212. htin 
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Appendix 4 
List of respondents 
Government institutions: 
Departemen Koperasi, Perusahaan Kecil dan Menengah Republik Indonesia 
(DEPKOP-UKM) / 
Anistry of Co-operative, Small and Medium Enterprises (MoC-SMEs) 
production Division 
A H. R. Rasuna Said, Kav. 3-5, Jakarta 12940 
Respondent: Dr. Noer Soetrisna 
16 November 2000 
Departemen Luar Negeri (DEPLU) 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Department of ASEAN Co-operation 
fl. Taman Pejambon No. 6, Fl. 11, Jakarta 
Respondent: anonymous 
13 December 2000 
Badan Koordinasi Penanaman modal (BKPM) 
Investment Co-ordinating Board 
International Promotion Division 
JI. Gatot Subroto No. 44, Jakarta 12190 
Respondent: Darmawan Jayusman 
18 December 2000 
Departemen Perdagangan. dan Industry (DEPPERINDAG) 
Ministry of Trade and Industry 
Sub-Directorate of ASEAN Co-operation 
Respondent: Ketut Suwarko 
J]. Ridwan Rais 5, Jakarta 
19 February 2001 
Central Bank of Indonesia 
International Trade Co-operation Division and Intemational. Economic and Institution 
Studies Division 
A. A H. Tharnrin 2, JakartalOO10 
Respondent: anonymous 
20 February 2001 
Departemen Keuangan (DEPKEU) 
Min'stry of Finance 
International and Regional Economic Co-operation Secretariat General Bureau of Foreign Co-operation JI. Lapangan Banteng Timur No. 2-4, Jakarta 107 10 
Respondents: Dr. Bambang S. Marsoem and Solehudin Masjar 21 February 2001 
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Badan Penyehatan Perbankan Nasional (BPPN) / 
Indonesian Banking Restructuring Agency (IBRA) 
central office 
Agency Planning and Secretariat Division 
Wisina Bank Danamon, 3 Oth floor, J1. Jendral Sudirman, Kav. 45-46, Jakarta 12930 
Respondent: Noegroho D. Soetardjo 
7 March 2001 
Indonesian Banking Restructuring Agency (IBRA), Jakarta Branch 
Gedung Atrium Grd. 1-7, JI. Senen Raya 13 5, Jakarta 10410 
Respondent: Swasti Sawitri 
31 July 2001 
Direktorat Jendral Bea dan Cukai Republik Indonesia 
Custom and Excise Republic Indonesia (DGCE) 
Directorate General 
A A. Yani, Gedung A, Lt. 1, Jakarta 13230, Kotak Pos 108, Jkt 1002 
Respondent: Dr. Permana Agung 
9 August 2001 
Dewan Perimbangan Otonomi Daerah (DPOD) 
Board of Provincial Autonomy 
Directorate General of Central and Local Fiscal Balance 
Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Indonesia 
J1. Dr. Wahidin No. 1, Jkt 10710 
Respondent: Kadjatmiko 
10 August 2001 
Badan Usaha Logistik (BULOG) 
State Logistic Agency 
Secretariat Bulog, JI. Gatoto Subroto No. 49, Jak-Sel 12950, P. O. Box 2346 
Respondents: Widjanarko Puspoyo 
14 August 2001 
Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional (BAPPENAS) 
National Development Planning Board 
Bureau of Balance of Payment and International Relations JI. Taman Suropati No. 2, Jakarta 103 10 
Respondent: anonymous 
20 August 2001 
Govemment of East Java Province, Industry and Trade Office A. Siwalankerto 11/42, Surabaya 60236 
Respondents: Liri L. Ildharn and Drs. Didi Teguh Wiyono 2 September 2001 
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Business associations: 
Asosiasi Pengusaha Indonesia (APINDO) 
Association of Indonesian Entrepreneurs 
il. Cikini I No. 313, Jakarta 10330 
Respondent: Djimanto 
19 October 2000 
Kamar Dagang dan Industri Indonesia (KADIN) / 
Indonesian Chambers of Commerce and Industry 
Sub-Committee of ASEAN 
JI. Bendungan Hilir Raya 60, Jakarta 10210 
Respondent: Iman Taufik 
26 November 2000 
Kaniar Dagang dan Industri Indonesia (KADIN) / 
Indonesian Chambers of Commerce and Industry 
Wisma Bakrie 7 th floor, JI. HR. Rasuna Said Kav. B 1, Jakarta 12910 
Respondent: Aburizal Bakrie 
23 August 2001 
Kerukunan Usahawan Kecil dan Menengah Indonesia (KUKMI) 
Indonesian Society of Small and Medium Scale Entrepreneurs 
Secretariat General, JI. Cikini IV No. 15, Jakarta 10330 
Respondent: Dr. In Mohammad Syargawi 
25 August 2002 
Perkumpulan untuk Peningkatan Usaha Kecil (PUPUK) 
Association for the Advancement of Small Business 
JI. Ketintang Madya, No. I 11, Surabaya 60231 
Respondent: R. Alam, Surya Putra 
3 September 2001 
AcadeWc commuuity: 
Centre for Strategic and Intemational Studies (CSIS) 
fl. Tanah Abang 111, No. 23-27, Jakarta Pusat 
Respondent: Dr. Hadi Soesastro 
6 December 2000 
Habibie Centre 
Ji. Kemang Raya Selatan No. 98, Jakarta Selatan 12560 
Respondent: Dr. Dewi Fortuna Anwar 
24 January 2001 
APEC Centre, University of Indonesia fl. Salemba Raya No. 4, Jakarta 
Respondent: Prof Lepi Tarmidi 
5 March 2001 
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Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 
ji, Tanah Abang 111, No. 23-27, Jakarta Pusat 
Respondent: Dr. C. P. F. Luhulima, 
21 August 2001 
Institute for Development of Economics and Finance (INDEF) 
j]. Wijayakarta 11 No. A-4, Kuningan Barat, Jakarta 12710 
Respondent: Dr. Bustanul Axifin 
7 September 2001 
Pressure groups: 
Urban Poor Consortium (UPC) 
Billy Moon HI No. 7, Jakarta 
Respondent: Wardah Hafidz 
9 October 2000 
Front Nasional Perjuangan Buruh Indonesia (FNPBI) 
Front National for the Indonesian Labour Struggle 
JI. Tebet Timur IIIK, No. 2, Jakarta Selatan 
Respondent: Dita Indah Sari 
13 November 2000 
Liga Mahasiswa Nasional. untuk Demokrasi (LMND) 
National Student League for Democracy 
JI. Danau Towuti Blok G1 /3 1, Bendungan Hilir, Jakarta 
Respondent: Reindhard Sirait 
20 December 2000 
International Financial Development (INFID) 
A Manipang Prapatan XI/23. Jkt 12790 
Respondent: Boni Setiawan. 
18 January 2001 
Federasi Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia (FSPSI) 
Federation of Indonesian Workers Union 
J1. Raya Pasar Minggu KM 17, No. 9, Jakarta 
20 January 2001 
Ikatan Cendikiawan Muslim Indonesia (ICMI) / 
Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals 
J1. Hail Agus Salim No. 117 
Respondent: Adi Sasono 
2 February 2001 
Pesticide Action Network Indonesia (PANI) 
Respondent: Reza Tjahjadi 
S February 2001 (electronic mail) 
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Wahana Lingkungan Hidup (WALHI) 
Friends of the Earth 
il. Tegal Parang Utara No. 14, Jakarta 12790 
Respondent: Longgena Ginting 
4 March 2001 
Kajian Layanan Informasi untuk Kedaulatan Rakyat (KLIK) 
Infonnation and Civic Studies 
yogyakarta 
25 July 2001 (in Hull) 
Korflisi Nasional Hak-Hak Asasi Manusia (KOMNAS-HAM) 
Indonesian National Commission on Human Rights 
JI. Latuharhari No. 4B, Menteng, Jakarta Pusat 
Respondent: Dr. Charles Himawan 
10 August 2001 
Leadership for Environment and Development (LEAD) 
JI. Tebet Raya No. 88, Jakarta 
Respondent: M. S. Kismadi 
25 August 2001 
Yayasan Lembaga Konsumen Indonesia (YLKI) 
Indonesian Consumers Organisation 
JI. Pancoran Barat VII/l, Duren Tiga, Jakarta 12760 
Respondent: Indah Sukmaningsih 
9 September 2001 
Uni Sosial Demokrat (UNISOSDEM) / 
Uni Social Democrat 
JI. Berdikari Kav. 2, Palmerah, Kebayoran Lama, Jakarta 
Respondent: Bambang Warih Kusurna 
25 September 2001 
ASEAN Secretariat and foreign embassies: 
U. S. Embassy 
JI. Merdeka Selatan 4-5, Jakarta 10 110 
Respondent: David C. DiGiovanna 
II October 2000 
Royal Thai Embassy 
74, J]. Imam Bonjol, Jakarta Pusat 103 10 
Respondent: H. E. Mr. Somphand Kokilanon 
17 October 2000 
ASEAN Secretariat 
Bureau of Trade, Industry and Services J1. Sisingamangaraj a, 70A, Jakarta 12110, Indonesia 
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Respondents: anonymous 
7 December 2000 
Gerrnan Embassy 
jj. MH. Thamrin No. 1, Jakarta, 103 10 
Respondent: Alexander Stedtfeld 
30 November 2000 
British Embassy 
il. M. H. Thamrin No. 75, Jakarta Pusat 103 10 
Respondent: anonymous 
25 March 2001 
Brunei Embassy 
Wisma GKBI Lt. 19, Suite 190 1, JI. Jendral Sudirman No. 28, Jakarta 102 10 Respondent: anonymous 
21 August 2001 
330 
Appendix 5 
List of Questionnaires 
A. Government institutions 
What are the main policies and objectives of (the name of the institutions) and 
how those policies and objectives work within the overall government's foreign 
economic policy (FEP)? 
2. What are the overall perceptions of (the name of the institutions) towards ASEAN 
and the regionalisation process in Southeast Asia? 
3. Please describe the extent to which the objectives and policies of (the name of the 
institution) can be used as a tool to accommodate greater co-operation with other 
Southeast Asian countries? 
4. Please describe some of the major achievements and setbacks of (the name of the 
institution) in dealing with ASEAN or each of ASEAN member countries. In the 
view of (the name of the institution), how such achievements or setbacks could be 
exploited further or tackled in the future? 
5. In the perception of (the name of the institution), to what extent does the overall 
Indonesian FEPs influence ASEAN or each of ASEAN member country's FEPs 
and ike-versa? 
6. Please describe the overall perspectives of (the name of the institution) towards 
the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA). 
7. How would (the name of the institution) perceive the overall readiness of 
Indonesia's participation in the AFTA scheme? * 
8. How would (the name of the institution) view the relationship between Indonesian 
nationalism and the development of ASEAN regionalism? Please also comment 
on the extent to which Indonesian nationalism acts as either a stumbling block or a 
stimulant towards greater ASEAN economic co-operation. 
9. The regional autonomy law (RAL) is one of the main policies recently introduced 
by the Indonesian government. In the perception of (the name of the institution), 
how would this law contribute to the future economic development of Indonesia 
and the maintenance of national unity of the country? In relation to AFTA, how 
would this law affect Indonesia's participation in the scheme overall? To what 
extent does the implementation of RAL affect the overall investment climate in 
the country? 
10. How would (the name of the institution) view the development of AFTA and 
other ASEAN regional economic integration schemes in light of the recent 
economic crisis (to what extent does the economic crisis acts as either a stumbling 
block or a stimulant to an enhanced economic co-operation in Southeast Asia)? 
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Please comment on the extent to which the transformation of leadership in 
Indonesia plays an important role towards the process of regionalism in Southeast 
Asia (particularly in the economic field). ** 
12. What is the view of (the name of the institution) towards Indonesia's participation 
in larger regional or multilateral trade agreements beyond ASEAN (i. e. APEC, 
WTO, etc)? 
13. How would (the name of the institution) view the expansion of the recent ASEAN 
economic co-operation to include Japan, South Korea, and China within the 
ASEAN plus Three (APT) framework? 
14. How would (the name of the institution) view the process of the dissemination of 
information regarding ASEAN and AFTA to the general public? 
15. Please identify some of the areas within the ASEAN economic co-operation that 
need to be improved and the way in which such improvements could be made. 
* Additional questions given to provincial government officials (i. e. the Ministry of 
Industry and Trade, Surabaya branch) 
How would (the name of the institution) view the readiness of this province to 
participate in AFTA (please add evidence and examples where available)? 
** Additional question for officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of 
Industry and Trade, and the Investment Co-ordination Board: 
Please identify some of the major achievements and setbacks in the implementation of 
the Indonesian FEP in ASEAN in light of transformation of leadership in the post- 
crisis period 
B. Business community 
Please specify the policy objectives of (the name of the institution) and please 
comment on the success or failure of (the name of the institution) to influence the 
current governmental policies? 
2. Please also specify (the name of the institution)'s interests towards the issue of the 
implementation within the Indonesian FEP in ASEAN or international economic 
issue in general. 
3. To what extent does (the name of the institution) has been (can be) used as a tool 
to accommodate greater economic co-operation between Indonesia and its 
ASEAN partners? Has (the name of the institution) engaged in any forms of co- 
operation with other business community in other Southeast Asian countries? If 
so, please comment on some of the major achievement and setbacks resulting 
from such co-operation. 
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What is the overall perception of (the name of the institution) towards ASEAN 
and the overall regionalisation process in Southeast Asia? 
5. Please describe the view of (the name of the institution) towards ASEAN's 
implementation of AFTA? 
How would (the name of the institution) perceive the overall readiness of 
Indonesia's participation in the AFTA scheme and how would (the name of the 
institution) view the Indonesian business community's reaction towards 
Indonesia's participation in the scheme? * 
7. How does (the name of the institution) view the relationship between Indonesian 
nationalism and the development of ASEAN regionalism? To what extent does 
Indonesian nationalism act as either a stumbling block or a stimulant towards 
greater ASEAN economic co-operation? 
What are the views of (the name of the institution) towards the implementation of 
economic nationalism in the Indonesian trade policy? To what extent does the 
implementation of such a policy create benefits (or not) for the overall members 
of the Indonesian business community? In the view of (the name of the 
institution), how does the ASEAN trade liberalisation programme, under the 
AFTA scheme, serve the interests of the Indonesian business community9 
9. RAL is one of the main policies recently introduced by the Indonesian 
government. In the perception of (the name of the institution), how does this law 
contribute to the future economic development of Indonesia? In relation to 
AFTA, how does this law affect the Indonesia's overall participation in the 
scheme? To what extent does the implementation of RAL affect the overall 
investment climate in Indonesia? 
10. How would (the name of the institution) view the development of AFTA and 
other ASEAN regional economic integration schemes in light of the recent 
economic crisis (to what extent does the economic crisis acts as either a stumbling 
block or a stimulant to an enhanced economic co-operation in Southeast Asia)? 
In the perception of (the name of the institution), to what extent do the recent 
transformations in Indonesian top leadership bring about changes to the way in 
which the Indonesian government implements its FEP in ASEAN and AFTA? 
12. What is the view of (the name of the institution) towards Indonesia's participation 
in larger regional or multilateral trade arrangements beyond ASEAN (i. e. APEC, 
WTO, etc)? 
13. What is (are) the view(s) of (the name of the institution) towards the recent 
expansion of ASEAN economic co-operation to include Japan, South Korea, and 
China within the APT framework? 
14. Please comment on the Indonesian government and ASEAN Secretariat's efforts 
in implementing the dissemination process of information concerning 
i 
ASEAN 
and AFTA? How often does (the name of the institution) make an enquiry to the 
333 
Indonesian governmental institutions and the ASEAN Secretariat to obtain 
information regarding AFTA and how useful was the infori-nation provided? 
please identify important information within AFTA that should be provided to 
members of the Indonesian business community. 
5. Please identify some of the areas in the ASEAN economic co-operation that need 
to be improved (and the way in which such improvement could be made) and 
could bring additional benefit to the members of the Indonesian business 
community. 
c Alternative question given to the business association located in the provincial areas 
)utside Jakarta (i. e. the Association for the Advancement of Small Business - 
)UPUK, in Surabaya, East Java). 
iow would (the name of the institution) view the readiness of East Java to participate 
n AFTA (please add evidence and examples where available)? 
E. The academic community* 
1. Please specify the major objectives and policies of (the name of the institution) 
and how does (the name of the institution) influence the FEP of the current 
Indonesian government? 
2. Please comment on the extent to which (the name of the institution) has been used 
as a tool to accommodate greater economic co-operation between Indonesia and 
its ASEAN partners? Has (the name of the institution) engaged in any forrns of 
co-operation with other similar institutions in other Southeast Asian countries? If 
so, please comment on some of the major achievements and setbacks resulting 
from such co-operations. 
3. What is your perception towards ASEAN and the process of regionalisation in 
Southeast Asia? 
4. What is (are) your view(s) concerning ASEAN's implementation of the AFTA 
scheme? 
5. How would you view Indonesia's readiness to participate in the AFTA scheme 
and how would you perceive the Indonesian public's reaction towards Indonesia's 
participation in the scheme? 
6. What is your view concerning the relationship between nationalism and 
regionalism? To what extent does nationalism act as a stumbling block or a 
stimulant towards the enhancement of ASEAN co-operation? 
7. In relation to the trade liberalisation process in Southeast Asia, how would you 
view the implementation of the Indonesian trade policy or FEP In general today, 
and the extent to which these policies serve the overall national interests of 
Indonesia? 
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What is (are) your view(s) towards the implementation of economic nationalism 
in the Indonesian trade policy today? To what extent is nationalism still prevalent 
in the implementation of the overall Indonesian FEP today? In your view, how is 
the implementation of a nationalist economic policy beneficial (or not) to the 
overall development of Indonesia? 
9. RAL is one of the main policies recently introduced by the Indonesian 
government. In your perception, how would RAL contribute to the future 
economic development and the maintenance of national unity in Indonesia? In 
relation to AFTA, how would this law affect the Indonesia's overall participation 
in the scheme? To what extent does the implementation of RAL will affect the 
overall investment climate in Indonesia? 
10. How would you view the development of AFTA and other ASEAN regional 
economic integration schemes in light of the recent economic crisis (to what 
extent does the economic crisis acts as either a stumbling block or a stimulant to 
an enhanced economic co-operation in Southeast Asia)? To what extent does the 
economic crisis strengthen or damage the relationship amongst ASEAN member 
countries? 
11. In your perception, how does the recent transformation of leadership bring about 
changes to the way in which Indonesia implements its FEP in ASEAN and 
AFTA? 
12. What is your view towards Indonesia's participation in larger regional or 
multilateral trade arrangements beyond ASEAN (i. e. APEC, WTO, etc. )? 
13. What is (are) your view(s) towards the recent expansion of the ASEAN economic 
co-operation to include Japan, China, and South Korea within the APT 
framework? 
14. What is (are) your perception(s) towards the issue of the dissemination process of 
information concerning the development of ASEAN and AFTA to the general 
public? As a member of the academic community, how often do you make 
enquiries to the Indonesian governmental institutions and ASEAN Secretariat to 
obtain information regarding ASEAN and AFTA? How would you rate the 
responses made by these institutions towards such an enquiry (i. e. poor, good, 
very good, etc) and how useful was the information provided? 
15. Could you please identify some of the areas within the ASEAN economic co- 
operation that need to be improved and the way in which such improvements 
could be made? 
* Note that the views of the each individual interviewed from the academic 
community are not necessarily the representation of the views of the institutions in 
which they work for. It is common to find that two scholars working within the same 
institution would have different points of view regarding the subject of the interview. 
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Therefore, starting from the question number three, all questions are specifically 
designed to gain the personal view of each interviewee. 
D. Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) / Civil Society Organisations 
(CSOS) 
Please specify the major objectives of (the name of the organisation) and (the 
name of the organisation)'s interests towards the issue of international and 
regional political-economy. 
2. To what extent does (the name of the organisation) influence the current 
implementation of the Indonesian government's FEP? 
3. Please comment on the activities of (the name of the organisation) within the 
regional level. Has (the name of the organisation) engaged in any forms of co- 
operation with similar organisations in other Southeast Asian countries? If so, 
please comment on some of the major achievements and setbacks resulting from 
such co-operations? 
4. What are the perceptions of (the name of the organisation) towards ASEAN and 
the process of regionalisation in Southeast Asia? 
5. What are the perceptions of (the name of the organisation) towards ASEAN's 
implementation of the AFTA scheme? 
6. How would (the name of the organisation) view Indonesia's readiness to 
participate in the AFTA scheme and the Indonesian public's reaction towards 
Indonesia's participation in the scheme? 
7. What is the perception of (the name of the organisation) towards the relationship 
between the Indonesian nationalism and ASEAN regionalism today? To what 
extent does nationalism acts as a stumbling block or a stimulant towards the 
enhancement of ASEAN co-operation? 
8. In relation to the trade liberalisation process in Southeast Asia, how would (the 
name of the organisation) view the implementation of Indonesian trade policy or 
FEP in general today and the extent to which these policies serve the overall 
national interests of the Indonesians? 
9. What is (are) the perception(s) of (the name of the organisation) towards the 
implementation of economic nationalism in the Indonesian trade policy today? To 
what extent is nationalism still prevalent in the implementation of the overall 
Indonesian FEP today? in your view, how does the implementation of a 
nationalist economic policy beneficial (or not) to the overall development of 
Indonesia? 
10. RAL is one of the main policies recently introduced by the Indonesian 
government. In the perception of (the name of the organisation), how does RAL 
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contribute to the economic development and the maintenance of national unity of 
Indonesia? In relation to AFTA, how does the introduction of RAL affect the 
overall Indonesia's participation in the scheme? To what extent does the 
implementation of RAL affect the overall investment climate in Indonesia? 
How would (the name of the organisation) perceive the development of AFTA 
and other ASEAN regional economic integration schemes in light of the recent 
economic crisis (to what extent does the economic crisis acts as either a stumbling 
block or a stimulant to an enhanced economic co-operation in Southeast Asia)? 
12. Please comment on the issue of transformation of the current leadership in 
Indonesia and its impact towards the overall implementation of Indonesian FEP in 
ASEAN and AFTA. 
13. What is the view of (the name of the organisation) towards Indonesia's 
participation in larger regional or multilateral trade arrangements beyond ASEAN 
(i. e. APEC, WTO, etc)? 
14. What is the perception of (the name of the organisation) towards the recent 
expansion of the ASEAN economic co-operation to include Japan, China, and 
South Korea within the APT framework? 
15. What is (the name of the organisation)'s view towards the issue of the 
dissemination process of information concerning the development of ASEAN and 
AFTA to various Indonesian NGOs and CSOs? How often does (the name of the 
organisation) make enquiries to either the Indonesian governmental institutions or 
ASEAN Secretariat to obtain information regarding ASEAN and AFTA? How 
would (the name of the organisation) rate the response made by these institutions 
(i. e. poor, good, very good, etc) and how useful was the information provided? 
16. Please identify some of the areas in the ASEAN economic co-operation that need 
to be improved and the way in which such improvements could be made. 
E. ASEAN Secretariat and foreign embassies in Jakarta 
ASEAN Secretariat: 
Please indicate the major policy objectives of the Secretariat and the ways in 
which the Secretariat implements these policies. 
2. Please specify the way in which the Secretariat works internally and how the 
Secretariat works with the bureaucracy from each of ASEAN member 
govemment. 
Foreign embassies: 
Please indicate the recent economic relations between (the name of the country) 
and Indonesia. 
337 
2. Please specify some of the major achievements and setbacks in the relationship 
between (the name of the country) and Indonesia 
ASEAN Secretariat and foreign embassies: 
3. What are the perceptions of the (Secretariat or foreign embassies) towards 
ASEAN and the regionalisation process in Southeast Asia? 
4. Please indicate some of the major achievements and setbacks of (the Secretariat or 
foreign embassies) when dealing with (other) Southeast Asian countries. How 
could these achievements or setbacks be exploited further or be tackled in the 
future? 
5. How would the (Secretariat or foreign embassies) view the Indonesian 
government's attempts to exert its influence over ASEAN and its member 
countries' FEP? 
6. Please describe the overall perspectives of the (Secretariat or foreign embassies) 
towards the implementation of AFTA. 
7. How would the (Secretariat or foreign embassies) perceive the overall readiness of 
Indonesia's participation into the AFTA scheme? 
8. How does the (Secretariat or foreign embassies) perceive the relationship between 
Indonesian nationalism and the development of ASEAN regionalism? To what 
extent does Indonesian nationalism act as either a stumbling block or a stimulant 
towards greater ASEAN economic co-operation? In the observation of the 
(Secretariat or foreign embassies), and in relevance to ASEAN regionalism, is 
there any evidence to indicate the emergence of nationalist sentiment within 
Indonesia? 
9. RAL is one of the main policies which has been recently introduced by the 
Indonesian government. In the perception of the (Secretariat or foreign 
embassies), how could this law contribute to the future of economic development 
of Indonesia and the maintenance of national unity in the country? To what extent 
does the implementation of RAL bring about a better (or worse) investment 
climate in Indonesia and how it would effect the overall implementation of 
AFTA? 
10. How does (the Secretariat or foreign embassies) view the development of AFTA 
and other ASEAN regional economic integration schemes in the light of the recent 
economic crisis (to what extent does the economic crisis acts as either a stumbling 
block or a stimulant to an enhanced economic co-operation in Southeast Asia)? 
To what extent does the economic crisis strengthen or damage the relationship 
between Southeast Asian countries? 
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12. How does (the Secretariat or foreign embassies) perceive the current 
transformation of leadership in Indonesia and its impact towards the Indonesian 
government's implementation of FEP in ASEAN and AFTA? 
13. What is the view of (the Secretariat or foreign embassies) towards Indonesia's 
participation in larger regional or multilateral trade agreements beyond ASEAN? 
14. What is the perception held within (the Secretariat or foreign embassies) 
concerning the recent expansion of ASEAN economic co-operation to include 
Japan, China, and South Korea within the APT framework? 
ASEAN Secretariat: 
15. How would the Secretariat view the dissemination process of information 
generated to the general public concerning ASEAN's activities, particularly 
AFTA? How would the Secretariat react towards criticisms posed by the majority 
of Indonesian domestic constituents regarding the difficulty of gaining access to 
information from the ASEAN Secretariat? 
Foreign embassies: 
16. How would your (foreign embassies) comment on the dissemination process of 
information provided to the general public and foreign embassies concerning 
ASEAN and AFTA? How often does your (foreign embassies) make enquiries to 
either the ASEAN Secretariat or Indonesian government for the information 
concerning ASEAN and AFTA? How would your (foreign embassies) rate the 
response by these institutions (i. e. poor, good, very good, etc) and how useful was 
the information provided? 
ASEAN Secretariat and foreign embassies 
17. Please identify some of the areas within the ASEAN economic co-operation that 
need to be improved and the way in which such improvements could be made? 
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Appendix 6 
ASEAN-5 major trading partners (2001)* 
Indonesia's Major Trading Partners 
Exports Imports 
Japan 13,530 Japan 7,046 
U. S. A 9,916 Singapore 3,773 
Singapore 7,081 South Korea 3,608 
South Korea 4,068 China 3,120 
China 3,535 U. S. A 2,750 
Taiwan 2,294 Australia 1,830 
Malaysia 2,038 Malaysia 1,719 
Germany 1,948 Saudi Arabia 1,550 
U. K. 1,560 Thailand 1,502 
Hong Kong 1,356 Germany 1,461 
Malaysia's Major Trading Partners 
Exports Imports 
U. S. A 17,816 Japan 14,211 
Singapore 14,913 U. S. A 11,839 
Japan 11,770 Singapore 9,293 
HonLy Kona 4,063 Taiwan 4,193 
Netherlands 4,060 China 3,804 
China 3,821 South Korea 2,958 
Thailand 3,360 China 2,139 
Taiwan 3,263 Germany 2,743 
South Korea 2,963 Indonesia 2,241 
U. K. 2,310 Hong Kong 1,892 
Philippines' Major Trading Partners 
Exports Imports 
U. S. A 8,994 Japan 6,098 
Japan 5,054 U. S. A 4,993 
Netherlands 2,976 South Korea 1,950 
Singapore 2,308 Singapore 1,793 
Taiwan 2,127 Taiwan 1,607 
Hong Kong 1,580 Hong Kong 1,259 
Thailand 1,358 China 953 
Germany 1,323 Thailand 897 
Malaysia 1,112 Saudi Arabia 887 
Korea 1,044 Indonesia 760 
Singapore's Major Trading Partners 
Exports Imports 
Malaysia 21,122 Malaysia 20,094 
U. S. A 18,755 U. S. A. 19,159 
Hong Kong 10,820 Japan 16,091 
Japan 9,341 China 7,195 
Taiwan 6,264 Thailand 5,159 
China 5,329 Taiwan 4,932 
Thailand 5,304 Saudi Arabia 4,229 
South Korea 4,688 Germany 3,835 
Germany 4,297 South Korea 3,823 
Netherlands 4,035 Hong Kong 2,765 
Thailand's Major Trading Partners 
Exports Imports 
U. S. A 13,246 Japan 13,881 
Japan 9,964 U. S. A. 7,198 
Singapore 5,287 China 3,711 
Hong Kong 3,298 Malaysia 3,078 
China 2,863 Singapore 2,854 
Malaysia 2,722 Taiwan 2,599 
U. K. 2.328 Germanv 2,562 
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Netherlands 2,028 South Korea 2,121 
Germany 1,568 United Arab Emirates 1,529 
1 
Belgium 
__ 
1,417 
- 
&, Australia 1,310 
ý-ote *Millions of US$ 
source: IMF (2002) 
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Appendix 7 
U. ý). ancl Japan major trading partners (2001)* 
u., ý. ivi aj or i racung Partners 
Exports Imports 
Canada 405,760 Canada 220,138 
Japan 57,639 Japan 129,708 
U. K. 40,798 China 109,392 
Germany 30,114 Germany 60,492 
South Korea 22,197 U. K. 42,367 
France 20,125 South Korea 36,491 
Netherlands 19,525 Taiwan 34,779 
China 19,235 France 30,984 
Taiwan 18,152 Italy 24,954 
Singapore 17,692 Malaysia 23,072 
Japan's Maj or Trading Partners 
Exports Imports 
U. S. A 122,701 U. S. A. 63,713 
China 30,948 China 57,780 
South Korea 25,292 South Korea 17,221 
Taiwan 24,256 Indonesia 14,883 
Hong Kong 23,252 Australia 14,385 
Germany 16,562 Taiwan 14,180 
Singapore 14,713 United Arab Emirates 12,850 
U. K. 12,146 Malaysia 12,824 
Thailand 11,837 Thailand 10,353 
Netherlands 11,489 Saudi Arabia 12,316 
Note: *Million US$ 
Source: IMF (2002) 
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